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Foreword
A
lready a key component of sustainable development policies, 
the alleviation of inequalities within and between countries 
also stands as a policy goal, one with high economic, social 
and environmental stakes.
We have dedicated this 2013 edition of A Planet for Life 
to inequality reduction, in light of significant recent works 
that reframe debate on sustainable development. Such works 
suggest that equity effectively supports long-term economic 
growth and increases resilience within economies1. Scholars 
have recently demonstrated a strong empirical correlation 
between an increase in inequality and a decrease in biodiversity2. In addition, others 
have argued that greater inequality has toxic effects on society, lowering life expec-
tancy, undermining trust in government and eroding social cohesion3.  
More importantly, since the 2008 global economic crisis, inequalities have regained 
centre stage as major public and policy concerns. Since 2008, many events have 
1. Bourguignon F., 2012, La mondialisation de l’inégalité, Seuil. Stiglitz, J., The price of inequalities: How Today’s 
Divided Society Endangers our Future. .
2. Mikkelson G. M., et al., 2007, Economic Inequality Predicts Biodiversity Loss. Public Library of Science (PLoS) 
ONE 2.e444.
3. Wilkinson R.G. and Pickett, K.E., 2009, The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better. 
Penguin, New York, NY.
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highlighted the unequal excesses arising from previous economic policies and 
their inattention to equality. These events include social movements and electoral 
campaigns, along with outrage at outsized compensation for the finance sector – 
the chief culprits of the crisis – and protests against governmental austerity policies. 
Most development professionals have seized upon these excesses, fueling debate 
through published reports and their own expanded views of sectoral and topical 
themes: society, the economy and the environment.
This volume, Reducing Inequalities: A Sustainable Development Challenge, repre-
sents a unique international initiative: it collects the works of many experts, 
researchers and development professionals who do not usually interact, bringing 
them together for this year’s A Planet for Life, a series focused on sustainable devel-
opment issues. The authors have grounded their work on conceptual and strategic 
thinking, and – most importantly – empirical experiments, conducted on five conti-
nents and touching on multiple realities. The authors draw on this fieldwork to 
analyse and evaluate inequalities and the policy actions that aim to reduce them. 
This unprecedented collection proposes a solid empirical approach, rather than an 
ideological one, to inform future debate.
We must all realize that inequality reduction does not occur by decree; neither does 
it automatically arise through economic growth, nor through policies that equalize 
incomes downward via blind taxing and spending. Inequality reduction involves a 
collaborative effort that must motivate all concerned parties, one that constitutes a 
genuine political and social innovation, and one that often runs counter to prevailing 
political and economic forces. 
The case studies collected in this volume demonstrate the complexity of the new 
systems required to accommodate each country’s specific economic, political and 
cultural realities. These systems combine technical, financial, legal, fiscal and organ-
izational elements with a great deal of applied expertise, and must be connected 
within a clear, well-understood, growth- and job-generating development strategy. 
Their durability depends on their ability to inspire collaboration among stakeholders 
who frequently hold antagonistic interests, values and rationales.
In the international realm, inclusive economic growth, improved well-being and 
conservation of public goods – especially environmental ones – require that all 
countries reduce inequalities and promote common rules. Such efforts depend on 
the establishment of rules that are fair and applicable to all
The publication of this 2013 edition of A Planet for Life coincides with the accelera-
tion of “post-2015” negotiations and the design of Sustainable Development Goals, 
agreed during the Rio+20 Summit in 2012. Among those goals, inequality reduction 
deserves to take centre stage. This volume is an important contribution for enhancing 
a shared understanding of inequalities. Its insights will provide valuable guidance 
for AFD, IDDRI and TERI in their relationships with partners. We hope this volume 
will also receive recognition during current and future international negotiations 
and that it will bolster collective action to alleviate inequality wherever it arises. n
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What is the state of inequalities worldwide?
I
s the world increasingly unequal? Are the rich getting richer and the poor 
poorer? Inequalities mobilize citizens more today than they did twenty years 
ago, fuelling protests by activist groups such as Occupy, the 99%, or the 
Indignant, to cite just a few. Such critics oppose and rebel against an unfair 
distribution of globalization’s costs and benefits – especially as the lion’s 
share of the latter goes first and foremost to the richest. 
To truly understand how inequalities have evolved, we must first distin-
guish between gaps in living standards among countries and those within a 
country. Both inequality types have seen great reversals that mark a historic 
change for humanity (Pedro Ramos Pinto, Chapter 1). The first is the 
reversal of a secular trend that fostered ever-larger regional income gaps, which 
had reached extremely high levels at the end of the twentieth century. The new 
geography of growth has displaced the world’s economic centre of gravity from the 
West to the East, ending what the head of the World Bank’s research department, 
Branko Milanovic, calls the “great divergence”1. The spectacular growth of emerging 
countries has reduced, on average, income inequality between countries. In addition, 
a significant reduction in absolute poverty has accompanied this growth. Twenty 
years ago, people lived twenty times better in Western Europe than in China; that 
1. Milanovic, B., 2009, “Global inequality and the global inequality extraction ratio: the story of the past two 
centuries.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, no. 5061.
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gap has been halved. During the same period, more than 500 million people have 
escaped poverty. These trends fuel a guarded optimism, especially about Africa; 
many observers view the emergence of a middle class in Africa as a lever for inclu-
sive and democratic development2.  
At the same time, a second reversal saw a major breakdown in developed countries, 
with inequalities increasing within many countries. In Europe and North America, a 
very long period of contraction in income inequality certainly helped maintain the 
illusion that societies had automatically moved toward reduced inequality. However, 
Europe has entered a protracted phase in which inequalities have increased because 
of slack economic growth; this greatly favours inherited capital, raising the spectre 
of a resurgence of a rentier society some thought had vanished (Piketty, Chapter 
2). This problem has arisen in developed countries as diverse as France, the United 
Kingdom, Japan and Germany. An implacable arithmetic tallies the increases in 
income inequality as the rate of return on capital exceeds the pace of economic 
growth, threatening all European countries, even the most egalitarian ones, such 
as Sweden. In the United States, income inequality has reached heights not seen 
in a century. 
Does globalization drive the inexorable rise of inequalities worldwide? A histor-
ical comparison of inter-country and intra-country inequalities shows a far more 
complex relationship between inequalities and globalization, one at odds with the 
overly-simplistic view of a world that is increasingly unequal. The entrance of nearly 
one billion unskilled Chinese and Indian workers into the global labour market has 
certainly led to changes in pay scales and the delocalization of production chains to 
Asia. In addition, technological advances, growth of corporations, and the structural 
changes in value-chains have principally benefited capital, not labour, increasing 
and concentrating profits. That said, over the last ten years globalization has also 
helped reduce inequality levels at the international level, driving the convergence 
of countries’ average income (Bourguignon, Chapter 4). This convergence remains 
fragile and unequal, particularly among the least-developed countries.
Inequality and unsustainable development trajectories
Inequalities have never achieved a central place in development cooperation strate-
gies, despite pressure from some countries, particularly France (Tomasi, Radar 4). 
Poverty alleviation and human development have taken priority since the turn of 
the century. Can inequalities take centre stage in the development agenda today? 
And why consider inequalities a collective-action problem whose solution requires 
cooperation within and between countries?
First of all, despite the reduction in national income gaps worldwide – particu-
larly between emerging and developed countries – large gaps remain; growth rates 
will not easily erase these gaps for several decades. Taken globally, the measurable 
2. See, for example, a 2009 report published by the African Development Bank: The Middle of the Pyramid: Dynamics 
of the Middle Class in Africa. Tunis: AfDB.
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decrease in inequalities between countries, and their increase within countries, 
stems from China’s population share and the high concentration of wealth among 
its rich (Pinto, Chapter 1). Much of humanity remains trapped in poverty. Emerging 
countries have become more unequal over time, despite their diversity in economic 
size, population, per-capita income and growth rate. Brazil and Indonesia have 
escaped this trend, but their levels of inequality nevertheless remain very high, 
as do those in China (Cook and Dong, Radar 11), in India (Bouver, Radar 12) 
and South Africa (Giordano, Radar 10). Countering the oft-expressed enthu-
siasm about the African middle class, Pierre Jacquemot’s meta-analysis on studies 
on sub-Saharan Africa (Radar 9) notes that social inequalities generally deepen 
despite the emergence of middle classes; traditional social ties disintegrate without 
public action to reshape or “modernize” them.  
Second, a growing number of economists and institutions also see a positive link 
between reducing inequalities and increasing the capacity for sustained and stable 
long-term growth. Equality may well be an important ingredient in promoting and 
sustaining growth, particularly over the medium and long term, making economies 
more resilient (Berg, Ostry, Radar 4bis). By contrast, the growth of inequalities 
contributes to economic crises; two economists from the International Monetary 
Fund, Andrew Berg and Jonathan Ostry (Radar 4bis) highlight the role that American 
inequalities played in igniting the global financial crisis five years ago3. We now see 
social cohesion emerging as a critical objective for governments, as expressed in 
the 2012 OECD World Development Perspective: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World 
report. In and of themselves, improvements to living standards, health and educa-
tion do not necessarily translate into greater satisfaction among the populace. The 
2010 anti-government protests in Thailand and the 2011 overthrow of Ben Ali in 
Tunisia demanded more fairness, beyond more just income distributions. Inequali-
ties incorporate far more complex mechanisms than simple income distribution: far 
upstream from income inequality, we find unequal access to productive resources, 
education, credit, justice, employment and/or government decisions. These various 
forms of inequality play a critical role, combining and reinforcing each other, segre-
gating social groups and regions.
Inequalities and development: a changing paradigm
In Chapter 4, François Bourguignon, former World Bank chief economist and a major 
scholar of the relationship between growth and equality, describes how in academic 
circles from the 1950s to present, debates about inequality, growth and poverty and 
their interconnections have shaped national policies and development organiza-
tion strategies. His history of economic ideas reveals that the growth paradigm has 
changed over the past twenty years, with a progressively greater focus on a key issue 
3.  In recent decades, the growth of inequalities in the United States resembles that of the 1920s, marked then as 
now by a boom in the financial sector, heavy borrowing by the poor and relatively insolvent, and the devastating 
financial crisis that followed.
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for sustainable growth: how can the most disadvantaged accumulate productive 
assets. The World Bank’s 2006 World Development Report proved a crucial turning 
point; it established inequality’s impact on growth as development’s central problem, 
thus bridging the divide between the academic sphere and the operational world 
of development.   
This report signalled the acceptance of a multidimensional approach to inequali-
ties, based in part on Amartya Sen’s concept of “capacity”4. The report draws on the 
major breakthroughs made by scholars in the 1990s who empirically demonstrated 
that high levels of inequality interfere with the allocation of investment capital; 
only entrepreneurs holding collateral or investible cash can complete projects using 
loans, even if their projects perform at a suboptimal level. Meanwhile, more poten-
tially profitable entrepreneurs and investment projects are sidelined (Bourguignon, 
Chapter 4). 
Since the middle of the 2000s – in the wake of these studies and the 2006 World 
Bank report – we have seen a certain proliferation of econometric analyses exploring 
the impact of inequalities on other aspects of development, particularly environ-
mental conservation and human health. In 2007, Gregory Mikkelson (Chapter 5) 
demonstrated a strong positive empirical relationship between increased inequality 
and decreasing biodiversity: his key findings are presented in this volume. In 2009, 
Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett published their groundbreaking book, The Sprit 
Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better, shedding light on corre-
lations between equality and health; Sridhar Venkatapuram discusses that book’s 
conclusions (Chapter 6). In all these ways, inequalities impact on the three pillars 
of sustainable development: economic, social and environmental.
The recognition of a positive relationship between sustainable development and 
inequality reduction has imbued public and development policies. Serge Tomasi 
(Radar 4) recalls how a multidimensional view of inequalities and poverty gradually 
gained a foothold in international organizations, as seen through the refinements 
of their programmes, measurements and indicators. Vincent Bonnecase (Chapter 
3) and Benoît Martin (Radar 3) analyse the history of this current of thought.
François Bourguignon (Chapter 4) also finds that governments have changed 
their attitude toward inequality. Tellingly, for example, the Chinese government 
currently recognizes that their large inequality problem threatens the viability of 
their growth model: Chinese households’ excessive savings rate may be due, in part, 
to the uncertain and limited nature of health insurance and pension coverage. Previ-
ously, a country’s growth was measured by its GDP growth rate; today, government 
offices and international organizations analyse GDP growth along with the pattern 
of income growth distribution. Many chapters and varied case studies in the book 
illustrate how they strive to ensure more equitable access to productive resources, 
health care, education, credit, justice, natural resources and public decisions.
4. Sen, A., 1985, Commodities and Capabilities. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Inequality reduction, a collaborative and innovative 
process
Authors in this volume share their analyses of national experiments, such as the 
collective management of natural resources in Namibia (Radar 5), health insurance 
systems in Cambodia (Radar 6), social policies in Brazil (Chapter 10), inequality 
reduction policies in municipalities in low- and medium-income countries (Chapter 
7), carbon tax implementations in Sweden (Radar 8) and France (Chapter 8), and 
so-called bottom-of-the-pyramid initiatives in private companies (Chapter 11).
It is no simple matter to implement effective inequality policies. Chapter 10 illus-
trates this particularly well in its analysis of social policy systems in Brazil, one of the 
only emerging countries to achieve inequality reductions in the last ten years: the 
country serves as a real-life “laboratory.” The authors Barbosa and Oliveira, note that 
multiple technical, institutional, organizational, financial, fiscal and legal elements 
must coexist to stimulate a virtuous circle of inequality reduction: public banks, univer-
sity networks and statistical agencies, along with well-formed labour laws and efficient 
oversight systems. This virtuous circle also needs clear, socially accepted rules that will 
foster individual responsibility; equally, it requires capable human resource managers 
who can train competent civil servants.  All the stakeholders – policymakers, develop-
ment professionals, academics and other actors like local communities and the private 
sector – must work together synergistically and horizontally to address the problem 
of inequality. The natural resource management programmes in Namibia (Lapeyre, 
Corbier-Barthaux, Radar 5) and health care services in Cambodia (Radar 6) are 
other good examples of collaboration between stakeholders.
These networks and systems do not get established overnight or in a linear fashion. 
Trial and error is inevitable; initiatives do not necessarily alleviate inequality. Reading 
through these chapters, we see that many emerging and developing economies strive 
to strengthen their institutional capacities through decentralization and stronger 
local tax collection and disbursement. However, these efforts frequently disappoint. 
South Africa provides a good example (Giordano, Radar 11). Typically, the central 
government may give impetus to socially inclusive programmes, but corruption and 
conflicts of interest undermine the programmes and service quality, as could local 
governments stymied by a lack of capacity and resources.
Inequality reduction involves real social and policy innovation that often collides 
with vested interests and with political and economic forces. In Cambodia (Radar 
6), organizations setting up a universal health insurance system are required to work 
alongside a for-profit private sector over which they have no control. The challenge 
for Cambodia and other governments lies in making suitable arrangements with 
the private sector and moving unregulated, informal activities into the formal and 
regulated market. The system’s sustainability (in the sense of duration) will depend 
on maintaining a coalition of actors even though they may have different (sometimes 
contradictory) interests and values.  
Some of the national experiments described in the book display a naive vision of 
economic growth or of fiscal policies leading themselves to a reduction of inequalities. 
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Brazilian authors Barbosa and Oliveira argue that, on the contrary, a social security 
system must be articulated within a clear, well-understood, growth- and job-gener-
ating development strategy (Chapter 10). Fiscal policy may then finance the system, 
but only if it does not call for “equalizing down” incomes to achieve absolute equality. 
Even if it still seems possible, on paper, to redistribute wealth and prevent inequali-
ties from worsening, we must recognize that redistribution comes with economic 
costs and political constraints that cannot be ignored (Bourguignon 2012). The 
state must explain its goals and promote the public good; this means expressing a 
vision and involving stakeholders. We saw this process work in Sweden; everyone 
understood that the carbon tax would go together with a wealth-and-job-generating 
industrial policy, and adopted it (Sterner, Focus 7). The episode of the Sarkozy 
carbon tax in France is a perfect counter-example of the success of the Swedish tax 
(Hourcade, Chapter 8).
Charismatic political leaders, deeply committed to equality and social justice, work 
at various levels to reduce inequality: Nelson Mandela (Giordano, Radar 10), Lula 
da Silva (Chapter 10), some leaders of informal urban settlements (Satterthwaite, 
Chapter 7), and social activist groups, like Ekta Parishad in India (Bouver, Radar 12) 
are inspiring examples. These steel-willed social entrepreneurs orchestrate collec-
tive action through a legitimacy earned by changing citizens’ daily lives and their 
relationship to the political, economic, social and even natural environment.
Measurement promotes collaboration
“Comparing nobles to commoners foreshadows the night of 4 August;5 comparing 
Blacks to Whites calls for the abolition of slavery; comparing men to women calls 
for truly universal suffrage, one that includes women,” Alain Derosières writes in his 
book, The Politics of Large Numbers, cited in Chapter 3. He explains that measuring 
things is as much a technical as a political act: measuring changes the world.   
The emergence of new measurement tools underpins the change in governmental 
attitudes toward inequalities and their interest in combining GDP growth with the 
pattern of income distribution. Governments analyse trends in so-called “growth 
incidence curves” to see how much different income levels have increased over 
time. These measures have come into wide use (Chapter 4) because approaches 
to development and public affairs management are now more multidimensional, 
and especially because a “statistical revolution” (and the widening accessibility of 
computers) has now made the data available for analysis. This statistical revolution 
occurred in the 1980s and 1990s in a few pioneering countries, followed by others 
as USAID, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program funded 
universities and national or local statistical agencies to conduct large-scale household 
surveys. Statisticians must transform the surveys and databases to “capture poverty” 
5.  In France, during the night of 4 August 1789, members of the National Constituent Assembly, formed from 
the National Assembly during the first stage of French Revolution, vowed to end feudalism and abandon their 
privileges.
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– to measure it in a granular fashion. This allows information to escape the confines 
of administrative statistics that are “structured by the formal sector, when poverty 
and hunger most affect families living outside the formal system” (Chapter 10). This 
re-working of household surveys and other new data allows decision-makers to go 
beyond the formal versus informal dichotomy – too often used in some countries to 
justify the difficulty if not the impossibility of implementing social policies. 
Moreover, this new knowledge promotes platforms for collaboration between actors 
who do not a priori share the same interests and values. Cambodia’s health insur-
ance initiative best illustrates this point (Radar 6). Insurers cannot set premiums 
or carry out actuarial analyses in the absence of reliable data and risk analyses. A 
similar situation occurs in the field of natural resources management (Radar 5), or 
in the field of GHG emission reduction initiatives (Radar 8).
Historically, researchers have been the first to undertake the risky business of 
quantifying inequalities, as Chapter 2 clearly points out. Thomas Piketty reminds 
us how often researchers have preceded institutions and politicians, furnishing 
the latter with the conceptual apparatus and statistics needed to comprehend the 
problem and devise solutions. For example, the World Top Incomes database contrib-
utes to scientific initiatives with policy implications: President Obama cited two of 
its authors in his 2009 inauguration speech, paying homage to science and showing 
gratitude for the researchers’ statistical work. Availability of data by itself is not 
adequate. Data must be intelligently used by governments to reduce inequalities. 
Since the advent of databases like the World Top Incomes, many governments have 
agreed to take inequalities firmly into account and have changed their measure-
ment procedures accordingly, at times aiming for a new kind of knowledge about 
the territories they govern (Martin, Radar 3). Other, more hermetic governments 
have not used the information; these countries show the highest levels of inequalities. 
Given the new certainties found in empirical measures, it is striking to see how 
many issues remain poorly understood. The authors of Radar 6 suggest this is true for 
micro-insurance: insurance system impact studies remain scarce, especially in devel-
oping countries. In 2007, the French development agency AFD, Domrei Research and 
Consulting, and the University of California, Berkeley conducted the first rigorous 
evaluation of micro-insurance in Cambodia. This highlights how many solutions for 
some international problems rest on incomplete empirical bases. 
Policy challenges to reduce inequalities
Various chapters of this volume highlight the increase in inequalities within 
countries. Without minimizing the problem of unequal living standards and access 
to opportunities between countries, we find that internal inequality presents the 
primary obstacle to even-handed, sustainable environmental, social and economic 
development. This raises a question: can such an apparently common problem find 
a jointly developed solution, one based on consensus and shared efforts between 
countries? Several sections of this volume, especially Radars 1 and 4, demonstrate 
the usefulness of international collective action in reducing (for instance) economic 
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inequalities. Addressing unequal pay and the (low) share of wages compared to 
profits in an economy may boost employment and growth, and skirt the non-negli-
gible risk of “free riders”. The first challenge, an enormous one, lies in coordinating 
fiscal and social policies. 
Creating a political consensus to address inequalities worldwide poses an equally 
large challenge. Are all governments ready to follow the recommendation of the 
International Labour Organisation presented in Radar 4. Are they all committed 
to reducing inequalities within their own countries? Inequality reduction, as such, 
does not seem to hold universal appeal within all countries – indeed, inequalities 
continue to grow within many. In his contribution to this volume (Chapter 9), Peter 
Utting stresses that the game is not over yet; changes in power relations between 
countries affect collective action paradigms, forcing them to evolve. A real oppor-
tunity exists to restructure cooperation, in the broadest sense of the word, through 
shared analysis of the underlying causes of capitalism’s current crisis. 
What about inequality between countries? The international community regularly 
includes inequality in its negotiating agenda, so often that inequality has become a 
refrain; countries seem to pay only circumspect and distant attention to it, because 
they hear it constantly, but without necessarily committing to reducing inequality. 
The international community constantly seems pulled in two directions: toward 
creating effective but ultimately unfair agreements, or producing fair but probably 
ineffective ones. We might recall that the United Nation’s principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility grants developing countries the privilege of exoneration 
from absolute and quantifiable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, given that 
these countries have emitted fewer greenhouse gases than developed countries have 
since 1950. The Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change may be considered equitable from this perspective, although some 
countries may argue this is at the cost of efficiency. 
It seems, however, that the United Nations Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) have aimed to circumvent such trade-offs between fairness and effective-
ness. Building on successes on the MDG front, the United Nations has begun to extend 
them to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in all countries. Mark Halle notes 
that this aim remains programme-based (Radar 13); fast-forwarding to 2015 – the 
official MDGs end-date, announced in 2000 – Halle predicts a bout of international 
self-congratulation, although “it would be an exaggeration to think that China’s 
and India’s relative success results from measures taken to respond to the MDGs”. 
Furthermore, the lack or near-absence of substantive decisions in Rio in 2012 on the 
twentieth anniversary of the Earth Summit highlights how little appetite countries 
have for negotiations. Might the international community successfully negotiate 
SDGs in the next two years? That was the question asked in Rio.
The last chapter of this volume is dedicated to the SDGs and their universal reach 
and specific targets for each country (Chapter 13). Such a tailored approach to 
inequalities has real merit. Serge Tomasi (Radar 4) believes it necessary to define 
goals and indicators that go beyond general goals and comparable measures for all 
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countries. His proposals include national goals in indicators, to follow each country’s 
progress vis-à-vis its specific situation. Sustainable development rests on trial and 
error more than on a conceptualization or a prescription; the SDGs may help guide 
and measure the effects of these experiments in each country.
The SDGs borrow important characteristics from the MDGs, even while offering 
distinct ones. Like the MDGs, the SDGs must be simple to state, measurable and 
attainable. However, their underlying concept differs. The MDGs answered a demand 
for results and remobilized exhausted donors. They provided goals related to a world 
we know is possible – a world free of its greatest scourges, poverty first and foremost 
among them. The SDGs are transformative. To borrow from business jargon, MDGs 
are “deliverables” while SDGs are “milestones”.
As the international community prepares the SDGs, it must capitalize on the 
experience of various countries and regions. As David Satterthwaite and Diana 
Mitlin (Chapter 7) emphasize, the international community must also be recep-
tive to social innovations; these must take centre stage in political discussions to 
increase their visibility and impact, according to Bruno Frère (Chapter 12). Capital-
izing on experience also requires increasing experimentation; this is the focus of 
the Sustainable Development Solution Network, presented in the last chapter of 
this volume (Chapter 13). 
Sustainable development continues to be a collective experiment, composed of 
trials and errors. To what extent do these experiments require inequality reductions 
in order to succeed and be replicated? This, as well, is the key political question that 
has to be addressed during the pursuit of a sustainable development agenda. The 
various chapters of this volume, written by eminent authors from across the world, 
offer some guidance. n
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It is easier to recognize the problems caused by unequal resource allo-
cation than it is to understand what causes them. Comprehending the 
causes requires an analysis of the conditions that produce differential 
access to resources; it also requires an understanding of the criteria that 
categorize people into differential social groups. A historical view of ine-
quality shows the durability of these social categorizations; it also shows 
opportunities for altering them and transforming society.
Why inequalities matter
A
concern for inequality has long been central to the field of devel-
opment, whose aim for some time has been to see a narrowing 
of the gaps between the “developing” and the “developed” 
world. In recent years, however, changes in the way inequali-
ties express themselves across the world have drawn our atten-
tion to differences in income, opportunities and life-chances 
within nations (Bourguignon, 2012). This transformation of 
stratification has implications for the sustainability of devel-
opment in human and environmental terms. Understanding 
it requires thinking beyond economic structures and taking 
seriously the role of social factors and historical trajectories.
After a long period of contraction in income inequality in Western European and 
North American countries, in recent decades these regions have seen the gap between 
the rich, the poor and the not-so-rich increase. At the same time as rich nations 
became more unequal, new studies and sources of data have become available which 
show that inequalities are associated to a variety of other differences in more impor-
tant quality of life dimensions: in comparison to more equal nations, more unequal 
countries tend to be less healthy, have lower life-expectancy, experience more crime 
and a range of other negative social outcomes (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).
This renewed interest in issues of distribution in rich countries has had the knock-on 
effect of returning the issue of inequality in global development to the forefront of 
policy and political debates. Since the start of the era of “development” following 
the break-up of empires in the second half of the twentieth century, the dominant 
modes of thought in the fields of economics and development have seen inequality as 
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a lamentable, but ultimately transient side-effect of economic maturation. Drawing 
on the historical experience of the first industrialized nations, the economist Simon 
Kuznets proposed that inequality accompanied economic development in a bell-
shaped curve: so that it would be expected to grow as leading economic sectors in 
each country forged ahead of traditional modes of production, widening the gap 
between the incomes of say, family-based farming, and those of skilled workers and 
investors in modern industrial production. This pattern, extrapolated from the history 
of the United States and Great Britain from the eighteenth to the early twentieth 
century, suggested a happy ending: urbanization, modernization, industrial diffusion, 
and the political pressure exerted by a widening waged workforce would lead to the 
creation of welfare systems and redistributive policies that would bring equalization 
at a greater plateau of wealth for all, completing the second half of Kuznets’ bell curve. 
Kuznets’ economic view of modernization as ultimately equalizing had a counterpart 
in political science and sociology with the equally influential work of T.H. Marshall 
on the evolution of citizenship, which saw societies evolving systems of civic, polit-
ical and ultimately social rights which would eventually produce equalizing institu-
tions not dissimilar to the welfare states created in post-war Europe (Kuznets, 1955; 
Marshall, 1955). Over time, Kuznets’ and Marshall’s hypotheses on modernization 
became solid certainties for development experts and rising inequality in industrial-
izing countries was not only a matter that warranted little concern, but could even 
be taken for a sign that a country was on the “right” path.
Scales of inequality
INEQUALITY OVER TIME. Evidence for the trajectories of inequality in longitudinal 
and international perspectives is difficult to come by (for an overview and critique 
see Clarke (2011); Ortiz and Cummins (2011)), but recent efforts in data collection 
and standardization have allowed more solidly based comparisons to be made; and 
these have failed to give Kuznets’ hypothesis strong support. As Ferreira and Rosan-
vallon note in their review, economic growth seems as likely to reduce inequality as 
to increase it (Ferreira and Rosanvallon, 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002). 
This is clearly the case in many high-income countries where, despite continued 
economic growth (at least until the financial crisis of 2008), inequality has increased 
again since the late 1970s.
Looking more broadly, a global view reveals a varied and complex picture that escapes 
a single-factor explanation, or even straightforward description – there is not one, but 
several distinct trends in levels of inequality between, and within, countries. Histori-
cally, the clearest and best known shift in inequality is what has been called “the great 
divergence”: at around 1500 AD, differences in wealth and standards of living across 
the world were not extreme (See Box 1). While within societies there were large differ-
ences in status, power and wealth between aristocracies and the mass of the popula-
tion, these did not vary widely across the more fertile and populous parts of the world: 
around this time the livelihood of a Chinese peasant under the Ming Dynasty would 
not be very different to that of a peasant living under Emperor Charles V in Europe. 
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Between then and the end of the twentieth century, Western Europe as a region 
multiplied its economic capacity at a much faster rate than the rest of the world. Over 
time other regions, including colonial territories in North America and Oceania, but 
also pockets of industrial productivity such as Japan, joined what became a powerful 
club of rich nations. The disparity in wealth and standards of living between the “West 
and the rest” became particularly marked from the middle of the nineteenth century 
onwards, creating a club of very rich nations which are home to a small fraction of the 
world’s population (Maddison, 2001). The result of this decoupling of the fortunes of 
different parts of the world was that, when considered in a global perspective (taking 
each individual in the world as a unit) inequality went from being largely accounted 
for by each individual’s position in the income ladder in their own country, to being 
largely the result of where in the world each individual was born, or managed to 
move to, in the case of migrants (Milanovic, 2012). Milanovic has calculated that 
the great divergence in national incomes between industrializing nations and the 
Global South stretched inequality between individual incomes, expressed in a near 
doubling of the global Gini coefficient between 1820 and 2002 (Milanovic, 2009)1.
HISTORY AND THE GREAT DIVERGENCE. What were the historical causes of the so-called 
“great divergence”? This has been a foundational problem of Western social science 
and economics. While the constraints of this chapter do not allow for a detailed survey 
of the most vibrant areas of research in economic history, it is possible to draw an 
1. See Milanovic (2009), Table 2, which gives a global Gini coefficient in 1820 of 43, rising to 70.7 in 2002. Using 
the Theil index, the change is between 58 in 1820 and 104.8 in 2002.
FIGURE 1 A recent divergence of income levels
Until 1500, it is estimated that incomes were relatively similar in all regions of the world. Since the mid-
nineteenth century, the average standard of living is more reliably predicted by the place where one lives, 
compared to one’s social position within a given society.
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outline of these debates. Early accounts of the transformations that led to Western 
global dominance focused on specificities of European societies that were said to 
promote economic growth, contrasting them to supposed impediments in Eastern 
and Southern economies. While some followed Marx in arguing for the importance of 
the bourgeois revolutions in ushering in a productive capitalist mode of production, 
over the supposed resilience of feudal systems elsewhere, followers of Max Weber 
suggested that again supposedly European legal, cultural and ideological institutions 
(such as the “Protestant work ethic”) were endogenous factors that promoted an 
economic take-off. Whilst they all looked to different factors as causes, these classic 
accounts of European economic growth shared an outlook that contrasted an assumed 
European political and social “appropriateness” to economic growth, with an often 
badly informed orientalist view of non-European societies as closed, backward and 
economically stagnant, views which pervaded (and often pervade still) the attitudes 
of Western policy-makers to non-Western societies (Escobar, 2012 [1995]). 
Over time the debate has come to include other factors, from the role of Western 
imperialism and colonialism both bolstering economic dominance and constraining 
opportunities for development elsewhere (Wallerstein, 1974) – a proposition that 
continues to feed intense argument – to current research that relativizes Western 
“take-off”, pointing to the fact that until at least the late eighteenth century, if not later, 
many non-European regions possessed a commercial and institutional environment 
no less conducive to investment than Europe (Bin Wong, 1997; Pommeranz, 2000). 
Just as Kuznet’s theory has been challenged by recent research, so new perspectives 
on the “Great Divergence” are beginning to show that the Western path to economic 
growth, and the conditions and technological breakthroughs that potentiated it, are 
more contingent and less generalizable than previously thought. Similarly, the recent 
economic growth of nations which, as recently as the mid-twentieth century, seemed 
locked in a situation of arrested development, has emphasized the fact that histori-
cally, the institutional underpinnings of development are more varied than Eurocen-
tric accounts have credited (Chang, 2011; Pommeranz, 2002)2. The problem, as 
the Indian economic historian Tirthankar Roy points out, is that theories focused on 
explaining why the “Third World” was poor, become useless once substantial parts 
of it begin to get richer (Roy, 2012).
THE LIMITS OF CONVERGENCE. During the course of the last two decades, economic 
growth in what have been called the “rising powers” of the global economy, led by 
China, India and Brazil, has been indeed spectacular. Remarkably, there seems to 
be a reversal in the secular trend of the “Great Divergence” between rich, mostly 
Western, nations and the other countries in the world, and a shift towards a new era 
of convergence in levels of national wealth, and therefore a reduction in inequali-
ties between countries in that dimension. Significantly, this has also brought with it 
important reductions in absolute poverty and improvements in standards of living, as 
2. For a review of the “Great Divergence” debate over the last few decades see O’Brien (2010).
REDUCING INEQUALITIES C H A P T E R  1
A PLANET FOR L IFE 21
measured by the Human Development Index. 
However, while much is made of the progress 
and challenge to Western economic dominance 
on the basis of continued double-digit growth 
in some middle-income countries, a measure 
of caution is necessary. The gaps in income and 
power between the richest countries are still 
large and are likely to remain so for some time: 
the scale of the economies of the rich world 
means that just to keep up with modest rates 
of growth in the rich countries and to maintain 
the distance, emerging economies need to 
achieve rates of growth that are very hard to 
sustain (Milanovic, 2011). In addition, there 
are no guarantees that this trend will continue 
– particularly as the consequences of the current 
financial crisis spread from the developed to the 
developing world, and questions remain about 
who will be the ultimate losers of the global 
economic shakedown. The sustainability of the 
growth experienced by many emerging econo-
mies in these new economic conditions, particu-
larly as a result of the retraction in consumption 
in rich nations, is a critical question.  
The issue of sustainability is also relevant if we focus on a second, and increas-
ingly noticeable trend in inequality. Inequality between individuals (considered 
both globally and within countries), as opposed to inequality between nations, is 
increasing. Just as this is happening in rich nations, so is inequality growing (and 
rapidly), amongst the strongest performing economies that are driving the conver-
gence between the West and the rest. It is becoming increasingly clear that conver-
gence in national incomes has not been translated into a significant levelling of 
incomes of the world’s population, taken as a whole (Milanovic, 2009a; Clark, 
2011; Hung and Kucinskas, 2011). In short, the proceeds of growth are not evenly 
distributed and two of the key emerging economies – India but especially China – 
have witnessed significant rises in inequality, even if Brazil has seen a slight reduc-
tion in its traditionally extreme levels of inequality. 
Clark has estimated that over the last 20 years, it is only in Africa that the incomes 
of the poorest quarter of the population have risen faster than those of the richest 
quarter. Elsewhere, but particularly in Asia and Eastern Europe, the incomes of the 
top quartile rose significantly faster than those of the bottom quartile – even where 
the absolute incomes of the poorest grew most strongly (Clark, 2011). Just as much 
of the decline in (population-weighted) between-country inequality is the result of 
China’s rates of growth (due to its large share of the world’s total population), so is 
FIGURE 2 Rising national inequalities
Although emerging countries are presently catching 
up to the incomes of the West, this has not resulted 
in a uniform enrichment of their populations. In 
South Africa, Russia and China, amongst others, 
inequalities are persisting or even getting worse, 
alongside the general increase in living conditions.
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this the cause of the rise in within-country inequality globally considered, due to 
the growth in incomes of the top quartile of the Chinese population having been a 
lot faster than that experienced by those of the lowest (Clark, 2011). The result is 
growing inequality within countries, as the very richest capture the lion’s share of 
aggregate rises in income, particularly at the expense of the very poorest. This issue 
is coming increasingly to the attention of the development community (Goesling 
2001; Cornia, Addison and Kiiski, 2004; Ferreira and Ravallion, 2008; Palma, 
2011). There is also mounting evidence that inequality - not only absolute poverty - 
matters for a number of social outcomes in low- and middle-income countries, just 
as they do in wealthier nations. A growing distance between rich and poor is likely 
to have significant negative externalities: firstly an increasing polarization of wealth 
in society makes it more difficult for the poor to bridge the gap towards a median 
standard of living, increasing the costs for the poor to achieve a minimum to partic-
ipate fully in society (Ferreira and Ravallion, 2008). Income inequality is also 
likely to have important mediating effects on how development affects other impor-
tant human functionings, not least health: surveying the interaction between GDP, 
inequality and a range of health outcomes in Latin American countries between 1960 
and 2007, Biggs and colleagues found that “Wealthier is indeed healthier, but how 
much healthier depends on how increases in wealth are distributed” (Biggs et al., 
2010). Other reviews have noted how low relative returns to labour are likely to affect 
productivity; and, perhaps most importantly, a concentration of wealth reinforces 
the capacity of elites to capture power and engage in rent-seeking behaviour to the 
detriment of other sectors of society (Voitchovsky, 2009; Echeverri-Gent, 2009). 
The causes and contexts of inequality
The realization that inequality per se matters for human development outcomes, 
points to a renewed challenge for the development community in understanding 
and addressing within-country inequalities. But recognizing the issue is easier 
than understanding its causes. Within economic and development circles, causes 
of inequality have been understood primarily within the parameters of countries’ 
differential positions within the world market (the effect of globalization) or whether 
technological change has affected labour markets (the role of human capital stocks). 
These factors are, without a doubt, relevant in providing prima facie hypotheses 
on the causes of income inequality within and across nations. They are, however, 
limited in accounting for a more diverse range of experiences of inequality (of gender, 
ethnicity, age, etc.) and accounting for how individuals and groups find themselves in 
differentiated positions vis-à-vis markets, politics and society. Looking simply at two 
dimensions of inequality, gender and income, Figure 3 shows how diverse inequali-
ties can be, even across such a limited range of examples. While the Gini figure on 
the left represents the degree of income inequality between individuals or house-
holds (methods of assessment differ) regardless of gender, the Gender Inequality 
index on the right measures the differences between men and women across a range 
of indicators, including access to labour markets, health, education and political 
REDUCING INEQUALITIES C H A P T E R  1
A PLANET FOR L IFE 23
representation. Despite having similar levels of income 
inequality, China and India reveal markedly distinct 
patterns of gender inequality, with women enjoying 
greater parity with men in China. Even South Africa 
and Brazil, which have some of the highest income 
disparities in the world, evidence lower inequality gaps 
between men and women than India (UNDP, 2011).
I have chosen these four countries to illustrate this 
point as they are often grouped together as the “rising 
powers” of the world economy and treated uniformly, 
despite their significant political, social and economic 
differences. What then, makes us so blind to the diver-
sity of experiences and causes of inequality? To a large 
degree, such limitations stem from the way inequality 
is most often considered. As the Indian sociolo-
gist André Betteille noted, the study of inequality is 
usually approached from one of two different perspec-
tives: the distributional and the relational (Betteille, 
2003). The former focuses on how valued qualities 
or assets (land, knowledge, capital) are distributed 
among a population, while the latter looks to social 
exchange between individuals and groups to explain 
unequal outcomes. A distributive account is essential, particularly in identifying 
which resources become the fulcrum of different systems of inequality. Seen in this 
light, we can for instance show how the critical resources for economic differentiation 
has changed from the possession of slaves in classical antiquity, to land-ownership, 
to access to moveable capital and, more recently, to knowledge and information.
Nonetheless, the distributive account cannot tell us (a) how individuals gain differ-
entiated access to these resources; (b) how and why the value of resources changes 
across time and social contexts; and (c) how groups and societies manage, maintain 
and transform the systems that allocate such resources. These questions have to be 
addressed in an essentially relational and historical manner: by looking at the context 
of how individuals interact, exchange, cooperate and compete. Such contexts are 
influenced and conditioned by history to the extent that the relationships, ways of 
seeing the world and concepts that people and groups use in such interactions have 
been constructed and evolved over time. In what follows I give a brief and schematic 
overview of how a sociological and contextually grounded approach to inequalities 
can help address these questions, before turning more specifically to how a historical 
perspective, or sensitivity to the role of history in shaping inequality, can aid us in 
promoting sustainable development.
FROM MEASUREMENT TO EXPLANATION. The example of the role of human capital 
in determining inequalities illustrates the above-noted difference between 
FIGURE 3 The unequal inequality against women
Inequalities suffered by women around the world do 
not only depend on the overall standard of living in 
the country in which they live. Indeed, the rules of 
distribution of goods are the result of principles that 
are much more complex than just scarcity.
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distributional and relational accounts of inequality. In both rich and developing 
nations, research has demonstrated how in the latest phase of globalization, individ-
uals with access to particular types of knowledge (for instance, high-level proficiency 
in IT) have seen their incomes rise quickly, while those of lower-skilled workers 
have stagnated or even declined in real terms. While this is important in identi-
fying which resources have become critical in differentiating workers, it does little 
to illuminate the root causes of inequality, to the extent that it leaves two central 
questions unanswered.
First, what determines which individuals are able to gain access to the education 
that provides them with such skills? Answering this question requires an exploration 
of how a much broader set of social processes condition access to skills: are oppor-
tunities in education equally available to all members of society, regardless of race, 
class, gender or religion, or are there explicit and implicit obstacles that mean access 
is differentiated? All societies have systems that manage the allocation of resources, 
and the conditions of access to them: institutions, broadly speaking, also influence 
the shape of inequality. Political systems influence levels of taxation and redistri-
bution, but also of investment in education, healthcare and other goods (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Pierson, 2004). Legal systems influence ownership of assets, such 
as land or intellectual property, or police the enforcement of rights to opportunities 
and resources. Social systems, including social attitudes, religion, and beliefs about 
status, and the way in which societies enforce conformity with them, are particularly 
important in determining the social value of roles and qualities, and how these are 
inscribed in political and legal institutions.
Second, how and why do some qualities and assets become valued differentially 
from others? On the face of it, the issue of value of different types of human capital 
(say, technical knowledge and management knowledge) may seem to be deter-
mined by the basic economic mechanism of supply and demand. But the closer we 
look into this, the more complicated the relationship becomes. Take, for instance, 
current debates about executive remuneration in rich economies, an issue that is 
closely related to the growing share of national income accruing to the so-called 
1%, and therefore the shape of inequality in those countries. To what extent do 
such immensely unequal rewards reflect the underlying “value” or performance of 
top executives, as opposed to, say roles such as teaching, housework or low-skill but 
high risk industrial employment?
Looking at inequality in a relational way highlights that income and educational 
inequalities are only one facet of difference and hierarchies in society. The emphasis 
on incomes may seem apt in increasingly commodified contemporary post-indus-
trial societies (Sandel, 2012) but in reality the experience of inequality is not solely, 
or perhaps even primarily connected to income. Inequalities express themselves in 
levels and access to education, in health and well-being, in rights and in freedoms. As 
Amartya Sen notes, inequality is a multi-dimensional concept which depends largely 
on the field on which distribution is being evaluated: of rights, resources, talents, 
characteristics or, ultimately, capabilities and social opportunity (Sen, 1992).
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BOX 1 HISTORICAL CATEGORIZATION PROCESSES CAN SHAPE REGIONAL WITHIN-COUNTRY INEQUALITIES
n Regional disparities in income, 
health and other social indicators 
are critical to understanding the 
dynamics of inequality within three 
of the key emerging giants, India, 
Brazil and China. Taking a histor-
ical perspective on all three reveals 
how diversity between regions has 
distinct historical roots in each 
country. In all three, however, the 
creation of categorical distinctions 
over time has produced groups with 
differential resources and assets 
with which to engage in a globalizing 
economy, leading to a reinforcement 
of existing inequalities. 
In Brazil, Barbara Weinstein 
showed how São Paulo’s planter 
elites in the 1920s used the polit-
ical, cultural and financial resources 
that accrued to them during the 
coffee boom to develop a distinc-
tion between the Paulista – hailed 
as enterprising, risk taking and 
hard-working people – and the 
people of rural areas of north-
eastern Brazil, who in contrast were 
portrayed as uniformly backward, 
lazy and culturally underdevel-
oped. This categorization was used 
to justify channelling subsidies and 
support to industrial development 
in São Paulo, and for the political 
prominence of its elites in national 
government, to the exclusion of the 
northeast. That region was instead 
characterized and planned for as if it 
were a “disaster area”: public funds 
to the northeast were more often 
than not channelled to emergency 
relief and resettlement programmes 
that brought workers to the south, 
rather than to the kinds of invest-
ment that would work towards 
a convergence between the two 
regions (Weinstein, 2008). 
Indian regional development trajec-
tories evidence different aspects of 
inequality generation: the integra-
tion of India into Britain’s impe-
rial economy in the mid-nineteenth 
century ushered in a period of large-
scale de-industrialization in many 
areas of the country, while focusing 
industrialization in concentrated 
pockets which were more closely 
embedded in an emerging world 
economy (Roy, 2012). This process 
was aided not only by legislation 
restricting competition between 
Indian manufacture and British 
industry, but also by the construc-
tion of sharper boundaries between 
Europeans and Indians by empha-
sizing rurality, tradition and trib-
alism as the “real India”, masking 
over equally “typical” cosmopol-
itan, literate and urban aspects 
of Indian society. Such a process 
not only reinforced inequalities 
between colonizer and colonized, 
but also shaped the state’s attitude 
to economic development and inte-
gration in a way that contributed to 
exacerbating regional inequalities 
(Ludden, 2002).
Over the last century China has 
seen its patterns of inequality 
undergo significant and dramatic 
changes. The establishment of 
State Socialism in Communist 
China brought in a period of equal-
ization of incomes and social 
outcomes (particularly between 
genders), although to a very low 
level and involving tremendous 
human suffering. Since economic 
reforms began gathering pace in 
the 1980s, inequality between 
regions has increased substantially. 
Wang and Wang link the divergence 
between Chinese regions to formal 
and informal institutions and 
bounded categories created under 
socialism. The state’s ambition for 
rapid industrialization was seen 
to require an unequal allocation 
of resources to the benefit of key 
regions and key personnel (skilled 
labour, technicians and planners), 
a goal which clashed with its own 
commitment to equality but which 
was skirted around through the 
institution of different categories 
of workers and different categories 
of citizenship (Wang and Wang, 
2003). One key feature of this has 
been the hukou system of house-
hold registration created in 1958, 
which divides citizens into “rural” 
or “urban”, with differentiated 
entitlements to welfare services, 
benefits, housing, education and 
employment, in favour of urban 
citizens. Movement between these 
categories is difficult and since the 
1980s, a third “grey” category has 
emerged, which consists of millions 
of migrant workers in China’s cities 
who find themselves with no or 
limited entitlement to certain goods 
and opportunities (Solinger, 
1999). Over time, differentiated 
access to housing, welfare, educa-
tion and employment in high-
skilled and administrative jobs has 
reinforced the advantages accrued 
by those living in cities, which in 
turn has made them better able to 
capitalize on the opening of the 
economy to competition and to 
global trade, which again served 
to underscore patterns of regional 
and inter-personal inequality. In 
addition, the categorical distinc-
tion between groups has filtered 
through to attitudes on equality of 
rights, with fewer urban residents 
than migrants supporting a removal 
of the institutional barriers created 
by the hukou system (Wang, 2007).
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CATEGORICAL INEQUALITIES. If inequalities are multidimensional, is it possible to 
develop an account of how they are created, reproduced and transformed that is 
usable as a tool in promoting development? Recent interdisciplinary approaches in 
the human sciences offer a way forward by suggesting ways of integrating the role of 
institutions, culture, and of social norms in shaping inequality and its reproduction 
in ways that help us understand its diversity and changing character. Contributions 
from these disciplines suggest that the common denominator in the production of 
inequalities does not lie primarily with individuals” stock of resources (physical, 
cognitive and social forms of capital) or opportunities, but in the social relationships 
that condition their entitlement to such resources and opportunities. An emerging 
approach to understanding inequality focuses on the process through which people 
are categorized into social groups; how such categories carry with them norms 
regulating entitlement to resources and positions, generating inequalities in status, 
assets and opportunities; and how the boundaries that circumscribe those catego-
ries are maintained and reproduced in ways that lock in differential rewards (Tilly, 
1999; Schwalbe et al., 2000; Schwalbe, 2008).
Social categorization is a relational process through which individuals are assigned to 
a group according to certain criteria – a ubiquitous process in social relationships. Some 
of these categories are near-universal, such as gender (male-female), age (old, middle-
aged, child, teenager) or citizenship (citizen/non-citizen), others are more context-
specific, such as grouping individuals according to ethnic, racial or social belonging, or 
by religious belief. These categories become the central inequality-producing mecha-
nism when they go hand-in-hand with the ascription of differential capacities and 
entitlements that justify differential access to goods, status and opportunities. 
The creation of social groups often entails the ascription of qualities (or the lack 
thereof) to the members of these groups. It is a well established fact in the social 
sciences that groups tend to attribute themselves positive qualities such as intelligence, 
ability, trustworthiness and other traits, and regard non-group members as lacking in 
these traits (for a foundational perspective, see Tajfel (1981); for a recent survey of 
the field see Hornsey (2008)). These qualities can then be used to justify excluding 
access to goods, status or opportunities, or their unequal allocation3. Such justifications 
are transformed into actual inequalities by the exercise of social norms that prescribe 
entitlements to individuals according to a certain category (e.g. woman, man, indig-
enous, non-citizen, etc.)4. Social norms in various guises, ranging from explicit legal 
codes to informal traditions and including religious law, often prescribe differential 
3. Tilly calls these twin processes “opportunity hoarding” and “exploitation” (Tilly, 1999).
4. Sen defines entitlements as “the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society 
using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she faces” (Sen 1984, p.497), but circumscribes its 
interpretation to (mostly) material commodities and legally defined rights. The concept of entitlement can be 
useful in articulating the relationship between categories and social norms that produce inequality, but to do so 
I propose extending the concept by (a) including a wider range of “commodity bundles” that encompasses not 
only material resources, but status, cultural, social and human capital, access to social roles and positions; and 
(b) going beyond legal rights to include all formal and informal social norms that define the person’s ability to 
command such commodity bundles.
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entitlements to goods, opportunities and positions according to group membership: 
age can, for instance, regulate access to political power by having minimum age limits 
for voting or holding office, as can, in well-known historical cases, race, sex, educa-
tion or property. Such norms often prescribe differential entitlements to resources: 
pay-differentials, rations or access to food or education across categories are regulated 
by a range of formal and informal arrangements, including the differential inputs and 
rewards within the household economy, which for instance, demand higher inputs and 
allocate lower rewards to women (Sen, 1990; Radcliffe, 2004; for a richly textured 
historical example see Ogilvie (2003)). Ascribed categories can also restrict access to 
jobs where they attribute qualities that supposedly make members of those categories 
“unsuitable” for those roles – these can be driven by beliefs about competency, fears of 
pollution, or even of the effects of the role on the individual (e.g. “no job for a lady”). 
Alternatively, categories and norms combine to give a particular group exclusive access 
to a certain position or resource because only the bearers of certain characteristics 
are said to be entitled to them – with, for instance, birth regulating exclusive access 
sovereignty monarchies, or to particular professions in caste societies. 
Both the distribution of entitlements and of individuals across such social catego-
ries is policed by social values and norms that enforce compliance in multiple ways. 
Many of these may be coercive to the extent that they involve a direct threat to those 
who seek to transgress boundaries or violate norms, but to a large extent they rely 
on the (at least) outward consent of those that are subject to their rules, through 
processes of value-assimilation or “naturalization”, or at the very least adaptation to 
conditions (Tilly, 1999; Schwalbe, 2000; Lukes, 2004). 
 The link between social category and inequality is not, however, a feature restricted 
to other times or “developing” societies. Wealthier nations and their welfare regimes 
also have to deal with this problem: as an emerging body of literature shows, public 
support for welfare and redistribution is eroded when the sense of community that 
underpins it is challenged by social categories that emphasize difference, whether 
they are focused on multiculturalism or a distinction between “deserving” and 
“undeserving” poor (Kymlicka and Banting, 2007).
EXPLORING INSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS AND CHANGE. Seeing the roots of inequalities 
through such processes of categorization and the normative entitlements that they 
regulate both within and across categories is a good way to begin addressing the 
three questions outlined above. Firstly, this helps us better analyse the full range of 
causes of inequality by looking upstream from the market allocation mechanisms 
to questioning both the acquisition of resources with which individuals enter into 
market relationships; and the extent to which those very market relationships are 
embedded in broader systems of social and cultural distinction. Categories and 
entitlements condition access to resources and positions that are translated into 
aggregated statistics as inequalities of income, health or political participation5. 
5. For an overview of how such social and cultural factors influence health, see Hall and Lamont (2009).
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Secondly, the focus on social norms allows us to explore issues of changing social 
value, and to explain and compare differential rewards both within societies, 
between societies and across time – for instance exploring the social norms behind 
why Japanese firms reveal much lower pay inequalities between executives and other 
workers compared to US ones (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009)6. Finally, it also draws 
attention to the variety of institutions, both formal and informal, that regulate access 
and reward and the ways in which they are constructed and maintained, such as: 
educational systems and beliefs about different types of education, for who and to 
what purpose; welfare and tax structures, as well as debates about deserving and 
non-deserving recipients; property and inheritance systems, and who is entitled to 
it; and political systems, along with discourses on rights, values and citizenship.
Inequality, history and sustainable development
Seen in this way, it is clear that history matters for understanding inequality in general, 
and the specificities of how and why inequalities are expressed differently across time 
and across the world. Rao, Szreter and Woolcok (2011) have proposed three key ways 
in which history and a historical understanding can make a contribution to devel-
opment practice and policy: it can help development practice learn about itself and 
question its own role in the construction of categorical boundaries and difference, or 
how past interventions affected locally rooted systems of inequality; it can serve to 
uncover trajectories and provide a long-term comparative perspective, addressing the 
question of “how did we arrive at this point?”; and finally, it can serve development 
practice by exploring the historicity of the categories and entitlement systems that 
structure inequalities across different contexts. This last aspect can prove particularly 
valuable in understanding the diversity of ways of being unequal encountered across 
different contexts, to the extent that it can highlight ways in which locally-specific 
histories and cultures intersect with global processes and inequality, which creates 
mechanisms that produce diverse outcomes.
DEVELOPMENT HAS A HISTORY. In the first instance then, a historical perspective can 
provide a “critical and reflexive stance on the nature of development, knowledge 
and practice”, showing for instance, how assumptions about the role of inequality 
in development based on a narrow reading of the historical evidence have served 
to hide the effects and experience of inequality, not least (until recently) by not 
developing measures and indicators that made it a quantifiable issue. Along these 
lines we can also see how different ideas from international organizations on what 
“development” is, and how it is achieved, have contributed to the reinforcement 
of inequalities, or to the shaping of new ones that are structured around catego-
ries such as colonizer vs. colonized, modern vs. backward, or by framing women’s 
6. However, there are also signs that while wage inequality for long-term contracted employees has remained low, 
there is rising inequalities of pay and benefits between long-term employment and irregular or short-term forms 
of employment, which recruit particularly certain categories, namely women (Jones, 2007).
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BOX 2 HISTORIES AND INSTITUTIONS: UNEQUAL WELFARE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE
n Formal institutions, including 
constitutions, welfare regimes or 
other government policy struc-
tures are important factors in the 
constitution of inequality to the 
extent that they reinforce cate-
gorical boundaries and distribute 
access and resources unequally 
according to them. Institutions are 
also the product of historical trajec-
tories and their development can 
be to a great extent conditioned 
by their past (Pierson, 2011). 
One example of how institutional 
origins continue to influence the 
shape of inequality in the present 
is the case of Southern European 
welfare regimes – welfare regimes 
are systems of redistribution of 
income and access to services, but 
as Esping-Andersen (1999) notes, 
that distribution need not be from 
rich to poor, nor particularly equi-
table, and systems vary extensively 
on how they do so.
Southern European countries such 
as Portugal, Spain and Greece share, 
despite their differences in many 
other domains, levels of inequality 
significantly above the average for 
European Union countries1. Their 
experience of inequality has been 
explained on the basis of the divi-
sions on the terms of inclusion in 
the labour market and access to 
welfare services, including pensions 
and unemployment insurance. 
Employees in a minority of sectors, 
both public and private can access 
1. Using 2005 data for 24 European 
countries, the average EU Gini score is 
29.7. Spain’s stands at 31.6, Greece’s at 
33.4 and Portugal’s at 37.
generously subsidized contribution-
defined pensions and unemploy-
ment benefits, whilst the majority 
of the population has to rely on 
very limited general benefits, rein-
forcing inside-outside divisions. 
Rather than being universalistic, 
these regimes are both fragmented 
and segmented, contributing to the 
reproduction of inequalities (Garcia 
and Karakatsanis, 2006). But why 
are there such distinct rewards, and 
how did that situation come about? 
Historians increasingly argue that 
these differences are to a signif-
icant extent derived from these 
countries’ authoritarian past and 
its legacies. In particular they have 
pointed to how Southern European 
welfare regimes reinforce inequality 
through inequitable redistribu-
tion, a legacy of their authoritarian 
origins (Espuelas, 2012).
Southern European welfare regimes 
began their developments in the 
early to mid-twentieth century, 
when these countries found them-
selves ruled by conservative author-
itarian (or semi-authoritarian) 
regimes – Franco in Spain between 
1939 and 1975, Salazar in Portugal 
between 1928 and 1974, and to some 
extent Greece even before military 
rule between 1967 and 19742. These 
welfare systems were designed and 
implemented as tools of social engi-
2. Greece’s post-civil war regime up 
until the military coup of 1967, although 
subject to regular elections, was a conser-
vative-dominated “guided democracy” 
that mirrored in many ways the corpo-
ratist ideals of other Southern European 
regimes (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, 2005). 
neering, looking to reinforce certain 
categorical distinctions between 
citizens as a way of shaping society 
along conservative and corporatist 
lines. The aim of these systems was 
to enshrine what these regimes 
considered “natural” inequalities 
and hierarchies in society through 
unequal benefits and entitlements, 
as well as the preservation of tradi-
tion, religion, and male authority 
over the family. This was done by 
targeting benefits according to class 
origins and gender – forms of cate-
gorical distinction – so that workers 
would be tied to tiered and sector-
specific insurance systems (such as 
insurance for agricultural workers); 
by ensuring that such benefits were 
set distinctly according to ideolog-
ical pre-defined needs; and that they 
flowed through the male head of 
household and were therefore rarely 
accessible to women (e.g. Ramos 
Pinto, 2012; Molinero, 2005).
Despite democratization in the 
1970s, these regimes left enduring 
legacies that have hindered the 
equalizing reforms of welfare 
systems. As well as inheriting the 
structural inequalities created 
and maintained by authoritarian 
systems, new democratic regimes 
were faced with the daunting task 
of addressing entrenched interests 
in welfare systems. While this was 
possible in the creation of universal 
health systems, southern European 
states have been less successful 
at enacting reforms that would 
entail breaking the privileges of 
entrenched groups who benefit 
from such inequitable systems (e.g. 
Ferreira, 2008).
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role in development in ways that reinforced their subaltern status (Copper and 
Randall, 1998; Kothari, 2005; Easterly, 2006; Peppin-Vaughan, 2010). Other 
recent work explores how humanitarian practice developed particular political and 
social contexts, both in wealthy nations (e.g. Davey, 2011; Davis and Taithe, 2011), 
but also rediscovering the history and tradition of non-Western humanitarianism 
(e.g. Fuller, 2013; Davey, 2012). 
 
HISTORICAL CONTEXTS AND INEQUALITY. Equally relevant in providing development 
practice with a sharper focus on the causes and dynamics of inequality is the use of 
history to understand local contexts that produce and structure inequalities, and how 
these change over time. Different social and cultural historical legacies shape the 
types of inequalities that are created. Figure 1 synthesizes some historical perspec-
tives which explore three different contexts through which some within-country 
inequalities were created in China, India and Brazil, revealing very different elements 
at play: inter-regional competition in the case of Brazil, colonial administration in 
the case of India, and the communist state’s transforming agenda in China. All three 
histories create different implications to tackling those inequalities.
While Western European nations are relatively equal societies, especially when 
compared with extremes of polarisation in some low- and middle-income countries, 
there are also considerable variations between the more egalitarian Scandinavian 
nations and other parts of the continent. While these differences are often attrib-
uted to recent economic performance, its political and institutional history is also 
critical in understanding how such societies function. Box 2 looks at the origins of 
Southern European welfare regimes since the mid-twentieth century, particularly at 
how their development under authoritarianism created social policies that not only 
were less redistributive than elsewhere, but they actively reinforced inequalities and 
power along categorical distinctions. The historical experience of the development of 
“authoritarian welfare” in conditioning present-day inequalities is an under-explored 
but urgent consideration, especially as we come to see that globally, non-democratic 
regimes have been primarily responsible for the creation of social policies that can 
continue to shape inequalities long into the future (Mares and Carnes, 2009).
But a historical perspective on inequality emphasizes not only its durability, but also 
how it changes and adapts. Social systems are not stable, but constantly challenged 
by changing circumstances, and human action consists of adapting and innovating 
on existing ways of understanding and operating with the world at such critical 
junctures. In doing so, the nature and structure of inequality may be transformed or 
extended. Before concluding, I would like to briefly highlight some of the ways in 
which we can see this happening historically. As Tilly noted, one of the key factors in 
the production of inequality is the process of inscriptions of categories and systems 
of entitlement from one context to another: this can happen as much on a local level 
– with say employers translating racial categories and their ascriptions into lower 
pay and little advancement for members of a given racial group – to processes on a 
global scale, such as when Portuguese and Spanish colonizers transferred to their 
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conquests in Latin America and Africa categorical systems that had been developed 
to manage (and control) the multi-religious populations of Iberia, including Chris-
tians, Muslims and Jews (Bethencourt and Pearce, 2012). 
CHALLENGING CATEGORIES, CHALLENGING INEQUALITIES. Inequalities are not static 
because any translation or application of one frame to a new context requires adapta-
tion and transformation, particularly in the context of globalization and techno-
logical change. As such, durable forms of social categorization and values can be 
adapted to new circumstances by merging them with social categories and values 
from elsewhere, creating “hybrid” forms of categorical inequality. In India, for 
instance, the structures that underpinned key aspects of gender inequality were 
profoundly altered by the combination of British rule and law, and Indian legal and 
social practice. As India gained independence and formed its own body of law, these 
were combined to create a system which reinforced patriarchal control over the assets 
and labour of family members, particularly women, transforming, yet reinforcing, 
structures of inequality (Newbigin, 2010). Looking into the way in which different 
nations and social contexts have constructed and adapted inequality-producing social 
structures in different ways is an essential first step.
Yet, the transformation and adaptation of structures of inequality to new conditions 
can also open up the opportunities for challenges that aim to equalize relations or 
recast the content of categories. In China, the very categorization used by the state 
to ensure differences between types of citizen has been used to contest the manage-
ment of inequality and demand interventions that force equalization, what has been 
called “rightful resistance” (O’Brien and Li, 2006). Other scholars point to similar 
forms of action that both use and challenge categories to the benefit of the poor 
(Chatterjee, 2004; Holston, 2008).
Yet, the historical perspective also shows how, even within nations, the social struc-
tures that shape inequality are changeable and contingent. The long view on the 
development of democracy (which to be sustainable must entail substantial equality 
across its various dimensions) shows that it can arrive by both exogenous and endog-
enous change, and there have been multiple paths towards democratization, as well as 
away from it (Tilly, 2004). In European history, the incorporation of larger swathes 
of the population into the market as waged workers also brought with it the condi-
tions for challenging long-standing inequalities through the collective mobilization of 
new political actors (Ziblatt, 2010). Such mobilization, however, was made possible 
not only by sheer numbers, but also by the way in which beliefs, ideas, and values 
were shaped by the interaction between popular traditions and radical critiques of 
liberal capitalism from both right and left, leading to new ways of conceptualizing 
social justice, the role of markets and the position of individuals within them. These 
challenged the dominant idea that inequality was a “natural” outcome of market 
relations, and therefore either fair or unchangeable, providing a frame for political 
movements and coalitions to mobilize and shape the reform of states and markets in 
the twentieth century  (Bevir, 2000; Biagini and Reid, 1991; Stedman-Jones, 2004). 
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In key moments of change in Europe, such as after each of the World Wars, tremen-
dous exogenous shocks contributed to a realignment of categories and social relation-
ships that shaped inequality. But those shocks only produced such results because 
once they destabilized entrenched ways of seeing the world, there were social actors 
– parties, movements, opinion-makers – that were well positioned to offer alterna-
tive ideas and conceptualizations. Crisis meant change because political action can 
itself provide a way of challenging and transforming categories (Clemens, 1998).
Conclusion
In this short overview I have tried to highlight how inequalities, or ways of thinking 
and seeing unequally, are embedded in social relations and as a result are pervasive 
and durable. Taking a historical perspective on the causes of inequality offers up a 
paradox: whilst it helps to frame and understand the dynamics of contemporary 
inequalities and finds cross-cutting elements that recur in the creation of multiple 
forms of injustice, on the other hand it also emphasizes the point that there are many 
ways of being unequal, because of the variation in contexts and histories that intersect 
to make inequality in say, the United States, something different to what it is in Brazil.
As a result, inequality and the obstacles it poses for truly sustainable human develop-
ment pose a tremendous challenge. Redistribution, or even “predistribution” (Hacker, 
2012), and legislation on equality of opportunities are only one way to address these 
issues – the roots of inequality lie deeper and further upstream, and have to be under-
stood in their own historical, cultural and political context. That deep embedded-
ness of social categories also raises the difficult question of the clash between deeply 
held values and a quest for equality, which is a problem that must be faced not just 
in relation to those who profit from inequality, but also to those who suffer from it.
Yet, I have also tried to show how historians account for social and political change, 
and in the process highlight how inequalities are liable to change. Inequality is the 
product of human action, not of an abstract and anonymous economic machine. As 
such they can, and are, challenged and transformed by human action. Which brings 
us back to the point I made above: because of its roots in the interaction of global 
processes and local cultures and societies, sustainable development towards a more 
equal (and sustainable) future will depend as much as on the actions of social actors 
within countries – parties, civil society and others – as it will on international organi-
zations and transnational actors. How both can combine and interact productively 
is, therefore, a key question. ■
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n December 2011 the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) published a 
volume, Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Ris-
ing, that examined trends in inequality in the OECD 
countries in the years since 1980 (OECD, 2011). The 
OECD’s analysis found that growing inequality was a 
common trend among the OECD countries. It attributed 
this growth in part to institutional changes that had the 
effect of raising wage inequality, most notably declining 
labour tax rates and weaker employment protection legis-
lation. It noted increases in secondary education were an 
important factor reducing inequality, along with increased 
labour force participation among women. And it argued 
that technology was the dominant force leading to higher 
wage inequality over this period. While the volume con-
tained much useful analysis and data, its analysis of the 
dimensions and causes of inequality is incomplete. 
There were three main ways in which the OECD analysis 
was inadequate. First, it relied heavily on the change in 
the ratio of the earnings of workers at the 90th percentile 
to the earnings of workers at the 10th percentile. This only 
captures part of the story. Workers at the 10th percen-
tile of the earnings distribution were indeed losers over 
the last three decades in many OECD countries; however 
workers at the 90th percentile were not really winners. In 
most countries their wages just kept even with average 
wage growth in the economy, meaning that they were 
not the beneficiaries of any upward redistribution. The 
upward redistribution went to individuals further up on 
the income ladder.
The second inadequacy was the brevity of the discus-
sion on the financial sector. Many of those who receive 
the highest incomes are located in the financial sector. 
Recent research also shows that a bloated financial 
sector can be a drag on growth by pulling resources 
away from productive sectors of the economy (CECCHETTI 
and KHARROUBBI, 2012). It is likely that the financial sector 
played an important role in the rise in inequality over the 
last three decades.
Finally, the OECD analysis was too quick to claim that 
technology was a major cause of the rise in inequality 
over this period. It actually found that a measure of the 
improvement trend in technology was not associated with 
a rise in inequality. Only a cyclical measure of technology 
was correlated with inequality; and cyclical changes in 
spending on technology cannot explain a decades-long 
trend of rising inequality.
We examine each of these issues in more detail below.
Figure 1a shows the difference between wage growth 
at each decile cut-off and average wage growth in the 
economy for six OECD countries. As shown, the lower eight 
deciles of the wage distribution all saw wage increases 
that were less than the average, with the biggest losses 
for those near the bottom of the distribution. Clearly those 
at the middle and the bottom of the wage distribution were 
not getting their share of the gains from growth over this 
period. However, workers at the 90th percen tile of the wage 
distribution certainly were not big winners. In Australia – 
where the 90th percentile grew fastest relative to the mean 
– that wage only rose 0.27 percentage points faster than 
the average rate of wage growth over this period. This 
means that the OECD’s analysis focused largely on the 
losers in this story of redistribution. The winners were 
further up on the income distribution. 
Figure 2 shows average income growth at the 90th, 95th, 
99th, 99.5th, 99.9th and (except Australia) 99.99th percen-
tiles in comparison to the average rate of income growth 
from the World Top Incomes database (note that this series 
includes non-wage income, so these numbers are not 
strictly comparable to those in Figure 1). As can be seen, 
the incomes for the very highest income groups substan-
tially outpaced the average rate of income growth over 
this period, with the difference being greater the closer 
you get to the top of the income distribution. 
The shapes and causes of inequality
Dean Baker and David Rosnick Center for Economic and Policy Research, Washington, United States of 
America
CHAPTER 1
A PLANET FOR L IFE 37
REDUCING INEQUALITIES
This point is important. The redistribution did not go from 
the middle and bottom of the distribution to those who 
were merely better off workers. It went primarily to those 
who were at or near the very top of the income distribution. 
This fact hugely influences how we should think about this 
upward redistribution and possible remedies.
The second inadequacy of the OECD analysis, its exclu-
sion of finance from the discussion, is also a significant 
issue. We know that the financial sector has expanded 
hugely as a share of the economy in many OECD countries, 
especially in countries like the United States and United 
Kingdom which have seen some of the largest rises in 
inequality. In our analysis of the OECD data we find a strong 
association between the share of financial compensation 
in GDP and the ratio of wages for workers at the 90th 
FIGURE 1  Unequal income growth
percentile to workers at the 10th percentile. 
While this analysis is far from conclusive, there are 
good reasons for believing that the financial sector has 
been a major contributor to the growth of inequality over 
this period. First and most importantly many of the highest 
incomes originate in the financial sector (PHILIPPON and 
RESHEF, 2009). The most successful managers of hedge 
funds can earn hundreds of millions or even billions of 
dollars a year. Even less successful but experienced 
traders often earn paychecks that are well into the millions, 
fifty or a hundred times the pay of a typical worker. By 
contrast, in 2010 the wage of the 90th percentile earner in 
the United States stood at only 2.37 times that of the 50th.
The earnings from the financial sector must come 
from somewhere. If the financial sector led to a more 
During the last decades, the lowest incomes in all OECD countries have grown less rapidly than average 
– with the notable exception of France. In some cases, as in the United States, only the highest salaries, 
representing only 10% of the population, did not decline. National redistribution devices have not played 
their role in protecting the lower and middle classes.
A PLANET FOR L IFE38
FIGURE 2 Revenue growth of the very rich
productive economy, then these high earners may be 
generating wealth comparable to their compensation. A 
recent study by Stephan Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubbi, 
two researchers at the Bank of International Settlements 
suggests that a large financial sector does not contribute 
to growth, but rather is a drain on the economy. The paper 
examined the growth of 50 countries over the period from 
1980 to 2009. It found a U-shaped relationship between 
the size of the financial sector and economic growth. The 
implication is that an underdeveloped financial sector 
impedes economic growth presumably because econo-
mies are not effectively allocating resources between 
sectors. However after the financial sector reaches a 
certain size relative to the overall economy, further expan-
sion of the sector slows economic growth. 
The paper then sought to examine how the financial 
sector could have this negative effect. It looked at the rate 
of productivity growth in 15 manufacturing industries in 
30 wealthy countries. It found that a larger financial sector 
was associated with slower productivity growth in indus-
tries with large amounts of research and development 
spending. This would be consistent with a story where 
the financial sector was responsible for pulling people 
with highly developed mathematics skills away from 
other sectors; people who could have been developing 
computers and clean energy, for example, are instead 
developing algorithms to be one up on the competition. 
Their study also found that a larger financial sector is 
associated with slower productivity growth in industries 
that are heavily dependent on external capital. This would 
be consistent with a scenario in which a larger financial 
sector ties up more capital in financial speculation, thereby 
making it harder for new firms to raise the necessary funds 
for investment. 
A fuller analysis of inequality has to examine the 
role of the financial sector more closely. There is good 
If we consider the total income of inhabitants of OECD countries, we note first that the income evolution is 
part of a broader trend. The most affluent employees, representing less than 5% of the population, have 
seen their incomes grow significantly above the national averages.
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circumstantial evidence to suggest that it is a major culprit, 
but more work needs to be done before the case can be 
closed1.
The report’s final inadequacy, the rapidity at which the 
OECD accepted the argument that technology is an impor-
tant factor in the rise in inequality over this period, is an 
issue because the evidence suggests otherwise. On this 
point there is an extensive literature, largely focused on 
the United States, which tries to blame technology for the 
rise in inequality over the last three decades (e.g. GOLDIN 
and KATZ, 2008; AUTOR et al., 2005).
While many of the world’s most prominent labour econo-
mists argue that this has been the case, there are a number 
of basic facts about the pattern of wage inequality that call 
this conclusion into question (e.g. GOLDIN and KATZ, 2008). 
First, the sharpest rise in the gap between the wages of 
college educated and non-college educated workers was 
in the early 1980s. This was well before computers and 
other information age technologies were having any major 
role in transforming the workplace or increasing produc-
tivity. Second, inequality has continued to rise in the years 
since 2000 even though college educated workers did not 
see real wage gains over this period. By education level, it 
has only been workers with advanced degrees who have 
seen real wage gains in the years since 2000. If technology 
is the one of the main forces that explain wage inequality 
thean the workers who are beneficiaries are consistently 
changing and now seem to comprise a very narrow group. 
In the case of the OECD data, it is very hard to come 
up with a story whereby technology provides much of 
the explanation. While the OECD’s simulation finds that 
technology explains two-thirds of the rise in inequality 
over this period, it is difficult to reconcile this conclu-
sion with either their analysis or that of the authors of 
this paper. The OECD uses a measure of spending on 
research and development as a share of GDP as a proxy 
for technology. They find a cyclical relationship between 
1. For example, we found an association between the ratio 
of wages for workers at the 90th percentile to the wages of 
workers at the 10th percentile and the portion of the economy 
dedicated to financial sector compensation (See Baker and 
Rosnick, 2012). 
this variable and the ratio of wages for workers at the 90th 
percentile and workers at the 10th percentile. This seems 
quite plausible. At a cyclical spending peak, workers with 
substantial technical skills, who are likely to be near the 
90th percentile of the wage distribution will be in short 
supply. Therefore their wages will be bid up.
However, the OECD and the authors of this paper find 
no relationship between spending on technology over the 
longer term and the ratio of wages for workers at the 90th 
percentile to wages for workers at the 10th percentile. 
This result can be readily explained by a rising trend in 
the number of workers with technical skills. There is no 
obvious reason that the supply of such workers should not 
keep pace with the demand.
With no trend relationship between technology and 
inequality as measured by the 90/10 ratio, we find that 
technology explains none of the rise in inequality over the 
last 30 years. Whatever impact the cyclical component 
might have in raising inequality during the upturn of a 
technology cycle is offset by the opposite impact it has in 
the downturn, leaving zero net effect.
The technology point is important because it focuses 
on whether the rise in inequality was a part of the natural 
development of the economyendogenous development of 
the market over the last three decades or whether it was 
due to policy changes that more directly affect distribution. 
If we assume that technology is the culprit, thean inequality 
is a natural development that we may as a matter of policy 
decide to alleviate to a greater or lesser extent. 
Figure 3 shows our calculations of the factors contrib-
uting to inequality as measured by the ratio of the wages 
of the 90th percentile worker to the 10th percentile worker.
While we find no role for technology, like the OECD 
we find that education, as measured by the share of 
the workforce with a secondary degree, has a substan-
tial positive effect in reducing inequality. This is readily 
explained by the fact that the more educated workers 
there are, the less their wages will rise relative to those 
of less educated workers. Like the OECD, we also find 
that a change in institutional structures has been a major 
factor contributing to inequality. Among these institutional 
factors, employment protection legislation appears to be 
an important factor in the reduction of inequality. Some 
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regressions found that greater labour union density lowers 
inequality, as does a higher minimum wage, however these 
results are not robust, while in the latter case reliable data 
is only available for a small subset of countries (the results 
of these regressions are available from the authors on 
request). It also appears that a lower tax rate on labour 
income is a factor that has increased inequality. While 
there is more work to be done on how these sorts of insti-
tutional factors may affect inequality, the OECD’s research 
suggests that changes in institutional factors played an 
important role in the rise in inequality over the last three 
decades.
This analysis still leaves the rise in inequality over this 
period largely unexplained. While the weakening of insti-
tutional support for workers has led to more inequality, this 
was almost exactly offset by an increase in the number 
of educated workers. The net effect of these two devel-
opments on the ratio of wages for workers at the 90th 
percentile to the wages of workers at the 10th percentile 
was close to zero. 
We believe that the causes of the rise in inequality are 
likely to be found elsewhere, most probably in the factors 
that have led to the sharp rises in income for those in the 
top five percent, and especially the top one percent of the 
income distribution. As noted above, it is likely that the 
financial sector is a big part of the picture, as the high 
incomes of those in the financial sector must come from 
elsewhere in the economy. If will be important to deter-
mine more precisely the extent to which the growth of the 
financial sector has come at the expense of the wages of 
those at the middle and bottom of the wage distribution. 
In effect, excessive income for the sector can be seen as 
a tax imposed on the rest of the economy, reducing real 
incomes for workers outside of the sector.
There are also other factors that are likely to lead to 
large economic rents for those at the top of the income 
FIGURE 3 The causes of income inequality
The development of inequality within OECD countries is difficult to explain. Factors such as education have 
indeed tended to reduce the widening inequalities while some institutional choices have increased it. There 
remains much to be done, however, to definitively identify the most influential factors.
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distribution. Recent research on the pay of top executives 
at U.S. corporations has found little relationship between 
pay and any standard measure of performance (BEBCHUK 
and FRIED, 2004). Top executives in the United States 
receive compensation packages that are far above those 
of top executives in other countries or what CEOs in the 
United States earned 30 or 40 years ago. Insofar as this 
higher pay is not tied to productivity, it must be coming at 
the expense of others. Further research is necessary to 
determine the extent to which excessive pay for top corpo-
rate executives has contributed to inequality.
Finally, stronger patent protection is likely to have 
played a role in increasing inequality2. Patent rents have 
taken up an increasing share of GDP over the last three 
decades. This is especially true in the United States where 
spending on prescription drugs alone accounts for close 
to two percent of GDP. The vast majority of this spending 
is due to patent monopolies, since most drugs would be 
available at little cost in a free market.   
To sum up, while the OECD report advances our knowl-
edge about trends in inequality in wealthy countries over 
the last three decades, it leaves much unexplained. A 
2. A draft version of the OECD analysis found a relationship 
between patents per capita and inequality, although they were 
using this measure as a proxy for technology, rather than rents. 
substantial portion of the rise in inequality is clearly attrib-
utable to government policies such as weakened employ-
ment protection legislation and reduced tax rates on labour 
income. However much of the rise is still unexplained. 
Further research is required to determine the extent to 
which the rise in inequality is due to the development of 
technology and other processes that are largely endog-
enous to the economy, as opposed to conscious policy 
interventions that have had the effect of redistributing 
income upward. n
REFERENCES
Autor D. A., Katz L. F., and Kearney M. S., 2005, “Trends in 
U.S. Wage Inequality: Re-Assessing the Revisionists” National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper # 11627.
BEBCHUK L. A. and Fried J. M., 2004, Pay Without Performance: 
The Unﬁ lled Promise of Executive Remuneration, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
Cecchetti S. and Kharoubbi E., 2012, “Reassessing the Impact 
of Finance on Growth,” Bank of International Settlements, 
Working Paper #318. 
Goldin C. and Katz L. F., 2008, The Race Between Education and 
Technology. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
2011, Divided We Stand: Why Equality Keeps Rising, Paris: 
OECD.  
Philippon T. and Reshef A., 2009, “Wages and Human Capital 
in the Financial Services Industry: 1909-2006.” National Bu-
reau of Economic Research, Working Paper #14644.

A PLANET FOR L IFE 43
C H A P T E R  2
P
rincipally, there are two ways to get rich – by one’s own labour 
or by inheritance. In the traditional hierarchical “three estate” 
societies of many European countries, and subsequently during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was no doubt 
that inheritance provided the best means of access to capital1. 
Classic literature, such as the works of Jane Austen, Henry 
James and Honoré de Balzac, provides plenty of references to 
the importance of inheritance during these periods. For example, 
Balzac’s 1835 novel Le Père Goriot features the famous speech of 
the villainous manipulator Vautrin to Eugène de Rastignac, an 
ambitious young man keen on social advancement, in which the former provides 
the latter with two very different scenarios for his future life that hinge on whether 
he is willing to marry for money. In essence, he informs Rastignac that if he works 
hard and becomes a brilliant student of law or medicine, then this will lead to a 
certain profession which, through continued hard work, would enable him to enjoy 
an above average income and lifestyle. Alternatively, if he successfully managed to 
wed a particular heiress, then he could be assured of an entirely different future: he 
would inherit a great fortune and could enjoy a life of luxury, all without the effort 
of study and work. The distasteful conclusion of Vautrin’s speech is that studies are 
useless and could never provide Rastignac with a standard of living consistent with 
his aspirations. 
1. This article is the translation of the written transcription, validated by the author, of an oral presentation given 
during an interview organized by IDDRI and AFD on 20 September 2012.
Thomas Piketty
Paris School of 
Economics, Paris, 
France
Will twenty-first century capitalism be as unequal and unstable as nine-
teenth-century capitalism? Even as predictions proclaimed that human 
capital would triumph, assets held by a minority continued to increase 
their share of national wealth and income. The twenty-first century must 
invent a more peaceful and sustainable way, surpassing twentieth-cen-
tury capitalism, stained as it was by two world wars. 
The new prosperity 
of rentiers
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Of course, although fictitious, the novel was set in a world that was far from imagi-
nary. Balzac’s words, expressed through Vautrin, are an accurate reflection of the 
structure of inequality at that time. It was simply impossible, through individual 
merit or hard work, to ever hope to achieve the same elevated standard of living as 
that enjoyed by those whom inherited wealth. 
It might be assumed that today’s societies are no longer dogged by this overriding 
influence of heritage and legacy on income determination and standards of living. 
Surely the process of development has implicitly resulted in a reduction of the 
benefits associated with inherited wealth, instead promoting the values of individual 
initiative, work and merit? Can we be certain that this has been a natural and irrevers-
ible consequence of change? Are societies of rentiers and heirs finally obsolete? 
The answer is “no”. The historical and theoretical work of the author has revealed 
that in many cases inheritance plays a role in twenty-first century capitalism that is 
just as important as the one it played during the era of Rastignac and Vautrin. The 
underlying mechanism is low population and economic growth – a characteristic of 
nineteenth century France and also perhaps of much of the world in the twenty-first 
century – which automatically gives disproportionate power to inherited wealth. 
When capital returns exceed the rate of economic growth for a sustained period, the 
past tends to devour the future, and the meritocratic values on which our democratic 
societies are based become deeply challenged.
An imperfect measure of income inequality and 
inheritance
It goes almost without saying that insights from historical literature are insufficient 
for addressing such an important issue, and that statistical data is essential. The first 
step towards fulfilling this requirement is the creation of databases, these databases 
should then be used to provide empirical evidence of long-term changes in income. 
Such an approach is preferable to the simple construction of new theories or the 
contradiction of existing ones. 
With this in mind, the author and a team of researchers constructed a historical 
database – the World Top Income Database – which identifies the percentile distri-
butions of national income for France, the United States, the United Kingdom and 
other countries, over a long period of time. The database now covers more than 30 
countries. To add a country to the database, information on its income inequali-
ties must be collated for the longest possible period: the earliest starting point is 
typically the date at which income tax was established in that particular country, 
which is usually in the twentieth century. When I started this research around 15 
years ago, historical data were only available for the United States, and only then 
back until 1950, which included the work of Kuznets (1955). It has taken many 
years to construct the current database, which enables comparisons of inequality 
over time and between countries.
Indeed, one of the limitations on the measurement of income through tax decla-
rations is that it is difficult to analyse the importance of inheritance in the structure 
REDUCING INEQUALITIES C H A P T E R  2
A PLANET FOR L IFE 45
of inequalities. Firstly, there is an increasing trend for significant amounts of inheri-
tance to escape taxation in France; secondly, even when income from assets is present 
in income tax documentation, it does not give specific details – in particular, it does 
not reveal where assets are from. If tax returns are the only basis of analysis, it is 
impossible to distinguish between inherited wealth and money that was earned by 
an individual, which is nevertheless a crucial question about the nature and justi-
fication of inequality.
Following the establishment of the World Top Income Database, the next task will 
be to fill the gap: to trace the sources of unearned income and to move from our 
world database on income inequality to a world database on inequalities in inher-
ited wealth. These two databases should then be joined as completely as possible. 
The author’s work on income inequality began with the building up of data for 
France. Then, through working in conjunction with a series of co-authors, research 
began on unearned income in the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and 
others. The overall goal has remained constant: to study the historical dynamics of 
the distribution of wealth in the broadest sense over the longest period possible.
Measuring the wealth of a country, to take stock of inherited wealth, is obviously 
not a new idea. It was an obsession of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries until 
being sidelined in the middle of the twentieth century with the development of 
modern national accounts. It is worth remembering that, for example, during the 
1930s no government would have been able to state that: “production has decreased 
by 10% compared to 1932”. It would have been simply impossible, as the necessary 
information did not exist. Clearly, this was not a very practical means of driving the 
economy or finding solutions to economic problems and as such provided a powerful 
incentive for the development of post-war national accounts. The earliest efforts 
in this field were based on the work of researchers – such as Kuznets in the United 
States, Clarke and Richard Stone in England and Dugé de Bernonville in France. 
Their work focused on the short-term variations in economic activity, much more 
than on the stock of wealth of a country. Indeed, inheritance was largely forgotten 
during this part of the twentieth century, firstly because of the obsession for the 
analysis of short-term fluctuations, recessions and crises, but also because of the 
strong state intervention in economic life at that time, which disrupted the struc-
tures of private property, capital and inheritance that existed at the beginning of that 
century. At the start of the 1950s, for example, properties were worth almost nothing. 
Indeed, there was a freezing of rent which led people, as Fourastié described, to 
spend less on their rent than they did on tobacco. In France in 1950, properties were 
worth nothing, so it made no sense to attempt to calculate their value. The stock 
exchange no longer existed, or only barely. Many activities had been nationalized. 
The traditional private capitalism of inheritance had been devastated by wars and 
then by policy responses to the economic crisis of the 1930s. For all these reasons, 
the measurement of inheritance was stopped. At the time, its reproduction and 
transmission seemed to be long forgotten issues.
Thirty years later and everything had changed. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
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waves of financial deregulation and privatization brought a new phase of capitalism 
where inheritance became much more significant, and it was then realized that the 
statistical apparatus was lagging behind reality. A parallel can be drawn between 
the present situation and the 1930s: at that time, not knowing the level of economic 
production was a problem; similarly in more recent times, the inability to accurately 
measure capital stocks and their distribution in the world posed a serious problem 
during the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. The disadvantages of tax declara-
tions and national accounts in terms of the determination of sources of inherited 
income, as briefly mentioned above, also apply at the international level. The sum 
of all the outputs and inputs of capital from all over the world – in other words, the 
sum of the balance of payments at the global level – should always be zero, unless 
a certain amount escapes to Mars! And yet the balance is always negative. That is 
to say, the dividends of outgoing interest are higher than the dividends of incoming 
interest. There is an obvious culprit here. The problem lies in the lack of reporting 
obligations for financial institutions in tax havens. Such institutions have absolutely 
no involvement in this statistical exercise. One of the virtues of a series of analyses 
such as this is that it reveals inconsistencies in the existing statistical system. In this 
case, the overall analysis of stocks raises major statistical inconsistencies, partly 
because for a long time, interest has focused on the annual flows of inheritance and 
less on the detail of stocks, which raises more interest today. When the instrument 
of observation is so imperfect, it is sometimes better to read the work of novelists 
rather than statisticians to find out what is happening today.
Inheritance thrives on low growth – or why growth 
reshuffles the cards
In the French case, by combining different sources of statistical information – 
especially data from the national accounts of income and wealth and data on inher-
itance tax2 – I managed to reconstruct the annual value of inherited wealth in the 
national income from 1820 to the present day. How much does inheritance “weigh” 
in the national income, year after year? The first finding is that flows of inherited 
wealth follow a pronounced U-shaped curve over time. The annual value of inher-
itance flows amounted to 20-25% of national income around 1900-1910. It fell 
gradually to less than 10% during the inter-war period, and to less than 5% in 1950 
(Figure 1). There has been a steady rise since then, with a marked acceleration in 
the last thirty years. We are now at a level close to 15%. In a longer perspective, the 
collapse of inheritance flow in the national income in the mid-twentieth century is 
even more spectacular. Inheritance flows during the period between 1820-1910 were 
stable in the region of 20-25% of national income, then from 1910 to the 1950s this 
figure plummeted by a factor of 5 to 6, before rising by a factor of 3 to 4 between the 
1950s and the 2000s. These results are robust and confirmed by the two convergent 
2. For more details, see Piketty T. (2011), “On The Long-Run Evolution of Inheritance: France 1820-2050”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics vol. CXXVI, Issue 3: 1071-1131.
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estimates of the annual inheritance flow - the first on the basis of economic data 
(assets), the second based on tax data (successions)3. Note that the current level of 
15% would be even higher if instead of the national income, we used the dispos-
able income - that is to say, the national income adjusted for taxes and public trans-
fers. Disposable income accounted for between 90% and 95% of national income in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, while this proportion is around 70% 
today - the share of taxes and transfers being simply more important. The 15% level 
of inheritance flow in the national income is equivalent to roughly 20% of dispos-
able income. This is a very significant amount. It is more than the combined total 
of new savings made each year and roughly equal to the annual capital income of 
the French economy. 
In which ways can these facts be interpreted? In particular, how can we account 
for the distinct U-shaped curve and what seems to be a return to a long-term equilib-
rium at the very high level of 20%? In the view of the author, there is a very simple, 
and also very convincing, explanation. The key lies in the comparative value of 
3. Cf note 1, in particular pp. 1084-1099.
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FIGURE 1 Inheritance makes wealth again
Inheritance flows peaked in the late nineteenth century, during which period the returns on capital could be 
up to five times the growth rate. After a fall following the two world wars and then a low-level stabilization 
during the “trente glorieuses”, these flows have been on the rise since 1980, again due to the impact of the 
remuneration of capital being at a higher rate than that of growth.
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the economic growth rate and the rate of return on property. When the economic 
growth rate is low, lower than the rate of return on property, for example when 
annual growth is 1-2% and the rate of return on property is 4-5% per year, which 
has been the situation in France during the last two centuries - with the exception of 
the period of the Les Trente Glorieuses (“The Glorious Thirty” - the thirty years from 
1945 to 1975) - then inheritance is the determining factor of wealth accumulation 
and the structuring of inequalities. Conversely, when the return on property is lower 
than the economic growth rate, then the accumulation of wealth is less influenced 
by inheritance compared to the year on year production of new wealth. This can 
be summed up in two very complementary ways. Inheritance thrives during weak 
growth. Or growth constantly reshuffles the cards, thus minimizing the weight of 
inherited wealth.
The easiest way to understand this result is to illustrate it by looking at the 
demographics. Imagine a society with high population growth, with five or ten 
children per household: this is a society where inheritance disappears. Everything 
must be divided by five or ten in each generation. So everyone must accumulate 
their own wealth. Population growth of the twentieth century, according to all avail-
able forecasts, is absolutely unique in human history. Until the eighteenth century, 
population growth was almost zero; it rose a little in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries to reach 0.3% to 0.4% per year, which is already a huge change. In the 
twentieth century, the worldwide growth of the population stood at an average of 
1.5% per year. In the twenty-first century, this rate may fall to 0.5%. This has great 
implications in terms of the transmission of inequality. Demographics feed growth, 
which as we have seen reduces the share of inherited wealth. A world of high popula-
tion growth is one where the inheritance is continuously divided. Conversely, in a 
world that is demographically stagnant, or worse, has a shrinking population, then 
inheritance becomes a crucial part of the distribution of income and multiplies the 
inequalities related to property transmission.
The same applies to economic growth. When output growth per capita is 5% or 
10% per year, then this produces a similar effect to a situation where the populace 
has between five or ten children each. What has been accumulated 10, 20 or 30 
years ago is not important. Conversely, when economic growth is small or zero, 
property inherited from the past accumulates with a rate of return higher than the 
growth rate. This causes extreme inequality. In the contemporary situation, where 
the growth rate is less than 1% per annum, with a higher rate of return on property 
- it doesn’t have to be double-digits, just 3%, 4% or 5% is sufficient - then the 
cumulative effects on wealth give an absolutely staggering importance to the past. 
When presented with these results, a common reaction is: “But this is not possible 
forever. It cannot always be the case. There is a logical inconsistency.” But in fact, it 
is perfectly possible. Human history is an illustration of this relentless mechanism 
of accumulation by successive transmissions. Roughly speaking, with the exception 
of the twentieth century, the growth rate has been less than 1% per year, with a 
much higher rate of return on property, i.e. the rate of the rent. Even small values 
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like 3% or 4%, compared to a 1% growth, produce decade after decade of immense 
cumulative effects. It is here we find one of the evils of capitalism.
Admittedly, and thankfully, there are many kinds of public policies and institu-
tions in place to reduce the accumulation of inherited wealth. Moreover, nominal 
growth rates (including inflation) are of the order of 5-6% per year, so that inert 
heritage, inherited from the past, weighs little against the new wealth generated 
each year. We are not yet back to the situation in the nineteenth century, which 
was also a world without inflation, where growth was in the region of 1% to 1.5% 
per year, and where the rate of return on inert capital was very much higher than 
growth. We are not there yet because there are reserves of population growth and 
economic growth. But we have seen that when population growth falters, with it 
falls the direct reduction of inequality by transmission, in addition to those inequali-
ties induced by growth, which should automatically falter too. Conditions are met 
- from a strictly logical point of view when comparing the evolution of the rates of 
growth and return - so that at one point, during the twenty-first century, we should 
expect to return to a very low level of growth, that is much lower than the rate of 
return on capital, recreating a world of great inequality (Figure 2). 
FIGURE 2 Toward a new century of rentiers in France?
The study of saving habits from 1820 to 2008 allows us to construct scenarios of rent building for the twenty-
first century. According to the evolution of economic growth and the return on capital after tax, the share of 
capital in national income should either be stabilized at around 15% to 20%, or exceed 20%.
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New rentiers
In the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom and France owned a large part of the 
capital of the rest of the world, and partly lived on pure rents. From 1850 to 1914, 
the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, France, were in permanent trade deficits 
to other countries throughout the world. However, these two countries benefited 
from a balance of payments surplus, that is to say that the rents paid by the rest of 
the world allowed these two countries not only to finance their trade deficit, but 
also to continue to accumulate at the expense of other countries. This is the power 
of capital: when you become an owner, you no longer need to work. Nineteenth 
century trade balances demonstrate this fact: some countries were rentiers compared 
to others. Although this doesn’t mean that the rentiers stopped producing, in fact 
they continued to produce, but less than they were consuming. On the eve of 1914, 
English and French national incomes were 10% higher than domestic production, 
and the gap was financed by the rent paid by the rest of the world. Politically, 
such a situation is highly confrontational and violent. Is this a world that we wish 
to return to? The great fear in Europe today is that such a situation could indeed 
occur again, but with reversed roles where Europe becomes the possessed, rather 
than the possessor. 
The resurgence of inheritance in a situation of low growth may ultimately lead 
to the absurd situation, which in the opinion of the author is socially and politi-
cally untenable, where millions of households pay rents to globalized, anonymous 
billionaires. Such a scenario reignites certain nineteenth century fears. Ricardo 
once said: “At the end of the nineteenth century, the rent will have absorbed all the 
national income” (Ricardo, 1817). While this prediction was not quite accurate, 
if we replace ground rent by property prices in capital cities or the price of oil, the 
same kind of predictions wouldn’t seem outlandish today.
Something radically new has emerged in the structure of inequality that has devel-
oped particularly in the United States, which is the appearance of a kind of super-
star entrepreneur, the working rich millionaires that claim their wealth is the result 
of hard work and not capital. There are no equivalent figures in history and their 
existence is a sign of complete institutional failure. It is simply absurd that people 
at the head of large US companies should be allowed to set their own salaries. What 
else can we expect in this situation? These people are simply helping themselves 
to company coffers. Since there are no limits to restrain them, they consequently 
build themselves a substantial heritage. The problem is not only greed, but also the 
inability of the market economy to properly control the remuneration of executives 
of very large companies. The invisible hand of the market cannot touch these people. 
It is possible to calculate the marginal productivity for replicable functions, such 
as for staff in a McDonald’s restaurant or an assembly line worker, i.e. the additional 
productivity an individual in such a role brings to the business. But such a calcula-
tion is not possible for non-replicable functions, such as for a chief financial officer. 
Nobody has conducted a test to see how much a business would lose without having 
a chief executive officer for ten years. Over such a period, even with all the controls 
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that can be imagined, the economic environment will have changed so much that 
the results would be inconclusive. This is a typical example of something that the 
market cannot do, which highlights the need for institutions that can.
This phenomenon of very high salaries, which transform into rent, is also symptom-
atic of a type of meritocratic extremism that has developed in the United States. The 
common justification for the exponential increase in some salaries is to say: “they 
allow new people, self-made people, to compete with very wealthy heirs.” Essen-
tially, we have set up a race between Forbes-listed individuals who inherit fortunes 
and those who earn several million dollars at Goldman Sachs. The problem here 
is that 90% of the population are excluded from the race - the vast majority do not 
enjoy any inheritance or receive very high salaries for their work, and in addition 
they are told that this situation is fair. In many ways this represents the worst of all 
worlds: here we have both the inequality of the past, but accompanied by the moral-
izing meritocratic discourse of the twenty-first century.
The first priority is to dispel the myths concerning Les Trente Glorieuses in France. 
The particular structure of inequality during this period was marked by low wage 
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FIGURE 3 Distribution of national income between wages and profits
The respective share of labour and capital in the French national income has been relatively stable over the 
past two centuries. Since 1820, capital has thus been generating 30% of the national wealth on average. 
During certain periods, such as the late nineteenth century, this share reached 40%. It fell below 20% 
in 1940 and has been fairly stable (24%) since the late 1980s, above its level of the 1970s, the end of the 
“Trente Glorieuses”.
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differentials, a very small role for inheritance as a proportion of the national income 
and property values that had fallen to zero in some cases, together with strong 
economic growth. This type of structure is now long gone.
Staying with the example of France, which is the country that has experienced 
the strongest break-ups during the twentieth century that can be divided into two 
periods between 1950 and 2010. These 30-year (i.e. one generation) periods between 
1950-1980 and 1980-2010 were times of revolutionary change. The growth rates of 
wages, incomes and production stood at about 5% per year during the first period, 
compared to 1.5% in the second. Rises of 1.5% or 5% in wages, income, per capita 
output over a generation, were remarkable and represented a complete overhaul. 
The problem is precisely the length of these periods. The first period lasted so long 
that people eventually believed it was permanent, and having taken this experi-
ence on-board, the second period was assumed to be transitional... except that we 
are still in the second period, that has now lasted as long as the first one. Some 
even believe that we have moved into another historical phase - a perpetual Trente 
Glorieuses perhaps? However, we are likely to pay dearly for such an assumption. 
We have yet to emerge from this transitional phase and some expect a return to a 
“golden age” if we just wait a little longer. This hope is based on the impression that 
such a world, although not without inequality, had inequalities that were much less 
pronounced. That is to say that inequalities existed between the blue-collar worker 
and the executive, with wage differentials from 1 to 3 or 1 to 5, but that these differ-
ences were not extreme and were mainly justifiable in light of the work that each 
brought to the production and the common good. Each had a common vision of the 
value of work. It was a period when arbitrary inequality, such as arbitrary rent, i.e. 
money without any possible justification that was there for some and not others, 
seemed to have disappeared. Many delusions exist about this period, there is the 
idea for example that technological and technocratic rationality had enabled the 
competent executive to replace the idle shareholder.
We now realize that the share of national income that goes to human capital and 
labour in the broad sense may be a little higher today than in Balzac’s era, but not 
much more. That is to say, that the share that goes to pure capital - rent, interest, 
dividends, which are paid by the mere fact of ownership of capital without the 
addition of individual work - has declined little compared to the nineteenth century. 
Then this proportion stood at roughly 35-40%; today it is around 25-30%. This is 
not an indication of a revolutionary change in civilization (Figure 3). It was during 
the 1950-1970 period, that the share of capital in national income fell to signifi-
cantly lower levels due to rent controlling mechanisms such as nationalization and 
the implementation of strong policies, which had the result of breaking up capital 
and inheritance so that it was mostly new savings that supplied the capital, meaning 
that the return on capital was more fairly distributed. 
Many French people who have lived through Les Trente Glorieuses still regard 
themselves as self-made entrepreneurs, as people who have not inherited much 
wealth but have accumulated a lot through their own hard work. All this continues 
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to weigh on the collective imagination. These people thought that after the war, 
the world had entered into a new era, an enchanted world where the inequalities 
of the past had permanently disappeared. Things seem very different to those born 
between 1970 and 1980. To take a specific example, people born between the years 
1970 and 1980 are not able to buy property in Paris or in any big city, unless they 
inherit a considerable sum or their incomes are within the top 1%. Without inher-
iting sufficient wealth, even those with salaries in the top 10%, have little choice 
but to pay rent throughout their lives to the children of owners. This reality simply 
did not exist for people born between 1930 and 1950. There has been a complete 
changeover, the cause of which is associated with low growth. 
Reshuffling the cards without strong growth
While low growth feeds the importance of inheritance, the obsession for strong 
growth is equally barren: by focusing overly on the creation of growth, other issues 
are forgotten - including issues that we actually know how to address. The creation 
of better institutions, particularly fiscal ones, can help solve the problems associ-
ated with growth. Taxes on capital must be developed in the same way that income 
taxes were developed in the twentieth century. Such taxes on capital must be inter-
national, or perhaps European-wide in the first instance. Europe makes a good 
starting point as it is the world’s richest economic area, with the largest number 
of multinational companies in the global Top 500 list, and the largest number of 
billionaires. Everything is in place for a taxable base, the tax just needs to be imple-
mented. All this could be achieved at a specific growth rate and could solve many of 
today’s economic problems. We could improve public health and education systems, 
and much more besides, if we broadened the focus away from the narrow goal of 
obtaining a 0.1 percentage point of growth, and if we finally accepted the idea that 
the average growth rates observed for thirty years are already very high. Annual 
growth of 1-1.5% in an economy that is already highly developed is actually very 
fast. Perhaps the best way forward is to stop considering the rate of growth on an 
annual basis, but rather view it in terms of generations. So a 1% annual growth 
rate is actually a 30% increase over a generation (30 years); while 1.5% equates to 
45%, i.e. in just 30 years almost half of the economy has been renewed. In these 
terms, the growth rate is huge! If we consider only the annual growth rate, then it 
is possible to think that nothing has happened for the last 30 years in rich countries, 
because during this time growth has hovered around 1.5% per capita. Whereas, in 
reality half of the economy has been renewed. While such growth is not sufficient 
to wipe away the advantage of inheritance, the development of tax tools is much 
more reasonable than relying solely on the automatic resorption of inheritance by 
virtue of a very high rate of growth.
Today, wages constitute a significant proportion of the rent. To address this issue, 
rigid rules on the highest salaries are necessary. Confiscatory tax rates are needed 
to prevent salaries reaching beyond a certain level. This is the only way to calm the 
market frenzy. Otherwise, without self-regulation of the market, all other efforts to 
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address this issue are doomed to fail. As discussed above, we can work out the value 
of people who work at a McDonald’s restaurant, but how do we value the executives 
at the company’s headquarters? The latter may have great ideas on how to improve 
McDonald’s menus across the world. But we have no idea how to value this contri-
bution. Similarly, it is very difficult to gauge the value of academic or scientific 
researchers. Their marginal productivity is not written on their foreheads. In the 
absence of a suitable means to value their work, the market needs rigid rules so that 
certain limits cannot be exceeded. Otherwise we know what happens: a company 
calls in consultants to determine salaries, they check the average in the sector and 
add 1% so that everyone’s happy. The next CEO does the same thing. And 10 years 
later, wages have soared.
During the time of the US President Roosevelt there were many successful experi-
ments with near-confiscatory income taxes. In fact, there is little cause to seek for 
new ways to address the problem of excessive salaries. The paradox is that, although 
France is developing a 75% tax rate, it is not the country where it is most needed. 
A taxation of 75% would be much more useful in the United States, but here we 
encounter a political problem: it seems that once individuals in the US reach these 
high-income levels, they are able to influence the political process and thus can 
prevent any reform. In France, where such individuals are much less numerous, 
those with excessively high incomes have much less ability to influence government.
It is the French wealth tax that can today be considered as the closest example of 
an ideal tax on capital. It has many merits. Created by left-wing politicians in 1981 
and then reformed in 1988-1989, it represents a much more modern tax than, for 
example, the property taxes that were abolished in Germany, Spain and Sweden. 
These other taxes actually dated from the nineteenth century and much resem-
bled the French property tax, which also dates from that period, and is based on 
completely obsolete cadastral values. At least the French wealth tax is based, as it 
should be if we want a global tax on billionaires, on the market value of property.  
Consider the Forbes ranking of the world’s wealthiest people. Every year these men 
and women become 7% to 8% richer. So, if global GDP increases by about 5% per 
year, we may think that their wealth grows at a rate that is only marginally above 
that of GDP. However, most people who work in rich countries have a salary that 
rises by just 1%, or even 0% per annum. This may seem like a small difference, but 
over 30 years, the effect of accumulated wealth is enormous. There are very strong 
scale effects at work: from 100,000 euros worth of assets, the returns are modest; 
with one million euros, the returns are much better; while 100 million euros will 
yield far higher returns. The effect of this from 1990 to 2010 is quite simple: the 
wealth of those listed in the Forbes rich list has multiplied almost by a factor of ten. 
This is true for both Bill Gates and Liliane Bettencourt – i.e. those who have worked 
to earn their fortune, and those who have not. Gone is the idea that capital income 
disappears with time because the world is becoming more rational. In fact, exactly 
the opposite is true: an efficient market fosters the continuation of the transmission 
of inherited wealth from one generation to the next.
C H A P T E R  2
A PLANET FOR L IFE 55
REFERENCES
Kuznets, S., 1955, “Economic Growth and Income Inequality.” 
American Economic Review 45(1):1–28.
Ricardo D., 1817, On The Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation.
Perhaps one day soon we will realize the folly of making free trade agreements 
with most countries of the world, without directly including agreements on the trans-
mission of all information on capital flows and flows of interest and dividends. For 
example, it is senseless to implement free trade on goods and services with Switzer-
land and not to have in counterpart a total transmission of information on who are 
the beneficiaries of the flows of interest and dividends into Swiss bank accounts. 
Allowing this to persist is merely giving our adversaries a stick to beat us with, and 
ensures that the full potential of our tax base is eaten away. n
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F
rom the Washington Consensus to the New York 
Consensus, the fight against poverty has become 
the central axis of development policies in the 
late 1990s. In the eighties and the early nineties, 
the so-called “Washington Consensus” largely 
dominated the development agenda. Faced with the debt 
crisis and the structural macroeconomic imbalances of 
many developing countries (internal and external deficits, 
high inflation, low economic growth), international finan-
cial institutions, notably the World Bank and IMF, advo-
cated the establishment of structural reforms to restore 
macroeconomic balances and strengthen competitive-
ness through Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). 
The Washington Consensus proposed the liberalization 
of foreign trade and the establishment of supply policies 
to strengthen economic competitiveness and to reduce 
budget deficits and balance of payments disequilibria. 
While these policies, along with efforts towards the mas-
sive external debt relief of heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPC), have helped to improve the situation on the macro-
economic level (lower inflation, the restoration of internal 
and external balances in particular), they have often had a 
deflationary effect and a high social cost in the short term. 
The first direct criticism of the Washington Consensus 
came from the publication of the UNICEF report “Adjust-
ment with a human face” in the late eighties, which warned 
of the human impact of these policies. In 1990, the publi-
cation of the first report on human development, and the 
development of the Human Development Index (HDI) by the 
UNDP, began the reorientation of the development agenda. 
Offering a composite indicator that measured both per 
capita income growth but also access to basic social 
services (education, health), the authors proposed an 
indicator of development that went beyond mere monetary 
wealth and included more qualitative elements focused on 
the creation of human capital. Major United Nations confer-
ences in the nineties, including Rio (sustainable develop-
ment), Cairo (population and development), Beijing (women 
and development) and Copenhagen (social development), 
have also been influential in pushing the direction of the 
development agenda towards human development. 
From Structural Adjustment Programmes toPoverty 
Reduction Strategies 
In a ddition, the World Bank, under the leadership of 
James Wolfensohn and with the impetus of chief econo-
mists who are specialized in inequality issues (Joseph 
Stiglitz and François Bourguignon), has gradually made 
the fight against poverty the central axis of its action. Its 
2000/2001 World development report (WORLD BANK, 2001) 
marked a turning point, the Bank advocated a multidimen-
sional approach to poverty, going beyond the monetary 
approach in terms of poverty lines, to integrate capacity 
and “empowerment”. Such theoretical consideration was 
given its operational implementation through national 
poverty reduction strategies (PRSPs).
The late 1990s was also characterized by the emergence 
of the themes of pro-poor growth and human poverty. 
The 1997 UNDP Human Development report (HDR) intro-
duced a human poverty index for the first time, while the 
1998 UNDP Human Poverty report advocated the imple-
mented pro-poor growth strategies. The Millennium Decla-
ration and the attached Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) represented the culmination of a long process of 
The fight against poverty: the central axis 
of development policies? 
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theoretical reflexion and a political coming-of-age, which 
would put the fight against poverty at the heart of the 
development agenda, discussed both from the point of 
view of monetary income (objective 1) and of opportuni-
ties/capacity (objectives on health, education, food security 
and gender equity). 
The French approach: the fight against poverty and 
inequality
The issue of inequality has never really managed to 
impose itself as a consensual objective of the international 
community. However, the French Cooperation strategy has 
developed proposals for an agenda that focused not only 
on the fight against poverty, but also on the fight against 
inequality. In a working document published on the eve of 
the Millennium Summit (DGCID, 2001), it clearly inscribed 
its approach within the framework of the theoretical work 
of economists specializing in inequality, including Roland 
Barro (BARRO, 2000) who highlighted the constraints to 
growth in poor countries that are caused by inequality, 
Philippe Aghion who advocated redistribution policies 
to correct market imperfections, and François Bourgui-
gnon who called for transfers of cash, or payments in 
kind, to poor families. The approach taken by the French 
Cooperation strategy also called on the political economy 
to integrate the political dimension and the analysis of 
power relations that influence the distribution of national 
income within a country. The IMPACT network, set up by 
the former Director General of the French International 
Cooperation, has for a long time been a place for the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to conduct research and 
empirical studies on poverty and inequality. It has often 
made reference to the work of, for example: Bruno Losch 
on the coffee and cocoa sector; Jean-François Bayard on 
the State in Africa; and Alice Sindzingre on the political 
economy of reforms in Africa. 
Inequalities are back in the headlines 
The issue of inequality and its impact on growth and 
human development has, however, never been recog-
nized as a central axis of development cooperation, 
despite efforts from France and others. Priority has been 
given to the fight against absolute poverty and to the 
support of human development. Nevertheless, inequality 
is now making a return to the heart of the debate, with 
rising income inequality attracting major media atten-
tion during the last decade. The OECD report “Divided 
We Stand” shows that in all OECD countries, and also 
in most emerging countries with the exception of Brazil 
and Indonesia, household income inequality measured 
according to the Gini coefficient has increased between 
the early 1990s and the end of the last decade (OECD, 
2011). See figure 2, chapter 1.
The main source of these inequalities in OECD countries 
is the growing inequalities in labour income1. In emerging 
countries, the same report noted a sharp increase in the 
dispersion of income since 1990 in China (+24%), India 
(+16%) and to a lesser extent in South Africa (+4%), 
whereas it has stabilized in Indonesia and decreased in 
Brazil (-10%), although Brazil has by far the highest levels 
of disparity (the income of the richest 10% is more than 
50 times the income of the poorest 10%, compared to 
nine times the average in OECD countries).
These developments, in the case of emerging countries, 
are logically leading to a reopening of the debate on the 
link between growth and inequality. Are we seeing here 
the classic Kuznets curve effect (emerging countries have 
not yet fully entered into the second phase of their growth 
process, which is characterized by a combination of growth 
in GDP/capita and the reduction of inequality)? Or is it 
due to the consequences of an external growth model 
that requires the long-term suppression of real wages to 
maintain a competitiveness differential? 
Such developments also revive the debate on the 
measurement of poverty and the way in which inequali-
ties are taken into account in the development agenda. 
The UNDP, as early as the 1990s, sought to go beyond 
the simple measure of absolute poverty by developing the 
human poverty index, which has since been replaced by 
1.These inequalities in labour income are determined by differ-
entials in wages and in the number of working hours (explo-
sion in part-time working) and by the inactivity rate (rising 
unemployment). Reducing tax progressivity and redistributive 
social policies, because of funding and competitiveness problems, 
only very partially correct these inequalities at the level of the 
final disposable income of households.
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the multidimensional poverty index (MPI). The MPI seeks 
to measure poverty not only in terms of low monetary 
income, but to provide a more qualitative approach in 
terms of capability deprivation (10 core indicators are 
used to measure the three dimensions of poverty: human 
health, education, living conditions). The 2011 HDR, in 
addition to monitoring the MPI of 109 countries, provides 
a sub-national monitoring in 66 countries to measure 
regional disparities.
In its 2006 report on equity and development, the 
World Bank emphasized the need to better take into 
account equity in development policies (WORLD BANK, 
2006). In an imperfect market, the distribution of wealth 
may affect the allocation of investment opportunities and 
economic efficiency by creating rent-seeking situations 
and preventing some players from expressing their full 
potential. The State may then play a role to compensate 
for market imperfections and to enhance the efficiency 
of the economy, either through a redistributive policy or 
by a longer-term policy to strengthen economic oppor-
tunities or by supporting the distribution of assets and 
the capacity of the weakest to express themselves. This 
action also strengthens social cohesion. The report did not 
avoid the questions of the political dimension, inequalities 
in access to power or the political expression that can 
promote rent-seeking behaviour and the reproduction of 
these inequalities.  
In the same vein, the latest report from the OECD Devel-
opment Centre (OECD, 2012) promotes the idea that social 
cohesion is a prerequisite for sustainable development. 
The report highlights progress in developing countries over 
the past decade: 83 developing countries had a per capita 
income growth that was double that of the OECD countries, 
compared to only 12 in the 1990s, while 50 developing 
countries have a GDP/capita growth rate greater than 
3.5% per year. It underlines, however, that most developing 
countries are now faced with rising inequality along with 
rising middle class expectations in terms of their standard 
of living and for a fairer redistribution of national income. 
This is reflected in the levels of public dissatisfaction over 
living conditions, despite the progress made  in terms of 
per capita income (graph below). The situation in Tunisia 
is particularly interesting as it shows a high dissatisfac-
tion index despite a 4% increase in GDP/capita on average 
over the last decade. The report therefore recommends 
the strengthening of social cohesion through appropriate 
fiscal policies, employment policies, education and social 
protection, and suggests that certain grants should be 
called into question as they are overly favourable to the 
wealthier classes (e.g. subsidies for the consumption of 
fossil fuels, which according to the International Energy 
Agency reached 450 billion USD in 2010). 
It is hoped that this work and a growing awareness of 
the issue of inequality will enable the post-2015 agenda 
to go beyond the measurement of absolute poverty alone. 
Indeed, a growing number of experts are arguing for the 
integration of relative poverty indicators (such as, for 
example, the UNDP’s indicator of measuring the propor-
tion of people with an income of less than half the median 
income) into measurement indicators. This approach would 
be easier to implement if, as advocated by the OECD, 
targets and indicators were not limited to the overall objec-
tives and indicators of comparability between countries, 
but they incorporated national objectives with indicators to 
monitor a country’s progress in relation to its own situa-
tion. n 
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FIGURE 2 Judging the quality of one’s own living conditions
The expectations of the middle class are rising in many developing countries, along with rising incomes 
and education levels. The fastest growth of the sample (China) and the lowest one (Thailand) correspond 
respectively to the highest and lowest levels of a population’s satisfaction with its living conditions. In Tunisia 
however, despite positive indicators in terms of increasing revenue and education level, the population 
remains largely unsatisfied.
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n historical terms, the measurement and understanding of inequalities in the 
world are relatively recent concerns. During the first part of the twentieth 
century, when most of the countries that would later become known as “devel-
oping countries” were undergoing colonization, there was no question of 
comparing the living standards of European populations, or those of European 
origin, with the situation of African or Asian populations, nor of reducing the 
gap between one and the other. At the time, a barrier of incomparability existed 
between colonized peoples and those who were not, which, depending on the 
various colonial empires, was expressed in a legal form, but also on the basis of 
differences in race and civilisation: the view was held that “whites”, “blacks” 
and “yellows” could not have the same needs or social aspirations. Without doubt, 
the development of international statistical data has, since the nineteenth century, 
played a role in the beginnings of a hierarchal definition of living standards across 
the world. But this remains “geographically limited to civilised countries” (Horvath, 
1972): in other words, concerning mainly European and North American countries 
which, due to their assumed degree of “civilization”, share the same referential space. 
The emergence of comparative data on living standards for societies that underwent 
industrialization in the nineteenth century is also closely linked to the development 
of social legislation intended to “govern misery” (Procacci, 1993), something which 
did not apply in the colonies.
The aim of this article is to put into perspective the conditions under which compa-
rable standards of living in the world emerged in the mid-twentieth century, focusing 
particularly on the contradictory role that may have been played by the data on one 
side, and the paradigm of race on the other. More specifically, this article focuses on 
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Controversial indicators of standards of living lie at the heart of inequal-
ity issues. A history of international comparisons of living conditions 
shows that these indicators definitely help change how the world is seen 
and whether human rights are recognized. By putting everyone into 
a space of equivalence that enables quantification, statistics serve as 
new tools for generating discussion about the reconfiguration of power 
relationships.
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the first ever collection of data on living conditions in French colonial Africa. How 
has this knowledge been materially developed? To which questions, both internal and 
external to the empire, was it addressed? What were the different political uses of such 
data? Through the analysis of these questions, a number of contemporary issues will 
be raised regarding the measurement of inequality in the world, issues which echo 
controversies that appeared some sixty years ago.
The first evaluations of inequality in industrial societies
Since the mid-nineteenth century, a number of industrial societies have collected 
statistical information to measure and compare the living conditions of populations 
in terms of collective standards. Although most of this data primarily resulted from 
the initiatives of individual scholars, industrialists and doctors, it was correlated with 
new social legislation that was being established in certain countries. In England, 
where the adoption of the Poor Law Amendment Act in 1834 led to multiple contro-
versies over the government’s management of poverty, several major surveys were 
thus made in the second half of that century to estimate the numbers of poor people 
living in certain cities. The most important of these surveys were conducted succes-
sively by Charles Booth and Benjamin Rowntree who are now considered as the main 
precursors of the “poverty line” concept: from the perspective of their research, poverty 
became a category that was defined by a quantitative threshold, allowing it to be 
compared from one place to another (Carré, Révauger, 1995). At around the same 
time, similar surveys on the working classes were being conducted in France, while 
from 1841 onwards the first social laws were passed, which were expected to reduce 
the hardships endured by the workers. One of the stated objectives of these surveys 
was to allow “a comparison between places and people” in the words of Frederic Le 
Play, who was the author of an important series of monographic studies conducted in 
the second half of the century on workers” conditions (Le Play, 1879).
From such research the concept of social inequality emerged, in the sense that it is 
currently perceived (Desrosieres, 2008), although at the time these social inequali-
ties mainly remained thought of at the level of a single country, where the same assis-
tance and management mechanisms applied. Admittedly, there were some examples 
of cross-national comparisons in this area, particularly the work of Le Play (1879) and 
Rowntree (1910), but also within the framework of the first international statistical 
congresses that, in the second half of the nineteenth century, gathered specialists in 
demography, health and work (Brian, 1989). Unemployment figures in particular – 
which, from the 1880s, gradually replaced poverty as a category of public action in 
industrial societies (Topalov, 1994) – led to international comparisons of the actual 
situation itself, but also of the policies that were put in place to deal with the problem. 
But such comparative approaches to the understanding of living conditions remained 
rare until the early twentieth century.
Between the two world wars, the measurement and international comparisons of 
living conditions became more formalized due to the influence of the League of Nations 
(LON) and the International Labour Office (ILO). At the disposal of these institutions 
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was quantitative data that governments were collecting on an increasingly routine 
basis for political purposes, although the production of statistics in this manner did not 
necessarily obey the same methodological framework. One of the LON’s objectives was 
to work towards a standardization that would enable the comparison between circum-
stances in different nations and also the different ways in which the public authorities 
were managing the issues. This was particularly important in the 1930s as the economic 
crisis had resulted in the deterioration of living conditions throughout most industrial-
ized countries. In 1932, the ILO thus published a “study of international comparisons of 
costs of living” that was based on a series of surveys involving working people from 15 
cities in Europe and the United States. In 1935, the LON Health Committee launched 
a programme to assess levels of nutrition in the world by adopting universal standards 
on calorie and nutritional requirements, and guidelines to harmonize the methods of 
investigation. In 1938, the ILO carried out another study on “the living standards of 
workers” in which, for the first time by an international organization, some “generally 
accepted objective standards” of living were proposed (Bonnecase, 2011).
Such activities of measurement and comparison, while enabling a figure to be put 
on inequality in the world, remained however largely confined to a white and civilised 
world: colonized populations were generally excluded from this common reference 
point. Significantly, discussions at the ILO and LON during the inter-war period, when 
touching on Africa, did not concern living conditions and social legislation, but rather 
so called specifically African problems, especially slavery and forced labour (Cooper, 
2004), the persistence of which was an ongoing concern in international fora. However, 
when the issue under consideration was health, nutritional conditions or mortality 
trends, the debate tended to focus mainly on industrialized countries. Indeed, colonial 
administrations had very little quantitative data on these issues. While the improve-
ment of living conditions of colonized peoples was a key aspect of the colonial justifica-
tion for conquest, it was not considered that this required measurement in order to be 
demonstrated: as evidence of such improvement, reports of clinics, agricultural develop-
ment work and schools counted more than statistics. Certainly, colonial administrators 
produced an abundance of statistics within the framework of the routine management 
of their territories, but they related more to the colonial work itself, rather than to the 
lives of colonized peoples. What tended to be measured were things like the number 
of people treated or vaccinated in the clinics, the number of tonnes of grain produced 
in a region, the number of children enrolled in schools, i.e. the performance of the 
different colonial services. However, such data ultimately said very little about the way 
people lived in colonies: no administrator sought to specify to what extent colonized 
populations were likely to eat a poorer diet or to die younger than European popula-
tions. Inequality between these two population groups was not measured until the early 
1940s, simply because it was considered that they did not belong to the same world. 
Mobilization and internationalization of knowledge
Following the Second World War, the colonial empires were embroiled in a crisis of 
legitimacy led by heterogeneous actors, including new United Nations (UN) bodies and 
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mobilized populations within colonies. French and British Africa had already witnessed 
great strikes in the late 1930s. In the British Empire, these strikes contributed to the 
adoption of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, which represented 
a real break in colonial policy: the improvement of living conditions in the colonies, 
which until then was based primarily on local budgets, became the object of metro-
politan public investment. In the French Empire, a similar break occurred in 1946 with 
the establishment of investment funds for economic and social development, while 
the colonies were shaken by a new phase of protests (Cooper, 2004).
This combination of institutional reforms and social mobilizations fundamentally 
altered the understanding of living conditions within imperial territories. On the 
one hand, new laws and policies to establish the transfer of funds from metropoles 
to colonies, encouraged administrations and the public to put the socio-economic 
disparities between the two population groups under further scrutiny; while on the 
other hand, colonial populations that had been mobilized in the fight to improve their 
living conditions eventually began to compare their own situation with those living 
in the metropolitan state. For example, railway workers in French West Africa, who 
were among the originators of the major strikes that caused alarm in the post-war 
colonial federation, requested that their working conditions and wages were deter-
mined according to the same rules as applied throughout the entire Empire. It was 
ultimately colonial differentialism, in terms of a growing awareness of living condi-
tions, that was at the heart of the conflict.   
The then newly formed UN organization became one of the main initiators of 
external pressure, on top of the internal social protests in imperial territories. In the 
post-war period, the UN quickly adopted an anti-colonial stance under the influence 
of the USSR and the United States, countries that officially opposed colonization, and 
also that of former colonies which had gained independence. While most criticism 
focused on the legal status of colonized peoples and their exclusion from the political 
sphere, the issue of living conditions was also taken on board. According to the charter 
adopted in January 1945 by the UN, Member States which “assume responsibility for 
the administration of territories whose peoples do not administrate themselves yet [...] 
accept the obligation to promote as much as possible their prosperity”. They commit 
themselves “to this end to communicate regularly [...] statistical information and others 
of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the 
territories for which they are respectively responsible” (United Nations Charter, 
Article 73 e). According to this clause, itself marked by an “ideology of development” 
that grew following the War (Rist, 1996), colonial powers were obliged to provide 
statistical proof of their willingness to improve the social and economic situation of 
colonized populations.
This political reconsideration of living conditions in the world in general, and in 
the colonies in particular, went together with the technical effort within interna-
tional organizations to produce new evaluation standards. Each specialized institution 
exerted standardizing actions within its own field. FAO, for example, in 1946 launched 
the first major “world food survey” and three years later instituted a “Committee on 
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Calorie Requirements”, which reviewed the validity of the pre-war minimum food 
requirement standards that were set by the LON, but which had most often been 
applied only to populations in Europe and North America. The primary objective was 
to collect standardized food information in territories where it was clearly lacking: in 
retrospect it was realized the extent to which, when undernourishment and malnu-
trition was considered in the 1930s, “we were almost always thinking of Eastern and 
South-Eastern European countries, with the Bosphorus [appearing] as the limit of the 
intellectual horizon” (FAO, 1955). Subsequently, the mental picture of food inequality 
was expanded to include non-European populations.
More generally, it was the overall measurement of living conditions across the 
world that became the subject of debate within international organizations. The 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) thus adopted a first resolution in 1949 
requesting the Economic and Social Council to assess the social situation in the 
world from “quantitative indices of satisfaction of needs whose existence is univer-
sally recognized”. Three years later, it adopted a second resolution in which it called 
for the development of “adequate statistical methods and techniques so as best to 
facilitate the gathering and use of pertinent data in order to enable the Secretary-
General to publish regular annual reports showing changes in absolute levels of 
living conditions in all countries” (Bonnecase, 2011). The intention was to bring all 
of the world’s populations into the same field of reference, where differences were 
both comparable and measurable, so that it became no longer only living conditions 
that were under discussion, but also living standards.
This led to the formation of a committee of experts from the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council, which in the early 1950s was charged with considering “the defini-
tion and evaluation of standards of living in an international perspective”. It included 
economists, demographers and other experts who, like Louis-Joseph Lebret in France, 
had previously worked on the theme of poverty in different countries and was by then 
dedicated to the study of inequalities in living standards internationally. Several contro-
versies afflicted the work of this committee. The main one concerned the relevance 
of a single index for the standard of living, since “the use of a uniform and universal 
system of values” could contribute to “penalising international technical progress 
in the West”. Infant mortality rate and life expectancy were discussed at this time, 
although it was said that “longevity does not necessarily indicate a degree of sanitary 
quality”. However, the main statistic highlighted was the national income per capita: it 
appeared as a “fairly comprehensive indicator of the determinants of living conditions 
as a whole”, even though it may generate “rather false conclusions on the differences 
between living standards in different regions of the world”, since “the non-market 
goods and services are partly excluded from the measurement” (Economic and Social 
Council of the United nations, 1954).
These controversies are of interest as they foreshadow more recent debates, particu-
larly on the dominance of productive indicators in the measurement of well-being, but 
also on the relevance of universal indices applied to different populations, regardless 
of how these populations may experience their own living conditions (Destremau, 
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Salama, 2002): such controversies, far from appearing in the last twenty years, were 
present from the outset in the history of the international measurement of living 
standards.
Compiling statistics 
The international demand for statistics was locally translated into a proliferation of 
surveys on living conditions in the colonies, which was sometimes met with resist-
ance from colonial administrators who were initially responsible for such investiga-
tions and often reluctant to   internationalize knowledge. Taking the food situation in 
French West Africa as an example, the first ever research conducted here into nutri-
tion was entrusted to a new agency, known as the Anthropological Mission, largely 
comprising military doctors and pharmacists. In the second half of the 1940s, the 
FIGURE 1 Measuring living standards internationally
The use of living standards indicators to enable comparisons between all of the world’s countries is a recent 
approach. The first trials of these indicators were conducted in the mid-1950s, showing that the objective to 
take multiple facets of life into account is not new, but the earliest attempts were hampered by the absence 
of measurable factors or statistical systems.
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Mission carried out an extensive survey in several of the federation’s colonies, which 
involved the observation of family meals and the weighing of food that went into the 
composition of these meals. For the first time the French government was seeking 
to quantify, according to clearly defined methodological procedures, the average 
calorie and nutritional intake in African towns and villages. However, underlying 
this innovative research was the racial assumption that Africans and Europeans did 
not necessarily have the same physiological needs: the fact that the people surveyed 
did not have a more malnourished bodily appearance, given their calculated food 
intake, led to the assumption that “the body of black people does not operate like 
[that of the whites]” (Pales, 1954). Investigators then tested this hypothesis for a 
number of nutrients before dismissing it, on a case by case basis, and concluded the 
uniqueness of the human physiology.
Despite these prejudices, research did however reveal the relative importance of 
nutritional problems in African populations, which was not obvious at the time. 
According to the results, the average calorie intake over one year was sufficient on 
average, while showing large variations depending on the timing and on the location 
studied: the strong decrease in the level of consumption during the “hunger gap”, 
although a widely known phenomenon, appeared in retrospect to have been underes-
timated. The same applied to qualitative deficiencies, which appeared relatively high 
in terms of what was considered by FAO nutritionists to be normal requirements. The 
administration, however, did not readily accept these findings as evidence, particu-
larly due to the small number of surveys on which they were based, which called 
into question their validity in terms of the whole of West Africa. Furthermore, the 
researchers knew that the people they observed strongly distrusted them, meaning 
that, in the eyes of the former, there was an additional parameter that significantly 
distorted the value of the results: for example, when the calculated intake appeared 
too low, the studied populations were sometimes suspected of concealing a propor-
tion of their nutrient intake; or, conversely, when the intake was higher than expected, 
investigators suspected individuals of making exaggerated claims about their wealth 
(Bonnecase, 2009). 
In the 1950s, this process of quantifying calorie intakes was continued, but under 
the auspices of new players: the colonial administrators, whom had previously held 
a quasi-monopoly on research in the colonies, began to be gradually replaced by 
professional nutritionists, sociologists and economists. New organizations acquired a 
central role in the compilation of data on living standards, especially ORSTOM (Office 
of Overseas Scientific and Technical Research), which was created in 1944, and the 
INSEE (National Institute of Statistical and Economic Studies), established in 1946. 
Methods of investigation were also changing, particularly through the adoption of 
the sampling technique. Thus, in 1957, the first food surveys based on probability 
samples were conducted in francophone West Africa. The same type of research was 
carried out in British colonies where Nutrition Committees were established after the 
War. By the late 1950s, Africa was still not yet considered as the main continent of 
hunger, in comparison to perceptions thereafter. However, compared to the situation 
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ten years earlier, there was increasing recogni-
tion - backed up by data - of the level of under-
nourishment and malnutrition experienced by 
a number of African populations (Bonnecase, 
2011).
A similar trend was emerging in the assess-
ment of health levels, while demographics 
and infant mortality rates in particular were 
regarded by international organizations as 
the key indicators. In the immediate post-war 
period, colonial administrations had only a very 
small amount of synthetic data on the issue: 
most of the demographic knowledge available 
was based on administrative censuses that were 
regularly organized in various districts for tax 
purposes. Besides the fact that these figures 
did not paint a remotely accurate picture of 
reality, because many people developed strate-
gies for concealing information from the census 
enumerators, they had not previously been 
regarded as of particular significance in terms 
of living conditions. If administrators were keen 
to take up the fight against “the depopulation 
of Africa” in the inter-war period, known in the 
French Empire as the “decline of the black race” 
(Conklin, 1997), it was mainly because it was 
seen as an obstacle to the development of the 
continent,.
During the 1950s, demographers in Africa 
instigated the first large population studies. In 
1950, the French Imperial government ordered 
a review of its territories, not only to investigate 
whether population growth was compatible 
with an “industrial take-off”, but also to assess 
“the elevation of the health status and the improvement of the way of life” (Bonne-
case, 2011). Some demographic sample surveys were organized by INSEE agents 
which, for the first time, enabled the establishment of synthetic data at the level of 
entire colonies. Certainly, even in the eyes of their creators, these surveys produced 
results that appeared quite random, a fact that was due to the material difficulties 
encountered during the investigations, as well as the people’s persistent distrust of 
enumeration efforts. However, these figures, especially the ones on infant mortality, 
enabled a hierarchy of health to be drawn up in which African territories now had 
their place. These data, in the absence of alternatives, continued to be regarded as 
FIGURE 2 Initial assessments of infant mortality in Africa
Initial demographic sample surveys, aiming in 
particular to measure infant mortality, have been 
conducted in sub-Saharan Africa since the 1950s. 
The results, despite uncertainties, highlight 
significant differences across the world, with the 
infant mortality risk being three to ten times greater 
in Africa than in Europe.
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definitive by international bodies until the first general population censuses on the 
continent in the 1970s.
National income was a third fundamental research area that contributed to the 
ranking of colonial territories on a scale of living conditions in the post-war period. 
On this aspect, a lack of knowledge was not a colonial specificity: even in industrial 
countries it was not until the 1930s or 1940s that the public authorities made regular 
records of national income while also developing their economic policies in the wake 
of Keynesianism (Vanoli, 2002). In the United States, the Senate called for the estab-
lishment of “national income estimates” for the first time in 1934, in a context of new 
investment policies that had been set in place to deal with the crisis; in Great Britain, 
such calculations became systematic from 1941 for the purpose of rationalising the 
war effort; in France, this trend towards modern national accounts emerged slightly 
later with the creation in 1945 of the Commissariat du Plan and the INSEE in 1946 
(Desrosieres, 2003). The earliest calculations of national income in the colonies was 
closely linked to the launch of proactive investment, the formulation of which, if not 
the practice, required new macroeconomic data. However, the compilation of such data 
also reflected the will to evaluate the effects of policies “on raising living standards, 
[...] by generating from all existing statistical data a single figure for each country and 
FIGURE 3 Initial comparisons of national income per capita in developing countries
Income measurement and its comparison have given a new prominence to inequalities in the world, while 
also reinforcing the idea that the need to catch up with developed countries should be at the heart of any 
development policy. 
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for each year, a figure which should indicate what is commonly called, in European 
countries, the national income” (Ministère de la France d’Outre mer, 1955).
The first national incomes of colonial territories were obtained from 1948 onwards 
in British Africa, and from 1951 in French Africa: some statisticians, generally from 
the Central Statistical Office or the INSEE, sought to apply an accounting system in 
overseas territories that had already been applied in the metropoles. However, they 
remained extremely cautious about the value of their results, in part because the 
validity of the statistical production on which their calculations were based remained 
questionable, due to the practical conditions in which they were developed by the 
colonial administrations, and secondly because it was difficult to define “the bound-
aries of production” (Jerven 2009), i.e. to agree on which activity sectors – especially 
the non-monetized sectors of the domestic economy – should be included in the 
calculations. The meaning accorded to the averages obtained was also a subject of 
controversy: while figures on national income per capita were intended to reflect 
the standard of living of colonial populations, the interpretation and “international 
comparisons that could arise” remained highly objectionable to statisticians, because 
of the strong heterogeneity of calculation conditions from one country to another 
(Courcier, Dubois, Fabre, 1958). Harmonization efforts were undertaken in the 
1950s under the auspices of the UN (United Nations statistical office, 1957), 
which at the beginning of the next decade gave rise to the establishment of “national 
accounts manuals adapted to developing countries” (Courcier, Le Hegarat, 1963). 
But many differences remained between countries with regard to the classification 
of economic agents, the monetary transcription system of non-market activities, 
the manner in which they were or were not included in the calculations or, more 
fundamentally, empirical data upon which the evaluation of production was based 
(Courcier, Ady, 1961).
The circumstances under which the statistics on national incomes developed did 
not however prevent them from being used in ways that their designers had not 
intended, and once established it wasn’t long before international fora appropriated 
the data. Statistics on hunger or infant mortality were used to formally place colonized 
people into an international hierarchy of living standards, placing them on the same 
continuum as non-colonized populations. Viewed through the prism of “development”, 
these scales indicated the degree to which each territory had “advanced”. Although 
this placed them in a position of relative inferiority, it appeared that they were now 
being promised the same social and economic future as developed countries: the gap 
between colonized and non-colonized populations became measurable, which simul-
taneously gave rise to the belief that it would be possible for them to catch up.
Discussing inequalities in an imperial context 
The significance of such statistics, beyond the technical conditions in which they 
were developed, therefore became eminently political. Not only did the data serve 
to highlight the existence of food, health and socio-economic issues in the territories 
concerned, but it also contributed to the emergence of a new cognitive framework 
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from which the world’s inequalities could be expressed, thereby providing a basis for 
new demands for equality.
These demands first manifested through international activism, and especially 
through the notion of “Third Worldism” which developed during the 1950s, a notion 
which takes its name from the works of Alfred Sauvy, a French economist and demog-
rapher who coined the term Third World in 1952, who referred to this Third World 
as “exploited, scorned like the Third Estate”, and which “also wants to be something” 
(Sauvy, 1952). This ideology, in addition to the various economic theories and political 
struggles that structured it, was initially fuelled by data that showed the inequalities 
between the “third world” and “developed worlds”. In the symbolic area of food, the 
1950s were the years that saw the emergence of the concept of “world hunger”, which 
implied the comparison of levels of food and nutrition throughout the world. At this 
juncture it is worth noting the story of Josué de Castro, a Brazilian geographer who 
was the first pamphleteer of books on this subject: he conducted research into the food 
shortages that afflicted his own country in the 1940s, before establishing in the 1950s 
a global “geopolitics of hunger” largely informed by statistical data (Castro, 1951), 
which served as a reference for many international campaigns over the next decade.
In the 1950s, knowledge on living standards also provided new opportunities for, 
sometimes antagonistic, discussion for the political actors in the colonial empires. From 
the point of view of metropolitan governments, they served as a means of legitimiza-
tion while new policies of investment were implemented in the colonies. For example, 
it became possible through the calculation of data on national income to quantify the 
“overall progress” delivered by colonisation, whatever the technical quality of the 
figures. In the French Empire, the strong growth of African economies during the 1950s 
was thus quickly indexed by the colonial authorities, both as evidence that “thanks 
to French efforts, living standards had risen in colonies” and as an encouragement to 
“pursue development policies” that had been undertaken 10 years previously. Admit-
tedly, the per capita income in African territories is often “characteristic of under-
developed countries”. But other nations, among the most opposed to colonialism in 
international fora, are “equally underdeveloped” and even “in a more serious manner” 
(AOF General Government, 1953).
Conversely, from the perspective of trade unions and the mobilized political parties 
of the colonies, the new data on living standards supported a denunciation of poverty, 
a state in which many people within the empire continued to live in, even calling 
into question the very idea of “colonial achievement”. In the French Empire, newly 
elected African Parliamentarians thus became able to highlight alarming statistics 
to the National Assembly, such as “dietary intakes that were often less than 2000 
calories” and “rates of infant mortality between 25% to 50%, compared to 4% to 7% 
in European countries”, denouncing the insufficient efforts to improve living condi-
tions. In the colonies, trade unions, equipped with supporting figures, became able to 
demonstrate the contrast between the “imperialist bourgeoisie, living in luxury,” and 
“the poverty experienced by the vast majority of colonial populations” (Bonnecase, 
2011). Within colonies, the new statistical knowledge even enabled the quantification 
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of differences that had never previously been measured: in French West Africa for 
example, national income data were used to calculate that “living conditions” in the 
federation were on average 40 times higher “among whites” than “among blacks”, 
finding that “modern sector revenues accrue mainly to the former” while income from 
“mixed and traditional sectors” were more for the latter (Capet and Fabre, 1957). 
Ultimately, a new expression of justice had emerged within the imperial territories: 
while colonial knowledge on the social situation in colonies had long been based on 
the idea of a natural difference between the colonized and those who were not, it 
became possible with the introduction of statistics to imagine that the former could 
become equal to the latter, not only in terms of political rights and legal status, but 
also in terms of material living conditions.
Conclusion
In The statistical argument, Alain Desrosières explains that “applying and building 
a space of equivalence enabling quantification, and thus measurement, has both 
political and technical results. It is political in that it changes the world: comparing 
the aristocracy with commoners led to the night of the 4th August [abolition of 
feudalism during the French revolution]; comparing blacks with whites called for 
the abolition of slavery; comparing women with men called for a real universal 
suffrage that included women” (Desrosieres, 2008). Statistical information, such 
as that described in this article, has undoubtedly helped change the way in which 
people see the world, if not actually directly changing it. We should not, however, 
credit such data with too much importance nor view them as causal agents in the 
history of political change: ultimately, these statistics only served as a new tool to 
engender discussion on the reconfiguration of power relations, but they have not in 
their own right changed the nature of inequality.
Finally, how can such a story enlighten us in terms of the modern controversies on 
the measurement of inequality in the world? The first lesson is that arguments over 
the choice of a “good indicator” – and over the place granted to productive criteria 
in particular – have not appeared in the 1990s with the advent of the Human Devel-
opment Index, or in the 2000s with discussions on the “Measurement of Economic 
and Social Performance” (Fitoussi, Sen, Stiglitz, 2009): they were already part of 
the international debate on the definition and evaluation of living standards in the 
1950s. The second lesson is that these first statistics on the world’s living standards 
were used without consideration for the material conditions under which they were 
developed, which again foreshadows more recent realities: while contemporary statis-
tics on poverty can sometimes resemble a “great swindle” (Lorraine Data, 2009) in 
both the North and the South, this does not prevent them from indicating realities and 
being used to either manage or refute them. A third lesson is that the first international 
standards of living statistics have contributed to the building of a common space of 
possibilities, and this may nuance the normative and somewhat oppressive dimension 
that they can also carry. The emergence of post-war “development” has often been 
seen as a device of power, the imposition of a social and economic trajectory onto large 
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populations that was mainly informed by Western history (Escobar, 1995). However, 
historically this knowledge was also considered by some of these populations, that 
had experienced a form of government based on race, as a means to express a funda-
mental claim: to be considered, if not measured, in the same way as everyone else. ■
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T
his article aims to situate, in chronological 
terms and in terms of ideas, the emergence of 
international statistics on inequality. We high-
light the limitations of the data that are most 
commonly used to quantify inequalities, such 
as national income per capita and the Gini coefficient, 
and present some alternatives that have been launched 
over the last 20 years. The contribution of geography to an 
evolving statistical corpus is demonstrated. 
The limits of national accounting for understanding 
internal inequalities
International organizations are the main producers of 
economic data enabling comparisons between countries. 
These databases are supplied by official State bodies, such 
as National Statistical Institutes (NSI), ministries, commis-
sions and governmental agencies. Economic statistics 
such as Gross National Income (GNI) and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), which record the total market added value 
for all goods and services sold in a year (on the basis of 
nationality for the former, and territory for the latter), are 
often used to compare inequalities between countries; and 
also to provide a picture of inequality in terms of economic 
power. The GNI, through a simple division, is commonly 
converted to a per capita figure and thus used to compare 
the average income per person. The “unit of account” is 
transformed from the nation to the individual, but this ratio 
completely masks the gaps within societies.
The GNI and GDP were not in fact designed for the 
quantification of inequalities. At the heart of what is called 
national accounts, these indicators were developed in 
the early 1940s, originally in the United States and later 
in Europe by researchers as tools of management and 
short-term forecasting of economic flows (the increase 
in production value and, in the context of the 1930s and 
1940s, its possible contraction) as outlined by Thomas 
Piketty in this volume. These tools were originally part of 
a Keynesian approach, where the State affirms itself as 
the driver of the economy (VANOLI, 2002). Today, the GNI 
refers to a set of robust and standardized statistics, calcu-
lated with quarterly regularity in most countries. It remains 
valuable for longitudinal comparisons and/or retrospective 
estimates enabling the reconstruction of series that cover 
several centuries (MADDISON, 2006). 
In addition to the GNI, the Gini index on income reveals 
information about inequality in terms of a society’s internal 
income distribution, within a particular country. Created in 
the 1920s and released at the international level by the 
World Bank and the OECD, this index is the only one to 
benefit from having the noun “inequalities” mentioned in 
the databases of both institutions, thus highlighting the 
emphasis that international organizations have placed on 
the strictly monetary aspects of inequality. The number 
of countries for which there are no recent Gini indica-
tors (and sometimes no Gini indicators at all) is also very 
important1. The financial and human effort entailed  in the 
determination of the GDP or GNI remains much higher 
than that deployed for the exhaustive quantification of 
domestic inequalities. Without doubt, the first priority of 
1. On the World Bank’s data website (http://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI), data under 5 years exist for only 
34% of countries, 46% of which concern the period 1991-2007 
and no Gini index is reported for 20% of States. 
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the World Bank is to establish accurate assessments of 
the macroeconomic situations of its debtors (CLING and 
ROUBAUD, 2008), while understanding the evolution of their 
internal inequalities does not take precedence, because 
such data does not directly provide information on the 
ability of countries to repay their debts. In response to 
the quantifications from the national accounts, which are 
primarily tools for States, alternative indicators of inequality 
are organized in two directions: not strictly monetary devel-
opment and environment.
Challenges and alternatives to the quantification of 
monetary inequalities
From the report of the Club of Rome (MEADOWS, MEADOWS, 
RANDERS and BEHRENS III, 1972) to that of the Stiglitz commis-
sion (STIGLITZ, SEN and FITOUSSI, 2009), most of the critical 
debates on inequality indicators focus on what GNI/GDP 
actually quantify and on the overemphasis they place on 
economic growth. The limitations of GNI/GDP, which have 
been well known for a long time, include: only taking 
market activities into account (the entire informal sector 
is excluded) and ignoring their many negative externalities, 
for example on the environment (pollution of air and soil, 
greenhouse gas emissions, etc.) (GADREY and JANY-CATRICE, 
2005). While knowledge of these limitations originally 
emerged in academic research environments, NGOs and 
a number of international institutions, such as the UNDP, 
now convey these criticisms.
Although the normative power of the UNDP is definitely 
lower than that of international donors such as the World 
Bank, in 1990, through its Human Development Report 
Office (HDRO), it launched the Human Development Index 
(HDI). The HDI’s originators intended it to be an alternative 
to GDP, moving the basis of the quantification of human 
well-being onto individuals, rather than on macroeco-
nomic income growth. The HDI has evolved over time, 
evidenced by its abandonment of UNESCO’s official statis-
tics on Education, to use international surveys instead 
(BARRO and LEE, 2010), and then the use of GNI instead 
of GDP to take into account income transfers between 
residents and non-residents.
In response to continued criticism of the HDI as merely 
an average value that masks inequalities within societies, 
in 2010 the HDRO introduced an adjusted version of 
the index, taking inequalities into account (Box 1). The 
popularity of the HDI has led to a global spread of its use 
at subnational scales, by provinces or even by counties 
(such as in Brazil, where the HDI is updated annually for 
the 5560 municípios).
Taking the environmental dimension into account
A significant part of the criticisms aimed at indicators 
of monetary inequalities derives from the fact that they 
neglect or only barely consider environmental aspects. 
In the early 1990s, before the Earth Summit (Rio, 1992), 
two researchers from the University of British Columbia 
(Vancouver, Canada), William Rees and Mathis Wacker-
nagel, defined and produced the first quantifications of the 
Ecological Footprint (EF). The innovation of this indicator 
is that it is expressed in global hectares and obtained 
by subtracting the total amount of resources consumed 
BOX 1. Quantification of inequalities by Human 
Development Index (HDI)
There are three main methods used for the quanti-
fication of inequalities: 
1. A version of the HDI adjusted to inequality – the 
IHDI – has been in use since 2010, which goes down 
when internal inequalities are high. 
2. The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), which 
considers the multiple deprivations faced by the 
poorest. This initiative, which was launched by the 
University of Oxford, has been adopted and supported 
by the HDRO. 
3. Gender disparities are quantified through the 
gender inequality index (GII). 
It is worth noting that the latter two indicators do not 
take the monetary criterion of income into account. The 
independent status of the HDRO, vis-à-vis the UNDP 
and its Member States, gives it a freedom to create 
such indicators. The HDRO functions as a de facto 
research centre and has the ability to make relatively 
unrestricted decisions about the statistical sources that 
it considers relevant. 
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by humanity from the Earth’s regenerative capacity. A 
negative value indicates a depletion of the Earth’s reserves, 
while a positive value indicates the sustainable use of 
resources. The design of the indicator allows it to be used 
to calculate the EF for different territorial levels (States, 
cities, regions, etc.) and for various actors (companies, 
governments, individuals, etc.). Supported by the World 
Wide Fund for Nature in the early 2000s and then highly 
publicized, the EF became the symbol of the alternative 
environmental indicator: experimental and “unofficial” 
in the beginning, and now commonplace in institutional 
reports and government rhetoric. Today the EF is a trade-
marked concept, organized in a global network that brings 
NGOs and academic centres together.
Faced with these initiatives, international organizations 
in turn integrated environmental factors into their own 
indicators, even if they remained largely monetary-based. 
Thus, in 2002 the World Bank launched the concept of 
“Genuine Savings”. Expressed as a share of GNI, it is 
calculated by subtracting the damage caused to economic 
and natural capital from gross savings (from the national 
accounts), followed by the addition of investment in educa-
tion. In addition, very recently at the 2012 Rio +20 Summit 
the United Nations University (IHDP) and UNEP seized the 
opportunity to present its tests involving several countries 
on the measurement of an “Inclusive Wealth Index” that 
is intended to provide an alternative to per capita GNI 
and HDI.  
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FIGURE 1 Comparison of indicators of inequality in South America, 2011
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Figure 1 shows a comparison between the results of a 
number of inequality indicators that were applied for South 
America. It is important to note that the levels and rankings 
of States change significantly according to the choice of 
indicator. A general dynamic is difficult to emerge: some 
countries tend to retain their rank (intermediate for Brazil, 
top ranking for Argentina), while others, such as Chile 
or Bolivia, show very different positions depending on 
whether one focuses on human development or environ-
mental sustainability.
The contribution of geography
International statistics that use the nation as the “base 
unit” cover very heterogeneous situations. Demographic 
giants with over a billion people (such as India for example) 
are contrasted with islands of a few hundred thousand 
people (e.g. some of the Pacific Islands). In terms of densi-
ties, continent-States with low population densities, such 
as Russia, differ considerably from totally urbanized city-
states like Singapore. The so-called “anamorphic” maps 
(or cartograms) where each country is swollen or shrunk 
according to the size of its population, partly enable these 
differences to be highlighted (LEVY, 2008). In addition to 
the quantification of inequalities within societies, it seems 
necessary to “zoom in” to finer spatial scales – what 
geographers would consider as “large scales” – such as 
provinces or municipalities. Figure 2 shows that national 
(federal in the case of India) averages can mask strong 
, There are many possible 
indicators of inequality. All of 
these indicators, however, or 
nearly all, rank the performance 
of states differently – in this 
case for Latin America. It is 
difficult to see the emergence 
of a general dynamic: some 
countries tend to stay at the 
same level (intermediate 
for Brazil, the highest for 
Argentina), while others, such 
as Chile or Bolivia, show very 
different standings depending 
on whether one focuses on 
economic performance, human 
development or environmental 
sustainability. In addition to 
these indicators, slum population 
estimates reveal that countries 
that rank highly in this regard, 
particularly Brazil, may also 
have numerous billionaires 
(including as a proportion of the 
population).
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internal geographical inequalities and that, according to 
this multidimensional poverty index, the Indian States 
experiencing the worst situations are comparable to some 
sub-Saharan African countries. The necessary fine scale 
microdata for this purpose do not fall within the open data 
movement that exist for some indicators, and are therefore 
often difficult to obtain or require payment.
In addition, cities and urban areas carry a greater 
weight in both demographic and economic terms. Today, 
more than half of the world’s population inhabit urban 
areas, which are emerging as essential sites and nodes 
for globalization processes (SASSEN, 2007). It is a damning 
indictment of international organizations that they do not 
provide a level of analysis sufficient to take urban areas into 
account, given that such data is critical for understanding 
inequality. Cities concentrate the rich elites and also the 
poor, with the contrast being particularly pronounced 
in developing countries (Rio de Janeiro, Johannesburg, 
Bombay, Mexico, etc.) where gated communities coexist 
alongside slums. The statistical initiatives of international 
organizations such as UN Habitat attempt to go beyond the 
State as the account unit (which does not allow the consid-
eration of urban areas spanning over several countries) 
by providing quantitative comparisons between cities in 
different countries. The GaWC university network (Global-
ization and World Cities Research Network), which initially 
focused on the connectivity between global cities, also 
, The MPI overcomes the purely economic 
approach (income) to analysing living conditions. 
When applied at the sub-state level, it enables the 
comparison of Indian states with other countries 
in the world, both in terms of proportion of the 
population affected and of the number of individuals 
involved. Thus, in terms of ratio, the lowest levels (in 
Delhi) are close to those of China, while the highest 
(Bihar) are comparable to those of Sierra Leone. As 
for numbers, the poor are more numerous in Uttar 
Pradesh than in Nigeria.
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FIGURE 2 Multidimensional Poverty in Indian States
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provides many relevant indicators (infrastructure, living 
standards, population density, services, companies, etc.) 
to enable the study of inequalities between cities (TAYLOR, 
2004).
Finally, the current “Westphalian” statistical system 
(which has the nation-State as its unit) appears obsolete 
and inadequate for the capture of the deep dynamics of 
inequalities that depend both on global logics (affecting the 
entire globe) and transnational logics (which escape, even 
partially, the control and actions of States) (DURAND et al., 
2013). Thus, the recent cases of transboundary pollution 
caused by oil spills (in the Gulf of Mexico for example) or 
from nuclear disaster (Fukushima) on the one hand, and 
the flows (migration or financial, legal or otherwise) on the 
other, show that States, confined to their national territo-
ries, cannot provide adequate statistical tools to quantify 
these phenomena. 
We see a familiar theme emerging in the production of 
new data that is better able to provide valuable informa-
tion on contemporary challenges, compared to the existing 
statistical system: as was the case for the GDP, or more 
recently for the Top Income Database, it is often academics 
who initiate the criticism of the existing systems and then 
launch new indicators that are better adapted to measuring 
changes in inequality. International organizations have fully 
understood the advantages of such a dynamic and develop 
multiple partnerships with academic research centres. In 
this hybrid collaboration, the latter benefit from the visibility 
and institutional authority of the former, in return, they 
bring scientific credentials. n
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B
efore the World Bank integrated the concepts of inequality and 
equity into its strategic thinking at the beginning of the 2000s, 
a lively debate about poverty reduction was taking place in the 
academic community. It centred on the relationship between 
poverty, inequality and economic growth on the one hand, 
and the definition of poverty and in particular its multidimen-
sional nature on the other. We will briefly review the academic 
history of these ideas before examining how they have perme-
ated operations in the field. 
Since poverty reduction depends in large measure on economic 
growth, the debate about poverty in development economics has long been – above 
all – a debate about growth. The 1990s saw a double turnaround: growth returned 
to developed economies, and growth – and therefore development – returned as a 
topic in economics literature.  The early 1980s had seen a major macroeconomic 
adjustment: inflation born in the aftermath of the oil crisis led the United States to 
change its monetary policy, increasing scarcity in the money supply and generating 
higher interest rates. This caused growth to slow worldwide. As the 1990s began, 
the world came out of this slow-growth period, and what appeared to be sustain-
able growth took hold. The topic of growth reappeared in economics literature.
 First came foundational articles for the “endogenous growth” theory (Romer, 
1986; Lucas, 1988), followed by two ground-breaking papers by Robert J. Barro 
(1991) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) that tried to identify determi-
nant factors for growth through econometric analysis of cross-country data. An 
entire literature then developed around this identification of growth factors. The 
François 
Bourguignon, 
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Since the 1950s, the relationship between inequality, economic growth 
and poverty has fuelled intense academic debates that have shaped 
national policies and development organization strategies. The history 
of economic ideas reveals changes in the growth paradigm, with a pro-
gressively greater focus on how the most disadvantaged can accumu-
late productive assets. New measurement tools, social programmes and 
modalities for steering public policy substantiate this change in focus.
Inequalities and growth: 
A comprehensive ideology 
emerges in 1990-2010
A PLANET FOR L IFE82
endogenous growth theory had a considerable impact. It contrasted with the 1950s 
vision of economic growth (e.g. Robert Solow, 1956), which argued that growth is 
essentially exogenous over the very long term, determined mostly by technological 
progress and managerial or organizational innovations without taking into account 
the drivers of that progress. Robert E. Lucas and Paul Romer showed instead that 
long-range growth rates arise from the preferences of economic agents and from 
the production and organizational features of a given economy. Their contribu-
tion paved the way for subsequent research on the specific growth determinants 
of individual countries.
However, poverty reduction requires not only growth, but also “inclusive” growth 
that benefits everyone. The notion of inclusion opens an important second chapter 
in the poverty-reduction debate: the relationship between growth and inequality. 
In effect, the relationship goes in two directions, from growth to the inequality of 
income distribution on the one hand, and from inequality to growth on the other. On 
the first account, an important hypothesis by Kuznets (1955) suggests that growth 
can generate more or less inequality depending on the development stage of a 
country. The theoretical underpinning of the hypothesis had to do with what Lewis 
(1954) saw as the fundamental (“classical”) model of development. On the second 
account, some theoretical models show how inequality in wealth distribution and 
access to credit or education can constrain growth. This runs contrary to the positive 
relationship previously suggested by some economists, notably the Keynesian Nicolas 
Kaldor1 (1960); in fact, the recent literature has completely overturned such models. 
In situations of strong inequality, for instance, entrepreneurs who lack collateral 
(and therefore access to credit) cannot undertake privately and collectively profit-
able investments. By contrast, entrepreneurs with collateral or even cash to invest 
will pursue projects, even those that eventually provide mediocre returns. Through 
that mechanism, an unequal society may grow more slowly – therefore reducing 
poverty more slowly – since it misses profitable investment opportunities.  Early 
papers rigorously formalizing this idea include Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee 
and Newman (1993).
This kind of analysis provided the starting point for a voluminous literature and 
body of thought on the “poverty-inequality-growth” relationship. Two very frequently 
cited articles are those by Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik 
(1994). They show what appears to be a negative correlation between economic 
growth rates in a sample of countries and the degree of income inequality in these 
countries. That was enough to convince some in the development community that 
maintaining inequalities counters growth and poverty reduction, and that reducing 
inequalities should favour development. Later, development economists and others 
in the field realized that the situation was far more complex, and that these first 
empirical constructs were, in fact, weak and little convincing. Better and more 
1. Kaldor argued that the wealthy saved more than the poor and consequently, even if distribution was unequal, 
there were more savings therefore more growth (Kaldor, 1960). 
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complete data showed no unambiguous empirical relationship between inequality 
and growth2. 
The debate on inequality and growth is directly related to poverty reduction only 
inasmuch as poverty is defined in monetary terms, as for instance the threshold of 
1.25 US dollars a day per person used by international organizations. Yet, such a view 
seems unduly restrictive. In effect, a multidimensional conception of inequalities has 
gradually taken hold, with the conviction that economic growth – even egalitarian 
growth – will not necessarily eradicate all dimensions of poverty. This evolution in 
thinking owes much to Amartya Sen (1985) and his “capability approach,” which 
postulates that what matters is not so much an individual’s level of consumption 
as his or her potential for generating the level to which he or she aspires. Poverty 
thus means the lack of education, healthcare, access to justice and other opportu-
nities as much as it means material deprivation. Researchers quickly realized that 
the correlation between various aspects of poverty (thus defined) and income were 
far from perfect. 
Together, these two currents of thought, about the relationship of inequality and 
growth and the multidimensional character of poverty or ability contributed to 
considerably expanding the development paradigm by emphasizing the fact that, 
in the relationship between inequality and growth, it is the inequality of opportu-
nities – that is, unequal access to productive resources, such as education, credit, 
justice, and government decisions. It is the distribution of such opportunities that 
ultimately determines both the pace of economic growth, the distribution of income 
and, therefore the extent of monetary poverty. The 2006 World Bank report entitled 
Equity and Development exemplifies this evolution in thought: within the World 
Bank itself, it represented considerable conceptual progress in development policies 
and strategies. 
Growth and inequality: what social insurance model 
to use?
Social insurance is an important instrument to promote the equality of opportuni-
ties and to fight poverty; corresponding policies give some indication about govern-
ments” attitudes in this area3. As a matter of fact, it can be observed that govern-
ments adopt different attitudes, often changing stances from one period to the next. 
In developed countries, the 1980s saw the neoliberal revolution, spearheaded by 
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. It led to important reforms in both countries. 
In the United Kingdom, in particular, the government cut deeply into social insurance 
programmes, considered too generous and consequently economically inefficient. 
2. Forbes (2000) found a positive relationship between inequality and growth, whereas Banerjee and Duflo (2003) 
showed none of the previous relationships were robust. In the same way that the first attempts at testing Kuznets” 
hypothesis on a cross-section of countries initially showed an inverted-U relationship between inequality and GDP 
per capita (cf. Alhuwalia, 1996) – a finding that proved non-robust later on with better and more complete data. 
3. For the explicit introduction of social protection policies in the inequality-growth framework alluded to earlier, 
see Benabou (2000).
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In continental Europe, the share of social insurance in the gross domestic product 
(GDP) did not diminish, and even increased in several cases. The shift towards a more 
liberal view came later. Governments imitated the British model principally by trying 
to isolate the social insurance system from the functioning of the labour market to 
minimize its negative effect on economic efficiency. In Denmark, France, Germany 
and the Netherlands, social insurance systems were initially very much linked to 
the salaried employment status of people. Initially, only wage-based employment 
gave entitlement to health insurance, retirement benefits, and certain other social 
welfare expenditures. Gradually, governments undertook significant reforms to this 
model. For example, in France a minimum income known as the “active solidarity 
income” or revenue de solidarité active (RSA, formerly the RMI) is allocated indepen-
dently of the recipient’s employment status. An increasing share of health insurance 
is now financed through income taxes rather than through employment taxes. In 
several continental European countries, governments have moved away from the 
Bismarckian4 model based on salaried or other work toward a Beveridgien5 model 
that offers safety nets to everyone, independent of employment status. Of course, 
this change did not occur in every country; the perception of a common model is 
illusory. However, the “flexicurity” model used in Denmark has gained in popularity 
everywhere; it frees market mechanisms while protecting individuals from the risk 
of entrapment in poverty.
In developing countries, we see great diversity in social insurance systems and 
entitlements. Latin American countries have adopted Bismarckian European 
systems in a particular way, without achieving universal coverage. In postwar 
Europe, social insurance tied to salaried employment expanded readily, because 
salaried workers progressively composed nearly 80%-90% of the labour force. 
That left the self-employed, professionals, small merchants and a small number 
of farmers who soon acquired a status similar to that of salaried workers. In Latin 
America, the extension of the social insurance system did not occur in the absence of 
sufficiently rapid growth sustained for an adequate period. A dual system resulted: 
formal-sector labour received social insurance while, until recently, informal-sector 
workers had none.  
Asian countries offer little social insurance, perhaps because of their very rapid 
growth. In an economy that constantly creates new jobs, households can handle 
mishaps through increased participation in the work force; this constitutes a kind of 
insurance. Oddly enough, it took the 1997 Asian crisis to make South Korea recog-
nize the need for a safety net so that individuals could avoid economic hardships. 
China is coming to the same conclusion for other reasons. Its government is trying 
to encourage households to consume more to activate its internal growth engine 
as a future substitute for foreign markets. Chinese households’ excessive savings 
4. Translator’s note: A social insurance system restricted to wage-earning workers in formal companies, and their 
direct dependents, named after the German chancellor von Bismarck.
5. Translator’s note: A universal social insurance system named after the British economist Lord Beveridge.
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stems, in part, from the fact that coverage for health problems or retirement remains 
uncertain or very limited.
Africa presents a special case inasmuch as a large part of its population works 
in the informal sector, largely escaping the formalism of social insurance; it is the 
extended family, above all, that covers basic risks.  
From “growth at all costs” to accounting for 
inequalities
International financial institutions have long considered the question of inequali-
ties and social policies of minor importance. In the 1990s, these organizations were 
very impressed by the Asian model, as evidenced in the publication of a World Bank 
report, The Asian Miracle: it presented the Asian experience as the model to follow. 
In countries with very rapid growth, redistribution and social insurance appear to 
be less acute needs than may be the case elsewhere. In its entry hall, the World Bank 
inscribed the slogan “Our dream is a world without poverty.” However, the Bank has 
conceived poverty reduction exclusively as a matter of economic growth; the Asian 
experience seemed to validate that approach.  
By the end of the 1990s, the rather disappointing growth experience of most Latin 
American countries gave many observers and analysts the feeling that inequality was 
a powerful impediment to development. This region of the world did not experience 
the sustained growth seen in Asia, inequality being one of the most obvious differ-
ences between the two groups of countries. Inequality was weak in South Korea, 
Taiwan and Vietnam, and a little less so in China; at the same time, these countries 
had become the champions of growth worldwide. This fuelled the hypothesis that 
early inequalities could hamper growth. This comparison, together with an analysis 
of growth failures in some African countries under predatory political elites – the 
height of inequality – progressively bolstered the idea that inequalities might play 
a key role in the growth process. 
Today it is widely recognized that poverty does not necessarily and automatically 
diminish with economic growth, if inequality increases as the economy grows. In 
Africa, some countries have recently seen rapid growth with, apparently, no poverty 
reduction. Very high commodity prices lay behind the rapid growth, making it 
possible to invest in construction and infrastructure, but the growth benefited only 
a small part of the population. Obviously, in economies with double-digit growth, 
such as China, it is hard to imagine that the growth process would exclude very much 
of the population. Yet, it is now well known that poverty declines less quickly with 
growth when inequality is high, and that at slower growth rates a moderate increase 
in inequality might be enough to prevent a decline in poverty (Bourguignon, 2003). 
In the late 1990s, the World Bank and similar organizations began to consider 
inequalities an important subject. Joseph Stiglitz and Nicholas Stern, my prede-
cessors as chief economist at the World Bank, were persuaded that inequality was 
a fundamental dimension of development. In 1996, James Wolfensohn, president 
of the Bank and friend of Amartya Sen, hired Stiglitz as chief economist. Both had 
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a vision of development that went far beyond per capita GDP growth, but only a 
minority of the Bank’s staff shared their vision. When I came to the World Bank in 
2003, questions of inequality were still seldom discussed, but progress was inargu-
able. By 2006, the Equity and Development report was a sign that the World Bank, 
and other international financial institutions, had finally accepted that distribution 
and redistribution mechanisms played a key role in fostering economic growth and 
in curbing poverty.
Other international organizations did not need this shift in perspective. In partic-
ular, the United Nations (UN) always had inequality at the centre of their devel-
opment vision; the long-dominant discourse of the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), which extolled growth at all cost, had never been as strong 
in the UN. It is true, however, that these two types of institution play very different 
roles in developing economies. In particular, the UN can have only a limited influ-
ence on national implementation policies compared with the substantially more 
robust means that the international financial institutions may deploy.
However, questions arise about the way these means could be, have been or are 
actually deployed to serve a certain vision of development. First, it must be under-
stood that a good part of the activity of the World Bank and other development 
banks is similar to commercial banking and has limited impact on development. 
Middle-income countries borrow from the World Bank as they would do from any 
big, international commercial bank, were it not for the Bank’s limited control over 
the nature of the projects being financed. The views that World Bank staff might 
hold on development mean little in such cases. In emerging and intermediate-income 
countries, the ties between loans and development “programmes” have increasingly 
loosened. The difference with the 1990s is stark. It arises from the expansion of 
international capital markets, the ease with which emerging countries can take on 
debt from international commercial operators and the weakening appeal of loans 
from international financial institutions. This lesser appeal also lessens the leverage 
that the latter can bring to bear on the development strategies of the countries that 
they finance.  
That said, development programmes have not entirely disappeared, and the World 
Bank and other international development banks remain present in their implemen-
tation, but in a very different way. The banks act more as technical advisers or consul-
tants than as project owners and financiers, as was the case in the past. In Brazil, 
the World Bank participated in the launch of the conditional transfer programmes 
to the poorest known as “Bolsa Escola”, which later became “Bolsa Familia,” but has 
a limited role in the programme’s financing.” Likewise, the Bank was present in the 
monitoring of “Progresa”6 in Mexico without being involved in its financing. The 
Bank can share its enormous developing-world and development experience with 
its partners. This may be a more valuable capital than its ability to raise money on 
6. Translator’s note: PROGRESA (Programa Nacional de Educacion, Salud y Alimentacion) was an anti-poverty 
programme begun in 1997 to provide poor mothers in rural Mexico with education grants
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global capital markets for lending middle-income and emerging countries. 
The situation is different in low-income countries where the World Bank Group, 
through its International Development Association, constitutes a genuine develop-
ment agency like France’s Agency Française de Développement (AFD) or the United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DIFD); the only difference is 
that the World Bank can marshal much greater resources. In low-income countries, 
development projects and programmes still mean a lot, and the evolution of the 
World Bank’s development vision (as discussed above) takes on its full meaning.
In those countries, a large share of the work of the World Bank and that of regional 
development banks now centres on individual “capabilities.” This aspect of devel-
opment was neglected for a long time. After the “trickle-down” or “let’s grow and 
poverty will automatically lessen” doctrine, which was followed by “let’s grow and 
redistribute”, we have entered a new stage that aims to facilitate the most-disad-
vantaged groups” accumulation of productive assets – both “hard” assets, such as 
land, equipment or housing, and “soft” ones, such as education or access to justice. 
Such strategies are believed to accelerate both growth and poverty reduction and, 
of course, to reduce inequalities. In low-income countries, conditional transfer 
programmes, drawing on the example of Bolsa Familia or Progresa, support the 
poorest households on the condition that they send their children to school up to 
a certain age, and that they have their children medically examined twice a year. 
Such redistribution programmes reduce poverty and also help the poorest accumu-
late immaterial assets, reducing inequality for future generations. Other types of 
action with the same overall objective include market-based land reform, irrigation, 
microcredit, free basic health care and minimum pensions.  
Furthermore, while the World Bank has less and less of a role to play with its 
programmes and loans in emerging countries, it maintains a major role in gener-
ating ideas. It often serves as a think tank by producing high-level, original research 
in fields such as measuring income inequality or the inequality of opportunities. It 
also very much serves by evaluating specific interventions in terms of their economic 
efficiency and their impact on poverty. The World Bank publishes reports that discuss 
alternative development strategies and that recommend specific public policies in 
China, India and Mexico; these studies often have a major impact because the work 
is done professionally and supplies innovative development ideas and concepts. 
From this point of view, the Bank has recently played a major role in reasserting 
inequality’s place at the centre of governmental concerns.    
Governments show greater sensitivity to inequalities
Governments have clearly shown a change in attitude. In the past, a country’s growth 
process was evaluated through its GDP growth rate; today, growth rate analysis 
combines with the distribution of growth’s income production through the popula-
tion. This involves studying so-called “growth incidence curves,” which show how 
individuals starting with different income levels have seen their income grow over 
time. These measurements have become commonplace tools as ideas have evolved 
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and statistics have become available, which was not the case 10-15 years ago. In 
fact, in parallel with the evolution of ideas stands a revolution in statistics. In an 
increasing number of countries, we now have the means to produce these graphs 
and to follow what happened to specific groups of people in the course of develop-
ment; they have become indispensible tools for decision-makers who want to orient 
their policies and communicate on their results. 
It would be an exaggeration to say that this changing of ideas is universal. But it 
must be noted that sensitivity to inequality issues has increased in many countries. 
For example, in China – the champion of growth over the last 30 years – the rise 
in inequalities has already preoccupied the country’s leaders for some time. The 
preceding Eleventh Five-Year Development Plan will come to an end this year; its 
title was “Toward a Harmonious Society” – harmonious in the sense of a more equal 
and more equitable society. The same concern hovers over several Latin American 
countries, beginning with the Brazil of Lula da Silva and Dilma Roussef, where 
great initiatives have begun. Brazil is and remains one of the world’s most unequal 
countries, but inequality has spectacularly diminished over the last 10-12 years. In 
the developed world, inequalities remain a source of constant concern for govern-
ments in several European countries, including France. Paradoxically, this is less 
true for the United States, even though inequality is higher there and has sharply 
increased.
The leading elites do not simply have moral or ethical sensitivities, but also political 
ones. The elites know that an increase in inequality may lead to conflicts and social 
tensions. Furthermore, putting social insurance systems in place meets a demand 
produced by the economic development process. As an economy grows, populations 
demand more consumer goods, and also more security. Social insurance, above 
all, is an instantaneous redistribution. It can also bolster an economy’s dynamism. 
Economic agents feel better about undertaking projects that may be riskier but also 
more profitable when they feel protected from sickness, old age, or an unexpected 
loss of income. 
A particularly sensitive type of inequality concerns access to decent jobs. The 
Maghreb and the Arab Spring provide examples, but the situation is equally worri-
some in several other Middle Eastern cities, where many young people who have 
completed their studies are not ready to accept jobs that do not match their expec-
tations. This mismatch in the job market may have serious consequences. It may 
also exist in other regions of the world. The “decent work” recommended by the 
International Labour Organisation is certainly a need and perhaps a “right,” but few 
have access to it in the poorest Asian or African countries. n
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T
he global crisis which erupted after the col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 has led to 
significant debate regarding the importance of 
adequate financial regulation. The G20 Summit 
which was held in 2009 in Pittsburgh, for exam-
ple, highlighted the critical role that improved financial 
regulation should play in securing sustainable economic 
growth. Important as it is, however, financial reform will 
not be enough to tackle the crisis. Indeed, some authors 
have called for the emphasis to be shifted onto the “real” 
factors behind the crisis, particularly inadequate employ-
ment growth and excessive income inequalities (KUMHOF 
and RANCIÈRE, 2010; TORRES, 2010). 
This paper draws on this literature and shows how 
addressing employment and income gaps could contribute 
to the rebalancing of the real economy and promote 
recovery. We examine the appropriate policy mix needed 
to tackle the crisis. In this regard, the pros and cons of 
fiscal austerity measures and labour market deregulation 
are assessed1. 
In order to achieve this, a model which takes into account 
the connections between macroeconomic policies and 
labour markets has been developed by the International 
1. The IMF and OECD propose three scenarios based on the 
Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF). In a first 
scenario, further fiscal consolidation leads to lower output and 
employment due to its negative impact on aggregate demand. 
In a second scenario, lower taxes on labour income and profits 
as well as more flexible labour markets have strong supply side 
effects leading firms to increase labour demand and production. 
In a third scenario, rebalancing in Asia reduces global imbalances 
between high income and emerging economies.
Inequalities and crisis recovery
Raymond Torres, Stefan Kühn and Matthieu Charpe, International Labour Organization, Geneva, 
Switzerland
Labour Organization (ILO)2. Importantly, the ILO model 
takes into account the impact that changes in income 
distribution may have on aggregate demand. Based on this 
model, the paper i) assesses the impacts of fiscal austerity 
and certain structural reforms on jobs; ii) examines how 
the labour market situation, in turn, affects macroeconomic 
performance; and iii) discusses what strategy would help 
meet both employment and fiscal goals.    
Fiscal austerity is detrimental to output growth and 
employment…
The analysis is performed by way of three economic 
and social scenarios for the period 2012-15, based on the 
ILO model. The first encompasses further fiscal austerity 
through a cut in public spending starting from the first half 
of 2012, hereafter referred to as the “fiscal consolida-
tion scenario”. The second analyses the effect of reforms 
that end up reducing wages and weakening workers’ 
bargaining power, hereafter referred to as the “lower labour 
standards scenario”. This second scenario also discusses 
the ability of minimum wage to limit income losses. In the 
third scenario, the “ILO scenario”, the effects of a policy 
mix combining sound fiscal policies to stimulate invest-
ment with policies that achieve balanced income develop-
ments are assessed over the selected period.
2. For further details, see Charpe and Kühn (2012). More infor-
mation on the Global Economic Linkages (GEL) model can be 
found at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/
research/global/index.htm. See also Charpe and Kühn (2011).
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Figure 1 shows the main outcomes of the three above-
mentioned scenarios. Employment trends over the next two 
and a half years are compared with a “baseline scenario”, 
which includes the economic and labour market projec-
tions as developed in Global Employment Trends 20123. 
In the first scenario, further fiscal austerity would reduce 
employment vis-à-vis the baseline. Fiscal austerity is 
modelled here as a cut in public spending as a share of 
GDP by 1.4 percentage points in high income countries. 
Output declines by 1.6 percentage points at peak and 
by 0.6 percentage points by 2015. Similarly, employ-
ment decreases by 1.3 percentage points at peak and 
0.5 percentage points by end 2015 (dash-dotted line in 
3. ILO. Global Employment Trends (2012)
Figure 1). This corresponds to 2.84 million fewer jobs in 
high income countries by end 2015 as compared to the 
baseline scenario (see Table 1). In low and medium income 
countries, fiscal austerity is milder with the ratio of public 
spending to GDP declining by 1.1 percentage points only. 
This is translated into 11.5 million fewer jobs by end 20154.
The result arises because fiscal consolidation reduces 
aggregate demand, in turn, affecting labour demand. Impor-
tantly, this simulation takes into account the fact that lower 
4. OECD Quarterly data on government accounts shows that 
spending to GDP ratio has declined by 1.4 percentage points 
between the third quarter of 2010 and 2011 in 25 advanced 
economies. Similarly, the World Economic Outlook forecasted 
a decline in spending to GDP ratio of 1 percentage point in 
developing economies between 2009 and 2011.
FIGURE 1 Employment, a political choice
This simulation examines the dynamic evolution of employment in the different scenarios. In a scenario 
of fiscal consolidation, public sector spending as a share of GDP is reduced by 1.4 percentage points. In 
the scenario of lowering labour standards, the share of labour income in total income is reduced by 1.8 
percentage points. The ILO scenario combines infrastructure spending and labour incomes that are aligned 
with the increase in productivity in all countries. Policies are intended to apply in all countries and enter into 
force in mid-2012. Their effects are measured until the end of 2015.
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public spending creates room for higher private spending. 
However this positive “crowding-in” effect is outweighed 
by the direct negative impact associated with lower public 
spending. The deflationary pressures exacerbated by 
spending cuts tend to push up the real interest rate, which 
discourages private investment. Fiscal austerity does not 
succeed in stimulating private investment, which declines 
by 1.3 percentage points at peak. Additionally, budget cuts 
are costly to the public purse since they depress economic 
activity and raise unemployment, thus eroding tax revenues 
and adding upward pressure on social spending. The result 
is that short-term budget savings from fiscal austerity 
do not materialize. Indeed, public debt increases by 1.1 
percentage points by end 2015. 
…the same goes with policies that reduce the 
bargaining power of workers...
The second scenario illustrates the employment effects 
caused by a further deterioration in the bargaining power 
of workers. In the ILO model, the distribution of income 
between workers and firms depends on a parameter which 
captures the workers’ bargaining power over wages5. 
The experiment conducted in the second scenario is to 
decrease this parameter such that the corresponding 
decline in the labour share of income is 1.8 percentage 
points. This drop corresponds to the decline in the labour 
share of income, which took place in the United States 
over the period 2008-2010. 
In the second scenario, output declines by 1.2 
percentage points at peak and 0.5 percentage points by 
end 2015, while employment declines by 1 percentage 
point at peak and by 0.36 percentage points by end 2015 
(Figure 1, dashed line). This corresponds to a decline in 
the global number of jobs by 10.53 million, compared with 
the baseline scenario (Table 1). 
The logic behind this result is that, even if lower wages 
may boost labour demand for any individual firm, a gener-
alised fall in wages would affect household demand at 
5. In detail, wage setting is subject to Nash bargaining over the 
surplus from an additional match. Wages therefore depend on a 
variety of elements such as the marginal productivity of labour, 
the replacement wage of workers, the interest rate as well as a 
parameter capturing the bargaining power of workers.
the aggregate level, thereby depressing total output and 
employment. This means that, in the model, the negative 
demand effect dominates the positive impact that higher 
profits (associated with lower wages) may have on 
business investment. The positive effects of lower wages 
on profits are not materialized since the sharp decline in 
consumption pushes the economy into a liquidity trap. 
Private investment drops by 1.2 percentage points at peak. 
As with the first scenario, the second scenario is associ-
ated with a widening in budget deficits owing to lower 
tax revenues and larger spending related to increased 
unemployment benefits. Importantly, however, the model 
does not consider the possible effect that lower wages in 
the public sector would have on budget deficits. 
The negative effects of lower labour standards may 
be attenuated by labour market regulations in the form 
of minimum wage. Minimum wage sets a floor on wages 
and therefore limits the fall in labour incomes. It follows 
that consumption drops less and employment losses are 
limited. Figure 4 shows the employment dynamic following 
a decline in labour standards with and without minimum 
wage. In the presence of minimum wage, employ-
ment “only” drops by 0.3 percentage points against 1 
percentage point in its absence. Additionally, the recovery 
is faster and employment is restored to its pre-crisis level 
by end 2015.  
...whereas a global job pact would help on both the 
employment and macroeconomic fronts. 
The third scenario looks at the effects of a crisis 
response inspired by the Global Jobs Pact, i.e. the imple-
mentation of the decent work agenda at times of crisis. 
Although such an agenda encompasses a large variety of 
tools and policy actions, numerical simulations can only be 
performed on a restricted set of instruments. For simplicity, 
the ILO scenario is here defined as a combination of i) 
infrastructure investment equivalent to 1 percentage point 
increase in the public investment to GDP ratio6 and ii) a 
6. The 1 percentage point increase takes place on impact. 
Spending then gradually declines at a rate of 10 per cent per 
quarter during the simulation period until they return to their 
starting value.
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rebalancing of the share of labour incomes in total income, 
corresponding to an increase in the share of labour income 
in total income by 1.8 percentage points7.
The component of infrastructure spending intends to 
capture the aggregate demand effect of public spending 
as well as the productivity-enhancing effect for the private 
sector of well designed public investment. Infrastructure 
investment plays the role of a positive externality on firms, 
since public capital is an input in the production function 
of firms. This measure captures the set of instruments 
advocated by the ILO to support enterprises. The stabiliza-
tion of labour share in total income captures the measures 
promoting rights at work and social dialogue as well as 
7. This experiment relies on the assumption that this policy mix is 
undertaken jointly by all countries and that no country engages 
in strategic games leading to free riding behaviour. 
those measures aimed at achieving a more balanced 
income distribution. 
These policies are especially relevant given the relative 
inefficiency of monetary policy in the current deflationary 
environment that prevails in most advanced economies: 
monetary authorities are faced with a liquidity trap as they 
are left with little room to further reduce interest rates to 
stimulate investment.
In the ILO scenario, output increases by 1.8 percentage 
points at peak and by 0.8 percentage points by end 2015, 
while employment increases by 1.1 percentage points at 
peak and by 0.35 percentage points over the same period 
(solid line in Figure 1). This translates in an additional 
12.74 million jobs created worldwide (Table 1). Well-
designed public investments are enterprise friendly to the 
extent that they generate a crowding-in of private invest-
ment, amounting to 1.1% of GDP by 2015. 
FIGURE 2 Social safety net does not constrain job creation
This figure shows the dynamics of employment in the scenario of a lowering of labour standards, with or 
without minimum wage. This scenario is characterized by a decline in the share of labour income in total 
income by 1.8 percentage points. As in the previous illustration, policies are intended to apply in all countries 
and enter into force in mid-2012. Effects are measured until the end of 2015. It shows that the existence of a 
social safety net does not constrain job creation.
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Public debt declines in the short run due to additional 
tax revenues. This increase is however moderate and does 
not exceed 1.6 percentage points of GDP at peak value. 
This scenario shows that the debt level is mainly driven 
by revenue associated with economic activity.
Comparison with other model results 
Compared to other modelling studies, the ILO model 
yields similar results concerning the effects of fiscal 
austerity. For instance, the IMF global model (GIMF) 
shows that in a situation of underemployment of produc-
tive resources, fiscal austerity will worsen the employ-
ment situation. Similarly, public investment has beneficial 
demand effects while also boosting enterprise investment 
and labour demand. Neither model, however, take into 
account the risk premium which financial markets might 
impose on government refinancing costs. 
As to the effects of labour standards, the findings of the 
ILO model are more favourable than is the case with GIMF. 
This is because the ILO model takes into account the impact 
that changes in income distribution may have on aggregate 
demand. Indeed, in contrast to the GIMF model, the ILO 
model features bargaining over wages between workers 
and firms. Due to the low substitutability between capital 
and labour in the short run, a reduction in wages (due 
to lower labour standards) entails limited labour/capital 
substitution. By contrast, with many households relying 
exclusively on labour income, the fall in wages lowers 
aggregate demand, depressing employment prospects. 
Recent IMF research, such as for instance Kumhof and 
Ranciere (2010), has taken into account income distribu-
tion effects and finds results in line with the ILO model.   
Importantly, the ILO model assumes that policies are 
coordinated across countries. In the absence of policy 
coordination, ILO friendly policies carried out by one 
country in isolation may yield much less gains than 
projected in the third scenario.
Finally, and crucially, none of the alternative models 
consider the implications of a prolonged labour market 
recession from the point of view of labour market partici-
pation (“hysteresis” effects). This means that employment 
effects of fiscal austerity and certain structural reforms are 
probably under-estimated. It is expected that later devel-
opments of the model will remedy this important knowl-
edge gap. n
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I
n his influential 1975 book Equality and Efficiency: The 
Big Tradeoff, Arthur Okun argued that pursuing equality 
can reduce efficiency (the total output produced with 
given resources). The late Yale University and Brook-
ings Institution economist said that not only can more 
equal distribution of incomes reduce incentives to work 
and invest, but the efforts to redistribute—through such 
mechanisms as the tax code and minimum wages— can 
themselves be costly. Okun likened these mechanisms 
to a “leaky bucket.” Some of the resources transferred 
from rich to poor “will simply disappear in transit, so the 
poor will not receive all the money that is taken from the 
rich”—the result of administrative costs and disincen-
tives to work for both those who pay taxes and those who 
receive transfers.
Do societies inevitably face an invidious choice between 
efficient production and equitable wealth and income 
distribution? Are social justice and social product at war 
with one another? In a word, no. 
In recent work (BERG, OSTRY, and ZETTELMEYER, 2011; and 
BERG and OSTRY, 2011), we discovered that when growth 
is looked at over the long term, the trade-off between 
efficiency and equality may not exist. In fact equality 
appears to be an important ingredient in promoting and 
sustaining growth. The difference between countries that 
can sustain rapid growth for many years or even decades 
and the many others that see growth spurts fade quickly 
may be the level of inequality. Countries may find that 
improving equality may also improve efficiency, understood 
as more sustainable long-run growth. 
Inequality matters for growth and other macroeconomic 
outcomes, in all corners of the globe. One need look no 
further than the role inequality is thought to have played 
in creating the disaffection that underlies much of the 
recent unrest in the Middle East. And, taking a histor-
ical perspective, the increase in U.S. income inequality 
in recent decades is strikingly similar to the increase that 
occurred in the 1920s. In both cases there was a boom 
in the financial sector, poor people borrowed a lot, and a 
huge financial crisis ensued (see “Leveraging Inequality,” 
F&D, December 2010 and “Inequality = Indebtedness” in 
this issue of F&D). The recent global economic crisis, with 
its roots in U.S. financial markets, may have resulted, in 
part at least, from the increase in inequality. With inequality 
growing in the United States and other important econo-
mies, the relationship between inequality and growth takes 
on more significance. 
How do economies grow?
Most thinking about long-run growth assumes implicitly 
that development is something akin to climbing a hill, that 
it entails more or less steady increases in real income, 
punctuated by business cycle fluctuations. The pattern in 
Figure 1 – which shows the level of real (after-inflation) 
per capita income in two advanced economies, the United 
Kingdom and the United States – is consistent with this 
idea. 
The experiences in developing and emerging econo-
mies, however, are far more varied (see Figure 2). In some 
cases, the experience is like climbing a hill. But in others, 
the experience is more like a roller coaster. Looking at 
such cases, Pritchett (2000) and other authors have 
Equality and Efficiency: Is there a trade-
off between the two?
Andrew G. Berg, International Monetary Fund, Washington, United States of America
Jonathan D. Ostry, International Monetary Fund, Washington, United States of America
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concluded that an understanding of growth must involve 
looking more closely at the turning points – ignoring the 
ups and downs of growth over the horizon of the business 
cycle, and concentrating on why some countries are able to 
keep growing for long periods whereas others see growth 
break down after just a few years, followed by stagna-
tion or decay. 
A systematic look at this experience suggests that 
igniting growth is much less difficult than sustaining it 
(HAUSMANN, PRITCHETT and RODRIK, 2005). Even the poorest 
of countries have managed to get growth going for several 
years, only to see it peter out. Where growth laggards 
differ from their more successful peers is in the degree 
to which they have been able to sustain growth for long 
periods of time. 
Income distribution and growth sustainability
In our research we looked at the extent to which the 
duration of a growth episode is related to differences 
in country characteristics and policies. The quality of 
economic and political institutions, an outward orienta-
tion of an economy, macroeconomic stability, and human 
capital accumulation have long been recognized as impor-
tant determinants of economic growth. And we found that 
they matter for the duration of growth episodes too. 
We argue that income distribution may also – and 
independently – belong in this pantheon of critical 
determinants of growth duration. At the level of simple 
correlation, more inequality seems associated with less 
sustained growth.
Figure 3 shows the length of growth spells and the 
average income distribution during the spell for a sample 
of countries. We define a growth spell as a period of at 
least five years that begins with an unusual increase in the 
growth rate and ends with an unusual drop in growth. The 
measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient, which varies 
from zero (all households having the same income) to 100 
(all income received by one household).
FIGURE 1 The climbing of the hill FIGURE 2 Growth in emerging countries: the roller 
coaster
FIGURE 3 Equality supports growth
For many advanced countries such as the United 
Kingdom and the United States, real per capita 
income has grown at a more or less steady pace 
over the long run.
The experience of developing and emerging market 
countries has been much more varied, and very few 
have had only steady growth. Instead, countries 
have experienced periods of rapid growth, decline 
and stagnation.
Inequality may create richness but it does not 
support long-term growth which demands political 
stability and public support to policies to secure 
investments. 
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It may seem counterintuitive that inequality is strongly 
associated with less sustained growth. After all, some 
inequality is essential to the effective functioning of a 
market economy and the incentives needed for invest-
ment and growth (CHAUDHURI and RAVALLION, 2007). But too 
much inequality might be destructive to growth. Beyond 
the risk that inequality may amplify the potential for finan-
cial crisis, it may also bring political instability, which can 
discourage investment. Inequality may make it harder for 
governments to make difficult but necessary choices in 
the face of shocks, such as raising taxes or cutting public 
spending to avoid a debt crisis. Or inequality may reflect 
poor people’s lack of access to financial services, which 
gives them fewer opportunities to invest in education and 
entrepreneurial activity.
Against this background, the question is whether a 
systematic look at the data supports the notion that 
societies with more equal income distributions have more 
durable growth. 
We study growth spells as medical researchers might 
examine life expectancy. They study the effects of age, 
weight, gender, and smoking habits on life expectancy; 
we look at whether factors such as political institutions, 
health and education, macroeconomic instability, debt, 
and trade openness might influence the likelihood that 
a growth spell will end. The result is a statistical model 
of growth duration that relates the expected length of a 
growth episode (or, equivalently, the risk that it will end in 
a given year) to several of these variables. We compare 
the risk that the spell will end in a given year with the 
values of these variables in previous years – at the begin-
ning of the spell or the previous year – to minimize the 
risk of reverse causality. In the face of the usual difficul-
ties involved in disentangling cause and effect, and the 
risk that we have been unable to find good measures of 
important variables, the results we report below should 
nonetheless be interpreted only as empirical regularities 
(“stylized facts”).
The analysis suggests that a number of variables found 
to be important in other contexts also tend to be associ-
ated with longer growth spells (see Figure 4). To show the 
importance of each variable, the chart (which covers 1950 
to 2006) reports the increase in the expected duration 
of a growth spell for a given increase in the variable in 
question, keeping other factors constant. To compare the 
effects of the different variables on growth duration, we 
calculate expected duration when all the variables are at 
their median values (the value greater than that observed 
in 50 percent of the observations in the sample). Then 
we increase each variable, one variable at a time, and 
look at what happens to expected duration. We want the 
size of each of these increases to be readily comparable. 
To achieve this, we increase each variable by an amount 
such that it moves from the median value to a value 
greater than that observed in 60 percent of the sample 
(a 10 percentile increase).
Hazard to sustained growth
Somewhat surprisingly, income inequality stood out for 
the strength and robustness of its relationship with the 
duration of growth spells: a 10 percentile decrease in 
inequality (represented by a change in the Gini coefficient 
from 40 to 37) increases the expected length of a growth 
spell by 50 percent. The effect is large, but is the sort of 
improvement that a number of countries have experienced 
during growth spells. We estimate that closing, say, half 
the inequality gap between Latin America and emerging 
Asia would more than double the expected duration of a 
growth spell in Latin America.
Remarkably, inequality retains its statistical and 
economic significance even when we include many poten-
tial determinants at the same time, a claim that we cannot 
make for many of the conventional determinants of good 
growth performance, such as the quality of institutions and 
trade openness. Inequality still matters when we allow for 
regional differences in expected growth duration (such 
as between emerging Asia and Africa). This all suggests 
that inequality seems to matter in itself and is not just 
proxying for other factors. Inequality also preserves its 
significance more systematically across different samples 
and definitions of growth spells than the other variables 
do. Of course, inequality is not the only thing that matters 
but, from our analysis, it clearly belongs on the list of well-
established growth factors such as the quality of political 
institutions or trade openness.
Do these statistical results find a voice in the political 
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and economic narratives of the actual country growth 
episodes? 
It appears to be the case in, for example, Cameroon. 
Growth averaged 7 percent from 1978 through 1985. 
Then the economy fell apart and declined by 6 percent a 
year over the subsequent decade. Oil wealth in the 1970s 
initially financed large increases in the public sector, partic-
ularly in public employee wages, which proved very diffi-
cult to cut when oil prices fell. “Although these measures 
[to cut government spending] were necessary to rescue 
the country from further economic crisis, they were very 
unpopular because they least affected the political elite 
and those in the upper echelon of government, whose 
privileges remained intact” (MBAKU and TAKOUGANG, 2003). 
Our statistical model of growth duration suggests that 
the risk that the growth spell would end in 1985 was 
very high – more than 100 times higher than would be 
typical for a country enjoying a growth spell. The model 
attributes this high risk mostly to Cameroon’s unusually 
high inequality as well as its low inflow of foreign direct 
investment and high degree of autocracy.
Cameroon is typical. We have examined six historical 
cases, including Colombia, Guatemala and Nigeria. These 
cases, and our broader statistical analysis of a large 
number of growth episodes, suggest that inequality is an 
underlying feature that makes it more likely that a number 
of factors –  external shocks, external debt, ethnic fraction-
alization –  come together to bring a growth spell to an end.
Raising the tide
One reasonably firm conclusion is that it would be a 
big mistake to separate analyses of growth and income 
distribution. To borrow a marine analogy: a rising tide lifts 
all boats, and our analysis indicates that helping raise the 
smallest boats may help keep the tide rising for all craft, 
big and small.
FIGURE 4. Inequality as a determining factor
Inequality is as strong a factor as trade orientation to explain the length of growth spell in developing and 
emerging countries. It seems to be even stronger than the quality of political institutions.
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The immediate role for policy, however, is less clear. 
More inequality may shorten the duration of growth, 
but poorly designed efforts to reduce inequality could 
be counterproductive. If these efforts distort incentives 
and undermine growth, they can do more harm than 
good for the poor. For example, the initial reforms that 
ignited growth in China involved giving stronger incen-
tives to farmers. This increased the income of the poor 
and reduced overall inequality as it gave a tremendous 
spur to growth. However, it probably led to some increased 
inequality among farmers, and efforts to resist this compo-
nent of inequality would likely have been counterproductive 
(CHAUDHURI and RAVALLION, 2007).
Still, there may be some win-win policies, such as 
better-targeted subsidies, better access to education for 
the poor that improves equality of economic opportunity, 
and active labour market measures that promote employ-
ment.
When there are short-run trade-offs between the 
effects of policies on growth and income distribution, the 
evidence we have does not in itself say what to do. But 
our analysis should tilt the balance toward the long-run 
benefits – including for growth – of reducing inequality. 
Over longer horizons, reduced inequality and sustained 
growth may be two sides of the same coin.
The analysis calls to mind the developing country debt 
crises of the 1980s and the resulting “lost decade” of slow 
growth and painful adjustment. That experience brought 
home the fact that sustainable economic reform is possible 
only when its benefits are widely shared. In the face of the 
current global economic turmoil and the need for difficult 
economic adjustment and reform in many countries, it 
would be better if these lessons were remembered rather 
than relearned. n
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Research has shown a strong empirical link between economic inequal-
ity and biodiversity loss. Gender equality helps stabilize human popula-
tion growth and mitigate the pressure on other species and on natural 
resources. A minimum level of equality also appears necessary to suc-
cessfully manage renewable natural resources for the benefit of all.
Economic equality as a 
condition for biodiversity 
conservation
E
conomic equality, a worthy political goal in its own right, also 
greatly benefits the individual health of, and social harmony 
among, human beings (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Might 
equality also promote environmental quality? Theorists and 
empiricists have debated this question for several decades 
now (for example, Olson, 1965; Boyce, 1994; Baland et al., 
2007). In 2007, Mikkelson et al. reported a strong empirical 
link between economic inequality and biodiversity loss – in 
other words, a strongly positive relationship between equality 
and biodiversity (Mikkelson et al., 2007). They found such a 
relationship at two different scales: across countries throughout the world, and 
states throughout the US.
This chapter builds upon Mikkelson et al. (2007) in several ways. First, we examine 
subsequent analyses of equality-biodiversity links among different countries. We 
do not know of any further published studies of such links among different states 
or provinces within any country. One of the subsequent between-country analyses 
affirms a positive connection between equality and biodiversity (Holland et al., 
2009), while the other denies such a connection (Pandit and Laband, 2009). 
This chapter thus first aims to explain this contrast. Second, we speculate about 
pathways through which equality may benefit biodiversity. These potential mecha-
nisms partially overlap with linkages between biodiversity and poverty (Roe, 2010; 
Roe and Walpole, 2011; Billé et al., 2012), on one hand, and biodiversity and 
wealth or over-consumption (Sukhdev, 2010; Mikkelson, in review), on the other. 
Their identification could have a marked effect on public policy.
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Third, we make a few suggestions about how to get economic equality onto the 
biodiversity protection agenda. Fourth and finally, we offer some thoughts about 
how best to achieve equality. While progressive taxation leaps first to many people’s 
minds, deeper political and economic changes seem needed to ensure equality in 
the long term. We focus here on worker cooperatives – a far more egalitarian, and 
surprisingly competitive, form of business organization relative to typical corpora-
tions. A crucial defining feature of cooperatives – whether worker, consumer, or 
community co-ops – is that they operate democratically, i.e., one person, one vote 
(UN, 2012). In contrast, typical corporations (which we henceforth call “corpora-
tions” for short) not only subordinate workers to both managers and shareholders 
(Glasbeek, 2002), but also place ultimate control in the hands of the shareholders 
on a plutocratic basis – one dollar, one vote. Shifting the economy from corporations 
to co-ops will require changes in law and policy at all levels of government – local, 
regional, national and international (Schweickart, 2011). 
Recent controversy and future research: A case of 
non-monotonic improvement in data quality
As mentioned above, Mikkelson et al. (2007) found an equality-biodiversity link both 
among countries and among US states. But country-level data, in particular – on both 
economic equality and biological diversity – tend to be incomplete and inconsistent. 
Mikkelson et al., as well as Holland et al. (2009), and Pandit and Laband (2009), 
all drew upon the best data available at the time, produced by the Pitt Inequality 
Project (PIP) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). 
However, they used very different versions of the PIP data.
The PIP corrected for several kinds of inconsistency between assessments of income 
inequality in different countries (Babones and Alvarez-Rivadulla, 2007). After 
performing these corrections, the PIP made three different data sets available. 
Mikkelson et al. used one of these, the Standardized Income Distribution Database, 
Version 1.0 (SIDD-1; see Reference # 17 in Mikkelson et al.). The SIDD-1 included 
corrected values for only those country-year combinations in which inequality had 
actually been measured. Holland et al. also made clear that they used only those 
measured country-year combinations (see p. 4), though they did not specify whether 
they drew from the original SIDD-1 or its revision, the SIDD-2. Pandit and Laband, 
in contrast, used the SIDD-3 (see p. 3222), which extrapolated and/or interpolated 
each country’s inequality figures to yield estimates for every year from 1955 to 2005.
These extrapolations and interpolations inflated the data set by nearly six-fold, 
from the 1,218 country-year combinations in the SIDD-1 and SIDD-2 to 7,242 
such combinations in the SIDD-3 (142 countries x 51 years). For some countries, 
the extrapolation was so extreme as to render the estimates for most years quite 
unbelievable. For example, for Barbados – one of the countries included in Pandit 
and Laband’s analysis (see p. 3225) – the SIDD-3 lists precisely the same Gini index 
of inequality (0.5326) for all 51 years. The Gini index theoretically ranges from 0 – 
perfect equality – to 1, the case where one person takes all the income in a country. 
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The fact that in the SIDD-3 Barbados has the same value for all years indicates that 
it contains only one corrected Gini index for that country, extrapolated all the way 
back to 1955 and forward to 2005. This spurious invariance contrasts markedly with 
the variation over time shown by the measured-then-corrected Gini indices in the 
SIDD-1 and SIDD-2. In the extreme case, Armenia’s inequality rose by more than 
0.35 after the fall of the Soviet Union.
Pandit and Laband did not mention the inclusion of such indefensibly long extrapo-
lations as Barbados’. Instead, they touted the fact that they could include 87 countries 
in their analysis rather than just 45 as Mikkelson et al. had done. Controlling for 
the same set of other variables as Mikkelson et al. had, Pandit and Laband failed to 
detect any statistically significant relationship between equality and biodiversity. 
We conjecture, however, that this failure results from the likely fact that the vast 
majority of data points in the SIDD-3 used by Pandit and Laband are extrapolations 
or interpolations, rather than measured-then-corrected Gini values.
Holland et al. provide additional support for this conjecture. Their study differed 
a fair bit from that of Mikkelson et al., regarding their choice of other variables to 
control for. Yet it supported the same general conclusion: more unequal countries 
have more species headed toward extinction (i.e., plant and vertebrate species 
that are “threatened” according to the IUCN). Mikkelson et al. and Holland et al. 
both controlled for the total number of plants and vertebrates (threatened plus 
non-threatened), human population size, and gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita corrected for the differential purchasing power of a dollar in different countries 
(purchasing power parity, or PPP). However, unlike Holland et al., Mikkelson et al. 
also controlled for geography by including a dummy variable for each continent. 
For example, if a country is in Asia, they assigned a value of 1 to the “Asia” dummy 
variable; if not, they assigned a value of 0 to that variable. They also controlled for 
one aspect of political history, through another dummy variable denoting whether 
or not each country is ex-communist or not. Unlike Mikkelson et al., Holland et al. 
controlled for a measure of environmental governance, the proportion of vertebrate 
species that are endemic (i.e., limited to one country only), and each country’s devel-
opment category according to the United Nations. Despite employing this distinct set 
of control variables, Holland et al. confirmed Mikkelson et al.’s finding of a statisti-
cally significant, positive link between economic inequality and biodiversity loss.
Future country-level studies of equality-biodiversity relationships can have the best 
of both worlds: bigger sample sizes than Mikkelson et al.’s or Holland et al.’s, but more 
reliable inequality data than the SIDD-3 used by Pandit and Laband. This is because, 
while the PIP has removed all versions of the SIDD from the web, Solt has made a new 
and improved inequality data set available (the Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database, or SWIID). Although the SWIID includes some interpolated values, it includes 
no gross extrapolations such as the Barbados example discussed above (Solt, 2009). 
The latest version of the SWIID includes Gini estimates for 4,549 country-year combi-
nations. In addition to better inequality data, future equality-biodiversity studies can 
also draw upon the latest updates and refinements of the IUCN Red List.
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FIGURE 1 Equality and Plant Conservation by Countries
Documenting the link between economic equality and biodiversity conservation demands the collection and 
construction of comparable data sets such as the Standardized World Income Inequality Database, or SWIID.
REDUCING INEQUALITIES C H A P T E R  5
A PLANET FOR L IFE 105
Figure 2 offers a preview of such studies. Derived from the 2011 versions of both 
the SWIID and the Red List1, Figure 2 shows a strong positive relationship between 
economic equality and plant conservation status among 122 countries (Kendall’s  
= 0.31). This relationship is highly statistically significant (p < 10-6), and prelimi-
nary analysis indicates that it holds up after controlling for potentially confounding 
variables. As Figure 1 shows, in all countries with an equality index (one minus the 
Gini index of inequality) greater than 0.70, more than 60% of well-studied plant 
species are considered to be at “lower risk” of extinction by the IUCN. In fact, in 
the great majority of these most equal countries – 21 out of 23 – more than 80% 
of such plant species are relatively secure. This suggests that achieving high levels 
of economic equality within a given country suffices to protect most of the plant 
species within that same country.
Possible mechanisms for the equality-biodiversity 
connection
 
Though Mikkelson et al. (2007) reported evidence for a causal connection between 
economic inequality and biodiversity loss, they did not detail the mechanisms by 
which equality may influence biodiversity. In this section we will therefore briefly 
discuss a few factors that may, upon further investigation, prove to be important. 
A first and probably important factor is population pressure. In an analysis of the 
2004 Red List, the IUCN emphasized human population growth as an important 
socioeconomic driver of other species” population decline (IUCN, 2004). Figure 3 
shows a strongly negative connection between economic equality and human popula-
tion growth (Kendall’s  = -0.35, p < 10-8). This inverse relationship holds up after 
controlling for per-capita income.
How might equality slow human population expansion? We hypothesise that 
gender equality will figure more prominently in the answer to this question than will 
other aspects of economic or political equality. Engelman (2008) identified gender 
equality as a key prerequisite – along with access to safe and effective contracep-
tion and abortion – to stabilising human population size. Gender equality also has 
at least one other advantage that benefits both human and non-human species: i.e., 
lower carbon emissions (Ergas and York, 2012).
A second possible mechanism for the equality-biodiversity link is the role of 
equality in promoting good governance. For example, Stiglitz (2012) stresses the 
importance of equality for guaranteeing access to justice. As we discuss below, a 
fair and efficient justice system may be a prerequisite for the effective management 
of environmental problems. In addition, Solt (2008, 2010) shows that economic 
equality enhances citizens’ levels of political interest, political discussion, and 
electoral participation. We conjecture that such civic engagement induces govern-
ments in more equal societies to protect biological diversity more effectively, through 
1.  See myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt/swiid/swiid.html and www.iucnredlist.org/about/summary-statistics.
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conservation and restoration of habitat, reduction of pollution, and regulation of 
hunting and gathering.
A certain level of equality also seems necessary for successful community-based 
management of renewable natural resources (Ostrom, 1990). Natural resource 
management experiments in developing countries provide a particularly clear illus-
tration of this. Whether for social forestry, the management of wildlife, protected 
areas, land ownership, or coastal fisheries, levels of equality affect poor rural stake-
holders” access to biological resources, and the security of this access over time as 
the operators of globalised commodity chains exploit these resources ever further 
afield and more intensively.
Without sufficient levels of equality, the most disadvantaged stakeholders often 
lack the legal means required to secure long-term exclusive access to the biological 
resources vital to their welfare, because of either problems of access to land, the 
status of the resources themselves, the limited attention given to customary law in 
relation to written law, informal advantages granted to the most powerful compa-
nies or collusion between major economic actors and political leaders. For example, 
the development of agriculture (soybean, cattle ranching) in the Amazon, the major 
FIGURE 3  Demographic pressure, a product of inequality 
Income equality, compared to the effect caused by income level, tends to have a stronger and more 
sustained impact on slowing a country’s population growth. It also tends to make citizens more interested in 
public affairs, including the protection of biodiversity.
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plantations in Indonesia, or the expansion of agricultural land into African savannah 
all reveal a transformation of natural rural landscapes composed of family farming 
areas with low externalities and considerable natural infrastructure into agricul-
tural systems made up of large farms with high externalities and limited natural 
infrastructure. These situations have an adverse impact on biodiversity.
Socio-economic inequalities thus depress biodiversity through the “crushing” of 
small rural stakeholders due both to their relative weakness (less formalized, poorly 
respected rights, inferior social status, cultural stigmatisation, limited negotiating 
capacities) and to an effective coalition between major farmers, industries and politi-
cians (one-sided resource exploitation contracts, large-scale land leases, assumption 
of risks and guarantees favouring major national and international stakeholders, 
weak trade unions and little representation of small farmers, etc.). For poor rural 
stakeholders, these inequalities result in land insecurity, unpredictability and a lack 
of transparency regarding access to resources. They diminish their capacity for self-
organization, encourage the individualistic race to appropriate resources and limit 
the benefits and possibility of improving the sustainability of production systems.
Integrating economic equality into conservation 
practice
Conservationists tend to focus on mitigating proximal causes of biodiversity loss, 
chief of which is habitat destruction for agriculture and aquaculture (Salafsky et 
al., 2008). The equality-biodiversity connection discussed herein calls for greater 
attention to more distal socioeconomic causes – and ultimately to cultural causes. 
See White (1967) for an early, and now classic, cultural explanation of environ-
mental destruction.
As discussed earlier, slowing growth in human numbers may be an important 
part of the mechanism by which equality mitigates species loss. It may also serve 
as a bridge between political economy and processes more familiar to conservation 
practitioners. Other pathways by which equality favours biodiversity take on special 
significance in the current context of the domination of concepts and instruments 
based on the economic value of biodiversity – especially economic assessments of 
environmental services and payments for environmental services – which tend to 
relegate approaches based on rights and statuses to the sidelines.
One of the first lessons to be drawn is that approaches based on the economic 
value of biodiversity must be systematically accompanied by a reduction in the 
political weakness of rural producers and direct users of ecosystems, by working 
on their rights of access to resources, their representation, and their capacities for 
negotiating and controlling local resources. Failing this, unequal dynamics result in 
greater insecurity for many local stakeholders, the rapid development of production 
systems with high profitability and externalities and an increase in adverse environ-
mental and social impacts. A second lesson is linked to the fundamental inequality 
between the rich, who are often urban, and the rural poor: the former have the 
privilege of being able to shop independently of the state of local resources, with 
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commodity chains moving around the world as ecosystems are depleted and oppor-
tunities provided by the weakest rights and regulations. Reducing this inequality of 
access and the associated biodiversity loss implies combining scales of action: for 
example, organizing sustainable local production systems for certified globalized 
suppliers; and reducing the relocation of urban supplies and better connecting cities 
to their peripheral rural areas.
A third lesson is that large-scale capitalistic production and exploitation must meet 
a rise in opposition and whistle blowing, as well as a consolidation of environmental 
rights. Actions to finance large-scale plantations (oil palm, rubber trees, etc.) must 
thus give way to stronger regulatory safeguards, transparency, and assistance for 
civil society.
How to attain equality
How then should societies go about increasing economic equality? With regard 
to the consequences for human well-being, it does not seem to matter. Wilkinson 
and Pickett (2009) used Sweden and Japan, and Vermont and New Hampshire, to 
illustrate this point. Sweden and Japan rank among the most equal countries in the 
world, in terms of net income (gross income, minus taxes, plus government trans-
fers). Likewise, Vermont and New Hampshire rank among the most equal states in 
the US. Sweden, Japan, Vermont, and New Hampshire all have high life expectan-
cies, levels of trust between citizens, etc. Yet while Sweden and Vermont attain their 
high levels of equality through progressive taxation and government transfers, Japan 
and New Hampshire achieve it through more equal gross income.
Figure 1 suggests that the route to high levels of net income equality does not 
matter for biodiversity conservation either. All of the most equal countries shown in 
Figure 1 also have relatively good plant conservation status. Nevertheless, Wilkinson 
and Pickett (2009) argue that one route to equality would achieve its end more 
securely and permanently than tax and benefits policies.  Governments can quickly 
undo progressive tax policies, and they often have. In contrast, if an economy under-
went a wholesale shift from domination by corporations – an inherently inegalitarian 
form of business organization – to cooperatives, it would fundamentally change the 
nature of work and investment (Mikkelson, 2011). Such a shift would therefore 
have more staying power than policies governing individuals’ taxation and benefits.
Capitalist firms – what most of us know as, and we are calling in this paper, 
“corporations” for short – rely on inequality for their very existence, and deepen it 
once they do exist. They rely on inequality because they presuppose a distinction 
between two kinds of people – those who already have enough money to survive, 
and can therefore invest an additional amount in the firm (the shareholders); and 
those who must instead sell their labour in order to survive (the workers). Corpo-
rations deepen this initial inequality because they put the shareholders, instead of 
the workers, in the “driver’s seat”. It is the shareholders, rather than the workers, 
who ultimately control the corporation. And it is the shareholders, rather than the 
workers, who reap the profits which, unlike wages, have no pre-established upper 
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limit. Of course, some corporations go out of business, causing their shareholders 
to lose some of their money and their workers to lose their jobs. But on average, 
corporations make more money for shareholders than they lose. Otherwise, only 
extreme risk-lovers would invest, and the stock market would collapse for good 
(Schweickart, 2011).
In contrast, worker cooperatives foster economic equality, in at least two ways. 
First, the profits go to the relatively poor workers, rather than to the relatively rich 
shareholders. Second, such co-ops operate democratically: the workers ultimately 
control the firm, and each has an equal vote. When workers decide on wages, they 
do elect to pay executives more than others, because they have an incentive to attract 
and keep managerial “talent” so that the firm succeeds, and its workers thus keep 
their jobs. But workers do not vote to pay executives hundreds of times more than 
others in the same firm. For example, in 2010 the highest-paid executive in the 
Mondragon federation of Spanish worker cooperatives earned just eight times the 
lowest wage in Mondragon (Ramesh, 2011). In contrast, by the early 21st Century 
the ratio between the highest and average wages in large capitalist firms had reached 
nearly 20 in Spain, not to mention over 500 in the United States (Bruce et al., 2005).
Despite the egalitarian advantages of co-ops, most firms are corporations, and 
most people work at the latter. Many have assumed that some kind of competitive 
disadvantage must explain the relative paucity of worker-controlled firms. However, 
the empirical record shows decisively that co-ops actually out-compete otherwise 
comparable corporations (Dow, 2003). To use a biological analogy, co-ops have a 
lower “death rate” than corporations. However, co-ops also have a much lower “birth 
rate”, mostly due to inadequate investment. The only solution to this long-standing 
problem seems to be public investment. In other words, if co-ops are to take over the 
economy, governments must replace stock markets as the main source of capital for 
new firms (Schweickart, 2011).
For some, this would raise the spectre of central planning, still feared two decades 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, it is one thing for governments 
to provide initial investment funds, and another for them to unduly control the 
firms they fund. The whole idea of a co-op is that its members (along with the 
market for its goods or services) control its behaviour. Another suitable guarantor 
of de-centralization would be to place most initial-investment decisions in the hands 
of local public banks, whose officials would be democratically accountable to the 
citizens of individual municipalities, rather than to a central government alone 
(Schweickart, 2011).
Conclusion
In this chapter we have reviewed work to date on the link between inequalities 
and biodiversity loss, discussed some possible mechanisms by which economic 
equality may benefit biodiversity conservation, suggested ways to integrate equality 
concerns into the conservation agenda, and discussed worker control of firms as 
a promising route to equality. We conclude that equality does seem to have an 
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important relationship to biodiversity. This relationship bears further study and 
action at various levels from the local to the global. In particular, social and environ-
mental activists should heed the equality-biodiversity connection, and work together 
to transform economies in a way that distributes resources more equitably both 
within the human species, and between humanity and the myriad of other species 
with a rightful claim to life and to flourish on Planet Earth.
In addition, official development assistance should aim to improve equality 
through the conservation projects it supports, and urge recipient countries to do 
the same. For funders increasingly concerned about demonstrating the effective-
ness of their action and setting clear objectives, enhancing equality also presents the 
advantage of being measurable in the long term (for example using indicators such 
as the Gini index). Consequently, the introduction of at least one equality target in 
the post-2015 development objectives and/or in future sustainable development 
goals is imperative. ■
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T
he ambiguous relationships between biodiver-
sity, its conservation and poverty alleviation 
are the subject of much discussion (BILLÉ et al., 
2012). While clear causal links have yet to be 
proven, evidence is starting to emerge from 
the field that supports the thesis of a possible synergy 
between biodiversity conservation policies and the fight 
against poverty and inequality.
The Namibian Community-Based Natural Resources 
Management (CBNRM) programme provides an inter-
esting example of the ongoing promotion since the 1990s 
of participatory approaches to biodiversity management 
in southern and eastern Africa (CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe, 
ADMADE in Zambia, NRM in Botswana, group ranches 
and conservancies in Kenya, etc.).
Namibia, with its population of about 2 million, has only 
been independent since 1990 and it continues to suffer 
today from the legacy of South African occupation. During 
South African rule almost all of the apartheid laws were 
imposed in Namibia (the black population was prohibited 
from property ownership, there was residential segregation 
and Bantustans were created, etc.). Despite a per capita 
income of 4,700 US dollars which places Namibia in the 
World Bank’s group of upper middle income countries, 
rural poverty remains high (27% in 2010, compared 
to urban poverty of 9% and an overall national level of 
19.5%) and inequalities in the country are among the 
world’s highest, with a Gini coefficient of 0.6 in 2010 (the 
world average was 0.39 in 2007).
Biodiversity conservation and the 
reduction of inequalities: the Namibian 
experience
Constance Corbier-Barthaux, Agence Française de Développement (AFD), Paris, France
Renaud Lapeyre, Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (Iddri), Paris, France
In this context, and based on a rich, diverse and endemic 
flora and fauna, the new democratic government has for 
20 years tried to promote sustainable development that 
would simultaneously reduce poverty and inequality.  
Devolution of use rights over flora and fauna
During the South African occupation, apartheid laws 
expropriated almost all of the black population’s rights of 
ownership and their use of land and natural resources. 
In 1990, around 4,000 white farmers privately owned 
44% of the land in Namibia and were entitled to harvest 
wildlife on it, while communal lands (which represented 
41% of the territory) were populated by the majority of 
the black population (more than 1.5 million people) and 
remained the property of the South African government1. 
On communal land, management and use rights over flora 
and fauna remained the prerogative of the South African 
administrator. Faced with a total lack of rights over land 
and associated resources, poor rural communities were 
often forced to hunt and harvest plants illegally to survive, 
which led to rapid degradation of biodiversity (a situation 
that had already been aggravated by the independence 
war and drought). For example, in 1970 there were 300 
desert elephants in the West of the country, a figure that 
was reduced to 70 individuals by 1982 (LONG and JONES, 
2004). On the contrary, on the private land owned by white 
1.  National parks, also owned by the South African 
government, represent the remaining 15% of land.
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farmers, wildlife abundance increased by 80% between 
1972 and 1992 (BARNES and JAGER, 1996).
Two laws were enacted to solve this situation. The first, 
known as the Nature Conservation Ordinance Amendment 
Act, was implemented in 1996 and allowed rural commu-
nities living on communal lands to create conservation 
areas (known as conservancies) where the community 
manages natural resources. Once a conservancy has been 
created and officially registered by the State, the commu-
nity obtains rights of management and conditional use of 
the fauna and flora present on its territory. Specifically, the 
community receives hunting quotas that it can use at its 
discretion. To be recognized as a conservancy, a commu-
nity must define a geographical area (with GPS-defined 
borders), agree on a constitution (defining the institutional 
rules of operation) and a list of members, elect an execu-
tive committee and draft a natural resources management 
plan for the area, and vote on it, as well as a distribu-
tion plan for the generated income. The second law to be 
enacted was the Communal Land Reform Act of 2002, 
which further devolved land use rights to these conserv-
ancies that now control the allocation of land leases in 
their territory (rights of leasehold) for commercial purposes 
(mainly tourism).
Each conservancy can use these different rights that 
relate to the biodiversity on their territory to generate 
monetary and non-monetary benefits for its members. 
Possible activities include trophy hunting, hunting for the 
sale of game meat, subsistence hunting, the sale of live 
wild animals and also tourism. Each community is free 
to use these rights and to manage these activities on 
their own; or may delegate the management of commer-
cial activities to a private operator, such as a professional 
hunter, butcher or tourism operator. In this case, the 
FIGURE 1 Community conservancies, an i mportant tool for nature conservation in Namibia
Between public protected areas, concessions and registered community conservancies, biodiversity is 
protected in more than a third of Namibian territory. 15% of the total population and most rural households 
live in these conservancies and thus benefit from the sustainable use of biodiversity.
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community signs a formal partnership agreement with 
the private company and/or the state (known as a joint 
venture or public-private partnership) and receives, on top 
of the private sector jobs created, lease fees and royalties 
from the private operator. All of the generated income stays 
in the locality (conservancy bank account) and is managed 
by the Executive Committee, which presents the annual 
accounts at the General Assembly’s AGM for approval; 
there is no local or state tax on this income.   
Increased biodiversity and the significant 
generation of local revenue
Since 1996 and the enactment of these laws, the 
number of conservancies has continued to increase in 
rural areas. There were four conservancies in 1998, by 
late 2003 this number had risen to 29, and in December 
2012 there were 77. This represents 19% of the national 
territory and involves 15% of the total Namibian population. 
To this total, if we add the national parks, the private land 
under wildlife management status, as well as community 
concessions and forests, 37% of the Namibian territory 
is thus included within an institutional framework for the 
sustainable management of natural resources and biodi-
versity.
Such exponential growth has been made possible 
through the major support of local and international 
conservation associations (IRDNC, NNF, WWF, NACSO, 
etc.), as well as from international donors (USAID, GEF, 
FFEM, EU, etc.). This support for Namibian conservancies 
places the emphasis on the development of initiatives with 
a business economic logic: promotion within the conserv-
ancy of partnerships with the private sector as well as 
individual entrepreneurs, encouraging the emergence of 
small private economic businesses and the diversification 
of alternative economic activities.
In this context, financial and non-monetary benefits 
are significant, especially when compared to the income 
earned from agriculture or livestock breeding. In 1998, the 
annual benefit derived from conservancies, both economic 
and non-monetary combined, was estimated to be around 
150,000 euros, while in 2010 this had escalated to 4 
million euros. It is income earned from partnerships 
between conservancies and the tourism sector (1.9 million 
euros in 2010, including lease fees, royalties and wages) 
that accounts for the largest part of these benefits, while 
hunting for sport is the second most important activity, 
bringing in 1.1 million euros in 2010 (i.e. 75% of the 2010 
total can be attributed to these two activities).
A significant proportion of these incomes and 
non-economic benefits generated by the utilization of 
biodiversity covers the maintenance costs of a conserv-
ancy (employee wages, including community game 
guards and administrative staff, the purchase of all-terrain 
BOX 1 Work undertaken by the French Global 
Environment Facility (FGEF) in Namibia
Through a project supported by the FGEF, the 
Namibian CBNRM programme has, among other goals, 
enabled the restoration of water points and the direct 
reintroduction of a total of 4,700 animals from rare 
species in 33 conservancies, one national park and one 
area of private land. At the local level, the Khoadi Hôas 
conservancy, which is located in the northWest of the 
country, has greatly benefited from this new commu-
nity management of biodiversity: firstly, black rhino and 
black-faced impala were reintroduced here and are 
now managed locally; secondly, an EU-funded commu-
nity lodge was built here, in partnership with a private 
operator (the Grootberg Lodge). By providing tourists 
with the opportunity to observe this rare wildlife, the 
lodge is able to employ and train 30 locals and pay 
royalties to the conservancy, which reinvests them in 
conservation and public infrastructure. Lapeyre (2011) 
showed that in 2007, between the 23 employees and 
their family dependents, the Grootberg Lodge provides 
livelihoods for about 115 people in the conservancy. 
Social mobility is also made possible: for example, a 
former farmer was initially appointed as a conserv-
ancy’s game guard before being employed by the 
Lodge as a maintenance worker and then a black 
rhino tracker, before finally becoming a tour guide 
(after passing his driving licence, which was funded 
by the employer). This is a very good example of the 
possible synergy between empowerment, biodiversity 
conservation and income generation for local people.
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vehicles and equipment for the monitoring of activities); 
while the rest is distributed as wages (for the employees 
of tourism lodges in conservancies, the trackers and 
other staff involved in trophy hunting operations, etc.); 
free housing for the lodge employees; free game meat 
distribution among local households; student scholarships; 
and dividends, which are paid to each family member 
but also fund community infrastructure (the purchase of 
ambulances, school or clinic construction, etc.)2. 
At the ecological level, the development of conservancy 
2. In 2009, 37% of income and benefits from the use of biodiver-
sity in conservancies were used to cover the costs of conservation, 
while more than 40% of the profits were distributed in the form 
of wages by the private operators to employees of the tourism 
lodges. About 15% paid for the free distribution of game meat 
to families in the conservancies.
areas has enabled a very significant improvement in the 
state of wildlife species. Indeed, populations of rare 
endemic species have increased since the mid-1990s, 
including mountain zebras, wild dogs, desert lions, desert 
elephants and black rhinos. 
Do conservancies reduce poverty and inequality at 
the local level?
As mentioned above, the Namibian CBNRM programme 
generates income for the rural households in conservan-
cies, but does this enable the reduction of socio-economic 
inequalities? Only a few studies have attempted to answer 
this question, to go beyond the simple analysis of the flow 
of financial income and the non-monetary benefits at the 
local level. Bandyopadhyay et al. (2004) conducted one 
such analysis, which was based on a survey of nearly 
FIGURE 2  Rising incomes in conservancies
Non-cash incomes and benefits from conservancies have increased dramatically since 1998, as have cash 
incomes from partnerships with private tourism and trophy hunting operators. These incomes are mainly 
distributed in the form of local wages and royalties paid to rural communities.
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1,200 households in seven conservancies (in the regions 
of Caprivi and Kunene) and showed ambiguous results 
in terms of poverty and inequality reduction. It seems 
that, on the whole, conservancies have a positive effect 
on the financial wealth of households situated therein, 
but have a much more mixed impact on poor house-
holds specifically. On the one hand, because conserv-
ancies provide low-skilled jobs (such as game guards), 
less educated households (in terms of the level of educa-
tion of the household’s head) see their standard of living 
increase faster (measured through expenditure) than 
more educated households, although this is only margin-
ally significant; similarly, in conservancies in the Caprivi 
region, the poorest households in terms of physical assets 
(durable goods) tend to see their living standards rise 
faster than richer households. On the other hand, in the 
Kunene region, households that are poor in physical assets 
have not benefited from a relative improvement in income 
from the establishment of conservancies, as compared 
with richer households; and neither have households that 
are poor in terms of livestock (goats and sheep) seen their 
standard of living rise faster than households that were 
richer in livestock. In general, as confirmed by Bandy-
opadhyay et al. (2010) through a 2006 survey of 965 
households in eight conservancies, even if the Namibian 
programme does not favour elite capture of revenue 
(often cited as a potential limitation of community biodi-
versity management projects), neither is it demonstrably 
pro-poor3. 
Studies based on the sustainable livelihoods approach, 
such as Long (2004a, b) and Lapeyre (2010, 2011), draw 
similar conclusions: the benefits derived from activities 
in conservancies, especially through wages paid to local 
residents employed in partnership lodges and the income 
earned from tourism community projects (e.g. associa-
tions of guides), allow rural households, including poor 
ones, to increase their human capital (payment of school 
fees), their physical capital (purchase of livestock) and 
3. Bandyopadhyay et al. (2010) even show that the probability 
of being a member of a conservancy, and thus to reap the 
associated benefits (see above) increases with the level of 
education of the household head. 
their social capital (contact with NGOs and donors) and 
thus serves as a safety net to reduce their vulnerability 
to economic and climatic downturns. However, it seems 
that these incomes, especially from tourism and from 
positions likely to be filled by less educated people, are 
still low and therefore serve more as a potential spring-
board towards stable employment, rather than a real way 
to reduce rural poverty. In this context it is also notable 
that better educated individuals usually monopolize the 
most qualified and best paid jobs in conservancies, in 
particular in the lodges, potentially accentuating inequali-
ties at the local level. 
Risks and limitations of the programme: its 
capacity to reduce inequality in rural areas
The model promoted by the CBNRM programme 
focuses primarily on charismatic wildlife and its habitat 
(elephants, rhinos, lions, etc.), and its commercial use 
via the upmarket private sectors of tourism and hunting, 
which are geographically and temporally volatile by nature. 
This approach seems most appropriate in conservancies 
that have the potential to be successfully managed in this 
way, which are those in the areas of Kunene and Caprivi. 
In these regions, the data show that a large majority of 
the programme’s total benefits (high royalties and large 
numbers of employees) is derived from the small number 
of conservancies that have managed to enter into partner-
ship agreements with a limited number of very reputable 
private tourism and hunting operators. Conversely, many 
conservancies have little tourism and wildlife potential and 
thus generate little revenue at the local level. Empirically, 
Lapeyre (2009) demonstrated that the four conservan-
cies located in the Kunene region, which are very well 
endowed (wildlife, spectacular landscapes and UNESCO 
World Heritage listed monuments) and have a low popula-
tion density, generate very significant income (for example, 
the Uibasen/Twyfelfontein conservancy in the northWest, 
with 230 inhabitants and a land area of 286 km², gener-
ated an income of 120 euros per capita and 98 euros per 
km² in 2007). In contrast, conservancies in the north of 
the country, which are much more populated and less well 
endowed (more agricultural landscapes with less charis-
matic fauna) have benefited little from the programme; for 
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example the Uukwaluudhi, King Nehale and Uukolonkadhi/
Ruacana conservancies generated between 0 and 2 euros 
per capita in 2007. This disparity is explained by the fact 
that tourism activities in conservancies (partnerships with 
private operators or community enterprises) are highly 
geographically concentrated: in 2007, four partnership 
lodges out of 25 generated half of the profits derived 
from this type of tourism, and nine lodges generated 
nearly three-quarters of this income. While seven tourism 
community projects out of 38 concentrated 80% of the 
distributed profits.
In summary, the programme requires a rethink on some 
of its policies if the objective is to ensure a balanced 
development on the entire national territory and to avoid 
reinforcing inequalities between conservancies or between 
members of the same conservancy. In this context, it 
seems appropriate that these activities involving biodi-
versity usage should be better linked and coordinated 
with “conventional” activities, such as agriculture and 
rural development, through a less sectorized ecosystem 
approach. n
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D
ifferent kinds of inequalities within low and middle-income 
countries as well as global or “North-South” inequalities have 
been recognizable for a long time. However, since the global 
economic crisis of 2008, inequality has resurfaced as a major 
public and political concern within rich countries. This crisis 
brought to light the unprecedented scale of the personal 
incomes and wealth of bankers, corporate executives and the 
top one per cent of the population in countries such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Greater awareness of 
the absolute and relative levels of wealth also produced much 
discussion about the causal role of the pursuit of personal wealth, on a scale of 
millions and billions, in the near collapse of the global financial system. The resulting 
social demonstrations such as the “Occupy” movement, many post-2008 election 
campaigns and anti-austerity protests have focused on inequalities – in wealth, job 
prospects for the young, education costs, social security, old age security, and so 
forth. It could also be argued that the political revolutions across the Middle East 
were motivated by inequality. After all, the Arab Spring was catalysed by a Tunisian 
fruit seller who set himself on fire as a form of protest expressing frustration at his 
relative inequality of opportunity to achieve a minimally decent life.  
The global economic crisis and other world events created an unusually recep-
tive environment for the publication of Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett’s book, 
“The Sprit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better” (hereafter 
“TSL”) in 2009. The book has been fantastically popular in many countries because 
it purports to provide scientific evidence about how inequality is bad for societies as 
Sridhar 
Venkatapuram
London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical 
Medecine, London, 
United Kingdom
In their book, The Sprit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always 
Do Better, Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett develop a thesis – “equal-
ity is healthy” – that has been incorrectly interpreted. The authors do 
not argue that income and wealth inequality directly and entirely cause 
dysfunctional societies, nor do they call for an equalizing of incomes 
to achieve absolute equality. Ultimately, improvements in living condi-
tions depend on the quality of programmes funded through taxation and 
redistribution policies.
Income inequalities, 
health inequalities and 
social progress
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well as what to do about it. TSL’s greatest appeal is perhaps that it is understood to 
argue specifically for the case that income and wealth inequality is bad for societies 
and, therefore, aggressive redistribution of income and wealth is, or will be, good 
for societies. The authors have given speeches around the world to a wide range 
of audiences, often managing to reach inaccessible and influential policy makers. 
The wide interest in their book is partly due to the context of great uncertainty and 
debate about what constitutes good social and economic systems. The authors seem 
to provide academic and scientific arguments that are more coherent, evidence-
based and legitimate than the demands from the protestors in the streets or the 
opinions of media pundits.  
A careful reading of the book, however, as well as an appreciation of the body of 
scientific literature that TSL draws from, shows that neither one of the two popular 
take-away messages is accurate. The authors do not argue that income and wealth 
inequalities directly and wholly cause dysfunctional societies or cause the lives of 
people to go badly. Nor do they advocate a simple wholesale redistribution of income 
and wealth, or an “equalizing down” of incomes to achieve absolute equality. So if 
these two take-away messages are not accurate reflections of TSL, then what exactly 
is their argument?
Income inequality and health
The central thesis of TSL is that in countries that are above the Gross National Income 
(GNI) threshold of $25,000 per person there is a positive relationship between 
income inequality and a wide variety of social problems. That is, above the $25,000 
GNI per capita threshold, the more income inequality in a country, the greater 
amount of social problems including poor health, teenage births, homicides, impris-
onment rates, low educational performance of children, and so forth (Wilkinson 
and Pickett, 2009: p. 19). This thesis challenges a variety of dominant views about 
the causes of “social bads” in a variety of domains, and most prominently it argues 
against the view that material poverty is the main cause of such problems. Wilkinson 
and Pickett show that average levels of income across countries, and across regions 
and states within countries, do not have a statistical relationship with the levels of 
social ills. They interpret this finding as meaning that in rich countries (i.e. above 
$25,000 GNI per capita) there has been a delinking between absolute material condi-
tions and quality of life and that, in comparison, the level of income inequality has a 
positive statistical relationship with levels of social problems above this threshold. 
The identification  of this relationship has led many to conclude that inequality 
in incomes directly causes many social problems and therefore, reducing income 
inequalities, most immediately through income redistribution, is the necessary 
remedy. Such a conclusion may be understandable because a whole variety of ideolo-
gies and intuitions about equality support the idea of income equality or at least, 
support the reduction of gross inequalities between the rich and the poor.  However, 
this interpretation or policy prescription does not accurately reflect the conclusions 
presented in TSL. While the authors highlight that countries that do better regarding 
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various health achievements and social bads have redistributive tax systems and large 
state welfare programmes, they also suggest that there are many different ways to 
achieve such outcomes (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009: Ch. 16). To understand why 
the equalization of incomes or the limitation of income inequalities prior to taxation 
is only one possible avenue to improving social progress requires a deeper look into 
the research. Wilkinson and Pickett argue that income inequality shows how hierar-
chical a society is; income inequalities show the social distances between people 
and the functioning of social stratification (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009: p. 27). 
Income inequalities reflect social inequalities, and they both reinforce each other.  
Furthermore, evidence is also presented that seems to show that the steeper the 
social gradient of a particular social problem – i.e. the more skewed the distri-
bution of a problem is towards the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy – the 
stronger the relationship with income inequality. Moreover, the authors argue that 
a relationship between income inequality and social bads exists, or only becomes 
visible, when comparing groups that have meaningful social differences; income 
inequality would not appear as a contributing factor to problems among families 
FIGURE 1 A fairer society is less sick
The work of Wilkinson and Pickett shows that the degree of inequality in a society is strongly correlated with 
the level of social problems experienced by that society. The most egalitarian societies (Japan, Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark) are also those with the lowest levels of certain problems, including obesity, incarceration 
rates, numbers of teenage mothers and people with low mathematical ability.
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within a deprived neighbourhood, but would appear when comparing neighbour-
hoods of different levels of wealth. Something about the social differences between 
groups of people, most easily represented by income differences, seems to play an 
important part in the levels of social ills experienced by those at the bottom as well 
as the higher levels experienced throughout the entire population. But what are 
these social differences if not directly income inequality, and how do they shape 
the pathways to various social problems? 
Social Epidemiology
Research on social gradients (i.e. inequalities across the socio-economic hierarchy) 
and influence of social factors on human deprivations, particularly health related 
issues, have been a central focus of the relatively new discipline of social epidemi-
ology. It is often contrasted with “classic” or “biomedical” epidemiology in which the 
scope of research on the causes of disease is limited to individual-level factors that 
include individual biology, individual behaviours, and individual-level exposures to 
harmful organisms and physical particles.  These three categories of factors are often 
metaphorically described as making up a multi-factoral “causal pie” or forming the 
links in a “web of causation” (Krieger, 2000; Rothman et al., 2008).  
Despite its dominance for most of the 20th century, this individual-level biomed-
ical model of disease has been increasingly challenged over the past four decades 
because of its persistent limitations in fully identifying the causes of many chronic 
and degenerative diseases, as well as its inability to explain the dynamics and distri-
bution patterns of population-level health (Syme, 1996; Krieger, 1994; Krieger, 
2001; Susser and Susser, 1996a; Susser and Susser, 1996b; Schwartz et al., 
1999; Susser, 1999). Molecular epidemiology, which delves even deeper into the 
individual, has been promoted as a panacea to the classic model’s explanatory 
limitations. In contrast, social epidemiology, which focuses on supra-individual 
factors, and the basic tenets of its research, has received considerably less public 
attention – despite its insights and productivity (Marmot and Wilkinson, 1999; 
Berkman and Kawachi, 2000; Marmot et al., 1997). The lack of greater public 
awareness of social epidemiological research may or may not be surprising, 
depending on one’s worldview, as social epidemiology brings to light two very 
politically charged issues: that of the social causation of preventable illness and 
mortality, and the unequal social distribution of illness and mortality. Unlike classic 
or molecular epidemiology, social epidemiology puts social conditions, policies and 
choices squarely in the causal explanations of preventable illness and mortality 
and their social patterning.
Moving away from the classic biomedical model that was very productive and 
dominant in the late twentieth century, social epidemiologists are expanding the 
causal chain outward from the proximate individual-level factors to include the 
causes of the proximate causes, and identifying their discrete and cumulative effects 
throughout the life cycle, starting from the womb. Social epidemiology also expands 
the causal chain upwards to incorporate multiple levels of factors – such as the 
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macro political, economic, and social policies and processes – that affect health. 
These factors are being quantiﬁed and integrated into an epidemiological model 
of causation and distribution of illness and mortality in individuals and groups. 
This bridging or integrating of the social and the biological has been characterized 
as creating a “Chinese boxes” paradigm (Susser and Susser, 1996a; Susser and 
Susser, 1996b). The metaphor aims to reﬂect the understanding that an individ-
ual’s health is determined by multiple and increasingly distal factors, which at the 
same time profoundly shape the immediate context or the more proximate factors. 
To consider this another way, just as the sun is distant from Earth, but still funda-
mentally determines the parameters of the biological functioning of human beings 
across the entire planet; similarly, there are many social factors from the global level 
downwards that, although remote, profoundly impact the functioning of individuals 
differently in different places in the world. 
The focus on social factors affecting health is not fundamentally new. There is a 
long history of research into the identification of the role of the social environment 
FIGURE 2 Life expectancy depends on equity
The Preston curve is a standard tool for studying the relationship between health and equity. Strong equity 
increases the average life expectancy of members of a society. The life expectancy of a Norwegian or 
Luxembourgian, people who live among the world’s most egalitarian societies in terms of income, is more 
than 30 years higher than that of a Swaziland resident, where the degree of inequality is among the highest 
in the world.
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in community and social medicine, while Louis-René Villermé and Rudolph Virchow 
conducted epidemiological work in this field in the 19th century. However, modern 
social epidemiology harnesses the most current epidemiological tools and method-
ologies combined with sociological analysis to explicitly identify supra-individual 
social phenomena that affect both the causation and distribution of ill-health across 
individuals and social groups, within and across countries (Berkman and Kawachi, 
2000; Marmot and Wilkinson, 1999).
In light of the productivity and profound insights of social epidemiology, the late 
J. W. Lee, then Director-General of the World Health Organization, set up the WHO 
Commission on Social Determinants of Health (“the Commission”) in 2005.  Its 
mission was to collect and synthesize global evidence on the social determinants 
of health, assess their impact on health inequity, and make recommendations for 
action to address that inequity1. Members of the Commission and its secretariat were 
motivated by three driving forces: a belief in social justice, respect for evidence, and 
frustration that there was far too little action on the social determinants of ill health 
and health inequalities2. These powerfully motivating forces led to three years of 
detailed work compiling and analysing research, consultations with experts from 
around the world as well as across many disciplines and professions, meetings with 
governments and practitioners, and the production of a final report and recommen-
dations. Rather than being an end in itself, the work of the Commission and the 
resultant report, Closing the gap in a generation: Health equity through action on the 
social determinants of health was intended to instigate discussions within institu-
tions and the public sphere, and help promote social action and policies to advance 
health and health equity, both within countries and transnationally.
In the first truly global application of social epidemiology, the Commission articu-
lated the causal nested framework in the following way:  
1. The conditions of daily life in which individuals are born, grow, live, work and 
age determine their experience of morbidity and length of life span.  
2. These daily living conditions produce proximal determinants, such as exposure 
to harmful substances and biological risks; availability of material needs, such as 
food, potable water, shelter and health care; as well as social environments that 
affect psychobiological pathways and health-related behaviours.
3. These daily conditions in turn have structural drivers or “‘causes of causes’’ – 
the economic, social and political conditions that, together with background social 
1. Information about the Commission is available at http://www.who.int/social_determinants/thecommission/ 
en/index.html. For the complete final report, see Commission on Social Determinants of Health, Closing the gap in 
a generation: Health equity through action on the social determinants of health. Final Report of the Commission 
on Social Determinants of Health (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2008). Available at http://whqlibdoc.
who.int/publications/2008/9789241563703_eng.pdf.
2. This frustration is associated with two main areas. First, that the concern for addressing preventable ill-health 
and mortality has to go beyond healthcare to also include the causes, particularly the social conditions. Most 
global and national health policies often focus only on healthcare. The second source of frustration was that 
despite decades of epidemiological research findings on the social causes of ill-health and mortality, health policy 
makers were not making use of the findings.
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and cultural norms, create and distribute the proximate causes across individuals 
and social groups.
The starting point of social epidemiology is that individual-level factors do not 
provide sufﬁcient causal explanations for the signiﬁcant health differences between 
groups of human beings deﬁned by such social characteristics as nationality, educa-
tion, income, occupation, gender, race/ethnicity or geographical residence. The 
hypothesis is that factors created by the social environment have a signiﬁcant 
inﬂuence in the causal pathways to illness in individuals and unequally distribute 
ill-health across social groups. Under this general hypothesis, there are a number 
of different pathways or explanations that are currently being researched (Bambra, 
2011; Mackenbach, 2012). Following this line of reasoning, the Commission started 
from the premise that there is no purely biological causal explanation for the marked 
differences in life expectancies across countries; for example, the gross inequality in 
life-expectancy between the Japanese (83 years) and Malawians (48 years) cannot be 
explained by differences in the biological endowments of the Japanese compared to 
Malawian populations. Rather, the Commission argued that differences in life expec-
tancies and health proﬁles are determined by social environments – by economic, 
political, and social policies and processes driven by social and cultural values that 
create and distribute the daily living conditions of people in different locations 
around the world.  
Importantly, social epidemiological research not only explodes outward the classic 
model of epidemiology from the individual unit of analysis, but the research also 
militates against the various social consequences of applying the biomedical model. 
Some of these social consequences include the narrow focus on health care provi-
sion and behavioural change as the primary avenues to improving health; being 
inattentive to social group inequalities in health; exaggerating individual volition 
and responsibility in health outcomes; and focusing on the material poverty of the 
most disadvantaged while ignoring psychosocial environments that produce prevent-
able ill health in the entire population. Such drawbacks of a narrowly individual-
level analysis are not only a concern for domestic health policies, but also for global 
health policies. These can include, inter alia, development assistance for health 
programmes, transnational health policies, or domestic health policies addressing 
extraterritorial health threats.  
The Wilkinson Thesis
It is this context of expanding the scope of epidemiology and identifying the social 
determinants of ill health and premature mortality as well as their distribution 
that has produced the TSL. Starting in the early 1990s Richard Wilkinson began 
publishing research findings showing that greater income inequality in societies 
correlated with a lower average population health and higher social inequalities in 
health (Wilkinson, 1992).  The “Wilkinson thesis” which was narrower in scope than 
that presented in TSL, asserted that in countries above a $25,000 GNP per capita 
threshold, larger average income differences between classes are associated with a 
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steeper gradient in health achievements and higher, overall premature mortality in 
the entire population (Kawachi et al., 1999; Wilkinson, 1997; Wilkinson, 2000). 
Below the threshold, income inequality shows no correlation with the gradient or 
distribution in health outcomes.
Across a number of industrialized countries, and within regions of countries, 
Wilkinson shows that the steepness of the health gradient is indeed associated with 
level of income inequality. In TSL Wilkinson and Pickett show that income inequality 
is linked with a wide range of social problems aside from disparities in health achieve-
ments (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). While many have understood this research 
as referring to material determinants of health, Wilkinson argues that the effect 
of income inequality lies first in the psychosocial effects of being of lower social 
status, experiencing subordination, or being denied respect (Wilkinson, 1996). 
Entrenched and increasing income inequality affects social standing and in turn, 
leads to particular biological processes in the individual, such as chronic anxiety, 
permanent increases in stress hormones such as cortisol, more atherosclerosis and 
poorer immunity. The total result of these processes that occur through psychobio-
logical pathways is said to be analogous to rapid ageing (Kawachi et al., 1999, p 493). 
In TSL, Wilkinson & Pickett further argue that an environment of gross inequality 
undermines trust between people and community life, including increased violence. 
It also increases status competition and consumerism. And, by affecting early life, it 
affects people’s abilities to build relationships, empathize, and their aggressiveness 
(Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009: p. 231).
The Wilkinson thesis, development and health 
inequalities
A quick review of the literature on social epidemiology soon reveals that most 
research on the social determinants of health and social inequalities in health 
achievements has so far been done mostly in developed economies. Social epidemi-
ology begins with an interest in the persistence of ill health and the unequal distribu-
tion of preventable ill health and mortality despite the availability of healthcare and 
social programmes to meet basic needs. In contrast, health research in developing 
countries has largely been focused on the causes of infectious diseases and control-
ling fertility, and less focused on the social inequalities in health achievements. The 
lack of research on social determinants in developing countries appears to support 
the economist Angus Deaton’s argument that for centuries the better-off have often 
benefited from new health technologies first (Deaton, 2011). That is, rich people 
and rich countries are often the first beneficiaries of state-of-the-art technologies, 
including research.  
However, the Commission argued that social determinants of health and health 
inequalities affect all countries (World Health Organization and Commission 
on Social Determinants of Health, 2008). The final report showed how social 
gradients are visible in rich as well as poor countries. But efforts to apply social 
epidemiology and to globalize concern for the social determinants of health appear 
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to be weakened by research coming from within social epidemiology. In particular, 
by Wilkinson’s thesis that it is only above the threshold level of $25,000 GNI per 
capita that the levels and gradient in mortality correlate with income inequality. 
This threshold, he writes, “represents a transition from the primacy of material 
constraints to social constraints as the limiting condition on the quality of human 
life” (Kawachi et al., 1999: p 27).  
However, while his main finding is about what is happening above the threshold, 
Wilkinson may be far too quick in his conclusions about what is happening below 
it, and in making a peculiar distinction between material and social constraints. 
Under this threshold, it is far from certain that the determinants and distribution 
of premature mortality and impairments in societies can be adequately explained as 
being due largely to material constraints, including a lack of commodities such as 
healthcare. There may be a danger here of making the common mistake of confusing 
the cure with addressing the cause.  For example, the poor reproductive health 
of girls and women, including deplorable rates of maternal mortality which are 
largely preventable, or the spread of HIV/AIDS are caused by social and cultural 
practices as much as they are by material deprivations, if not more so.  To conclude 
FIGURE 3 Child well-being is an indicator of societal equity
Child well-being goes beyond the physical health of children. Equitable societies offer a better development 
framework for their younger members, with interesting exceptions such as Japan, which despite having a 
very equal distribution of income does not rank highly for child well-being.
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that poor health and premature mortality below the threshold is caused primarily 
by material constraints, based on a finding about income inequality above $25,000 
GNI per capita, seems to simply represent the reassertion of a theory as being appli-
cable to poor countries, when this theory is being forcefully rejected as having any 
relevance to rich countries. Just as the relationship between material conditions 
and ill health and quality of life is not straightforward in rich countries, nor is it the 
case in poor countries.    
It would be even an greater error to conclude from Wilkinson’s thesis – given its 
identification of a threshold level or turning point of $25,000 GNI per capita –that 
economic development in the form of rising GNI per capita up to the threshold 
automatically brings with it improvements in life expectancy and lower prevalence 
of impairments. The argument that material conditions and health achievements are 
delinked above the GNI threshold may lead some to the conclusion that below the 
threshold, rising GNI automatically improves these material conditions and conse-
quently improves health and quality of life. There is a widely held view, particularly 
among economists, that economic growth inevitably leads to dramatic improvements 
in life expectancy and infant mortality, while decreasing the overall burden of impair-
ments and improving social prosperity (Bloom and Canning, 2007; Pritchett and 
Summers, 1996). This theory, which is often attributed to Samuel Preston (Preston, 
1975; Preston, 2007), underlies a popular theory of epidemiological transition 
describing the movement of societies from an initial “under-developed” stage with 
a high burden of infectious diseases, to an “industrialised” stage with a high burden 
of chronic diseases (Omran, 1971). However, Simon Szreter and others argue that 
there is little historical evidence of an automatic link between economic growth 
and the improvement of health or welfare of individuals (Szreter, 1997; Biggs et 
al., 2010b; Sen, 1981). 
In fact, Szreter, a public health historian, argues that industrialization released 
very disruptive forces into British society that were managed by the politics of 
public-health advocates and institutions. That is, social action had an influential 
role in the management of the process and the consequences of industrialization 
which do not appear to be captured by Preston’s and Omran’s theories. Amartya Sen 
also points to the modern-day importance of public discussion and agitation in the 
domain of health policy in such places as Thailand, India and China (Sen, 2011). 
In parallel discussions in economics, Sudhir Anand and Martin Ravallion show that 
indeed growth in GNP per capita is correlated with increasing life expectancy. But 
those improvements in life expectancies are largely explained by poverty alleviation 
programmes and spending on public health goods and services (Sen, 1999; Anand 
and Ravallion, 1993). In fact, after accounting for these two factors, there is not 
much left of the link between improvements in average incomes and life expectancy. 
So, a rise in GNP improves health only when resources are marshalled towards public 
health goods and services. Sen and Jean Drèze show a similar situation in India 
(Drèze and Sen, 2002). More recently, Biggs and colleagues have looked at 22 Latin 
American countries and shown that the relationship between GDP per capita and 
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health is mediated by poverty levels and income inequality (Biggs et al., 2010a).    
It is worth expounding on the relationship between economic development and 
health because it is social factors that determine health and longevity, both above 
and below Wilkinson’s GNI per capita threshold. Wilkinson’s distinction between 
social versus material “constraints” on either side of the threshold seems based on 
the role of psychological factors related to relative social status and their influ-
ence on the onset of disease, factors that become prominent above the threshold. 
He contrasts these psychosocial pathways with material conditions affecting the 
health of individuals below the threshold. But why should psychosocial factors be 
considered as the only social factors affecting health? Given the wide variety of 
social factors that are currently the focus of social epidemiological research, it is 
surprising that the proximate cause model of disease and health impairment is being 
reasserted in poor countries. Much of the above-cited research (by Szreter, Anand, 
Ravillion, Biggs, Sen and others) has shown that economic growth on its own does 
not automatically improve health and longevity and, in particular, it does not ensure 
equitable achievements across populations. These improve because economic growth 
is usually accompanied by various social policies and provisions, such as poverty 
alleviation and investment in medical and public health programmes, as well as 
education. Economic policies are themselves important social determinants.  And, 
of course, there are the exemplary cases of Costa Rica, Cuba, Sri Lanka and the 
Indian state of Kerala which achieve better health outcomes than many developed 
economies, despite their low GNP per capita, because of the positive impact of their 
social choices on the proximate causes of health (Sen, 1999, pp. 46-47). 
The identification of a threshold where psychosocial factors related to relative 
inequality influence ill-health (and other social problems) should not be under-
stood to mean that social factors do not affect health below the threshold.  Indeed, 
social factors underlie both the psychological pathways in richer countries and the 
material pathways in poorer countries. In both rich and poor countries, going back 
in the chain of causation of ill health or any kind of impairment will inevitably lead 
to a meaningful social factor. TSL has largely been of interest to audiences in rich 
countries because of the public interest in income inequalities. However, for a global 
audience, an emphasis on the threshold as the tipping point at which material factors 
give way to socio-psycho-biological factors risks perpetuating the idea that rising 
GNP or economic growth automatically, without additional social policies, leads to 
health improvements. The notion that economic growth without supplementary 
social strategies will achieve improvements in health and quality of life has been 
profoundly contested in mainstream economics, but such debate does not seem to 
have reached social epidemiologists, perhaps because they mainly work in developed 
country contexts with little exposure to development related literature. 
The relative influence of different factors on health varies across rich and poor 
societies, and across individuals. Wilkinson showed that in the United States and 
United Kingdom, psychological pathways have a great affect on health. In other 
countries, such as those researched by development economists, health may be more 
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influenced by material pathways determined by levels of public spending on social 
goods and programmes. The important thing to recognize is that even the proximate 
material causes of ill health in developing countries have social determinants that 
can range from acts of commission as well as social neglect.
It is also worth noting that Wilkinson and Pickett identify a variety of interven-
tions to increase social equality, including reducing gross income differences before 
tax, redistributive taxes and welfare programmes. In the study of social hierarchy 
phenomena, it is clear that acting on incomes is really only one possible means of 
reducing distances between social positions. Given that income inequality does not 
directly cause poor health – the fact that one person’s monthly wage is less than 
another’s does not directly induce disease in the former – the real focus is on what 
is happening in the lives of individuals in relation to other individuals and groups. 
Income intervention is only one way to help individuals to avoid disease and other 
social deprivations. Above and below the GNI threshold, the actual target is an 
individual’s ability to achieve various physical and mental functionings, including 
the ability to avoid illness and premature mortality.  
In light of the expansive scope of social epidemiological research to supplement 
the biomedical model, as well as the need to integrate debates on health and devel-
opment, there is a pressing need for a “unified theory” of health causation and 
distribution. Social epidemiologists are aware of the need for a better paradigm 
for epidemiology that captures both individual and macro-level factors.  But as the 
above discussion highlights, even the best social epidemiology research has not yet 
integrated state-of-the-art research on health and sustainable development, and it 
requires a better grounding in the realities of rich and poor societies. In addition, 
micro and macro analyses remain confined to developed country contexts and 
various assumptions about developing countries are not being sufficiently explored. 
There is a need for a unified theory that is applicable to the entire human species 
to defensibly allocate responsibility for health causation and distribution among 
the four categories of nature/biology, social conditions, environmental conditions 
and individual behaviour/agency. While a number of candidate paradigms exist, 
Amartya Sen’s work on development as a form of increasing capabilities offers great 
potential as a basis for such a theory (Venkatapuram, 2011). Sen was a member of 
the WHO Commission and a significant influence on the Commission’s arguments.
Conclusion   
Given the renewed focus on income inequality as a result of TSL, it seems relevant 
to draw attention to long-standing discussions on precisely this subject in economics 
and especially, development economics. For decades, Sen has argued for a single 
or unified approach to evaluating social progress or sustainable development for 
all countries whether they are rich, poor or middle income. A central idea in this 
approach is the need to shift social and analytical concern from income inequality 
to economic inequality (Sen, 1997). Reflecting a long established view held by 
many economists, Sen argues that the importance of income is instrumental and 
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circumstantially contingent rather than intrinsic and categorical (this conclusion is 
reaffirmed by Wilkinson’s research which highlights income’s effect on health and 
quality of life, rather than its intrinsic nature). Sen demonstrates the important 
insights that are revealed when the impact of other social and economic influences 
on the quality of life are examined, aside from incomes and their inequalities. While 
not wholly discarding concerns over income inequality, which does have important 
consequences, Sen argues for an approach that targets capabilities, or the freedoms 
that individuals have to be and do what they have reason to value.       
Integrating this approach with the Wilkinson thesis would mean that our moral 
and practical target is not a narrow focus on income inequality but the unequal 
capabilities of people to achieve good health or live a good life. Indeed, Wilkinson 
has clearly found that there is something about the how unequal societies are which 
affects the inequalities in the capabilities of individuals in society to pursue flour-
ishing lives.  Inequality in this view is not only morally bad as it reflects inequalities 
in the abilities of people to pursue good lives. It is doubly bad because the higher 
the inequality, the less free the people are in the lower parts of the social hierarchy, 
and the less free is the entire population.
While income inequality is indicative of social inequality, and also a cause of 
it, there is a wide range of social factors that cause ill health and other social 
ills. The focus on income alone therefore constitutes an incomplete and possibly 
incorrect approach. Wilkinson and other social epidemiologists have brought to 
light the important social factors that negatively impact on the lives of individuals 
in rich countries, while other researchers, particularly development economists, 
have shown how social action and public policies, in addition to economic growth, 
impacts on health achievements in poor countries. The goal now is to establish 
an analysis framework that addresses the entire human species on a single plane, 
which the Commission is attempting to do with its framework on the causation 
and distribution of health across the world. The great insight of Wilkinson’s thesis 
is that social inequalities in different domains, one of which is income, have a 
profound influence on the overall levels and distribution of constraints on the 
quality of life of individuals, social groups and national populations. It would be 
a shame if this major insight was forgotten and replaced by a more familiar focus 
on income inequality. n
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C
ambodia has to tackle a “double epidemio-
logical burden”. The country faces the typi-
cally characteristic pathologies of developing 
countries (tuberculosis, dengue, malaria...), 
and also diseases more specific to prosperous 
societies (diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, cancer...). 
Exacerbating the problem is the fact that Cambodia is 
poorly equipped to address these issues.
Self-prescription and self-treatment are common 
practice (POURSAT, 2004). Members of the population 
frequently consult private doctors and traditional thera-
pists who have had widely varying amounts of training. The 
public authorities do not yet have control over this lucrative 
private sector. Meanwhile, public facilities go underused 
(according to the 2010 Demographic and Health Survey 
(DHS) only around 25% of the population sought first treat-
ment in the public sector (DHS, 2010)). Unofficial payments 
often add to the costs of official treatment prices (MEESSEN et 
al., 2008). Public staff are poorly paid, which often encour-
ages doctors and nurses to look for work in the private 
sector. This lack of regulation allows the flagrant abuse of 
the price setting of services and of the quality of prescrip-
tions (DUFFAU, DIAZ PEDREGAL, 2009).
The Cambodian Government finances only 10% of 
national health expenditure, while international donors 
contribute more than 20%. The remaining 70% of the total 
cost has to be met by the users. This represents a consid-
erable burden for the average household in Cambodia, 
especially in rural zones. Health costs are around 25 USD 
per person per year in these zones, which is more or less 
a month’s salary for a rural inhabitant. 
First steps towards universal social health 
protection in Cambodia 
Social health protection in Cambodia combines an 
assistance scheme for poor people (health equity funds - 
HEF), a voluntary insurance scheme for the informal sector 
(community health-based insurance - CBHI), a mandatory 
scheme for the formal sector (social health insurance - 
SHI), as well as a private health insurance scheme (PHI) 
for the wealthiest of the population. Other types of health 
financing schemes are also found in Cambodia – although 
these remain minor in terms of coverage (ANNEAR, AHMED, 
2012) – such as maternal health vouchers, global health 
initiatives and national programmes for patients with tuber-
culosis, malaria, AIDS and for child vaccination schemes. 
The majority of Cambodians (89% of women and 92% of 
men) still do not have health insurance (DHS, 2010). 
HEFs provide the most important health protection 
scheme in Cambodia, in terms of the number of individuals 
covered. The Cambodian Government considers 26% to 
30% of its population as poor (ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA, 
2011) and that the majority of the poor are eligible for HEF 
or fee exemption. However, due to discrepancies between 
official statistics and actual coverage, this represents only 
around 6% to 9% of the Cambodian population (DHS, 
Towards universal social health 
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Stéphanie Pamies-Sumner, Agence Française de Développement, Paris, France 
Ian Ramage, Domrei Research and Consulting, Phnom Penh, Cambodia
A PLANET FOR L IFE134
2010)1. Poor individuals who do not benefit from an equity 
fund have to finance their own health care expenditure 
(“out-of-pocket expenditure”).
The second most important social health protection 
scheme, when considering the number of individuals 
insured, is CBHI. Today, however, only 1% of the popula-
tion is insured by one of the nine CBHIs in Cambodia. A 
State objective is for the whole informal sector (with the 
1. According to the Royal Government of Cambodia (2011), 68% 
of poor people are protected under HEFs and fee exemption, 
which represents 18% to 20% of the total Cambodian population. 
The discrepancy between the figures in the 2010 DHS and the 
numbers given by the Royal Government of Cambodia may be 
explained by the fact that some poor people are “theoretically” 
covered and are therefore included in the official figures. 
However, many potential beneficiaries are either unaware of 
this protection or have not used it, so they declare themselves 
as not covered to DHS administrators.  
exception of the poor) to have access to CBHI (see figure 
1). In practice, there are many reasons why so few people 
are covered by CBHI, these include: a lack of knowledge 
or understanding of the concept of “insurance”; the low 
level of trust towards legal institutions; a lack of “willing-
ness to pay” for a hypothetical risk of disease; and the 
weakness of the medical infrastructure and public care 
services (DUFFAU, DIAZ PEDREGAL, 2009; RAMAGE et al, 2012; 
POLIMENI and LEVINE, 2012).
At present, SHI is still under construction. This type of 
insurance is intended to be obligatory for people working in 
the formal sector (mainly civil servants) and will be wage-
based. The objective is that SHI will eventually cover approx-
imately 15% of the population.
Finally, PHI targets the wealthiest section of the Cambo-
dian population, which represents approximately 0.1% of 
the population (DHS, 2010). These insurance packages are 
FIGURE 1 The construction of heath insurance
The Cambodian State has designed a complex system of health insurance aiming at covering the whole 
population. The discrepancy between State objectives and the actual percentage of the population covered 
is clearly discernable.
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expensive but quite efficient, giving a reasonable level of 
social health protection to affiliated individuals.
A tentative assessment of social health protection 
schemes 
The combined coverage of these four social health 
protection schemes amounts to less than 10% of the 
Cambodian population (HEFs: 6% to 9%; CBHI: 1%; SHI 
and PHI: 0.5%). Social health protection schemes usually 
cover the costs of primary care and hospitalization, but 
this does not always extend to medicines. The international 
Global Fund finances the treatment of certain diseases, 
such as tuberculosis, malaria and AIDS. This means that 
people affected by these diseases should not have to face 
out-of-pocket expenses (except for the costs incurred by 
travelling to and from the health care centres). In theory, 
the Government provides the necessary funding to cover 
chronic diseases (such as high blood pressure, diabetes, 
etc.). Conversely, most of the for-profit health schemes 
(such as private insurance) do not cover these diseases, as 
such coverage is not financially profitable. The disturbing 
reality is that patients suffering from chronic diseases do 
not always know how to access public healthcare services; 
while many live too far away from public health centres, 
making regular treatment impossible. 
As disease frequencies in Cambodia are often 
unknown, calculating the “risk factor” is a complex 
process that makes the design of appropriate insur-
ance-based schemes all the more difficult. With regard 
to CBHI, a 2010 experimental study conducted in rural 
areas showed that these types of schemes have the 
potential to significantly decrease the health-related 
out-of-pocket expenditure of insured households, leading 
to less debt and less asset sales (LEVINE et al., 2012; also 
FIGURE 2 Assessing the equity and quality of health protection mechanisms
The developing health protection schemes in Cambodia give poor households access to basic health care. 
However they do not enable families to overcome the fragmented nature of the health care system, which 
remains dependant on financial resources.
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BOX 1 Insuring health or insuring wealth? Main 
results from an experimental evaluation of health 
insurance in Cambodia
In 2007, AFD initiated1, in conjunction with the Univer-
sity of California, Berkley and DOMREI, a Cambodian 
research institute, one of the first rigorous micro-health 
insurance impact evaluations, based on a randomized 
control trial, in Cambodia2,3. The study aimed to measure 
the impacts of a micro-health insurance programme, 
known as SKY (Sokhapheap krousar yeung – health for 
our families), and also to analyse the determinants of 
its take-up. The SKY insurance programme had origi-
nally been developed by an NGO called GRET in 1998. 
This study highlights the difficulties faced by such 
a scheme in terms of reaching the large populations 
in rural Cambodia. Without subsidies, take-up of the 
micro-health insurance programme is shown to be 
very low (less than 5% on the “control group”) and 
proves unstable (drop-outs are frequent after the initial 
six-month coverage). It is found that some households 
are unfamiliar with the concept of insurance, therefore 
indicating that educational and cognitional barriers are 
involved. Some evidence indicates that the less (finan-
cially) risk-averse households are the ones that purchase 
1. The study was jointly funded by AFD and USAID. 
2. All the results of this research program can be found on 
http://www.skyie.org and on the AFD website. 
3. This study partially drew on the only large-scale randomized 
experiment examining the effects of health insurance, set in the 
1980s in the United States, called the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment. 
SKY insurance, suggesting that SKY is perceived as a 
“risky product”. However, demand for insurance is 
found to be rather elastic to the level of the premium. A 
decrease of 80% of the insurance price leads to a 41 
percentage points increase in purchase. 
Despite the slow “adoption” of micro-health insurance 
in rural Cambodia, the experiment confirms its strong 
potential economic benefits. SKY decreases total health 
care costs of serious health shocks by over 40%, leading 
to a one-third reduction in debt compared to uninsured 
households and to a significant reduction of asset sales. 
SKY is also successful in terms of its goal to shift rural 
Cambodians away from unregulated private providers 
and drug sellers and into the public system. However, 
the experiment does not find any reduction in the delay 
period prior to individuals seeking first healthcare; and 
nor an increase in the overall level of care received (in 
particular, preventive care). 
Finally, the study points to the strong influence of 
the public healthcare supply in sustaining insurance 
membership. Many households think of public facili-
ties as being of poor quality (compared to private ones). 
When this perception is compounded by the fact that 
people often have to travel very long distances to reach 
such facilities, then it is enough to persuade many new 
SKY members to continue using costly private care (in 
particular for minor health problems), and eventually to 
drop-out of SKY. Overall, the evaluation highlights the 
advantages but also the limits of voluntary health insur-
ance, compared to other health protection schemes 
like HEF. 
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see box)2. It is also worth noting that the financial cost of 
utilizing the social health protection system varies consid-
erably, ranging from zero to quite high figures, depending 
on the scheme considered (see figure 2).
Conclusion
Cambodian social health protection has been conceived 
on the basis of individual wealth and employment type 
(formal or informal sector). In 2012, State objectives to 
extend the breadth of protection are still far from being 
reached, thus leaving the great majority of Cambodian 
people without access to social health protection. 
To improve social health protection coverage and reduce 
inequalities, other criteria in addition to individual wealth 
and employment formality should be taken into account. 
Schemes to target medically vulnerable individuals (the 
elderly, disabled people, patients suffering from chronic 
diseases…) are urgently required. There is also a need for 
systems that take less socially visible groups into account 
(women, children, ethnic minorities, homosexuals, and 
so on). A good start in this direction is to give healthcare 
vouchers to pregnant women (ANNEAR, SHAKIL, 2012).
2. According to the DHS (2010), only 2% of money spent on 
healthcare by persons seeking treatment in Cambodia came 
from a health equity fund and 0.5% from a CBHI. Indeed, wages, 
pocket change and savings remain the most common sources of 
money for minor illnesses. For severe illnesses, the main sources 
of funds are borrowed money, the sale of assets and gifts from 
relatives or friends.
For the continuation of the struggle against inequali-
ties in developing countries, these new ways of targeting 
beneficiaries should be incorporated into Cambodian public 
policy, while the sustained financial support of donors is 
also essential.
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W
ithin a world where more than half the population 
lives in urban areas and draws their livelihoods 
from urban-based enterprises, some of the largest 
and most astonishing inequalities are within urban 
populations. Across the world urban settlements 
show a wide variation in terms of health outcomes, 
housing conditions, provision for services, protection 
of asset base, provision for voice and the quality of 
work environment.
But detailed data on such inequalities within 
national urban populations or within individual cities has been relatively rare. Now, 
important research is emerging that is providing new insights into the field. This 
article discusses some of this recent data, summarized in Table 1, which highlights 
the contrast in the conditions between some of the worst and the best performing 
urban settlements. 
One path breaking study on which this paper draws is the study of informal settle-
ments in Nairobi by the African Population and Health Research Center (see APHRC 
2002). This provides evidence from Nairobi for many of the inequalities listed in 
Table 1. Infant and child mortality rates are shown to be very high (to an extent that 
should be completely unacceptable) in the informal settlements that house around 
half of Nairobi’s population (see Figure 1). In addition, a growing number of studies 
are showing that many informal settlements in cities have conditions similar to 
those listed in Table 1, which are among the worst performing urban settlements 
(Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2012; Sverdlik, 2011; Subbaraman et al., 2012).
David 
Satterthwaite 
and Diana Mitlin
International Institute 
for Environment 
and Development, 
London, United 
Kingdom
The greatest inequalities appear in cities in low and moderate-income 
nations. These urban areas concentrate more than 2.8 billion inhabit-
ants, particularly in informal settlements where residents are subjected 
to intolerable discrimination. The scale and depth of urban poverty is 
often underestimated because of the methodology used to measure it. 
An analysis of numerous initiatives to improve access to basic services in 
cities across the world identifies the conditions needed for local govern-
ments, civil society, aid organizations and development institutions to 
reduce inequality. 
Inequalities within the 
urban half of the world
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At the upper end of the scale
In high-income and some middle-income nations, 
many of the inequalities highlighted in Table 1 
have been removed or dramatically reduced – 
even if income-inequality has usually increased. 
Although low-income urban dwellers in these 
nations may still face poor housing conditions, 
they do not live in informal settlements lacking 
basic infrastructure – most have water of drinking 
quality piped to their home 24 hours a day, along 
with connections to sewers, drains, paved roads, 
electricity and street lights. In such urban settle-
ments, regular household waste collections are 
provided and residents have access to health care, 
schools and emergency services (for fire or acute 
illness/injury) and there is policing in the neigh-
bourhoods. Most inhabitants have legal addresses 
and are able to join voters’ registers. Most popula-
tions of high-income countries are eligible for state cash transfers if they become 
unemployed, are rendered unable to work or they retire. Although somewhat eroded 
and often challenged by neo-liberal policies over the last 30 years, these countries offer 
a range of state or state-supervised provisions that dramatically reduce the type of 
non-income inequalities listed in Table 1. The inhabitants of such countries recognize 
that the state has responsibilities for the universal provision of many services, which 
should be available to all regardless of income1. Other such services include early 
warning systems for extreme weather, public response measures to extreme risks (e.g. 
temporary evacuation for those in sites where cyclones are due to strike), provision 
for needs following disasters, land-use planning and management systems to restrict 
development on dangerous sites, and many more. There are also public services that 
must be paid for, but are affordable for most, for instance public transport, piped water, 
sanitation, solid waste collection and electricity; and measures are often in place to 
make these services cheap or free to those on low incomes. Standards are enforced to 
protect health in the workplace and to regulate housing, manage road traffic and to 
protect consumers. Of course, there is a legal and institutional framework that under-
pins all the above that protects civil and political rights, and that seeks to reduce or 
remove discrimination in access to all public entitlements and rights. These societies 
are far from perfect and considerable levels of structural disadvantage remain, but 
there are also measures that seek to ensure that a minimum level of basic needs is 
met which serve most of the low-income population.
The inequality-reducing measures mentioned above did not materialize without a 
1. Of course, taxpayers contribute to the costs of service provision; while some services incur additional payment 
from users.
FIGURE 1 Infant mortality is indicative of urban 
living conditions
Children are among the first victims of poor 
environmental and health conditions. Informal 
settlements of Nairobi thus display an infant 
mortality rate that is three times higher than the 
city average.
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FIGURE 2 Measuring inequalities in living conditions in urban areas
It is not only the incomes of the inhabitants that determine the inequalities that exist between the richest 
and the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods in cities. The quality of building construction, the existence of 
basic services and infrastructure, of a public or private supply of specialized services, and even the physical 
safety of people, are all factors that fundamentally determine the experience of urban life.
Source: author's compilation
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long struggle by those who did not have such infrastructure, services and government 
accountability. They required political organization and pressure (Tilly, 2004). Such 
measures were also driven in large part by the death tolls of epidemics (especially 
cholera) and their economic impact, which persuaded businesses and higher income 
groups to join the call for action (Rosenberg, 1962); these conditions may no longer 
prevail in urban settlements today, where elites have developed new ways to protect 
themselves (Chaplin, 1999; McFarlane, 2008). The limited information available 
for the period 1850 to 1900 on inequalities in cities in what are today high-income 
nations show that most of the inequalities listed in Table 1 were present at that 
time (see for instance Bairoch, 1988), including infant and child mortality rates 
comparable to those in the above mentioned informal settlements of Nairobi (ibid).
Low- to middle-income countries
Although progress has been uneven, available data on cities in Latin America show 
that some of the inequalities listed in Table 1 have been reduced in many cities – 
or within national urban populations. This region has also seen important changes 
in attitudes within city governments, away from regarding informal settlements as 
aberrations in contravention of the law (and thus bulldozing them) to the reali-
zation that such settlements house a large part of the city workforce, which plays 
a major role in the economy, and that these settlements can be upgraded. Thus, 
the upgrading of informal settlements – which considerably reduces many of the 
inequalities listed in Table 1 – has become simply a routine task for many city or 
municipal governments. 
One of the largest and most effective national programmes for upgrading informal 
settlements is the Baan Mankong “slum” upgrading programme in Thailand (more 
details below) (Boonyabancha, 2005, 2009). It will be interesting to see the scale 
and nature of reductions in inequality that such a programme will deliver, and 
also in this instance to examine its effects on reductions not only in inequalities in 
housing conditions, insecure tenure, infrastructure and services, but also in citizen 
and community participation and interaction with local governments. However, 
despite these improvements in a number of countries, large sections of the urban 
populations in low-income and many middle-income nations face astonishing inequi-
ties – despite 60 years of development assistance. For instance, it is common for 20 
to 80 per cent of households in cities or within national urban populations to lack 
water piped into their homes (UNICEF and WHO 2012, Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 
2012) and therefore to rely on public standpipes, wells, water vendors or kiosks. 
These people usually have to pay far more per litre of water than middle- and upper-
income groups that have water piped to their homes (UN Habitat 2003). It is also 
common for 30 to 80 per cent of the urban population in low- and middle-income 
nations to have no sewers or storm drains. For example, there are many large cities 
in sub-Saharan Africa with no sewers or covered storm and surface drains – or where 
they do exist, they are only available to 5 to 10 per cent of the population (Mitlin 
and Satterthwaite, 2012). Similarly, in many cities in low- and middle-income 
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nations, between 20 to 70 per cent of the proportion of urban dwellers live in build-
ings that do not meet building standards and where occupation of the land or its 
development is illegal. Today, some 2.8 billion people live in urban areas in low- and 
middle-income nations (United Nations, 2012). A very significant proportion of this 
urban population does not have the infrastructure, services, rule of law and citizen 
entitlements that governments are meant to provide or ensure provision for. This is 
despite recognition and formal commitments by almost all governments and inter-
national agencies during the 1970s to ensure universal provision of “basic needs” - 
for instance for water, sanitation, health care and primary and secondary education. 
Inequalities in political influence and social status underlie unequal access to 
government transfers, goods and services, and, at least to some extent, disadvanta-
geous positions within labour markets.  Inequalities in access to infrastructure and 
services reflect inequalities both in income and political power. While the housing 
markets and particularly the gap between the costs of housing and what low-income 
groups can afford may be used to explain the inadequacies in infrastructure and 
service provision in low-income settlements, infrastructure investments are essen-
tially political decisions (rather than market transactions). In many cities, it is the 
interests of political elites that are primarily responsible for the lack of access to 
essential infrastructure and services, such as piped water and sanitation, faced by 
much of the population. 
In addition, those living in informal settlements so often face discrimination in 
labour markets and access to services. Having an inadequate income means having to 
live in an informal settlement which often means facing discrimination on the basis 
of where you live – which can then be part of the discrimination faced on the basis 
of race, gender and ethnicity. At the same time, informal labour is struggling as a 
result of unequal access to decision making. City governments may decide to beautify 
central city areas, expelling informal traders and/or informal settlers in the process 
(Bhan, 2008; Crossa, 2009; Fernandes, 2004). Many city governments seem to think 
that their city should follow the “Dubai” or “Shanghai” vision of the modern urban 
centre, this means that the populations in many informal settlements are likely to be 
threatened with eviction since the inclusion of these residents is rarely prioritised.
The inadequacy of poverty lines in accounting for 
urban inequalities 
It is not just that incomes are unequal – very little attention is given to the unequal 
costs of living and the adverse prices faced by the poor across a spectrum of essential 
goods and services. Poverty lines are set and applied in almost all low- and middle-
income nations. These do not show a detailed picture of inequality but they do 
distinguish between those who are considered “poor” and those who are “not poor.” 
Most governments now apply two poverty lines – the “extreme poverty line” (which 
is usually the income needed to get sufficient food) and a higher poverty line that 
is meant to include income for non-food needs. From this comes statistics on the 
proportion of the national population (or the urban or rural population) that is 
A PLANET FOR L IFE144
below whichever poverty line is defined. This is hardly a sophisticated measure of 
inequality – but the proportion of the national, urban or rural population below 
the poverty line does at least provide some measurement of those who are poor. 
Although such measures of “absolute poverty” do not focus on inequality (and 
were never intended to do so), if accurately applied they should reveal one aspect 
of inequality, which is that they highlight the proportion of the population with 
incomes too low to meet their needs.
Unfortunately, the definition and application of poverty lines remains very crude in 
most nations. It is rare for poverty lines to be implemented on the basis of surveys that 
assess the real costs of non-food needs and for adjustments to be made according to the 
location, to take into account the differences in the costs of food and non-food needs 
in various locations. This latter omission is particularly perplexing given that the costs 
of many non-food needs clearly vary considerably by location – and are likely to be 
particularly expensive in large and prosperous cities. The cost of public services is also 
likely to be particularly high for urban populations that are not reached by infrastruc-
ture – as these populations have to buy water from kiosks, vendors and tankers and 
pay for public toilet sanitation (they do not have toilets in their homes). As government 
schools frequently refuse admission to the children of low-income groups in informal 
settlements, the families have to pay for their children to go to private schools, which 
are usually poor quality schools located in these settlements. They also have to pay for 
private health care (again because of inadequate or no public provision). Yet none of 
this is taken into account when setting many poverty lines – especially the dollar a day 
poverty line which assumes that the income needed to avoid poverty, when adjusted 
for purchasing power parity (PPP), is the same everywhere. This is surprising given 
that international experts working in development are able to make far more sophisti-
cated allowances for the differences in living costs between different locations within 
nations and between nations in the rates set for their daily costs (accommodation, 
food and others). Why therefore is the same logic not also applied to poverty lines? 
According to the dollar a day poverty line, there is virtually no urban poverty in many 
nations – including nations in which the scale and depth of urban poverty is known to 
be very significant. For instance, Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula (2007), in applying 
the dollar a day poverty line (US$1.08 a day at 1993 PPP) in 2002, claim that less than 
one per cent of the urban population of China, the Middle East, North Africa, East 
Europe and Central Asia was poor; that less than 10 per cent of the urban population 
in Latin America and the Caribbean was poor; and that for all low- and middle-income 
nations, 87 per cent of their urban population was not poor. The documentation of the 
scale and depth of urban poverty in most nations in these regions shows the lack of 
validity for such statistics – and for the dollar a day poverty line that is used (Mitlin 
and Satterthwaite, 2012). What is more worrying is that the dollar a day poverty 
line is being used in the assessment of progress for the Millennium Development Goals 
and in discussions on the post-2015 development framework and this means greatly 
underestimating the scale and depth of urban poverty in most nations.
There are also other problems with data on inequality. The lack of interest in 
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inequality by national governments and international agencies can be seen in the 
data they choose to collect and the methodologies for doing so. The priority has been 
data collected from sample surveys – usually national ones. This can be seen in the 
support given by international agencies to the Demographic and Health Surveys and 
other national sample surveys. Such surveys have sample sizes that are too small to 
show much detail on inequalities in the provision of the types of infrastructure, services 
and entitlements noted above. Also, they do not provide data on where those with the 
highest levels of deprivation live – beyond very general categories – e.g. for rural and 
for urban populations. The questions they ask are also very inadequate in regard to 
being able to assess who has adequate provision for (among other issues) water, sanita-
tion and the quality of housing. As the official UN statistics on provision for water and 
sanitation state, they cannot provide data on who has safe and adequate provision for 
water and sanitation, as there are no data sources on this for most nations.   
Discussions of inequality usually focus on income inequalities. Very rarely do they 
consider inequalities in living conditions and access to services. For instance, the Gini 
coefficient is much used in assessing income-inequality and for making comparisons 
between nations in terms of income inequality. There are also cities for which Gini 
coefficients have been calculated (UN Habitat, 2008). But no coefficients have been 
developed to assess inequalities in housing conditions or access to infrastructure 
and services, or in the political structures that underpin many aspects of inequality.
What then has informed us of the many forms of inequality faced by low-income 
urban dwellers? Our knowledge in this area derives from a limited number of detailed 
studies of informal settlements, see in particular the work of Caroline Moser, who 
has researched and visited the same informal settlement in Guayaquil for over 30 
years (Moser, 2009), Nancy Scheper-Hughes (Scheper-Hughes, 1992) and Janice 
Perlman (Perlman, 2010). While these works cannot be considered as represen-
tative, they are supported by a much larger body of literature that shows compa-
rable aspects of inequality – including the discrimination that the residents of these 
informal settlements face in their daily lives. Many governments and higher income 
groups still portray those living in informal settlements as dirty or illegal, or label 
them as rural migrants that should return to their villages. They are considered as 
a drain on the public purse (see for instance Bhan, 2009), when in reality the city 
economy (and many of the services enjoyed by middle and upper incomes) would 
collapse without them. In addition, a high proportion of these people are not rural 
migrants and very few get any public entitlements, so they hardly constitute a drain 
on public funds. However, these negative and inaccurate stereotypes serve as justi-
fications for the bulldozing of settlements, especially where they “offend” nearby 
middle-income groups or where the land is particularly valuable.  
How local governments can reduce inequalities 
One important reason for widening the measurement of inequality beyond incomes 
is that governments and international agencies (and civil society organizations) 
have far more scope to reduce many other aspects of inequality – for instance in 
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the quality of housing and the quality of provision for water, sanitation, drainage, 
health care, schools, emergency services and energy sources (moving away from dirty 
fuels and their health impacts). This is especially the case for local governments and 
for organizations formed by those who face among the greatest inequalities – the 
residents of the informal settlements. Indeed, one reason why inequalities in these 
aspects have remained so large is that too little attention has been given by national 
governments and international agencies to these two key sets of actors. This does 
not mean ignoring income-inequalities. But the scope for governments is limited 
(especially local governments) to influence labour markets to give better incomes to 
lower income groups. Even the scope for workers themselves to influence employers 
is limited. Agarwala (2004) reports on how informal workers in India focused their 
efforts to improve access to basic services (in a context in which informalization in 
labour markets has been rising and industrial disputes falling).
Local governments can only address inequalities within their jurisdiction. It is 
commonly found that the weakest local governments are among those with the 
highest proportion of their population lacking basic infrastructure and services. 
In contrast, as noted in the introduction, city and municipal governments in high-
income and some middle-income nations have reduced or removed inequalities in 
many of the aspects listed in Table 1. Such examples from middle-income nations 
usually exhibit a combination of: strong political leadership (for instance a mayor 
committed to addressing inequalities); a national government with the will to drive 
through the necessary changes; a responsible and accountable local government 
(including elected mayors and city governments); and grassroots organizations that 
can represent the needs and priorities of those living in informal settlements. 
There have been successful examples of large-scale “slum” and squatter upgrading 
programmes in many cities in Latin America. These programmes have achieved 
reductions in inequalities in access to piped water, sewers and drains (Campbell, 
2003; Gilbert and Davila, 2002; Almansi, 2009; Satterthwaite, 2009). Such work 
is often supported by national governments through a strengthening of local govern-
ment capacity to take action. In Thailand for example, the large-scale Baan Mankong 
community-driven “slum” upgrading programme, which did much to reduce inequal-
ities in housing conditions, infrastructure and services, was supported by a national 
agency (the Community Organizations Development Institute). The many innova-
tions in reducing inequality in cities in Colombia and Brazil are in part the result of 
local governments having more accountability, power and capacity.  
Achieving universal provision for basic infrastructure and services for urban 
populations greatly benefits from national measures to channel support to the 
weaker and less well-resourced local governments. However, many city govern-
ments have demonstrated their own capacities to reduce a range of inequalities. 
Hundreds of city governments have instituted or supported participatory budgeting 
schemes as a way to make their decisions and actions more accountable to citizens 
and also to allow residents in each neighbourhood to influence priorities in public 
investments (Cabannes, 2004). In Rosario, Argentina, the current mayor and the 
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mayor that preceded him have implemented a range of measures that have reduced 
inequality within the city, despite little support from higher levels of government 
(both mayors were from an opposition party  and, until recently, the same was true 
for the provincial government). Measures included a decentralization of services 
that improved provision and accountability, a municipal health care system avail-
able to all and much increased provision for parks and other forms of public space 
(Almansi, 2009). In the city of Manizales in Colombia, over the last two decades, 
many mayors have supported the improvement in housing conditions for low-income 
groups, the reduction of the disaster risk (especially for those living in informal 
settlements on dangerous sites), the increasing of public space and the implemen-
tation of an “environmental traffic lights” public monitoring system, which informs 
residents of the environmental conditions in the city’s different neighbourhoods 
(Velasquez, 1998, 2005). An increasing number of city governments are addressing 
disaster risk reduction within their boundaries which so often means working with 
residents of informal settlements to upgrade housing and infrastructure (UNISDR 
2012). All these examples highlight the importance of competent city and municipal 
governments that can demonstrate political leadership and are held accountable to 
those facing the most serious inequalities.
How civil society can reduce inequalities
Addressing most of the inequalities listed in Table 1 depends not only on change 
within national and local governments but also on more space and influence for those 
suffering these inequalities. The dramatic reduction in inequalities in housing, infra-
structure and services that has occurred in high-income and some middle-income 
nations was driven by urban poor groups becoming organized and obtaining the 
necessary political changes. Over the last 15 to 20 years, organizations and federa-
tions of “slum” or shack dwellers have developed in many nations in Africa and 
Asia, with savings groups (mostly comprised of and led by women) at their founda-
tion. All have undertaken initiatives, such as the upgrading of homes, improvement 
of water or toilet provision, while many have managed to negotiate for housing 
land, either for free or at a low price, which has allowed them to demonstrate their 
capacity to build. Many of these organizations have undertaken detailed enumera-
tions (in effect censuses) of informal settlements and city-wide surveys of all informal 
BOX 1 THE NECESSITY TO SURVIVE AND IMPROVE A DIGNIFIED LIFE
Bayat (2000) documents how indi-
viduals challenge urban govern-
ance outcomes in cities of the 
Middle East. He argues that the 
occupation of streets by informal 
traders, the expansion of housing 
in contravention of formal regu-
lations and the non-payment and 
illegal tapping of basic services are 
all part of a quiet encroachment 
that reflect an inability to chal-
lenge disadvantageous outcomes. 
He suggests that it is helpful to see 
such “…activities not as a delib-
erate political act; rather, they are 
driven by the force of necessity – the 
necessity to survive and improve a 
dignified life” (ibid, 547).  But in 
so doing he highlights the extent 
to which exclusion from resources 
and from the rules that influence 
control over resources, create diffi-
culties in the struggle to secure 
urban livelihoods.
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settlements that then allow dialogue with local governments over planning for city-
wide upgrading and, where needed, resettlement (Patel and Baptist, 2012; Dobson 
and Samya, 2012; Livengood and Kunte, 2012; Chitekwe-Biti et al., 2012; Farouk 
and Owusu, 2012). Most have initiatives underway for upgrading or for devel-
oping new housing supported by local government – including in India (Patel and 
Mitlin, 2004; Burra, 2005), South Africa (Baumann, Bolnick and Mitlin, 2001; 
see also the web site http://www.sdinet.org/), Thailand (Boonyabancha, 2005, 
2009), Namibia (Mitlin and Muller, 2004), Malawi (Manda, 2007, 2009), Kenya 
(Weru, 2004), the Philippines (Yu and Karaos, 2004) and Zimbabwe (Chitekwe-
Biti, 2009). Over 200,000 families within these federations secured tenure between 
1993 and 2008 and upgrading in the form of housing and infrastructure improve-
ments has taken place in most such settlements (Urban Poor Fund International, 
2011). These federations have also formed a small umbrella organization – Slum/
Shack Dwellers International – to help organize exchange visits, manage external 
funding and help negotiate with international agencies. 
Many city governments now work with the organizations and federations of 
“slum”/shack dwellers to directly address a range of inequalities that include housing 
tenure, infrastructure, services, rule of law and participation. All these programmes 
directly or indirectly address one of the most profound aspects of inequality – the 
discrimination faced by those living in “slums” or informal settlements in all the 
above. For instance, the mayor of the city of Iloilo in the Philippines has a strong 
partnership with the Homeless People’s Federation of the Philippines, helping house 
or rehouse those whose homes have been damaged or destroyed by floods and 
working on disaster prevention (Car cellar et al., 2011). Many city governments in 
Asia contribute to Community Development Funds that were set up in their city by 
savings groups formed by residents of informal settlements to fund improvements 
in infrastructure and services (Boonyabancha and Mitlin, 2012).
The inequality in who gets aid and who influences its use
One of the most profound inequalities is in who receives the funding from aid 
agencies, international NGOs and development banks. Very little aid is actually 
available to low-income groups and their own grassroots organizations, even if the 
work of such international agencies is legitimated on the basis that it addresses the 
needs of these groups. Even when, in rare instances, a limited amount of aid funds 
becomes available to low-income groups, its use is subject to the conditions and 
priorities established by the aid-provider. These international agencies emphasize 
accountability and transparency – but they have very little or no accountability or 
transparency to low-income groups (Satterthwaite, 2001).
Official aid agencies and development banks were not set up to work directly with 
low-income communities. They were set up to work with and fund national govern-
ments. Aid agencies have to be accountable to the government that funds them (and 
beyond this to the voters who put the government into office). Multilateral devel-
opment banks such as the World Bank and the Asian, African and Inter-American 
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Development Banks have to be accountable to the governments that sit on their 
boards – especially those that provide them with funding. Initially, it was assumed 
that international funding agencies would support national (recipient) governments 
to address unfulfilled needs. It was also hoped that this approach would encourage 
stronger economies in the expectation that it would lead to investments to address 
unfulfilled needs through increased incomes and larger government capacity to 
provide the basics – secure housing, water, sanitation, health care, schools, rule of 
law and provision for voice.
What would a development finance system look like if it had a commitment to 
reducing inequality?  Certainly, this would have to include more influence for those 
facing the worst inequalities. Might there be a form of participatory budgeting for 
any funding allocated by international to national governments? But there is also 
the profound inequality in the support available to low-income groups to take action. 
There are two working examples to draw from that have provided funding to 
support the initiatives of low-income groups. The first, the Urban Poor Fund Inter-
national, supports the national federations of “slum”/shack dwellers or homeless 
people’s federations to decide on how available funding is used. Since 2002, it has 
channelled over US$15 million to over 100 grassroots initiatives and activities in 17 
nations. These include: tenure security (through land purchase and negotiation) in 
Cambodia, Colombia, India, Kenya, Malawi, Nepal, Philippines, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe; “slum”/squatter upgrading with tenure security in Cambodia, India, 
Kenya, Philippines and Brazil; bridge financing for shelter initiatives in India, Philip-
pines and South Africa (where government support is promised but slow to be made 
available); improved provision for water and sanitation in Cambodia, Sri Lanka, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe; enumerations and maps of informal settlements in Brazil, 
Ghana, Namibia, Sri Lanka, South Africa and Zambia that provide the informa-
tion needed for upgrading and negotiating land tenure; exchange visits by estab-
lished federations to urban poor groups in Angola, East Timor, Mongolia, Tanzania 
and Zambia (in Tanzania and Zambia, these helped set up national federations); 
community-managed shelter reconstruction after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in 
India and Sri Lanka; and Federation partnerships with local governments in shelter 
initiatives in India, Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe2.
The second example is the Asian Coalition for Community Action (ACCA). Since 
2009, this has provided small grants to 950 community-initiatives to upgrade “slums” 
or informal settlements in 165 cities in 19 nations. Each community initiative is 
chosen by residents. Up to US$3,000 of grant finance is available, and communi-
ties use this, for instance, for the construction or improvement of their water supply 
systems or toilets, drains, roads, paths or bridges, community centres, household 
waste management, playgrounds or parks. Up to US$40,000 has been available for 
larger initiatives at the city scale, as loans. While these sums seem very small in 
relation to the scale of the problems they seek to address, the organizers explain 
2.  For more details, see the website of the Slum/Shack Dwellers International at http://www.sdinet.org/
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that there is not enough development money to fund “sufficiently” all that needs 
to be done in all informal settlements. The funding available to community groups 
may be small but it is available quickly and can be used for whatever they choose 
and is enough to allow them to address one of their priority needs. Insufficient 
funding catalyses new ways of using finance – people have to think harder about 
what resources they can contribute, what additional support they can negotiate 
and who they can work with – and so forge partnerships to address other needs. 
ACCA supported the setting up of 107 City Development Funds – across the ACCA 
countries – and also financed 110 larger housing-related initiatives (ACHR 2010, 
Boonyabancha and Mitlin, 2012).
These two examples show a working finance system in which those who face the 
largest inequalities within cities have the power to decide what is funded and imple-
mented – and the decision-makers are accountable to these low-income groups, as 
well as to external funders. The initiatives funded by these two sources are planned 
and undertaken by the residents of informal settlements as collective processes: 
collective information collection (settlement mapping, city-wide surveys), collective 
definition of problems and search for shared solutions, collective funding systems 
managed by networks of savings groups (the City Development Funds), and new 
collective relations as linkages are built between those living in informal settlements 
and local governments.
Conclusions
This chapter has made clear the many aspects of urban inequality and the often 
severe implications for health, education, living standards, quality of life and 
economic opportunities. It has emphasized how an interest in addressing inequality 
needs to go beyond income-inequality and to include reducing differentials in access 
to safe, secure housing with infrastructure and services, access to schools, policing, 
the realization of civil rights and opportunities to have political influence that puts 
pressure on the government to be more accountable and transparent. As the focus 
on inequality is widened to include these, so the key roles of local governments and 
representative organizations of the urban poor become evident.  
This chapter also noted the profound inequalities in access to or influence over 
funding from aid agencies and development banks. It suggests a need to go beyond 
considering how governments and international agencies can address inequalities to 
consider how they can support individuals, households and communities to address 
the inequalities they face. The examples given of the Asian Coalition for Community 
Action and the Urban Poor Fund International show how support given directly to 
community-based organizations within informal settlements and the larger federa-
tions or networks they form in many nations addresses not only the inequalities in 
infrastructure or service provision, but also those related to the provision of voice 
and the capacity to act – and critically in the capacity to engage with local govern-
ment and negotiate to obtain positive responses. n
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R
io de Janeiro is geographically compressed 
into a narrow strip between sea and moun-
tains, which strongly determines its physi-
cal expansion and population growth. The 
extensive modernization of the country, 
which began in the twentieth century and intensified 
in the 1930s, means that the city has grown through 
two competitive processes of territorial occupation.
The boundaries of the city were stretched by the construc-
tion of mass housing settlements in previously suburban 
areas (SANTOS and BRONSTEIN, 1979). These speculative and 
largely illegal projects have left the new owners in a pre-
carious situation both legally and socially (FISHER, 2008; 
GONÇALVES, 2010; MAGALHÃES, 2010). The fragile nature of 
ownership rights in these areas was accompanied by a 
limited or non-existent supply of public services, the new 
owners finding themselves obliged to pressurize pub-
lic agencies to acquire these services (see many refer-
ences, among which: RIBEIRO, 1982; 1997; FERREIRA DOS 
SANTOS, 1979). It was in this way that the peripheries of 
Rio were established, and they today remain character-
ized by countless forms of illegality and a limited number 
of public services. Their management has been entrusted 
to a new dedicated administrative body (the “município”, 
one of the three levels of the Brazilian federation). Despite 
their demographic weight and the many conflicts that have 
beset them, these mass settlements have never figured 
prominently on Brazil’s public agenda. 
In parallel, spaces within the conventional inner urban 
area that had been neglected because of high construction 
costs, started to attract the interest of the population and 
then of small developers. Gradually, the property market 
began to incorporate these spaces, which had previously 
been regarded as unsuitable for construction. Despite 
the lack of an organized collective movement, buildings 
that were erected by the people with the support of small 
informal entrepreneurs and some branches of formal 
activity began to be established on these areas within the 
heart of the urban space. These buildings became the 
subject of growing interest from conventional developers, 
due to the emergence of new construction technologies 
and new ways of valorization. 
While the two processes have coexisted since the 
1940s, the issue of favelas has eclipsed that of the suburbs 
in public debates. This is partly explained by historical 
reasons, but also by the evocative use of language, and 
in particular, the powerful imagery conveyed by the word 
“favela”.
A historical representation
Three main stages can be distinguished in the evolution 
of the concept of favelas and therefore, in the way that 
the authorities have approached the issue of government 
intervention in disadvantaged neighbourhoods.
When favelas appeared in the early 1920s, despite the 
beginning of industrialization, the city was still essentially 
a colonial warehouse. At that stage, favela inhabitants 
were not yet sufficiently organized to have any influence 
on policies that might affect them. Their physical presence 
in the city was subject to access restrictions. Considered 
simply as insalubrious squatter settlements, as slums 
that should be eliminated and as a health and aesthetical 
problem, favelas were only of marginal interest to council-
lors. In the early 1930s, with the election of Getúlio Vargas 
as President, a new era of industrialization began, based 
on the idea of import substitution. While modernization 
Favelas - segregation in the heart 
of the city
Luiz Antonio Machado da Silva, Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Politicos, Universidade do Estado do Rio 
de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
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programmes began to be launched in Rio de Janeiro, the 
situation and the fate of the favelas moved into the public 
arena, with profoundly different ideas emerging on the 
policy responses that should be designed.
Following the end of the Second World War and the 
re-democratization of the country in 1945, two forces 
favourable to the favelas appeared. “Developmentalism” 
was the new dominant ideology of that period, which 
caused high economic growth accompanied by an increase 
in the demand for labour, which thereby strengthened the 
political power of workers. The two most important polit-
ical forces of that time – the church and the commu-
nist party – were diametrically opposed. The debates and 
conflicts between the two were particularly apparent in 
the favelas, where they fostered a vast public grassroots 
movement. In this way, these physical locations became 
a symbol and the favelas entered into the public sphere, 
first through inhabitant associations, and then through the 
federation of these groups. With local variations (clien-
telism, revolutionary radicalism, reformism), the political 
emergence of the favelas was enhanced by the strong 
economic and demographic growth of the city. This trend 
towards inclusion and political normalization extended into 
the 1970s; eventually being brought to an end by the crisis 
that followed the first oil shock.
Public debate on the favelas centred on the produc-
tivity of migrants (which was criticized for being low or 
zero) and how they fitted into the city, i.e. mainly through 
the so-called informal economy. After a short period 
during which the State claimed it was making changes 
to urban governance, the military took power in 1964 
FIGURE 1 Favelas, the inner boundary
The favelas have experienced significant urban transformations, such as access to water and electricity 
networks, etc., which have been obtained through the campaigning efforts of their inhabitants. However, 
these areas remain pockets of poverty in the heart of the city. The average household income in Rio’s favelas 
is almost four times lower than average incomes elsewhere in the city. 
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and the debate on favelas changed. Political organiza-
tions suffered severe repression. The only question still 
debated was housing. Two opposing interventions were 
proposed: “remoção” – the displacement of people to the 
outskirts of the city; and “urbanization” – the improve-
ment of urban facilities and buildings in areas occupied 
by favelas (MACHADO da SILVA, 1967, 2002; LIMA, 1989; 
FISHER, 2008). All conflicts around issues of social cohesion, 
including those relating to the favelas, were only able to 
grow within the narrow repertoire of the claiming of rights.
With the economic crisis of the 1970s, the issue of 
favelas changed in the way it was perceived. It became 
part of the fight against the military government and the 
refusal to submit to violations of civil and political rights 
– a fight that was partly sustained by the middle class 
victims of repression. Then, in the 1980s, the govern-
ment used the preservation of public order as an excuse 
to renege on the acquired rights. A “discourse on urban 
violence” then emerged (MACHADO DA SILVA, 1995, 1999, 
2010a, 2011) that emphasized the risks that city inhabit-
ants had to face in daily life. Crime and violence were no 
longer considered as interstitial but as everyday realities 
that were increasingly making invasions into all areas of 
life. This discourse endowed the notion of the favela with 
an evocative and powerful symbolism. Violent crime and 
its daily repression by the police became the central, and 
relatively autonomous, subject of public attention.
The violence began to be decentralized with the 
emergence of various forms of private police and armed 
criminal groups. The government received criticism for its 
inability to control areas that fell under the influence of 
drug traffickers. Militarization was increasingly regarded 
as the only way to preserve public order on a daily basis 
(LEITE, 2001), profoundly transforming the perception of 
the favela as a collective problem (MACHADO DA SILVA, 2008).
In 2008, a policy to maintain urban order, which received 
FIGURE 2 A political focus on violence
Over the past 15 years, Rio’s annual homicide rate has significantly declined, even though the national rate 
has continued to increase and the absolute number of homicides per year remains very high: in 2010 there 
were 1,535 homicides in Rio de Janeiro and 49,932 in Brazil.
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full public support, began to be implemented in Rio. This 
approach, which is still militarized, involves Pacifying Police 
Units (UPP) which are designed specifically for intervention 
in the favelas. This approach seems to have reduced the 
number of deaths caused by armed clashes between rival 
drug traffickers, and between traffickers and the police, 
although the homicide rate had already been in decline well 
before the implementation of this policy. It is worth noting, 
however, that these results have had little impact on the 
perception of violence by the city’s inhabitants. In 2010, the 
UPPs were strengthened by the “Social UPP” state scheme 
(which was a way to acknowledge the brutal nature of the 
conventional UPP). The aim of the Social UPP is to promote 
access to full citizenship for the people living in favelas.
From the word to the socially invented 
representation
Historically, the word “favelas”, which describes 
interstitial inner periphery settlements and examples 
of uncontrolled development in Rio de Janeiro’s urban 
area, has been associated with specific social groups, 
a certain type of architecture, along with a number of 
physical and ecological characteristics. It also refers to a 
type of economy, or socio-economic and politico-cultural 
processes. This characterization, in the choice words of 
Valladares (2005), is a socially invented representation 
that is continually renewed. However, this depiction has 
not developed as a myth, as suggested by Valladares, but 
rather as a key reference in the evolution of urban forms. 
The term has territorialized the debate on the city’s social 
integration problems. The strength of the favela does not 
lie in its ability to embody a reality that is both nearby and 
concealed. Instead, it comes from its ambiguous seman-
tics and its polysemy, which give it the virtues of a political 
arena and the weapons of an object of struggle. n
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his paper will attempt to show the mechanisms by which 
arguments based on equity have played a central role in the 
failure of the carbon tax project under the presidency of Nicolas 
Sarkozy. One can argue that these mechanisms are partly specific 
to the French institutional framework, to a precise politico-
media cycle and a somewhat unusual presidency style that put 
the emphasis on media announcements rather than on social 
consultation, which was suspected of being a strategy to slow the 
pace of reforms. Without, I hope, falling into the trap of thinking 
that what happens in France automatically has universal value, 
I will show that the effectiveness of arguments mobilized to counter the project is 
indicative of broader fundamental problems that go beyond the “carbon tax” project. 
These problems are those of the blocking of reforms, at national or international 
scales, through the manipulation of the concern for equity in a media-crazed world 
where the primacy given to the consumer obscures the “best interests” of the citizen.
From general consensus to a blitzkrieg that was rapidly lost
The story of “Sarkozy’s climate contribution” begins on 31st January 2007 when five 
of the presidential candidates1, including the three that received the most votes in 
the first round (N. Sarkozy, S. Royal and F. Bayrou), signed an “ecological pact” that 
included a carbon tax proposal, that was drawn up by Nicolas Hulot, the host and 
producer of a renowned television programme, Ushuaia. Once elected, N. Sarkozy 
1. These candidates gathered a total of 78.51% of the votes in the first round.
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confirmed his commitment during the closing of the Grenelle Environment Forum 
on 25th October 2007, and once again during his presidential vows in January 2009. 
The political context seemed favourable: the election of Barack Obama to the U.S. 
presidency gave hope during the late-2009 Copenhagen conference that it might 
be possible to unblock the climate negotiations that had been becalmed by G. W. 
Bush; while the 15.8% of votes gained by Europe Ecology in the European elections 
in May 2009 at last reflected a rise in environmental concern among the public.
Finally, the choice of Michel Rocard, former Socialist Prime Minister, as Chairman 
of the preparation of the climate-energy contribution (CEC) indicated a willingness 
for a transpartisan compromise, while the appointment of Yves Martin to assist 
him – a senior official who has supported this idea since 1990 – was a guarantee 
of technical seriousness and sincerity. Conferences of experts met in early July and 
the Rocard report was submitted on 28th July; he advocated an immediate rate of 
€32 per tonne of carbon emitted that should reach €100 in 2030. M. Rocard said: 
“There is something extraordinary, totally unexpected for a society as confrontational 
as ours, in the consensus expressed by almost all experts from all sides involved in these 
discussions” (p. 67). The problem is therefore to understand how, within a period of 
just six months, we moved from this apparent consensus to the invalidation by the 
Constitutional Council on 29th December of a bill that the Chamber of Deputies and 
the Senate had definitively voted in favour of on 18th December, and to the perma-
nent abandonment of the project by Prime Minister Francois Fillon on 23rd March 
2010, about a year after its launch.
To fully comprehend these events, we must return to two important recommen-
dations of the Rocard report, namely the absence of exemptions and the enactment 
of a social negotiation process to clarify the use of the revenue, accompanied by 
“the implementation of an appropriate governance on a multiannual perspective, 
comparable to the “Green Tax Commissions” that exist in other countries, in order to 
institutionalize this need for governance, assess its impact and determine how this 
revenue is used. Admittedly, in January, N. Sarkozy had announced that the carbon 
tax would be used to finance the reduction of the professional tax, a local tax paid 
by businesses that was unanimously considered as particularly distortionary. This 
announcement led to the presentation of the carbon tax as an indirect means to give 
a “gift to the employers” and was therefore denounced by labour unions. But the 
Rocard report put things back into perspective by giving prominence to usages of the 
tax that included a reduction of social charges, and using among others a study of 
the CIRED to back it (Combet et al., 2009). Everything therefore remained open for 
negotiation: at this stage the second largest French union, the CFDT, had officially 
given its support, while the largest union, the CGT, had not vetoed the proposals.
The defeat of the bill stems back to the beginning of July when, from the angle of 
protecting consumers from rising energy prices and the mobilization of an anti-tax 
reflex, the Consumer Association, UFC Que Choisir, through the voice of François 
Carlier became very prominent in the media, calling for the handover of the tax 
revenue to households. The Fondation Nicolas Hulot, which had the ear of the 
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president, was convinced that this option, which combined social justice and budget 
neutrality, would be the only one likely to be accepted by the public and would enable 
a rapid adoption of the CEC. On 5th July the Minister of Ecology Jean-Louis Borloo, 
to avoid being accused of inventing a new tax grab, then argued in Le Point magazine 
for the idea of a “green cheque” to be given to households with equal retrocession of 
payments. Then, on 6th July, the Budget Minister Eric Woerth declared his opposi-
tion to this idea in La Tribune. This clash rendered obsolete, prior to its emergence, 
the recommendation of a negotiation on the use of such a tax: the recommenda-
tion fell on deaf ears when it was released on 28th July and was definitively buried.
The mechanism that would lead to failure had been triggered. Public opinion did 
not understand the logic of a reform where money taken from them could be given 
back; on 3rd September, a survey by TNS Sofres showed that two out of three French 
people declared themselves opposed to the CEC. While employers highlighted the 
competitiveness argument and the additional costs of the carbon tax when compa-
nies do not benefit from other lower taxes. Technical points were debated in the 
heat of the moment before the Head of State made a decision on 10th September to 
implement zero taxation on electricity, provision of a green cheque to households, 
and exemption for industries covered by the European Emissions Trading scheme 
(EU-ETS). Failure was now inevitable, due to the inclusion of exemptions that the 
Rocard report had strongly urged against.
However, companies that are subject to the EU-ETS (i.e. the highest emitters), are 
only required to pay the European market-determined carbon price in the event that 
they exceed their allocated free quota. This leads to tax inequality, as highlighted 
by the Constitutional Council: “the significance [of the exemptions in relation to 
major emitters] was such that it was contrary to the objective of fighting against 
global warming and has created a characterized fracture of equality in terms of the 
public burden”. While the butcher or the carpenter would have to pay tax on their 
first tonne of emissions, the steel and chemical industries would only be liable for 
their excess emissions. This gives weight to the argument of tax inequality that the 
Constitutional Council had already used in 1998 against a carbon tax proposal by 
the Jospin government. F. Fillon abandoned the project on 23rd March and on the 
24th March, N. Sarkozy “subordinated the creation of a domestic carbon tax to a tax 
at the borders”.
Certainly, one can accuse Sarkozy’s method for this defeat, but in doing so, we 
would not draw any useful lessons. One may indeed wonder why the Greens or the 
Socialist Party (whose candidates had signed the N. Hulot pact) did not mobilize to 
demand a negotiation around the carbon tax, and simply welcomed the withdrawal 
of a tax that was considered as antisocial, without offering an alternative project 
for a tax that would fit better into the overall project, and did not campaign on the 
carbon tax during the last presidential election. In fact, the failure of the Sarkozy 
carbon tax is indicative of two more general problems: the first relates directly to the 
profession of economists and their ability to respond effectively to issues of fairness, 
the second concerns the way in which the media process “informs” citizens.
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Did the economists lack pedagogy on the equity-
efficiency links?
The mechanics of the failure of the Sarkozy carbon tax can be likened to a double-
bladed razor: the first blade, that of the fairness argument, can be said to “raise 
the hair”; while the second one, that of the arguments of competitiveness, is the 
blade that “cuts it”. This can only raise questions for economists who, for more than 
20 years, have been involved in the development of some models of reasoning in 
“general equilibrium”. The results of these models are certainly not consensual, but 
they are more than sufficient to show how the idea of a  green cheque given to house-
holds is counter-productive and ignores the fact that, because of economic interde-
pendencies, the one who pays a tax is not necessarily the one who bears the ultimate 
cost. This means, in practical terms, that a redistribution measure that is apparently 
equitable may eventually have consequences contrary to its stated objective.
This was the case of the “green cheque” as it was presented in the heat of the 
FIGURE 1 Can we combine efficiency and equity?
The Rocard mission has used this model to compare the effects of a carbon tax of €300/tCO2 in France 
according to the way in which it is applied: green cheque paid to the consumer (purple line), reduction of 
social charges (black line). The modelling shows that it is possible to combine economic efficiency (job and 
wealth creation) and equity. A reduction in social charges is good for the economy but does not compensate 
for the weight of higher energy prices on poor households. Conversely, the green cheque is inversely 
proportional to income and more socially fair, but it does not create additional jobs or wealth.
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moment. A fee of €20 for each tonne of CO2 that a consumer is directly responsible 
for would also affect companies, which will charge this extra cost to customers; this 
cost would be spread from sector to sector with an amplification effect on the price 
of final products, and a green cheque of €20 per tonne delivered to a consumer 
to offset rising energy costs would not compensate for the increase in prices that 
the extra cost of energy will have caused for the rest of the consumer’s purchases. 
The use of the carbon tax to decrease the social charges is necessary to block this 
mechanism, thus offsetting the extra cost of energy by reducing the labour costs. 
Without this compensation, the €100 per tonne (planned for 2030 in the CEC project) 
that is necessary to truly “decarbonise” our economies would cause an unbearable 
additional cost.
Economists may bear some of the responsibility for the way in which the public 
and the policy makers understand the simple reality of these propagation mecha-
nisms. If one takes stock of two decades of work on the carbon tax, the importance 
of the “double dividend” is striking, i.e. the fact that by using the revenue of a carbon 
tax to reduce the most distortionary taxes, we could have, in addition to improving 
the environment, an economic dividend in the form of an increase in employment 
activity. Opposing this theory were the many reflexes from within a profession that 
is always wary, with good reason, of anything resembling a “free lunch”. In this 
case, it was important to avoid the creation of the illusion of a miracle tax, one 
that would solve economic problems, especially those in terms of employment. L. 
Goulder had introduced in 1995 a very useful distinction between “strong form” 
and “weak form” of the double dividend by showing that the first was not automatic 
and depended on specific conditions, but it should not make us forget the second, 
namely that an environmental tax was necessary to reduce the economic and social 
costs of environmental policies.
But this was not enough, and tension amongst theoretical economists continued, 
they pointed out that a double dividend was not possible in a so-called first best 
economy i.e. using optimally its resources (Hourcade and Robinson, 1996) and 
criticized the empirical models for working on second-best economies for which 
economic science does not provide generalizable theoretical solutions. A second 
complaint, collateral to the first, is that these models only point to a double dividend 
assuming that the introduction of a carbon tax is carried out in parallel with reforms 
that have not been undertaken so far; they therefore attribute to the carbon tax 
the dividend of reforms that should have been adopted independently of climate 
policies. This argument is encapsulated in the provocatively titled paper “The double 
dividend is dead” by Bovenberg (2000)2.
We can wonder whether this “tension” in the debates between “theorists” and 
“empiricists” is particularly relevant when one sees that the empirical models 
generally find modest increases in GDP, rarely above 2% over the long term, the 
2. In the French debate, this position was echoed by K.Schubert (2010), and in a very nuanced way by Guesnerie 
(2010).
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employment figures being more significant. The issue of double-dividend is numeri-
cally secondary with respect to the propagation effects of a carbon tax and the 
need, in order to control these effects, to use the product of this tax to reduce levies 
that ultimately weigh on production costs. What has been lacking in the public 
debate is a good understanding of this point, which induces the “weak form” of 
the double-dividend as an undisputed theoretical result. CIRED’s IMACLIM model 
shows that alight strong form is possible in France, due to the proportion of the 
tax that implicitly hits annuity incomes and oil imports. But this is not the essen-
tial element; the important issue was to clearly explain the need to control the 
spread of rising energy costs and the fact that, without this control, the green 
cheque was an illusory gift.
This lack of pedagogy is perhaps due to an intellectual posture that makes sense as 
a step in the analysis of general equilibrium effects of a carbon tax, but not to calcu-
late the real cost of a measure. This posture, which requires consideration on the 
basis of a leading universe (that is to say, assuming all the reforms are carried out to 
lead to optimal taxation and full use of factors of production), leads to an argument 
that is somewhat scholastic. In a given historical period, the only relevant question 
is whether a carbon tax, because it brings revenue that has to be used, facilitates 
or otherwise the implementation of reforms that have not been undertaken so far. 
Such as, for example, the reduction of social security contributions3.
This structuring of the debate may be at the origin of the difficulties in giving equity 
issues the appropriate consideration. Indeed, in a leading universe, the solution is 
to make compensatory transfers towards households adversely affected by a reform; 
there is “separability between equity and efficiency”. However, in the real world, 
this separability is far from being realized. Figure 1 shows its issues. Taken from a 
simulation by the IMACLIM-S model, that was used for the Rocard study, it provides 
a comparative analysis of the situation in France in 2004 if a carbon tax had been 
enacted 20 years earlier to reach the level of €300/tCO2, depending on whether this 
tax would have been given back to the consumer in the form of a green cheque or 
used to reduce the social security contributions. It provides the comparison of four 
criteria (GDP, employment, consumption of the poorest 5% of the French popula-
tion, and the Gini coefficient), the baseline situation before tax being described by 
the dotted square.
It is immediately clear that the use of revenue to decrease social security contribu-
tions (black diamond) allows very significant improvement in employment, signifi-
cant growth of GDP and incomes of poor households, but leads to more inequality. 
3. At the time of writing, the French government is initiating a downward trend in social security contributions, 
through increased value-added tax (VAT), which affects consumption, and through the increase in the Generalized 
Social Contribution (CSG), which is a form of income tax. The limits of these increases will appear very quickly, 
i.e. pressure on the purchasing power for the first increase, resistance of the middle and upper classes for the 
second. Compared to these solutions, we have shown in our work that a carbon tax has a similar effect to that of an 
increase in VAT and has the advantage of decreasing energy imports; the only valid question is then whether the 
carbon tax will be politically accepted as a means to diversify funding sources to lower social security contributions. 
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This result can be explained by a virtuous circle: the transfer of the tax burden on 
income from rents, higher salaries, lower labour costs, increased exports, lower 
imports (on top of the decrease in oil imports). This allows an increase in employ-
ment which is of sufficient benefit to disadvantaged segments of the population to 
compensate for the decline in purchasing power caused by the higher energy costs. 
But this device aggravates inequality (Gini coefficient degradation) because the 
wealthier strata dedicate a significantly less amount to energy than that which is 
spent by the disadvantaged. The egalitarian “green cheque” device improves the 
Gini coefficient, since wealthier households receive a cheque lower than the amount 
they have paid out, while the opposite is true for poor households. But there are 
negative points: it comes at the expense of growth and no gain in employment due 
to the degradation of production costs; rising domestic consumption triggered by 
the higher incomes of the disadvantaged cannot compensate for the loss in competi-
tiveness; and, in addition, a fact that does not appear in this graph, there is a decline 
in investment and a higher level of national debt.
The terms of arbitration on the use of the money from the tax thus clearly appear 
and the goal of the social negotiation, that was recommended by the Rocard study, 
was precisely to see the emergence of solutions to allow compromise, with some of 
the tax revenue targeted towards the most vulnerable households and another part 
focused on the lowering of charges. However, such a substitution between carbon 
tax and the social security contributions could not be dissociated from the negotia-
tions on wages and on the financing of social protection. This is a politically sensi-
tive issue because it affects the “equal representation” between employers and trade 
unions in the management of social security. An important point for the starting of 
a virtuous economic circle is the proportion of the decrease in contributions which 
employees can benefit from in the form of net wage increases without preventing 
the decrease in production costs.
It is in this search for a compromise that two sensitive issues could have been 
addressed. The first is the specific arrangements for certain activities, not only those 
covered by the European system of tradable emission permits, but also very vulner-
able activities such as fishing or mountain agriculture. The second is the impor-
tance of location in the vulnerability to energy prices. Figure 2, which is drawn 
from a survey of 35,000 households, shows that the share of energy expenditure in 
the household budget is based on income, but that its variability within the same 
income class is high. This is because the energy requirements are very specific to the 
place of residence, not only for climate issues, but also and especially for issues of 
dependency on economic mobility, which is highly variable depending on whether 
you live in the centre of Paris, where the combination of metro plus walking is very 
effective, or far out in the suburbs or in the mountains.
In fact, the heterogeneity of situations is a concern to economists because the 
scheme of compensation through money transfers to take this into account quickly 
leads to very complex administrative solutions, which pave the way for endless 
lobbying. We can only find a solution by expanding the scope of the negotiations 
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so that what one social category loses through its energy bill, is regained on access 
to employment, rental costs, lower (or at least not increased) other charges, and for 
economically vulnerable occupations (agriculture, mountain pastoralism, fishing) 
an institutional framework that gives them the prospect of true economic viability. 
In other words, the basic reductions of carbon tax or monetary transfers are not 
the only tools by which the “losers” of the reform can be compensated. The major 
political advantage of the Rocard proposal for a specific governance on the use of the 
CEC revenue was the forced reconnection of issues, fears and expertise, including by 
encouraging specialists of retirement funding, public debt, health or social housing 
to examine the potential offered by environmental taxation and the complementary 
measures to adopt (the insulation of buildings, for example) to make it a “win-win” 
device, what economists call “Pareto-improving”.
The dictatorship of the immediate, its reasons and 
modalities
The above shows why forcing the adoption of a carbon tax outside of any social 
negotiation could only lead to failure. The episode of the Sarkozy carbon tax is a 
perfect counter-example of the success of the Swedish tax, which is described in 
this publication by Thomas Sterner. However, this does not explain the collapse of 
the idea of  such a tax, or the fact that it was not used by the opposition parties, and 
neither does it explain why the equity argument was so effective, even though it 
could be easily disproved.
We must firstly underline here an element of psychological context. When 
decisions were to be made on the carbon tax, the media hype over the climate issue 
suddenly stopped after the failure of Copenhagen. This can be explained by the 
discouragement felt by those whose expectations had been overly high. There was 
also a suspicion that the climate issue was not particularly serious, or was even a 
sham, as suggested in the title of Claude Allègre’s bestseller, which was published 
in February 20104. It is irrelevant that Allègre relied on distorted documents or that 
the Academy of Sciences had refuted his arguments. The important element is the 
mistrust vis-à-vis the predicted disasters and the anti-environmentalist reflex that 
was revealed by the success of this book. This reflex can be easily understood if we 
remind ourselves of the historical examples of prophets of doom that were proved 
wrong, and of course, the figure of Cassandra that the Trojans refused to believe. 
Such a reflex is all the more to be expected given that the population feels threat-
ened by a financial crisis for which it feels no responsibility for, and which fears 
unemployment. If climate warnings are presented as catastrophes, they do not allow 
“enlightened catastrophism” (Dupuy,  2002). If people feel they have their backs to 
4. Claude Allègre: The Climate fraud or false ecology, Plon, February 2010. Former Minister of Lionel Jospin’s 
government, a member of the Academy of Sciences, Claude Allègre is a French example of a “merchant of doubt”; 
as a columnist in some influential newspapers, he was frequently invited during this period to voice his opinions 
on radio and television. Having approached Nicolas Sarkozy, he asked that the French Academy of Sciences should 
rule on the issue, which it did by certifying the scientific character of the work on climate change.
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the wall, there is no room for choice and they become very receptive to rhetoric that 
presents environmental taxes as punitive and guilt-apportioning.
The effectiveness of Ségolène Royal’s position, the runner up in the second-last 
presidential election as the leader of the Socialist Party, against the carbon tax is 
very symptomatic: she argued during a television debate (“À vous de juger” on France 
2, 25th March 2010): “If you put a tax on people before they have a choice – to buy an 
electric car or take public transport – it is very unfair.” In essence, an easy response 
to this view is that it is precisely the low oil prices since 1983 that have discouraged 
the investment in such vehicles and that the failure of the CEC has undermined, for 
example, the strategic gamble made by Renault in 1989 to allocate more than 5,000 
engineers to this field. But this is not the important element. The essential point is 
the sense of a “trap” that captures part of the population, illustrated as the “peaks” 
in Figure 1, including those among the middle and higher income bracket, because 
it has no flexibility in its consumer choices.
A typical example here is the dependence on cars for commuting between home 
and work. The power to purchase vehicular mobility has increased over the last 
thirty years together with the intolerance towards increases in petrol prices. The 
paradox is that the growth of real estate prices, combined with low fuel prices, has 
made the population migrate to less dense suburban areas, less served by public 
infrastructure, where it found itself dependent on the car, including to go to work. 
In the 1990s, when interviews and vox pops recorded the suffering of the motorist 
at each price increase (without similar coverage whenever falls in prices occurred!), 
it constituted a disservice to households, maintaining the illusion that the rising 
cost of fuel was avoidable.
It is this feeling of being trapped which explains the effectiveness of anti-environ-
mentalism, the presentation of the carbon tax as punitive and guilt-apportioning 
and ultimately of the rise in the media of consumer protection. But this efficiency 
would have been less effective if we had used, in addition to the appeal for caution 
vis-à-vis climate change, other arguments to support higher prices of fossil fuels. 
There are at least three of them:
- The most obvious concerns energy security; indeed, during this period, there 
has been little emphasis on reminding the French people that the tax was a bulwark 
against excessive dependence on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), and that it would be better to fund French schools and pensions rather than 
to contribute to an oil revenue that funds an 828 metre tower in Dubai and feeds 
the financial strength of the Gulf countries.
- The second is, as we have seen, the possibility of using carbon tax revenues to 
lower levies that are particularly disadvantageous for the economy. To this is added 
the fact that, by taxing energy, the level of charge that falls on the company follows 
the fluctuations of production and declines when business is not good; it would 
enable the reduction of the significant disincentive to employ people in the current 
system where, when the turnover is lower than expected, social security contribu-
tions increase per unit produced and represent a tax on excess employees because 
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of labour laws. In addition, there is the fact that companies have an incentive to 
retain skilled and committed employees to be able to respond when orders increase 
again. The carbon tax could have been included in a general fiscal reform to help 
the competitiveness of SMEs and manufacturing industries, once having responded 
to the concerns of heavy industry, by giving them the choice to stay in the EU-ETS 
system or to be taxed but to benefit from a decrease in charges.
- Finally, one could have explained how, in the long term, a carbon tax can support 
policies aiming at reorienting agriculture, construction and transportation systems 
(without carbon tax, road freight will continue to increase its competitiveness in 
relation to rail or waterways), and at centralized innovation or a more balanced 
territorial planning. This affects our agricultural model (better use of local poten-
tial, ecological engineering in substitution for more expensive energy and chemical 
inputs, higher transportation costs moderating competition among territories by 
major distribution channels) as well as our urban model (commuting distances).
By ignoring these arguments, it was easy to stir up anti-green reflexes in certain 
parts of the population. A polemicist from the radio station RTL even said that the 
carbon tax was a stupid idea equivalent to taxing babies because of the CO2 they 
The more incomes rise, the less energy expenditure represents an important part of the household budget. 
But this trend includes high variability within the same income class. Energy needs depend on the place of 
residence, lifestyle as well as income.
FIGURE 2 Energy consumption does not only depend on income
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emit through respiration, and that N. Sarkozy had only wanted to please N. Hulot. 
We cannot blame the latter for the brilliance with which he imposed his pact, but 
his action has affected public opinion that was so little informed of the carbon tax 
that it was easy to label as a “bobo” fad, an idea that had been promoted since the 
1990s by many economists and by the European Commission on behalf of the concili-
ation between environment, employment and competitiveness. It remains to be seen 
why these “oversights” were possible. This is where the case of the carbon tax has a 
value of generality, revealing the implicit anthropology of public space today, which 
fragments the person and the citizen.
First, there is the compartmentalization of issues and militancy that show the 
neglect of non-climatic arguments and the reluctance to advocate social negotia-
tion. It is as if we had wanted this tax to remain purely an ecological issue, either 
by fear of diluting the environmental objective or, prosaically, to avoid having 
discussions with activists from other causes. A cultural gap remains between 
environmental NGOs and trade unions. It is exacerbated by the ease of access 
to the media of spokespersons for causes that are not subject to the discipline of 
trade unionists who are accountable to their constituents. These advocates hope 
for an easy victory through their impact on public opinion and policy. But public 
opinion turned when there was a move from abstract wishes to the determination 
of who should pay the bill.
Finally, there was the obstacle highlighted by the effectiveness of interventions 
“in the name of consumers”, that started in early July 2010: the mobilization of the 
equity argument in a public discourse marked by the primacy of the interests of 
consumers and this interest being reduced to the search for the lowest price above 
all else. It is in the name of this consumer interest that we reject rising gas and 
electricity prices, or we allege to protect the population against rising fuel prices. 
But what the consumer does not pay today is what the taxpayer or the company will 
pay tomorrow, and after that so will the dismissed worker and the future consumer 
whose bills will be duly weighted by the spillover effects between sectors.
In fact, the way in which the concern for fairness and protection of vulnerable 
populations was translated through the media on the basis of a consumer figure 
has blocked any projection into the future; this consumer looks at price without 
questioning the reasons for that price and what it involves in terms of sacrifice in the 
present (underpayment, poor working conditions) and future (under-investment, 
environmental costs). The future disappears in such a game, because there is no 
room for the discussion of the real interests of all, as here and now consumers, but 
also as a consumer of tomorrow, the worker, the parent or the grandparent who is 
concerned about the fulfilment of their children and grandchildren. 
Conclusion
In the end, Sarkozy’s carbon tax was killed by the temptation for a “political coup” 
that, by refusing to allow time for negotiations on the use of the tax revenue, did 
not allow sufficient intellectual preparation to develop arguments that would speak 
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to citizens and not to fragmented individuals, who were reduced to the state of 
consumer, taxpayer, bobo-green or poor…
A major issue appears here beyond the cases we have analysed: the construction 
of a public space for debate which blocks the diabolical game of the fragmentation 
of individuals and societal issues, equity questions being of course a major dimen-
sion of these issues. Perhaps this cannot be done without what Pierre-Noël Giraud 
calls “a vast movement of awareness in favour of equality”. Here lies the heart of 
the issue, which is ethical in principle, that we should not only think of the “poor” 
(or any minority) when to do so is merely useful for blocking a measure that we do 
not want. A movement is necessary to counter these manipulations and to discuss 
the necessary solidarity, in an integrated collective project, so that the benefit of 
coming generations is not preserved at the sacrifice of the most vulnerable genera-
tions today. n
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A
n important tool to achieve reduced green-
house gas emission targets is the use of eco-
nomic instruments, such as carbon dioxide 
(CO2) taxes and emissions trading
1. Pricing 
of CO2 emissions is essential to make those 
who pollute pay for their impact on the environment. A 
central goal and characteristic of CO2 taxation is to set 
a price for fossil CO2 emissions irrespective of the kind 
of fossil fuel that is being used, thereby acknowledging 
the Polluter Pays Principle. The use of this principle can, 
however, imply distributional consequences that need to 
be addressed. 
This chapter outlines the basics of the CO2 tax, which 
was introduced in Sweden in 1991 as an important part of 
a major reform of the national taxation system2∗. 
The Great Tax Reform in 1990/91
Sweden has applied taxation to energy carriers for a long 
1. In this paper we refer to carbon dioxide (CO2) taxation. 
The molecular weight of one C is 12 and the corresponding 
weight of O2 is 32 (2 × 16). Hence the ratio between CO2 and 
C is 44/12=3.67. In the comparison of carbon pricing levels, it 
should, hence, be remembered that one tonne of carbon (C) is 
equivalent to 3.67 tonnes of carbon dioxide CO2. This implies, 
for instance, that, a tax of €10  per tonne of CO2 is equivalent 
to 36.70 per tonne of C.
2. Parts of this paper have been previously published, see 
Hammar and Åkerfeldt (2011). The views expressed in the 
paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish Ministry 
of Finance. The usual disclaimer applies. Research funding from 
the Mistra program Indigo is gratefully acknowledged. 
Sweden’s CO2 tax and taxation reform 
experiences
Henrik Hammar, Ministry of Finance, Stockholm, Sweden
Thomas Sterner, Environmental Defense Fund and Professor at the University of Gothenburg, 
Stockholm, Sweden
Susanne Åkerfeldt, Ministry of Finance, Stockholm, Sweden
time. Up until the 1970s, the primary reason for taxation 
was to raise public revenues and taxation consisted of one 
single tax, an energy tax. 
In 1991 Sweden complemented the energy tax with 
specific CO2 and sulphur taxes, as environment policy was 
becoming increasingly important on the political agenda. 
The CO2 tax was introduced on all major fossil fuels at 
rates equivalent to 27 per tonne of CO2. At the same time 
the energy tax rates were reduced by 50%. These two 
taxes combined, however, still meant a taxation increase 
for all fuels (although the increase varied in magnitude 
between fuels). All in all this still implied a pioneering – 
and very high – level of taxation on fuels compared to 
other countries.
The introduction of CO2 taxation was part of a major tax 
reform that implied dramatically lower marginal income 
taxes on capital and labour, the elimination of various tax 
shelters, base broadening of the value added tax, etc. 
It is worth emphasizing that the political opportunity to 
introduce this rather unique tax consisted of the conflu-
ence of two separate political processes. On the one hand, 
there was a demand for a drastic reduction in marginal 
income tax rates which had reached very high levels (in 
some cases around 90%). At the same time there was 
an increasing interest in environmental issues politi-
cally and throughout society. The CO2 tax was thus intro-
duced at a moment when there was a need to fill a gap 
created by reduced taxes on other factors of production. 
According to pre-reform estimates, the rate cuts entailed 
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a reallocation of revenue of approximately 6% of gross 
domestic product (GDP). The reform can be seen as an 
early green tax shift reform. The tax yield from changes in 
energy related taxation amounted to roughly 1% of GDP 
in 1991, of which the introduction of value added tax on 
energy consumption accounted for the major part (SWEDISH 
GREEN TAX COMMISSION, 1997)3.
CO2 taxation from 1991 to 2015
The CO2 tax rates have over the years been signifi-
cantly increased, with the purpose of achieving cost 
effective emission reductions. The use of tax instru-
ments is considered to be the most cost effective way 
to achieve emission reductions. The tax changes have, 
however, been implemented stepwise so that house-
holds and companies have had time to adapt. Typically, 
tax increases in Sweden for companies and house-
holds in the energy and environmental areas have 
been combined with general tax relief in other areas to 
avoid increases in the overall level of taxation, address 
undesirable distributional consequences and stimu-
late job growth. Such a combination of measures has 
been the result of a desire to design the tax scheme 
in a way that ensures a sufficient balance between 
different policy considerations. It is worth mentioning 
that there has over the years been a general consensus 
among the different political parties in Sweden to focus 
on the CO2 tax as the primary instrument to achieve 
greenhouse gas emission reductions. Sweden has 
had left-wing and right-wing governments, but this 
has not meant any major deviations from the chosen 
road forward in this regard. Also, all major Govern-
ment proposals are based on in-depth analysis by 
independent committees which include experts from 
different parts of society. Further, the proposals are 
sent out for public consultation prior to being final-
ized in a bill to Parliament. This general law-making 
procedure in Sweden enables stakeholders and other 
interested parties to be able to give their views on the 
future tax policy design. 
3. For readers interested in the tax reform in general, see Agell 
et al. (1996).
For instance, in the area of labour taxation, 
increasing tax allowances for travelling to work 
(including fuel costs) can be seen as a measure that 
to some extent counteracts the potentially disruptive 
consequences of higher fuel taxes. Also other, more 
significant measures, have been carried out in the area 
of labour taxation over the years. These include the 
introduction of higher basic tax allowances targeted 
at low and medium income households and, during 
recent years, major in-work tax credits. However, the 
main reason for the in-work tax credit reforms has 
been to boost labour supply and employment during 
the recent recession, even if it can also be seen as a 
way to compensate households for raised costs caused 
by increased environmental taxes. This can be illus-
trated by the fact that during the 2007 – 2012 period 
environmental tax increases for households and firms 
amount to + 0.5 billion, while reduced taxes on labour 
amount to – 8.6 billion. Thus, from a Swedish point 
of view it is essential to regard the CO2 tax in itself as 
a powerful and necessary tool to curb CO2 emissions.
The advantage of a CO2 tax is that it is a market-
based instrument, which enables households and firms 
to choose measures to reduce fossil fuel consumption 
– and thus greenhouse gas emissions – that are best 
suited for their specific situation. However, the effect 
of the CO2 tax can be enhanced by aid schemes for 
limited time periods, to ensure that real options are 
available for households and firms. In Sweden such 
schemes have for example included investment state 
aid during the 1990s for fossil free electricity produc-
tion, mainly for biofuelled combined heat and power 
plants. Also, a general focus in infrastructure projects 
has been on ensuring well-functioning public trans-
port systems. 
The development of CO2 taxation and the use of 
revenues are determined in accordance with general 
Swedish national budgetary rules. A central element is 
not to earmark tax revenues, but instead the spending 
of the tax revenues is decided in the normal, annual, 
national budget process. However, throughout the 
existence of the CO2 tax the policymakers have 
aimed at ensuring a balanced tax design by, inter 
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alia, a step-by-step introduction of CO2 tax hikes and 
addressing for example undesired distributional conse-
quences on low-income households by adjustment of 
the income tax rules. 
A two-level CO2 tax system
An essential aspect when designing the energy 
taxation system has been to strike a balance between 
fulfilling environmental objectives and accounting for 
the risks of carbon leakage (which in turn is related to 
securing the competitiveness of certain sectors that are 
subject to international competition)4. Ever since the 
introduction of the CO2 tax, industry has faced a lower 
tax level than households on fuels used for heating 
purposes and for stationary motors. Figure 1 shows 
4. When high CO2 and energy taxes imply that industries will 
move their production and consequently their emissions outside 
the “Kyoto bubble”, an ambitious climate policy can give rise to 
undesirable effects in the form of higher global CO2 emissions.
how these two tax levels have developed5. Since it is 
necessary to avoid disruptive effects on competitive-
ness, such a lower tax level can be seen as a prerequi-
site for a high tax level for other sectors and has been 
instrumental in achieving major emission reductions 
in the household and service sectors6. This two-level 
system has been by far the most important element in 
the design of a well functioning system to curb CO2 
emissions in Sweden. 
Motor fuels used in vehicles are basically taxed 
according to the general CO2 tax level. The sharp 
increase of CO2 taxation between 2000 and 2004 was 
to some extent offset by a reduction of the energy tax as 
far as motor fuels were concerned. The CO2 tax propor-
tion of the total tax on fuels (energy tax and CO2 tax) 
was heavily increased. On the other hand, the sharp 
CO2 tax increase was not combined with energy tax 
cuts on heating fuels used by households and services7. 
In 2009, the Swedish Parliament adopted a number 
of tax changes in the climate and energy area that 
would enter into force over several steps: 2010, 2011, 
2013 and 2015. The purpose was to increase transpar-
ency and efficiency of the taxes in the area of climate 
and energy policy. In 2011 the CO2 tax for industrial 
installations within the EU ETS was abolished, since 
national policies for emissions regulated at the EU 
level only cause emissions to move within the EU ETS 
without affecting total emissions. It is worth noting that 
this implied a reduction in the effective price paid by 
industry. This illustrates the difficulty of combining a 
tax policy with a cap and trade programme. 
5. For a more detailed description of the CO2 tax provisions for 
industry, see Hammar and Åkerfeldt (2011). 
6. District heating has not only heavily increased its share of total 
residential and commercial space heating, but it is now also to 
an overwhelmning extent fuelled by biofuels (e.g. wood residues 
and pellets) and household waste. 
7. The energy tax and CO2 tax should be seen in combination, as 
two tax components rather than as two separate taxes. Sweden 
has been using these taxes as instruments to support various 
policy objectives. Apart from raising revenues, the energy tax 
takes account of other external effects than CO2 emissions (such 
as noise, congestion and road wear from traffic) and also acts as 
a way of generally stimulating energy efficiency.
FIGURE 1 Taxing carbon without taxing the economy?
The progression of the Swedish carbon tax since 
2000 has mainly concerned households and not 
industry. Industrial emissions have been taxed more 
since 2010, while the general level of taxation has 
remained fairly constant. This indicates a gradual 
transfer of the mitigation effort towards industry, to 
the benefit of households.*
*Nominal CO2 tax levels, for 2010-2015 the 2010 level is used. From 
2008, the level for industry outside the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) is shown. Fuel used for stationary motors and for heating 
purposes in the manufacturing process in industry. Diesel as motor 
fuel in tractors and other agricultural and forestry machinery is not 
included. 
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FIGURE 2 Can the carbon tax be social?
Swedish environmental taxation applied to energy is only slightly progressive. The middle and higher income 
groups are, on average, only a little more heavily taxed than the poorest 10% of the population. In other 
countries – such as the UK – the highest tax levels do not apply to the richest households (ID10) and nor to the 
poorest households (ID1). Between these two income levels, low-income households remain heavily taxed (ID2)
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In 2013, the general CO2 tax corresponds to €118 
per tonne CO2 (1.08 SEK per kg CO2). It is interesting 
to compare this figure with the current permit prices 
within the EU ETS that are below €10 per tonne, or the 
minimum CO2 tax levels in the EU proposal for a revised 
Energy Taxation Directive of €20 per tonne 8.
Concluding remarks
We believe the Swedish CO2 tax experience is of 
interest for several reasons: 
− it includes an early example of the introduction of 
a CO2 tax. 
− it was part of a major tax reform and the total tax 
share of GDP has actually fallen, so CO2 taxation did not 
lead to “a bigger state”. 
− we have seen gradually increased tax levels that are 
now considerably higher than those typically considered 
in other countries and considerably higher than the prices 
in current carbon trading schemes.
− the risk of carbon leakage has been addressed 
through the use of somewhat lower tax levels (that are 
still high in an international context) for certain sectors 
that are more open to international competition and thus 
the risk of carbon leakage. 
− a demonstrated and widely held political acceptance 
8. The CO2 tax rate expressed in SEK per kg is used to calculate 
the tax rates for respective fossil fuel by volume or weight units 
(e.g. SEK per litre) in the Swedish tax legislation. An exchange 
rate of 9.1582 SEK per €, official rate per 1 October 2011, is used 
throughout this chapter. In USD, the current tax rate is thus over 
$150/ton CO2 (or more than $550/ton C).
and an evolution over time with, most recently, steps 
taken towards a more uniform and even higher national 
price on fossil CO2. 
− the Swedish experience shows that emission reduc-
tions can be combined with economic growth. During the 
1990 – 2011 period, the CO2 equivalent emissions were 
reduced by 16% while at the same time economic activity 
increased by 58%. A further important advantage of a tax 
(as compared with a cap and trade programme) is that the 
tax works well together with other instruments of climate 
and energy policy, such as green certificates and subsidies 
to renewables, regulations that have been introduced after 
(or in some cases before) the tax. n
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Crisis contexts inevitably open the door to “rethinking development”. 
The current crisis involves each pillar of sustainable development, sug-
gesting at least three types of responses – differentiating market rela-
tionships from those of society, and emphasizing their potential implica-
tions for sustainable development.
Pathways to sustainability 
in a crisis-ridden world
R
ecent global crises related to food, energy and finance, as well as 
climate change and the scale of precarious employment, suggest 
that we are in the midst of a broader crisis of sustainability1. This 
is apparent in both senses of the term: the (dis)integration or 
(im)balance of economic, social and environmental dimensions 
of development, and chronic instability in terms of the long-
term reproduction of economic, social and ecological systems. 
The Rio+20 summit positioned sustainable development as the 
key challenge for contemporary development strategy. This was 
symbolized in the call for a set of Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) to succeed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Contexts of crisis inevitably open the doors for “rethinking development”. In the 
wake of the food and financial crises certain features of neoliberalism, notably finan-
cialization, came under the spotlight, some new regulations and governance insti-
tutions emerged, and old and new social movements mobilized to demand policy 
change that implied very different configurations of state-market-society relations 
and development priorities. Similarly, as recognition of climate change has increased, 
solutions associated with “green economy”, environmental regulation and myriad 
eco-social grassroots alternatives have gained traction.
In practice, different actors and institutions at multiple levels have called for 
1.  Peter Utting is deputy director of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development  (UNRISD), 
writing in his personal capacity. This paper draws partly on Utting, Razavi and Varghese Buchholz (2012). Research 
and editorial assistance from Nadine Ruprecht is gratefully acknowledged, as are comments from Shahra Razavi.
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very different responses to both crisis and the sustainability challenge. This paper 
examines these responses through the lens of three ideal-type representations of 
different pathways associated with “market liberalism”, “embedded liberalism” 
and “alter-globalization”. It identifies key features of each of these approaches and 
reflects on their implications for sustainable development, understood here in the 
holistic sense of a development process that is economically developmental, socially 
inclusive, environmentally sound and rights-based. 
A final section reflects on some of the limitations and challenges confronting 
each of these pathways and the prospects for change in the real world of institu-
tional dynamics, contestation and interest group agency. While the dominant policy 
and institutional reforms that are currently being proposed and implemented tend 
to draw on elements associated with both market and embedded liberalism, it is 
argued that the challenge of sustainability requires far more consideration of the 
alter-globalization perspective within mainstream knowledge and policy circles. 
This, in turn, requires that social forces promoting such an agenda cohere, organize, 
mobilize and build coalitions for change.
Diverse pathways
Global crises not only deeply impact economic growth and people’s livelihoods, they 
also unsettle basic ideas and assumptions about the meaning and drivers of devel-
opment. In the wake of the global financial crisis a vibrant debate unfolded about 
“where do we go from here”. This debate has been further energized by international 
efforts to craft a development agenda beyond the (2015) MDGs. 
At the time of the financial collapse there was an instant revival of Keynesian ideas, 
which, in contrast to neoliberalism, elevated the role of the state and countercyclical 
public expenditure in development strategies. Speculative activities and financializa-
tion came under the spotlight as did the ethics of a development model that resulted 
in growing inequality and perverse levels of wealth for the 1%. Just as “third world” 
developmental states and northern welfare states eventually emerged as part of the 
solution to the crisis of the 1930s and geopolitical rearrangements associated with 
decolonization, the question arose as to whether a different approach to develop-
ment and global governance might gather momentum. Or less ambitiously, would 
the type of policy reforms (e.g. greater fiscal “policy space” and more comprehen-
sive social policy), which were introduced in some countries in the wake of the 1997 
Asian financial crisis (Kwon, 2005), be replicated?
As Bob Jessop has pointed out, a key question was whether global crises consti-
tuted a crisis “in” the system or “of” the system. If interpretations of crisis lean 
towards a crisis in the system then the solution centres on crisis management 
via adjustments in mainstream policies and institutions. But if it is a crisis of the 
system, then a more fundamental restructuring – involving transformations in 
power relations and in patterns of commodification, growth and consumption – is 
required (Jessop, 2012).
A schematic representation of different responses is presented in the sections that 
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follow2. The first involves stabilizing, legitimizing and sustaining market liberalism. 
It relies on market forces and technology, tweaks existing regulatory and governance 
institutions, and enhances some aspects of social and environmental protection. The 
second, embedded liberalism, seeks to craft a 21st century social contract via social 
protection, redistribution and rights, and a Green New Deal, whilst respecting the 
basic institutions of modernity and capitalism. The third, alter-globalization, calls 
for a more fundamental reconfiguration of state-market-society relations seen as 
conducive to both the social control of markets and emancipation.
Focusing on these pathways is not meant to suggest that others do not exist; these 
three, however, have gained considerable currency in the discursive arena concerned 
with issues of contemporary crisis, development and sustainability. Selected features 
of each of these pathways are discussed below and summed up in Figure 1.
Market liberalism
A remarkable feature of capitalism over several centuries has been its staying 
power and capacity to re-stabilize following episodes of crisis. From the perspec-
tive of sustainability, the contemporary challenge for the market liberal paradigm in 
contexts of crisis is not only how to re-energize and sustain growth and employment, 
but how to do so in ways that also address climate change and other environmental 
limits to growth, as well as threats to social reproduction and legitimacy associated 
with precarious employment and food insecurity.
To assuage international financial markets and investors, policies involving some 
combination of cuts in social spending and public sector employment, tax reform 
and labour market flexibilization were adopted in much of the global North after 
the financial collapse of 2008. The market liberalism approach leans towards 
enhanced public sector efficiency and safety nets as the means to limit negative 
social impacts of both crisis and austerity policies, as well to keep the lid on social 
discontent.
At a systemic level, a major challenge for elite economic interests relates to finding 
outlets for surplus capital by creating or expanding markets in developing countries, 
new industries, commodification and privatization3 (Harvey, 2010; Ghosh, 2010). 
Discourse, policies and practice associated with “green growth” (World Bank, 
2012b) are crucial in this regard, as are priorities of governments and corpora-
tions to secure new sources of energy, food and other raw materials. The market 
liberalism pathway favours approaches to green economy that are led by private 
investors and corporations interested in new profit opportunities associated with 
cleaner energy, payments for environmental services (PES) and the commodifica-
tion of nature and the global commons. It positions such actors to take advantage 
of a market for environmental goods and services that is expected to double from 
2. This approach was inspired by the analysis of Jennifer Clapp and Peter Dauvergne in Paths to a Green World 
(2011).
3. Speculation and militarization are other means that can be used.
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around USD 1.3 billion around the time of the financial crisis to USD 2.7 billion by 
2020 (UNEP, 2009).
In relation to the food crisis, the market liberal pathway includes the following 
features. Governments of a number of food insecure countries promote investment 
in large tracts of land in developing countries (so-called land grabs). Low produc-
tivity agriculture is identified as a key cause of food insecurity. It is also a key site 
for new investment in potentially profitable sectors, given the scope for productivity 
increases through a “New Green Revolution”, which like its predecessor in the 1970s, 
modernizes agriculture through technology and intensification. The attraction of 
private investment in agriculture is further reinforced by the projected need for a 
70% increase in food production to meet demand in 2050 (World Bank, 2012).
High input agriculture with improved environmental management, greener 
technology and GMOs are seen as the way forward (Paarlberg, 2010). Large 
agri-food and other corporations come to see low income populations as a largely 
untapped “bottom of the pyramid” market (Prahalad, 2005). Small farmers can 
be integrated in global value chains as both consumers of intermediate products 
and suppliers of cheap agricultural produce. Having relinquished direct control of 
land and production of raw materials several decades earlier, agri-food corpora-
tions need to (re-)secure raw material supplies through contractual relations that 
also serve to raise productivity and lock-in producers via measures associated with 
export orientation, training, input dependency and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) (Lucas, 2012). Discourses and practices about CSR, centred on voluntary 
environmental, social and governance standards, serve both to legitimize corpo-
rate expansion and mitigate certain negative externalities associated with business 
behaviour and global value chains (Utting, 2012).
Concerning energy and climate, the market-liberal pathway favours market- and 
corporate-led green economy or lower carbon growth within a “lite” regulatory 
framework. Key features are carbon trading, investments in new energy sources such 
as bio-fuels, and gradual shifts in the energy mix from conventional fossil fuels and 
production methods to “cleaner” coal, gas and nuclear. This approach also involves 
tapping into new sources of “dirty” fuel (deep sea oil, tar sands) but adopting certain 
CSR practices and accepting a degree of environmental regulation. Managerial and 
technological solutions associated with eco-efficiency and cleaner technology are 
key for “relative decoupling” of economy and environment, i.e. to ensure that energy 
and material inputs decline relative to economic output (Jackson, 2009).
Stabilizing market liberalism also requires discursive shifts that serve a legiti-
mating function. This may include the rhetoric of protectionism, e.g. “buy American”. 
Translating words into policy, however, is generally more difficult given the way 
“free trade” has been locked-in legally and ideologically. The discourse related to 
the greening of business and CSR is also key in the legitimization process. CSR 
emphasizes the capacity of (big) business to put its house in order through voluntary 
standards and initiatives. These involve codes of conduct, “sustainability reporting” 
by companies, and various forms of monitoring and certification. While such an 
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approach is often dismissed as “greenwash”, from a systemic perspective this “new 
ethicalism” (Sum, 2010) can be viewed as a necessary complement to institutional 
and regulatory reforms that attempted to lock-in economic liberalization and neolib-
eral orthodoxy through free trade agreements and WTO rules, or through what has 
been called “new constitutionalism” (Gill, 2003).
Embedded liberalism
A solution to the economic and social crises of the Great Depression and the two World 
Wars was “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie, 1982), an ideology and project which 
recognized that markets and economic liberalization need to be shaped by values 
and institutions that can mitigate market failure, social injustice and inequality. Key 
features of 20th century embedded liberalism were Keynesianism, state capacity to 
plan and regulate, neo-corporatist governance arrangements favouring organized 
business and labour, and the strengthening of the welfare state. In practice, these 
aspects were more apparent in some of the advanced industrialized countries and 
benefitted particular social groups, notably formal sector workers.
In today’s world, embedded liberalism means addressing three challenges that 
were not central to mid 20th century embedded liberalism, namely: i) the structural 
reality of mass “informal” employment and the limited scope for universalizing social 
policy through the (formal) workplace and labour relations, ii) women’s economic 
and social rights, and iii) the need for an industrial or growth model that does not 
destroy the environment.
Calls in recent years for a global social contract and a global Green New Deal 
suggest what contemporary embedded liberalism might look like (Birdsall, 2005; 
Brown, 2010; UNEP, 2009). In contrast to the rolling back of the state and certain 
types of regulation under neoliberalism, this approach leans towards enhanced state 
regulation, new or strengthened institutions of democratic governance and account-
ability; and comprehensive social (including labour market) and environmental 
policy. Regulations, policies and institutions of social dialogue attempt to promote 
“decent work” and counter labour conditions associated with precarious employment 
outsourcing. Key elements of the embedded liberal pathway are typically found in 
UN-system publications such as the report of the World Commission on the Social 
Dimension of Globalization, “A Fair Globalization”, or more recently the statement 
by a group of well-known development economists, “Be Outraged: There are Alter-
natives” (Jolly et al., 2012), or the report of the Stiglitz Commission set up by the 
UN General Assembly in the wake of the 2008 financial collapse. The report of the 
high level panel on global sustainability, “Resilient People, Resilient Planet” brings 
together perspectives supportive of green economy or green growth with human 
rights. It was also laid out clearly by former UK prime minister, Gordon Brown, in 
“Beyond the Crash” (Brown, 2010).
Two recent developments point to the crafting of a 21st century social contract. 
First, several of the BRICS countries and some other developing economies, 
have broadened the scope of social policy and introduced new large-scale social 
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programmes. Second, internationally, there is growing momentum behind the idea 
of a global social floor whereby all countries would provide a set of basic social 
benefits including access to essential healthcare and income security for children, 
the unemployed, elderly and disabled (Deacon, 2012; ILO, 2011b).
Of particular interest from the perspective of coupling inclusiveness or social 
protection and environmental sustainability, is the new policy arena of “eco-social” 
policy (UNRISD, 2012; Gough, 2012). Examples include workfare programmes in 
India that rehabilitate rural and environmental infrastructure, compensation in EU 
countries for low-income households affected by increases in energy prices, and the 
new IMF strategy to promote reductions in fuel subsidies in developing countries 
whilst simultaneously expanding social safety-net schemes, as has occurred, for 
example, in Indonesia (International Monetary Fund, 2012).
Embedded liberal responses to the food crisis highlight the need to reverse the 
neglect of agriculture and rural development, which has occurred in national and 
international policy circles in recent decades, via aid and public investment in 
infrastructure and skills development. A key goal is to promote food security via 
increases in agricultural productivity, smallholder economic empowerment and 
multi-functional agriculture (IFAD, 2010). Regulations and standards associated 
with land governance or land rights, as well as ethical trade also feature prominently. 
Discourse and policy associated with green economy focuses on dematerialization, 
subsidy reform, and the need for significant investment, training and employment 
generation in “cleaner” and green sectors and industries. Social dimensions of green 
economy are also addressed including decent work, social policy to compensate 
losers in the transition to lower carbon economies, and stakeholder participation 
in consultative processes 
Alter-globalization
Major gatherings of civil society in recent years, in events like the World Social Forum 
and the People’s Summit at Rio+20 in 2012, bring into sharp relief a third scenario 
of change, which we can call “alter-globalization”. This suggests that dealing with 
current and recurring economic, food and climate crises requires not only rolling 
back neoliberal policies, strengthening state regulatory capacity and democratizing 
global governance, but also a more fundamental restructuring of market and power 
relations which are seen as central to social and environmental injustice.
Within the field of critical scholarship and advocacy considerable attention is 
focusing on the need to transform capitalist relations and institutions (Bello, 2005; 
Cavanagh and Mander, 2004); how to reassert social control over finance, produc-
tion and distribution and consumption (Harvey, 2010); deep transformation of 
growth and consumption patterns (Jackson, 2009); and emancipation from forms 
of domination associated with gender and ethnicity (Fraser, 2012).  But the alter-
globalization pathway goes beyond changing material and political aspects by calling 
for fundamental shifts in values. The structure of the outcome report of the Thematic 
Social Forum, “Another Future is Possible”, prepared for the 2012 People’s Summit in 
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Rio de Janeiro, is telling in this regard. Before addressing the question of economic 
transformation (Part 2) and political transformation (Part 3), it begins with the 
discussion of how sustainability demands new “ethical, philosophical and cultural 
foundations”. These relate, for example, to the imperative of equity, care, steward-
ship, diversity, solidarity, non-violence, and recognizing the symbiosis of human 
life and nature (Thematic Social Forum, 2012).
Sharing some commonalities with the embedded liberal approach, the alter-
globalization route to sustainability lies in the creation of a people-centred 
economy. Here employment is generated through a fundamental retrofitting of 
economies, finance serves production and communities, international taxation 
(such as the Tobin Tax) serves to control speculative activity and mobilizes new 
sources of finance for sustainable development, international financial insti-
tutions are democratized, and corporations are held accountable or, indeed, 
“dismantled”4.
But the concern broadens from the question of how to re-embed liberalism 
through social protection and regulatory reforms to the need to transform 
capitalism through deeper structural, cultural and political change. The challenge 
lies not simply with institutional adjustments but in deep changes in production 
and consumption patterns. A new growth model centred on low carbon economic 
activities and dematerialized services, community-based social enterprises, and 
the provision of public goods is key (Jackson, 2009). 
Deep changes in power relations are required both to curb the power of elites 
(not least corporations) to influence politics (Reich, 2010; Marques and Utting, 
2010), and to provide far greater scope for the effective participation of citizens 
and disadvantaged social groups.  While both the market and embedded liberal 
pathways acknowledge, to varying degrees, the importance of “participation”, 
this is often reduced to notions of stakeholder consultation, or in the case of 
embedded liberalism, to social dialogue involving organized business and labour, 
as well as NGOs. Under the alter-globalization approach, participation conforms 
more to the definition coined by UNRISD in the late 1970s, namely, the organized 
efforts of the disadvantaged to gain control over resources and regulatory institu-
tions that affect their lives (UNRISD, 2003). Social agency centred on grassroots 
collective organization and social movements is key for meaningful participation. 
The term “food sovereignty”, which has been popularized by Via Campesina, 
can be used to sum up the alter-globalization approach to dealing with the food 
crisis and food strategy. Here attention focuses on securing the land rights of the 
disadvantaged; enhancing the scope for redistributive agrarian reform; and the 
importance of local knowledge, production and trade. It also upholds principles 
of fair trade and agro-ecology, and the need not only for smallholder economic 
empowerment but also political empowerment through collective organization 
4. The term refers to the campaign, “Dismantling Corporate Power”, launched at the People’s Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro in June 2012.
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and mobilization. The alter-globalization perspective seeks alternatives to food 
systems that are controlled by agri-food corporations and structured by “free trade” 
agreements that prioritize corporate/investor/intellectual property rights and facili-
tate cheap food imports from Northern countries where agriculture is heavily subsi-
dized.
Much of the food sovereignty agenda, notably specific features such as agro-
ecology, low-input agriculture and local trade, also relates directly to the challenge 
of dealing with climate change and the energy crisis. The Quechuan concept known 
as Buen Vivir or Living Well (Fatheuer, 2011), which emphasizes the rights of Mother 
Earth and living in harmony with nature and diverse cultures, is one descriptor for 
the alter-globalization approach to the climate challenge. 
Elements of the alter-globalization pathway include not only relative but also 
absolute decoupling, voluntary simplicity which connotes the need to challenge 
consumerism and profoundly transform consumption patterns, and public environ-
mental regulation and law, both national and international. This includes, for 
example, non- or “neo-extractivism” (Eduardo Gudynas, cited in Fatheuer (2011)) 
where governments are compensated for leaving oil in the ground (as proposed by 
the Ecuadorean government), and nationalize extractive activities, using revenues, 
inter alia, for social programmes, as in Bolivia.
Some proponents of the alter-globalization pathway pin their hopes on the long-
term possibility that a cohesive coalition capable of challenging a capitalist class 
will emerge. This would involve social movements, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), trade unions, grassroots organizations and left-leaning political parties 
(Bello, 2005; Harvey, 2010). In the shorter term, some also look to populist alter-
natives of the type being pursued within the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas 
(ALBA), as well as the scaling-up and ongoing proliferation of myriad social and 
solidarity economy initiatives centred co-operation and collective organization of 
workers, producers and communities.
Wither sustainable development?
In the midst of economic turmoil and the severe social consequences of recent crises 
lies the optimism that contexts of crisis will lead to progressive change associated 
with sustainable development. Often compared to the 1929 economic crisis (United 
Nations, 2009), which led to a more pro-active management of the economy by the 
state and the extension of various social policies embodied in the New Deal, many 
commentators argued that the financial crisis could create the political space for 
a structural transformation needed for the challenges in the social, economic and 
environmental sphere (NEF, 2008). Indeed, one argument is that crises are condu-
cive to policy change when they enable societies to enact measures that would be 
impossible to enact in less distortionary circumstances (Hirschman, cited in Drazen 
and Grilli (1993)). New social movements like Occupy Wall Street and the indigados 
of Spain and Greece, as well as global rural movements like Via Campesina or Ekta 
Parishad in India suggest that social pressures for change are mounting.
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Tensions and blind spots
Each of the different pathways outlined above raises questions vis-à-vis the challenge 
of sustainability. This is apparent both in terms of the relationship between economic, 
social, environmental and emancipatory dimensions of development, and norma-
tive aspects associated with well-being and rights (of people and the planet) and 
intra- and inter-generational equity. Each pathway is characterized by certain 
biases, blind spots or the so-called elephant in the room syndrome.  
While many social groups today are seriously affected by vulnerability and 
insecurity, a fundamental challenge of sustainability relates to living condi-
tions of future generations. Unless issues of debt, inequality and decoupling are 
addressed head on, it is our children’s children and subsequent generations that 
will suffer most.
The market liberalism pathway to sustainability tends to adopt a narrow, if not 
contradictory, approach to such issues. Attention to the debt issue centres to a large 
extent on austerity policies involving cuts in certain social spending. Concerns for 
inequality relate to equality of opportunity (not equality of outcomes), which are 
addressed primarily through education and active labour market policies. Decou-
pling involves only relative (not absolute) decoupling, largely through techno-
logical and managerial innovations associated with eco-efficiency. 
The policy response to the financial crash, particularly in the United States, was 
designed essentially by persons closely associated with financial institutions and 
whose world views corresponded closely with the market liberal paradigm. Govern-
ment policy may have prevented a general financial meltdown, but mainstream 
policy discourse narrowed the effective scope of public debate to a limited set of 
policy options and diverted attention from questions of institutional design, as 
well as from deeper causes that reproduce crisis-tendencies (Jessop, 2012). 
The market liberal approach is economically and technologically determin-
istic. By de-emphasizing the key role of institutions and politics in shaping devel-
opment processes and outcomes it leaves open key questions about state and 
societal capacity to engineer transition, the distributional consequences of change 
processes for different income or social groups, and ongoing contradictions that 
will arise in contexts financialization, market de-regulation and public sector 
retrenchment. In the context of financial crisis, capital must seek to take advantage 
of surplus labour through policies and practices associated with the flexibilization 
of labour markets. This may facilitate hiring but also firing and more precarious 
forms of employment (Standing, 2011). Furthermore, it can transfer risks and 
costs downstream towards suppliers and producers in global value chains.
Policy responses to the financial crisis included massive liquidity injections into 
the financial system and direct support to major financial institutions (United 
Nations, 2009). Much of the criticism of the bailout of the banks has been that it 
restored “Wall Street” and executive pay but not enterprise and employment on 
“Main Street”. While there were signs of global economic recovery in 2009 and 2010, 
the world has experienced a “jobless recovery” (ILO, 2011). In 2011 the number of 
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workers in vulnerable employment5 was estimated at 1.52 billion. Nearly 30% of all 
workers (more than 900 million) were living with their families below the $2 a day 
poverty line, up 55 million in relation to pre-crisis trends (ILO, 2012).
Within the market liberal frame, macro-economic and structural fundamentals 
that underpin unsustainable development are not seriously interrogated. The key to 
social development fundamentally lies in reactivating employment through growth, 
voluntary corporate social responsibility, social protection (safety-nets for the most 
needy), education and training. Often sidelined are redistributive policy and public 
policy associated with care and social reproduction that provides women with 
greater freedom of choice and is important for social cohesion (Fraser, 2012). Also 
marginalized are various forms of mandatory regulation that can minimize tensions 
between market-led development and social well-being. The environmental pillar is 
addressed through greener technology, eco-efficiency, environmental management 
and better pricing signals, whilst largely ignoring the structural, institutional and 
political underpinnings of environmental decline and climate change. The market 
liberalism pathway may address the economic power of monopolies through compe-
tition policy and anti-trust regulation (The Economist, 2012) but downplays the 
scale of the climate change challenge (and the need for decoupling), as well as 
the issue of skewed power relations and political influence of organized business 
interests.
Embedded liberalism emphasizes the need for stronger institutions to reshape 
development processes. The debt issue is addressed through such means as progres-
sive taxation, public sector efficiencies and regulations on the reserve requirements 
of banks. It is more proactive in relation to inequality through certain redistribu-
tive policies and also emphasizes the need for relative decoupling of environmental 
impacts and growth. In contrast to market-liberalism, it extends the focus of social 
policy beyond social protection to redistributive policies and eco-social policy, food 
security and green jobs. But like market liberalism, it places great store on the 
growth-employment-consumer demand nexus. The notion of a 21st century social 
contract is directly concerned with issues of social protection and redistributive 
justice but within the frame of fairly conventional patterns of growth and consump-
tion (Birdsall, 2005).
Embedded liberal environmentalism couples technological solutions and “getting 
the prices right” with stricter environmental protection and regulation. It leaves 
open, however, questions about the scope for absolute decoupling, i.e. the need 
for emissions or resource impacts of economic activity to decline in absolute terms. 
Whilst emphasizing the role of accountability, stakeholder or social dialogue, and 
global governance, it tends to downplay the need to significantly transform power 
relations both among social groups and North and South. Whilst strong on the need 
to correct certain social and environmental injustices associated with market liberal-
ization, embedded liberalism can play down or ignore various forms of domination 
5. The ILO defines vulnerable employment as the sum of own-account workers and unpaid family workers.
REDUCING INEQUALITIES C H A P T E R  9
A PLANET FOR L IFE 185
FIGURE 1 Pathways to Sustainability?
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associated with gender (patriarchy) and ethnicity, and the corresponding need for 
“emancipation” (Fraser, 2012).
Within the alter-globalization camp one finds more emphasis on issues of decou-
pling, inequality and emancipation. In relation to the debt problem, considerable 
attention is focused on such aspects as reduced government spending on defence 
and corporate subsidies, controls on money creation and lending by banks, as 
well as debt forgiveness for low income countries. As argued below, however, 
other aspects have been neglected. Alter-globalization sees conventional growth 
patterns and consumerism as central to the problem of unsustainable development, 
requiring either décroissance (degrowth) or highly differentiated growth patterns 
for developed and developing countries, as well as voluntary simplicity in relation to 
consumption patterns. The social and environmental pillars of sustainable develop-
ment are addressed not only through comprehensive social policy (related to social 
assistance, services, care, training and redistribution) but also proactive community 
and local development, social and solidarity economy organizations and enterprises, 
and food sovereignty.
While proponents of the alter-globalization pathway tackle crucial structural 
issues they often ignore others that have bedevilled radical transitions (populist 
or socialist). These include, lack of understanding of, or capacity to anticipate, 
the economic, social and political consequences of disarticulating complex market 
systems,  not only in terms of the reaction of market forces, investors, savers and 
consumers, but also the multiple functions of market actors and institutions that 
are crowded out. The fiscal issue is often downplayed. This relates to the ways and 
means of financing change, whether the mechanisms in place are sustainable over the 
long-term, and impacts in terms of debt and inflation. So too is the political question 
relating to the fact that leaders and parties associated with sub-altern groups need 
to become “hegemonic” in the Gramscian sense. This refers to the capacity to govern 
on the basis of consensus, rather than coercion, building broad-based coalitions and 
accommodating diverse interests and demands, including those of the middle class 
and business sectors. The political question also concerns the co-optation of social 
movements and civil society leaders, and the ongoing neglect of certain rights of 
women and indigenous peoples or injustices within communitarian society. Issues 
related to state capacity and legitimacy, which is crucial for transition, may receive 
short shrift, including problems of middle class brain drain, the competency of the 
civil service, and the transparency and accountability of public institutions.
The interplay of ideas, actors and institutions
Ideal-type representations correspond more to the discourse or rationalizations that 
different actors espouse as their preferred approach to crisis and “sustainability” 
than to real world policy and practice. As various literatures and writers have empha-
sized, reality consists of hybrids and diverse, heterodox, institutional arrangements. 
Complex institutional dynamics and ongoing changes in political economy mean 
that standardized prescriptions tend to exist more on paper than in practice. 
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Real world policy and institutional change associated with sustainable develop-
ment will be shaped by the interplay of such factors as institutional path dependence; 
contestation and other societal responses to market pressures and failures; changes 
in political opportunity structures and state capacity; and the scope for institutional 
learning or “learning by doing”. Indeed, as Ben Fine points out (2012), each area of 
policy (for example, health, education, trade, etc.) is likely to be shaped by different 
social, political and institutional dynamics, and each may follow a different trajec-
tory in terms of social or distributive outcomes. 
Beyond the dynamics of specific policy areas is the constant and evolving 
tension between, on the one hand, “capitalist logic” centred on profit maximiza-
tion, commodification, “creative destruction”, coercive competition, concentration, 
growth and consumerism, and, on the other hand, societal responses that aim to 
mitigate negative social and environmental effects associated with these relations 
through some form of social regulation (Polanyi, 2001; Streeck, 2008; Harvey 
2010). And beyond the tensions and struggles associated with commodification and 
decommodification are other struggles for emancipation (Fraser, 2012).
Eclecticism and hybrids, rather than anything approaching ideal-type futures 
or “utopias designed by committees” (Wolfe, 1996), are more likely outcomes. 
Spaces for progressive change may open in one area, only to close in another. For 
example, small farmers participating in fair trade producer groups, which promote 
agro-ecology, producer empowerment, and community development, simultane-
ously integrate global value chains dominated by transnational corporations. Such 
relations involve terms, standards and priorities that can deviate substantially from 
those associated with fair trade.
As Elinor Ostrom and others have observed, it is often a complex mix of “polycen-
tric” institutional arrangements (state, private, community) operating at different 
scales (local, national, regional, global) that provide the complementarities and 
synergies that facilitate regulation, efficiency and governance (Ostrom, 2009; 
Brett, 2009).
Diverse and often contradictory approaches may also exist at the macro level. Some 
welfare state regimes that typified the 20th century European embedded liberalism 
now conform more to a “flexicurity” model, which retains basic social services but 
flexibilizes labour markets and rolls back, to some extent, progressive taxation. Some 
governments that form part of ALBA, which promotes an alternative development 
model through south-south co-operation and solidarity, are simultaneously locked 
into free trade agreements with their ideological adversaries such as the USA. 
But ideas and discourse do matter. They frame and influence public and policy 
debate and can influence priorities. And they shape common sense understandings 
about the meaning of development, ways forward, what are legitimate issues for 
concern and what should remain off-limits (Ocampo, 2006).
The recent Rio+20 process and Summits (both the official and the People’s 
Summit) intended to re-energize the political momentum for action to craft a more 
sustainable future. All three world views and perspectives outlined above were well 
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represented (Utting, 2012). The official Summit outcome document, The Future We 
Want (like that of the Durban climate conference), is a hybrid of principles, proposals 
and initiatives associated primarily with the market liberal and embedded liberal 
approaches. This outcome was perhaps to be expected in the context of ongoing 
economic crisis, the proliferation of geopolitical power, the influence of corporations 
and market forces on agenda setting and policy making, and the fragmentation of 
civil society voices in the build-up to Rio.
The scale and scope of contemporary economic, social and environmental crises 
suggests that we are at a crossroads.  Policy responses and solutions must go beyond 
the assumption that this is a crisis “in” the system that can be resolved through “lite” 
institutional reform. As in the past, we can continue to draw on policy and institu-
tional arrangements associated with the market and embedded liberal pathways. 
Such an approach, however, is unlikely to produce the type of institutional and 
structural changes that a crisis “of” the system requires. Policy makers need to think 
outside their comfort zone. The alter-globalization pathway provides a fertile ground 
for new ideas and innovations. It also identifies certain ways of living and institu-
tions conducive to sustainability that have been tried and tested but are often in 
urgent need of support.
Key to the receptivity of policy makers is not only better understanding of 
complex problems but social and political pressures. It remains an open question 
whether anything resembling, for example, the power of the labour movement that 
contributed significantly to the post-crisis social contract in the mid 20th  century 
can be reproduced within civil society today. The People’s Summit clearly honed the 
capacity of disparate social movements to connect, forge alliances, launch advocacy 
campaigns and craft a strategy for action. If that momentum can be sustained 
nationally and globally, and local and global struggles can connect both in terms 
of their analysis of development problems and strategically, then features of the 
alter-globalization pathway are likely to raise their profile both in mainstream 
discourse and policy. n
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ub-Saharan Africa has experienced dramatic 
changes in recent times, including sustained 
economic growth throughout the 2000s (5% 
to 6% of GDP on average), major demographic 
transformation, the pursuit of rapid urbaniza-
tion and improvements in the management of economies, 
along with the emergence of the “middle classes”. Accord-
ing to the African Development Bank, this social group 
already comprises tens or even hundreds of millions of 
people. Will these middle classes induce the inclusive and 
democratic development that some predict? To answer 
this question, there are three major points to consider: the 
phenomenon is usually accompanied by a deepening of 
social inequality; social ties tend towards less solidarity; 
and while certain demands for democracy may be made, 
they are often set in a context of relative “political apathy”. 
A widening of social inequalities
Despite national differences, all Africa’s middle classes 
have managed to find a place within the existing income 
structures, between the very poor and the very rich, this 
income structure being very unequal, with gaps that have 
widened further during periods of rapid growth. In Mozam-
bique, Kenya and Zambia, the Gini index (a high value 
represents greater inequality) varies between 45 and 55, 
while in Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa, it exceeds 
60 (African Progress Report, 2012). 
South African society is incommensurately the most 
unequal in Africa, while it was also the country that experi-
enced the most spectacular rise of an intermediate middle 
The emergence of the middle classes in 
sub-Saharan Africa
Pierre Jacquemot Associate researcher, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégique, Paris, France
class. Post-apartheid measures of the Black Economic 
Empowerment, initiated after 1994, led to rapid social 
change. Within a decade, 12% of the black population 
had access to the markets of intermediate consumption. 
The result was paradoxical: there was both a decrease in 
inter-racial inequality, along with an increase in intra-racial 
inequality, with the entrenchment in poverty of a larger 
proportion of the population. It can even be argued on the 
basis of the South African example that the promotion of 
the middle class has simultaneously led to the creation 
of a new poor class, largely composed of foreigners, in 
this case from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and DR Congo, to 
provide services at low cost to the middle class. 
An impact on the growth and diversification of 
domestic markets
It would be wrong to assume that the intermediate 
classes that have emerged in Africa demonstrate homoge-
neous behaviours and shared objectives. It would also 
be erroneous to assume that economic and social forces 
cannot lead to the making of “middle classes” as discrete 
entities. They get their impetus from this transformation 
itself. The identification must therefore be made in motion.
More than a decade ago, W. Easterly (2001) antici-
pated that a virtuous circle would be triggered by the dual 
phenomenon of the boom of the middle classes and of 
urbanization. He predicted that consumers would become 
more numerous and that markets would gain in size; 
housing construction would experience a boom; and that 
the banking economy would expand. To what degree have 
these expectations materialized in the current situation? 
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The changes introduced by social evolution and the 
emergence of new groups can be easily detected in terms 
of consumption. McKinsey (2010) estimates that, as a 
result of a major growth in GDP per capita, an additional 
one hundred million Africans will have access to the market 
for basic consumer goods in 2015. PROPARCO (a member 
of the Agence Française de Développement group) predicts 
that the number of “creditworthy consumers” will be 132 
million in 2020, then 243 million in 2040, which equates 
to $584 billion in terms of spending in 2020 and a market 
of $1,750 billion in 2040, which is more than the amount 
spent today by the 300 million urban Chinese Internet-
users. Signs of an increase in domestic demand due to 
the appearance of emerging groups are already visible 
in the growth of two key sectors: the automotive sector 
and telecommunications. The dramatic spread of mobile 
telephony and the Internet correlates perfectly with the 
trend of social change. 
To fully understand the future impact of this phenom-
enon on African societies, we must go beyond the figures 
and extend the analysis to dimensions other than income 
and consumption potential.
Monographic surveys (such as those of the Bordeaux-
based Laboratoire des Afriques dans le Monde, which were 
conducted in South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya and Mozam-
bique, and those collected in Afrique contemporaine, 
2012) indicate that the middle classes of these countries 
are comprised of teachers, nurses, shopkeepers, private 
sector employees and mid-level officials. These surveys 
also show members of this class work mainly in the private 
sector, sometimes in sectors that have been devastated 
by the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s. 
These people seek a “good job” that is stable, well paid 
and which allows them to “gain status”. The wives of these 
workers also participate in the family economy in increas-
ingly independent ways. Priority is given to a low-level 
capitalization of resources, to health and especially to the 
education of children. The middle classes have statistically 
fewer children and spend relatively more on education. 
Aside from their regular job, most of the people in these 
classes have informal second jobs. The surveys also show 
that the values  held by the urban middle social classes are 
geared towards a competitive market economy, greater 
BOX 1 The three categories
The so-called African “middle” classes are difficult 
to identify. The African Development Bank, which has 
pioneered attempts of statistical identification (for the 
whole of Africa), now provides the reference (AfDB, 
2011). It proposes a division into three categories, 
showing that these emerging groups do not strictly 
form a single “class”, but rather fit onto a scale 
between “neither very poor, nor very rich”, in other 
words somewhere “in-between”.
The first of these groups, known as the “floating 
class”, is only barely above the poverty line, the inter-
mediate group or “lower-middle class” has attained 
a “low level of prosperity”, while the “upper-middle 
class”, which represents 5% of the total, has an 
average income of more than $10 per day. There is a 
clear distinction between these three groups and the 
“possessing class”, also known as the “new rich”, a 
group that live on more than $100 per day and have 
a lifestyle that attracts jealousy, as well as an equal 
measure of sarcasm, from the intermediate categories.
The histories behind the origins of the three groups 
in the “middle of the pyramid” are unique from one 
country to another. In Nigeria, which is by far the most 
populous country in Africa and has benefited from the 
redistribution of oil revenues, the middle classes have 
grown in numbers with the expansion of the private 
sector in areas such as banking, telecommunications 
and the service sector, mainly in Lagos. However, it is 
difficult to generalize about this trend, as estimations 
are that two-thirds of Nigerians continue to live below 
the poverty line. The extreme disparity in incomes is 
partly explained by the low-level income diffusion effect 
experienced in the country. In Ghana, the rise of the 
intermediate classes was associated with the sums 
of money that were sent by those that were part of 
a large diaspora. In Liberia, the intermediate class 
is comprised of educated entrepreneurs that were 
involved in the restoration of peace.
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political and administrative governance, greater gender 
equalities and more investment in science and technology.
Rearrangement of social ties
Africa’s “middle classes” participate in the “urban 
dream”. The top group, which has been in existence for 
many years, search for accommodation in clearly identified 
areas, seeking permanent houses equipped with running 
water and electricity. This group aims to buy rather than 
rent property, investing time and effort in considering 
ways to improve home comforts, including the purchase 
of electronic consumer goods. This behaviour can lead 
to the phenomenon of spatial segregation, particularly 
in terms of development and housing. The provision of 
housing for the middle classes and civil servants is often 
confused with the notion of “social housing”, and it is 
these classes that have benefited the most from social 
housing and urban renewal projects. In Johannesburg, 
Nairobi, Libreville, Dakar and now increasingly in Bamako 
and Ouagadougou, there are privileged and protected 
archipelagos of high standard buildings, residential areas, 
administrative and commercial centres. These islands are 
surrounded by housing belts that accommodate those with 
a “low level of prosperity”, while the outlying working-class 
neighbourhoods are surrounded by slums, which in turn 
FIGURE 1 A relative reduction of extreme poverty in 
sub-Saharan AfricaBOX 2 Disparities between the middle classes
The first group, known as the “floating class”, 
is only slightly above the very insecure category. It 
includes people that have between $2 and $4 per day 
(in purchasing power parity). It is this group, located 
just above the poverty line, that has grown the fastest 
in recent years, from just over 10% of the population 
in 1980 to over 20% in 2010. Members of this class 
have attained a level above that of the very poor, but 
remain in an unstable and vulnerable position, at risk 
of returning to poverty in the event of a critical situa-
tion (unemployment, recession).
The second group, the lower-middle, has a daily 
income of between $4 and $10 per day. Its members 
have reached a “small amount of prosperity” and 
obtained an improvement in social status. Representing 
9% of the population, this group has escaped from a 
number of daily risks and enjoys an income that allows 
relatively easy access to certain goods on top of basic 
food consumption requirements.
The class above, the upper-middle, lives on more 
than $10 per day. Representing 5% of the population, 
its members typically having invested a proportion of 
their savings in a suburban property near a big city. 
This class has everything to lose from political insta-
bility, insecurity, poor public management and inflation.
The “possessing class”, which live on more than 
$100 a day, constitute the “new rich” (including the 
“Black Diamonds” of South Africa, the Nigerian “Oil 
Blokes”, the Congolese “en haut d’en haut”), i.e. a 
group which includes a few million people across 
Africa, who are at the highest level of the income 
hierarchy and whose lifestyle is embodied by cars, 
property, travel and bank transfers.
Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced a steady 
decline in extreme poverty since the 1990s due to 
unprecedented economic growth. This reduction 
of poverty is accompanied by the emergence of 
a middle class with new expectations in terms of 
consumption and living conditions.
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are bordered by a ring of squatter settlements that provide 
a degree of shelter to the multitudes that are “excluded” 
from the modern city.
Divisions are also noticeable in terms of social ties, 
through a clear willingness for emancipation from the 
traditional model of the extended family, with references 
borrowed from external models conveyed by the media 
– television and the Internet – that these populations 
have access to, and of which they are great consumers. 
They are obliged to counterbalance two opposing aspects 
inherent to their status: they must take on board pressure, 
which remains intense, from their communities of origin 
with regards to the hierarchical obligations to support 
others; while on the other side they aspire to urban and 
individualistic modernity, driven by the notion of every man 
for himself. Since it is not possible to completely escape 
these ties, the social status can be seen as conferring a 
double bind onto the individual, making it necessary to 
make existential compromises that are difficult to live with.
Gradually, however, these populations change their 
habitus and develop new avoidance strategies, for 
example: ceasing to send money to their former village; 
no longer welcoming those that migrate from their village 
of origin; or no longer employing family labour. They shelter 
their nuclear family, their trade and business from solici-
tations.
A force for democracy or relative political apathy?
Some experts have raised concerns about these devel-
opments, fearing that the rise of the middle classes will 
bring acculturation and a loss of solidarity. The emergence 
of a depoliticized class, along with increasing inequalities, 
unchecked consumerism, lower levels of interaction, and a 
loss of the sense of community, could all open the door to 
new profiteers that take advantage of the social insecurity 
affecting both agents and victims of the new market forces. 
At the same time there is increasing expectation that the 
“middle classes” may provide a driving force for democratic 
change. Their potential weight could, depending on local 
conditions, either make usurpation difficult, or mitigate 
the anti-democratic actions of regimes that are already 
in place that may have autocratic tendencies. It is also 
believed that the intermediate social group develops as 
FIGURE 2 Social inequalities persist in sub-Saharan 
Africa
The emergence of a middle class in Africa does 
not indicate an automatic reduction of inequalities. 
South Africa, which has experienced the most 
dramatic emergence of a middle class, is also the 
country with the highest rate of inequality, where 
the richest 10% account for almost 52% of total 
consumption.
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a “middle class with aspirations”, and therefore that it 
soon demands the construction of a state that guaran-
tees compensation for losses of security resulting from 
the erosion of traditional protective institutions.
What do the field surveys tell us? They show that 
the African middle classes often have a certain political 
“apathy”. These surveys reach opposite conclusions to 
the international and regional banks that target finan-
cial support towards the “new” middle classes, which 
they consider as in possession of the positive values  of 
progress and democratization (World Bank, 2012). In fact, 
the creation of a new group does not always lead to collec-
tive action that would open the social system. Here we find 
the Olson paradox: since all members stand to gain from 
collective action, whether they participate in this action 
or not, it is therefore better to do nothing and rely on the 
action of others. Ultimately, if each member follows this line 
of reasoning, there is no collective action. Moreover, we are 
talking here about states where economics and power are 
often closely linked. It is therefore perhaps understand-
able that individuals may prefer not to openly challenge 
the elite coalitions in power, when their own position is not 
fully consolidated. n
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B
razil’s social achievements in the first decade of the 21st century 
are remarkable and have captured the world’s attention. 
Indeed, the country became and continues to be an important 
kind of laboratory for the experimentation of social policies 
and for testing them on a massive scale. The eradication of 
extreme poverty and hunger is under way and, in order to keep 
momentum, the country now has to overcome challenges to 
boost the supply side of the low and middle-income strata of the 
economy to favour urban, rural and forest populations. These 
transformations are necessary for a sustainable development 
pattern, both socially and environmentally. 
The reader must be aware that this laboratory does not provide ready-to-use 
solutions, but rather shows that knowledge about the social problems to be tackled 
is a starting point. This is the basis for pragmatic governmental action; solutions 
must emerge from the specific institutional frameworks and social structures of 
individual countries. The upcoming pages describe the pathway to social inclusion 
undertaken by Brazil in the last decade, taking into account its specific institutional, 
political and social background.
Brazil’s social policy in historical perspective
Poverty and hunger are social phenomena. While they are very real to anyone living 
under such social conditions, they may sound like a faraway tale to those who have 
never experienced such suffering. Be as it may, the fact is that no country, seen as a 
social organism, can fully develop its potential with such social atrophy remaining 
Thiago Varanda 
Barbosa, 
Ministry of Social 
Development and 
Fight against Hunger, 
Brasilia, Brasil
Mayra Juruá 
Oliveira,
Centro de Gestão e 
Estudos Estratégicos, 
Brasilia, Brasil
Deploying an effective social policy is no simple matter. Brazil, long 
known as one of the world’s most unequal countries, is making consider-
able progress in reducing inequality and improving living conditions, in 
particular for its informal workers. To understand Brazil’s success, we 
must look at the country’s experience from 1930 to its recent Fome Zero 
and Bolsa Familia programmes. Brazil is a major proving ground for an 
innovative social insurance system that may adapt itself to disparate 
local realities. 
Brazil’s social policy 
in the 21st century
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among its population (see chapter 4). To overcome the problem of poverty and 
hunger a society must have the political will to implement all embracing in-depth 
policies, confronting various difficulties that are caused by the lingering effects of 
long-standing existing policies and practices, which must be dealt with for once and 
for all. The very understanding of hunger and poverty phenomena may at first sight 
appear simple, but in reality the issue is highly complex. 
Brazil became a republic in 1889. Slavery had formally been abolished just one 
year before. Agriculture was the main economic activity, which since it was oriented 
to commodity export, was based close to the ocean. Only a small part of the popula-
tion benefited from this activity, specifically big farmers and traders. Throughout 
the hinterland, the Brazilian population formed a huge mass of deprived people.  
By the 1930s the country was undergoing a transition from a commodity export-
oriented economy to a more inward-oriented industrial one. By this time, there was 
already a rising urban middle class in the works. Social policies were being built that 
were structured and focused on labour rights, health and education of the formal urban 
worker. The great majority of rural inhabitants remained outside of this dynamic.
Throughout the next 50 years the country was to undergo a long-term industri-
alization process. But again, in order to support this rising reality, attention was 
primarily given, in terms of social improvements, to that same formal social stratum. 
From health networks to the gathering of social data, the focus was unequivocal: 
the formal urban worker. The core idea was that this social-economic pattern would 
one day be universalized. However, this did not turn out to be the case, not in Brazil, 
nor in the World-System as a whole (Wallerstein, 1995). 
Social policies in the re-emerging democracy
During this long-term development trend, the country was able to include into the 
formal segment around half of its population, until the model stagnated during 
the 1980s, precisely when Brazil was overcoming a three-decade long dictatorial 
regime. By the middle of the decade the country had re-established the right to have 
a civilian president, although one that was elected indirectly, and just three years 
later in 1988 a new Constitution was proclaimed. 
However, by this time Brazil had ceased to grow at such a rapid rate and the federal 
budget was significantly compromised by the massive foreign debt burden that had 
been acquired during the previous decade. The aspirations for in-depth social reform 
advocated by the rising fresh new democracy were therefore obstructed. As a result, 
the government’s social budget stagnated, caught between economic and financial 
contingencies and social pressure for expansive reforms.
The new Constitution established an ample spectrum of social rights and inaccu-
rate attributions to the three executive dimensions of the nation: municipal, state 
and federal. The new constitutional frame was not yet backed by a legal apparatus, 
able to set specific responsibilities to each of the three levels of the executive branch. 
With unsettled legal obligations, government heads could politically and legally 
avoid some social responsibilities.
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By the end of the first government of the post-democratization Brazil (1986-1990), 
one third of Brazilians under five years old remained undernourished (INAM/IBGE/
IPEA, 1990). Unemployment was at around 7% of the working population (Ipeadata, 
2012). Hunger and poverty acquired political relevance to Brazilian society. An 
increasing number of personalities from various walks of intellectual and cultural 
life started a movement1 that led to a more proactive social awareness: hunger was 
no longer acceptable in a food-exporting country ranked among the top ten econo-
mies in the world.  
The next President, Fernando Collor, did not improve on this scenario (1990-1992). 
On the contrary, by the time of his second year in power, food and nutrition policies 
underwent a budget reduction of around 80%. The subsequent government of Itamar 
Franco (1993-1994) inherited a political atmosphere of social mobilization. A new 
format of political articulation was set in motion by different government areas, 
while the participation of civil society in government decisions was facilitated by the 
creation of the National Council for Food and Nutrition Security. Its suggestion to 
decentralize policies to improve cooperation with municipalities began to be taken 
seriously by the federal government.     
At the same time, Map of Hunger (Pelianno, 1993) was published by an impor-
tant public think tank2, which highlighted the fact that 32 million people were living 
in hunger in Brazil. These people were dispersed throughout the country, in rural 
and urban areas. This publication also provided an analysis of the food production 
situation, concluding that Brazil produced an amount of calories and proteins that 
could feed a population 50% bigger than its own. A huge and alarming difference 
was identified between producer price and food cost to the final consumer.
Civil mobilization over the problem of poverty and hunger kept rising, in confron-
tation with the limits of Brazil’s development process. The aim to universalize the 
income pattern of the formal industrial worker spread worldwide in the 20th century, 
pushing political forces forward in many nations to structure social security systems 
(Wallerstein, 1995). This idea of the universalization of welfare was embedded 
into the 1988 Brazilian Constitution. 
Health and education were established as civil rights in Brazil, but historically they 
had been geared towards the formal urban worker and thus for the main part only 
provided good quality services to this sector of society. Now, the forces pushing for 
democratization were pressing governments to extend these services to the entire 
population. However, since the budget was in decline, broadening the reach of 
these systems meant lowering their quality. As a result, and due to the encourage-
ment of income tax reductions, the upper middle class moved to private education 
and health care.   
1. Ação da Cidadania Contra a Fome, a Miséria e pela Vida (Citizenship Action Against Hunger, Misery and for 
life), created in 1993. 
2. Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), Institute of Applied Economic Research (http://www.ipea.
gov.br).
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This delineates the reality of welfare policies in Brazil during the 1990s: more 
people were able to access schools and hospitals, but they received lower quality 
services. Furthermore, despite the cost-cutting reduction in quality, these services 
were still not able to cover the entire population. Social assistance was scattered 
and left open to hijack by local political powers for electoral purposes, leading to 
problems of continuity as well as of focus away from those who were really in need. 
Thus, no clear-cut pathways to de facto continuous social inclusion were offered to 
poor families.
The great policy contribution for poverty reduction during that decade occurred in 
1994 and was a side effect of the end of high inflation. The poor no longer had to deal 
with the month-by-month erosion of their income due to inflation. This increased 
the monetary value of their income, allowing them to spend more on consumption, 
thus taking 10 million people out of poverty (Peliano, 2010).
From 1995 to 2002, the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso advanced a 
neoliberal agenda with strong fiscal efforts. The National Council for Food and Nutri-
tion Security was replaced by a Council with a broader focus on poverty, presided 
over by the first lady. An Executive Secretariat was created with no budget, its mission 
being that of linking and stimulating anti-poverty actions among the different minis-
tries and with civil society. 
However, contractionist macroeconomic policies were leading to increased 
unemployment, which reached 10.4% in 1999 (Ipeadata, 2012), along with a rise 
in social tension. Social policies were especially affected and, in accordance with 
the government’s neoliberal agenda and its minimalistic idea of State, focaliza-
tion on the poorest was chosen as a response to overcome budget limitations, at 
the expense of classical universal policies, such as education, health, pensions and 
other worker’s rights. 
The new generation of Brazil’s social policies
In reaction to this neoliberal pathway that had not managed to reduce the social 
pressures that had emerged during the re-democratization process, Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva (popularly known as Lula) won the first presidential election of the current 
century on the strength of his electoral campaign which focused on a structured 
social agenda. The fight against hunger and poverty thus became the top priority 
of the new federal government.
When Lula’s Workers’Party came to power at the federal executive it introduced the 
Fome Zero Programme (Zero Hunger), which was based on four lines of approach: 
(i) access to food; (ii) the strengthening of family agriculture; (iii) income genera-
tion; and (iv) institutional linkages, mobilization and social control (Aranha, 2010). 
Furthermore, the new government had a broad development strategy based on the 
strengthening of the Brazilian internal market, employment creation and increasing 
the capacity for State action (Brasil, 2003). Social policies became part of the 
arsenal not only to fight hunger, but also to stimulate the internal market and income 
generation in regions where they had stagnated. 
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A great number of policy proposals were now on the table, drawn from ideas that 
had emerged in debates since the 1980s and from many experiences that had been 
locally tested. There was also a need to continue the social policies that had been 
implemented by the previous government. The importance of this was realized once 
discontinuity, a characteristic of a fragile institutional and legal framework, was 
identified as a major problem associated with policies that focused on the poor. 
These efforts had a dispersive nature among different ministries and produced little 
intersectorial3 dialogue.
The Extraordinary Ministry for Food Security and the Fight Against Hunger 
(MESA) was thus created to unite actions in the fight against poverty and hunger. 
Although it had greater institutional strength than the preceding Council that was 
presided over by the first lady, it still had no budget to implement policies of its own 
and its ability to link up different areas was redundant towards other government 
areas with similar functions, such as Casa Civil – which was later to become the 
main source of support to the President in his efforts to bring about more synergy 
between different areas, from infrastructure investment to action against hunger. In 
its first year, Fome Zero embraced 36 different actions. But the optimism for these 
proposals that were based on sound values was, as is usually the case, not enough: 
social policies must have efficacy and efficiency and, in Brazil, they must function 
on a massive scale. 
There had been no previous experience of massive anti-poverty policies with a 
permanent structure and transparent rules. Some policies implemented during the 
beginning of the government showed good results and others were to have a complex 
execution or weak impact. Therefore a draft process occurred where some policies 
could expand, becoming structural to Fome Zero’s strategy; some remained very 
limited in range, as if in pilot mode; and a few were simply discontinued. Federal per 
capita annual expenditure in social policies rose from US$950 to US$3,325 between 
2003 and 2010 (IPEA, 2012); and federal social expenditure rose as a percentage 
of the total federal budget (see figure 2). As this budget increased in real terms, 
reaching US$320 billion, it is evidence that there was indeed a political effort to 
strengthen social protection in Brazil.
Identification and targeting
Identification of the target population and of their living conditions was the first key 
challenge for anti-poverty policies. Previously, identification systems were based on 
those who were already included in welfare policies or framed by formal employ-
ment. Such systems were designed to provide information about individuals, dissoci-
ated from their family structure. As policies were fragmented, so were their registry 
systems, throughout various ministries and federation levels. The creation in 2002 of 
3. Brazil’s multi party political system, its logic of coalition during elections and how each party of the winning 
coalition is granted with the power to appoint a Ministry or Secretary of its own, makes intersectorial work very 
difficult.
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the Unique Database for Federal Government Social Programmes (Cadastro Único) 
and a unique social identification number was an important step to overcome this 
dispersion of social data sources. By the beginning of Lula’s mandate, Unique Registry 
data still had a lot of flaws as far as quality and focus were concerned, and no federa-
tive pact had yet been built to allow for the necessary accountability. 
In 2004, the Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger (MDS) 
was created by the linkage of the Ministry of Social Assistance, the MESA and the 
Secretariat for Food and Nutrition Security. The new Ministry was now able to incor-
porate social assistance, the Bolsa Familia Programme (BFP - a conditioned cash 
transfer programme to poor families), the Unique Registry as well as food security. 
At the launch of the BFP in October 2003, the President led a federal negotiation 
process that resulted in joint management agreements which set municipal and 
federal responsibilities. Registry data gathering became a municipal task and the 
federal government established an index for decentralized management, used both 
as a monitoring tool and as a formal measurement to the financial counterpart by 
the Union to the administrative costs of data gathering.  
Income and family size are declared by families to the Unique Registry and this 
information is used to determine whether a household is eligible to receive a BFP 
grant and if so for what amount. In 2012, the BFP had 13.7 million beneficiary 
families with a targeting error of around 5%, which the World Bank considered to 
be a “very impressive targeting accuracy” (LINDERT et al., 2007:2). Federal govern-
ment uses estimation criteria based on previously existing survey systems4. For 
each of Brazil’s 5,565 municipalities, MDS estimates the number of poor families, 
setting quantitative goals for families registered by municipal staff. As informality 
is a characteristic feature of the poorest, although a declaration of family income 
is necessary to prove eligibility, there is no requirement for documental proof5. 
Accuracy comes from the knowledge of local officials regarding the poverty areas 
in their territories, and is calibrated using MDS’s statistical estimates. 
Of all policies advanced in Fome Zero’s scope, the BFP has become a main pillar 
in terms of budget, extension, impact and public opinion. It is based on simple and 
clear rules, endowed with a family approach and it promotes universal policies of 
health and education through conditionality enforcement. For families to qualify for 
benefit, their children must have an 85% school attendance rate and be up-to-date 
with the vaccination schedule defined by the Ministry of Health, while pregnant 
women are required to adhere to a prenatal schedule. 
Poverty and extreme poverty are defined by per capita family income. Of course 
poverty has many faces beyond just income insufficiency (Stiglitz, Sen, Fitoussi, 
4. Brazil has well-established statistical institutions, for example the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics 
(IBGE) that was created in 1936. The IBGE has conducted a National Household survey on a regular basis since 
1967 and a National Census every 10 years.
5. MDS audits BFP’s payroll using other administrative databases, such as those with data on formal workers, car 
owners and pensions. An additional factor that helps keep the targeting error low is social control, both among 
community members and by Municipal Councils composed by civil society to control local government.
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2008) but this factor has been chosen by the BFP as its sole eligibility criteria due to 
the fact that it is very easy to manage, it also favours the practice of social account-
ability. By operating in conjunction with the Unique Registry and universal policies, 
BFP helped government put aside the dichotomy between focused versus universal 
action. As both the Unique Registry and the BFP now function on a massive scale 
– they include 72 million registered individuals, one third of the Brazilian popula-
tion, and 50 million beneficiaries – they are in a strong position to provide valuable 
information to other projects, such as rural electrification, basic sanitation and water 
supply (Table 1). Indeed, during the first stages of the implementation of massive 
anti poverty policies, it was easier to find poor families waiting for social inclusion. 
In 2011, 16 million are still excluded from Brazil’s social, political and economical 
rights. While major efforts have not yet been enough to reach all of these people, it 
looks like the answer lies in targeting action towards specific populations, in terms 
of territories or cultural belonging, such as quilombolas, Indians, river side inhab-
itants, forest extractivists, etc. The Single Registry Department has built different 
strategies to reach these specific populations, and action was taken according to 
FIGURE 1 Who benefits from the Bolsa Familia Programme?
The Bolsa Familia programme has not only renewed the approach to social policy in Brazil, it has enabled 
the implementation of very precise statistical tools for targeting poor families on a territorial basis.
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social movement demands. This approach has effectively reached many poverty 
spots that local authorities have not yet targeted.  
Social assistance, a constitutional right, has now become institutionally structured 
through a federative treaty and specific legislation. Now, many Social Assistance 
Reference Centres (CRAS) have been established in areas of poverty through the 
work of the MDS, which aids infrastructure construction, together with munici-
palities, which provide human resources. They provide territoriality to a variety 
of social policies. Information technology is fundamental for the management of 
these decentralized actions. In 2010, MDS was monitoring more than 6,700 CRAS 
(Brasil, 2010).
Supporting Family agriculture
On the supply side of food security policy, family agriculture has been growing in 
importance. Although 70% of the food consumed by Brazilians comes from family 
agriculture, the agribusiness had received preferential attention due to its impor-
tance in terms of the country’s exports. However, since the 1990s a number of policies 
have started to be directed to small-scale agriculture. For example, a rural credit 
programme was created6, setting in motion the registration of small farmers. 
In 2006, specific legislation that defined family agriculture7 was adopted, which 
created a better environment for the targeting of policies for this type of family 
business. An agriculture census in the same year identified 4.3 million family farms, 
which although occupied less than 25% of the total area of rural properties, they 
were responsible for 74.4% of agricultural employment (França, Del Grossi, 
Marques, 2009).
Family agriculture became central to rural development strategies with policies 
of access to land, credit, insurance, technical assistance and commercialization. In 
2009, 1.4 million small farmers accessed PRONAF credit (see footnote 6), which 
amounted to a total of US$7 billion in credit operations (Brasil, 2010). Technical 
assistance for small crops was also improved and expanded. As usual, actions were 
dispersed among different ministries, so a programme was created in 2008 to link 
such efforts, which gave a territorial approach to government intervention on poor 
rural areas by defining 120 territories (made up of municipalities) where policies 
of all kinds should be present. 
Commercialization, a long-standing problem for small farmers, especially in poor 
regions, was addressed by these measures. Agricultural businesses could now become 
financially viable through policies of public purchase from family farms, and through 
6. The National Programme for the Strengthening of Family Agriculture (PRONAF), and the Declaration of 
Eligibility to PRONAF (DAP) a registry system that reaches 3.2 million agricultural families. Registration is done 
at the local level by rural unions or technical assistance institutions. Following registration, a family can access 
PRONAF credit at any bank or credit cooperative, once credit rules are approved by the National Monetary 
Council, a top financial authority.   
7. Family Agriculture is defined by a maximum property size, where no more than two employees are hired, 
with the main income source deriving from agricultural activity and the farm is managed by family members.  
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an increase of the food expenditures of poor 
families. At least 30% of the school meal budget 
now had to be spent on produce from family 
farms. Another important programme in this 
respect is the 2003 Food Acquisition Programme, 
which purchases as much as R$8,000 a year from 
each family. In 2011, it bought 476 million tons 
of food, worth US$300 million, from 162,242 
farms and donated to 29,800 social institutions 
(PAA DATA, 2012) such as schools, popular 
restaurants, social assistance centres, restaurants 
for people on low-incomes or simply directly to 
families. Products are also used to form public 
food stocks that function as price regulators and 
as emergency stocks in the case of climate disas-
ters, the most common being drought and flood. 
At present the programme is being adapted in 
order to expand its figures to reach an annual budget of around US$1 billion. 
Monitoring results and upcoming challenges
The MDS was created alongside the Secretariat for Evaluation and Information 
Management, which is responsible for the evaluation and monitoring of this new 
generation of well-institutionalized and decentralized social policies. It works in two 
ways: diagnosis and policy monitoring, carried out through networks with public 
statistical and research institutions; and policy evaluation by external institutions. 
As statistical and administrative social databases have traditionally been based on 
the formal sector, and poverty and hunger are predominant among families living in 
informal situations, the management of policies that focus on the poor demanded a 
better understanding of the phenomena. By networking with public statistical and 
research institutions, MDS was able to open a methodological debate and advocated 
the inclusion of supplementary fields into traditional household surveys and in the 
all-embracing Brazilian Census. Through this effort the country is making advances 
in “the establishment of a broad statistical system that captures as many of the 
relevant dimensions as possible” (Stiglitz, Sen, Fitoussi, 2008).
As mentioned above, the Fome Zero strategy is linked with a broader development 
strategy based on internal market stimulus and employment generation. Prior to the 
subprime financial crisis, in 2008 unemployment had dropped to 7.8% (Ipeadata, 
2012). This is important for a better appreciation of Brazil’s recent social achieve-
ments. The total number of formal workers increased by 15 million between 2003 
and 2010 (Barbosa et al., 2010), during the same period minimum wage had a real 
value increase of 66%. Indeed, job market dynamic was responsible for 75% of the 
rise in household income during the first decade of the millennium (IPEA, 2012), 
which is a key element of poverty reduction. Inequality was also impacted, the Gini 
FIGURE 2 Addressing poverty and the informal 
sector
The Bolsa Familia programme aims to fight against 
extreme poverty in Brazil and to assist people that 
work in the informal sector. The increasing number 
of beneficiary families corresponds to a reduction 
in the number of people living on less than $2 a 
day or working in the informal sector.
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index dropping from 0.594 in 2001 to 0.527 in 
2011. Income source decomposition methods 
indicate the relative impact of each source on 
Gini reduction: employment and real wage raises, 
58%; pensions, 19%; and BFP, 13% (IPEA, 2012). 
Nevertheless, Brazil’s job market remains a 
very unstable source of income for families in 
poverty. While OECD workers are hired for an 
average of 126 months, compared to an average 
for Brazilian formal workers of 62 months, 
those workers included in the Unified Registry 
stay hired for only 22 months – almost one third 
of the national average – and BFP beneficiary 
families on average keep their formal jobs for 
less than a year (Figure 3). 
This reality points to the necessity of a new dynamic of social inclusion through 
productive means. As seen, a linked set of productive inclusion policies targeted to 
rural areas based on family agriculture is already in existence. But as yet no policy 
has emerged as a consistent solution for the stimulation of low-income businesses 
in urban and forest areas that is applicable on a massive scale. From the experiences 
gained so far, new policies should be targeted towards: (i) solidarity economy cooper-
atives; (ii) small business formalization; and (iii) the creation of new credit lines. 
Furthermore, technical assistance is still poorly adapted for small businesses. Taking 
these factors into consideration, in 2011 the new government of Dilma Roussef estab-
lished the Brazil without Misery Plan (Plano Brasil sem Miséria). It was identified that 
Brazil still had 16 million people living in extreme poverty and that further efforts 
were necessary to change their situation. The Brazil without Misery Plan is based 
on existing policies and works on the improvement of policies through three lines 
of approach: income guarantee, access to public services and productive inclusion. 
As seen, poor families in urban and rural areas face different deprivations that 
demand specific strategies from public policies. In the following section it is shown 
that Brazil faces not only urban and rural social challenges, but in the northern 
region of the country, the rainforest also poses a great challenge to social policies. 
Poverty and environment
Policies that address poverty and promote social development in Brazil have always 
faced an additional challenge which is quite particular in relation to the majority of 
other countries: besides the usual dichotomy of rural versus urban, Brazil’s forests 
represent a third dimension which demands specific consideration in national strate-
gies. The debate on the economic use of natural resources, particularly from forests, 
is frequently associated with the debate on the policies and pathways to national 
development. The so-called Amazônia Legal, in Brazil’s northern region, represents 
nearly 60% of Brazilian territory, provides home to 13% of the country’s population, 
FIGURE 3 Str uctural fragility of Brazilian workers
The Brazilian labour market offers few stable jobs, 
which maintains poverty and makes the Bolsa 
Familia programme particularly crucial for many 
families.
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and contains the planet’s largest reservoir of biodiversity and water. During the 
1970s, the prevailing trend here was that of slash-and-burn clearance to create 
traditional rural and urban settlements. As result, two thirds of the population in the 
Amazon region live in urban areas, and about six million live in forest or rural areas. 
At present, the rainforest is the ultimate frontier to social information and policy 
management. Social data on forest resident families remains absent, even though the 
Household Survey carried out by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 
(IBGE) has been in existence for some time. While these people may be few compared 
to the entire Brazilian population, together with the rainforest itself they are the 
starting point for many solutions that the country must create to meet the neces-
sary social and environmental sustainable development objectives of this century. 
In addition, forest populations are a major source of focalization error faced both by 
policies that fight poverty and universal ones. There is no doubt that the scattered 
nature of traditional settlements, inland and along the river margins, is a barrier to 
the implementation of social policies. 
The main trajectory of rainforest resource production has been centred on mining 
and deforestation, which is largely illegal, upon which land agriculture and cattle 
ranching follow. President Lula’s Minister of Environment encapsulated the nature of 
the problem, saying that while it is easy to dismantle an illegal sawmill in a day, it is 
not possible to create quality jobs for all sawmill workers at the same pace. Another 
important aspect should be brought to light here: that of the high amount of green-
house gas (GHG) emissions that result from forest burning8. Although the Brazilian 
government’s efforts to reduce emissions have produced impressive results, this 
fact alone has not been able to break the prevailing economic logic of that region.  
As highlighted earlier, the dominant sociotechnical regime in the Amazon is neither 
environmentally nor socially sustainable. As was the case for poverty and hunger two 
decades ago, sustainable development has been emerging as a consensual political 
goal in Brazil’s democracy over the last ten years. Rainforest preservation is essen-
tial for both the survival of the population and also to ensure that the rich spectrum 
of natural products offered by the region is not lost but sustainably used. It is now 
clear to all that the promotion of the sustainable use of biodiversity is key for long-
term sustainable development. When the aggregate value generated by the forest 
“standing up” becomes higher than that of the deforestation (“forest down”) activi-
ties, people will be more ready to engage in sustainable activities. 
Federal government social grants (such as those from the BFP and, more recently, 
Forest Grant9) have been an important social policy for ensuring a minimum income 
for local populations within the Amazon region. Nevertheless, much more is needed 
to truly encourage sustainable development: it is of pivotal importance to promote 
natural resource-based productive chains that combine traditional knowledge of 
the uses of biodiversity along with science, technology and innovation. Certain 
8.  Deforestation is the major source of Brazilian GHG emissions. 
9. Forest Grant (Bolsa Floresta in Portuguese), is a cash transfer programme aimed at seasonal sustainable activities. 
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products, such as natural cosmetics, foods, beverages and phytotherapeutics (herbal 
medicines) are already putting this into practice. Some large and medium-size enter-
prises, such as Natura and Beraca Sabará10, have heavily invested in the sustainable 
development area, while at the same time they have worked with the local extrac-
tivist communities. 
However, the prevailing economic activity in relation to forest resources remains 
based on the slash-and-burn model for providing valuable wood and useful land 
for agriculture and cattle ranching. Such extractivism, although recognized as an 
important social movement for the region, is faced with its own limitations in terms 
of absorbing a large proportion of the local working population without transforming 
its traditional techniques. This issue has become a major challenge to the develop-
ment of the Amazon region and to the aim to improve extractivism through science 
and technology.
Conclusion
Social policies have developed in Brazil since the 1930s. At the beginning they 
focused on the formal urban worker, but following re-democratization in the 1980s, 
the problems of poverty and hunger gained political relevance for public policies. To 
plan and calibrate the targeting and formatting of policies, the Brazilian authorities 
used consolidated statistical tools. However, because the existing social databases 
and surveys had not been designed to capture specific information on poverty, new 
tools had to be created for this purpose. 
These tools were not only of an informational nature. Brasilia has a well-estab-
lished set of institutions at its command: three big public banks and a public invest-
ment bank; a federal universities network; statistical institutions; consolidated 
worker legislation; and effective external control. Politically, constitutional rights 
provide key parameters to social results, while more specific legislation is impor-
tant to structure policies so that they can be maintained when there is a change in 
the ruling political party. Clear rules are fundamental for the popular acceptance 
of programmes and for social accountability. Social movements also play a political 
role by pressing for specific groups to be given access to social policies. 
A new social security system has arisen in Brazil through the conjunction of policies 
based on universal social rights and those focused on the problems of poverty and 
hunger. This social security system is linked to a broader development strategy based 
on Brazil’s huge internal market.  
Brazil’s social policies have many successful strategic features: the merging and 
strengthening of social databases to enhance the understanding of poverty in its 
different social environments; the decentralizing of operations to cut costs and 
improve targeting quality; assigning well-defined roles and responsibilities which 
10.  Natura is the largest cosmetic company in Brazil. Baraca Saba is the major organic supplier for cosmetics 
enterprises in the country and is a pioneer in organizing local communities to extract biodiversity products by 
traditional processes. 
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favour accountability; implementing clear and simple rules that favour social control; 
the targeting of cash transfer and other policies towards the poor to complement 
universal policies; the use of food acquisition and institutional markets to improve 
rural income and local circuits of wealth; the use of employment and minimum wage 
increase in the fight against poverty; applying a territorial focus, which favours policy 
intersectoriality; the specific targeting of populations to address targeting errors; 
the monitoring and evaluation of policies as a guide; and finally the acceptance that 
trial and error is inevitable and political will is obligatory. 
In spite of the many successes, Brazil’s social policies still face a great challenge 
if extreme poverty and hunger is to be eradicated. During the last decade, social 
policies became synergic with the country’s broad development strategy by stimu-
lating economically stagnated areas with an influx of income – through cash trans-
fers or family agriculture incentives – and an expansion of social services and infra-
structure. This dynamic of income generation led the country to acquire economic 
and social momentum through the expansion of low and medium-income household 
consumption. To maintain this momentum, the challenge now turns to the supply 
side of the economy, and must be met through low and middle-income entrepreneur-
ship. Options are already evident for rural areas, such as the expansion of produc-
tive inclusion policies, while effective alternatives are required for urban and forest 
area production. n
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1
994: Nelson Mandela is elected as the first 
pre sident of the post-Apartheid era. There is 
much work to be done to correct the gender, 
racial and spatial imbalances inherited from the 
past regime. The Reconstruction and Develop-
ment Program (RDP) is then launched by the new gov-
ernment, which aims to address the inequalities that exist 
in terms of access to education, water, energy, housing, 
employment and land. Meanwhile, the Commission for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) starts working on the 
drafting of the new Constitution. In 1996 this Constitution 
is promulgated and constitutional experts deem it as one 
of the best in the world. A Bill of Rights is entrenched in 
the Constitution which stipulates that every citizen has the 
right of access to adequate housing, health care services, 
sufficient food and water, social security, basic and fur-
ther education, and a safe and healthy environment. There 
could be no better demonstration of a serious attempt to 
reduce inequality than that provided by this Constitution 
and the first policy framework developed by the ruling 
party.
Over the past 18 years, much progress has been made, 
for instance between 1996 and 2007 the percentage of 
households with access to water has increased from 80% 
to 89%, while rising from 54% to 74% in the Eastern Cape, 
a former homeland. Access to electricity has also improved, 
increasing from 57% of households to 83%. Similar devel-
opments have been achieved in every sector (education, 
sanitation, refuse removal, telecommunications, housing 
and transport). However, access does not equate to quality, 
and the regular demonstrations in most townships serve 
as a reminder of the low living standards faced by most 
of the population. The reality lies beyond the national 
averages: income inequality remains among the world’s 
highest; access to essential services is far from universal, 
especially in suburban townships and poor rural areas; and 
former homelands are still the country’s poorest regions, 
while the big metropolises are thriving. What then has gone 
wrong? This article does not attempt to unravel the multiple 
causes that might explain the persistence of inequality, but 
rather sets out to highlight an oft-overlooked aspect of the 
South African governance system, in terms of inequality 
reduction efforts, i.e. the role of local government. 
Local governance in disarray 
Enshrined in the Constitution is the principle of coopera-
tive government, i.e. the then appealing principle of decen-
tralization, where service provision and economic devel-
opment are devolved to the spheres of government that 
are deemed most relevant. Thus, water, sanitation, energy 
and housing are examples of municipal responsibilities; 
while education, health and transport are illustrations of 
devolved provincial competencies. However, in practice, 
decentralization appears highly dysfunctional and a cause 
of truly appalling consequences.
Firstly, due to their level of financial distress, every year 
the poorest municipalities find themselves incapable of 
meeting their short-term liabilities, which has serious 
South Africa: when devolved 
governance fails
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Montpellier, France
A PLANET FOR L IFE212
consequences on the maintenance of infrastructure and 
hence results in a deterioration of service quality and relia-
bility. Secondly, many municipalities fall short, often by 
30% or even 40%, of spending their entire annual capital 
budget allocated by the National Treasury, which again 
has severe consequences, in this instance on the roll-out 
of services and the reduction of backlogs. In February 
2012, the Finance Minister reported to Parliament that 
the departments and municipalities had only spent 68% 
of the 2010-2011 R260 billion capital budget, which 
was intended for infrastructure development. While in 
2011-2012, 54 municipalities under-spent their budget 
by R3.7 billion according to the auditor general report of 
July 2012. 
These municipalities are being eaten away by a combi-
nation of corruption, conflicts of interest, cronyism, a lack 
of capacity and expertise (from chief financial officers 
to planners and engineers, many of these positions 
remaining unfilled) and incompetent cadre deployment; 
all this against a complex social and cultural backdrop 
where municipal mayors and councillors are in conflict with 
traditional organizations and the powers of local kings and 
tribal chiefs. The lack of capacity is worth illustrating. The 
latest Local Government Budget and Expenditure Review 
released by the National Treasury in September 2011 
reveals the grim truth about the employment situation 
in municipalities: on average, 36% of approved positions 
were vacant in 2006, with the rate reaching 51% in the 
metropolitan municipality of Tshwane. No one can say 
whether these vacancies are being compensated for 
through skills development, as there is no data on the 
training budget for official posts. 
The centre of the problem appears to be poor public 
procurement and supply chain management processes. 
FIGURE 1 Water, an objective almost reached in South Africa
Satisfaction of basic needs is enshrined in the South African Constitution and is a prevalent theme in the 
country’s policies. Universal access to water is today an objective that has been achieved in almost all South 
African municipalities.
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Tender processes are heavily flawed. Of course, checks 
and balances exist, but rules and regulations are so 
complex and capacities so weak, that it has become easier 
to tweak the system rather than to enforce it. Projects are 
poorly prepared; technical requirements are inadequately 
specified; and capital expenditures are badly planned. 
As a result, tender bids are usually over-priced and 
awarded on the basis of cronyism to under-capacitated 
suppliers, representing a win-win situation for councillors 
and bidders, while the poor communities are always the 
losers. The same auditor general’s report revealed that 
local governments had misspent R11 billion over the fiscal 
year previous to the report’s publication. However, despite 
these findings, it would be wrong to conclude that money 
is not an issue. Even if the municipal budget was spent 
more wisely, it would still probably take several years to 
reduce the current backlogs in service delivery and infra-
structure maintenance. Therefore, for the time being at 
least, increasing the municipal budget allocation is not the 
answer as only 13 of the 283 municipalities have received 
a clean audit this year, i.e. they have produced a clear 
and transparent report on the use of public funds. One 
must keep in mind however that a clean audit does not 
necessarily mean that money is being spent more wisely, 
or that a better delivery is being achieved. Municipalities 
need assistance.
Taking over municipality responsibilities
The Constitution makes provision for provinces to 
assume control of the responsibilities of municipalities 
FIGURE 2.South African Municipalities that remain fragile
Official reports point to a lack of capacity that prevents municipal authorities from fulfilling their mandates. 
This figure illustrates the performance of the Free State, which has no former homelands in its territory. It 
shows that most municipalities remain below national recommendations in terms of policy and financial 
management, as well as governance (transparency, participation, compliance). The situation is even more 
difficult in the former homelands of Limpopo and Eastern Cape.
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when poor management capacity is recognized. However, 
most provinces are fraught with the very same problems, 
resulting in unauthorized expenditures, unlawful conduct 
and violation of supply chain provision and public 
procurement procedures. Services that are devolved to 
provinces are equally poorly delivered. Given this state 
of affairs, how can such provinces be expected to assist 
and oversee dysfunctional municipalities? Furthermore, 
because the Constitution also makes provision for the 
National Department to take over provincial departments, 
the situation has escalated. Since December 2011, to 
address mismanagement and avert the collapse of essen-
tial services, the cabinet has put under national admin-
istration several provincial departments in Eastern Cape 
(education), Limpopo (treasury, education, health, public 
works, roads and transport), Free State (treasury, police, 
roads and transport) and Gauteng (treasury and health). 
The consequences of this action go beyond service provi-
sion. Recently, an engineering and construction company 
was liquidated following the nonpayment of contracts by 
provincial departments in Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal and 
Free State, which resulted in the loss of 2,500 jobs in a 
country where the official unemployment rate exceeds 
24% and job creation is the utmost governmental priority. 
In addition, this situation is also controversial at the 
national level: since the last presidential election in May 
2009, several ministers (public works, local government), 
deputy ministers (economic development), as well as the 
police commissioner, have been accused of misconduct 
before being suspended or dismissed. The Fiscal and 
Financial Commission has pointed out the shortcomings 
of the Public Finance Management Act, stressing the lack 
of criteria to trigger national intervention. While this is true, 
could a simple revision of the Act, even one that was as 
comprehensive and well structured as possible, solve such 
systemic failures? It seems highly unlikely.
Consequently, the cabinet is stepping up to address 
these issues. National departments have deployed staff to 
the different provincial departments under public admin-
istration. In addition, the National Treasury has estab-
lished a technical support unit in each province to assist 
municipalities with the planning and spending of capital 
budget. The Department of Cooperative Government and 
Traditional Affairs has created the Municipal Infrastruc-
ture Support Agency to support rural municipalities that 
lack planning and project development capacities. The 
Presidential Infrastructure Coordination Committee has 
identified 17 strategic infrastructure projects, one of 
which aims to assist the 23 district municipalities with 
the least resources (17 million people) to provide an 
adequate level and quality of essential services to their 
constituencies. Some functional provinces, such as the 
Western Cape, are also committed to assisting munici-
palities in better planning and spending for infrastruc-
ture and service delivery. What can actually be expected 
of these plans? Previous trials of methods of capacity 
building and technical support have been conducted but 
have had only limited success because the capacitation 
of local government does not eliminate the political games 
that are being played, which are eating away at the system. 
Action plans remain too vague and flimsy on this dimen-
sion. Consequently, results take too long to achieve and 
inequalities persist.
Solving the implementation problem
This is not to say that progress has not been made, as 
the reality is far from that. But the progress that has been 
obtained has benefited only a minority, while almost half the 
population continues to live below the poverty line. While 
it has been 18 years since the first democratic election, 
the Apartheid legacy remains to varying extents across the 
country. Many inequalities have actually increased rather 
than diminished: the former homelands are still lagging 
behind; poor black (and increasingly white) townships 
are still in disarray. Nevertheless, despite what certain 
high profile politicians would like people to believe, Apart-
heid can no longer be singled out as the culprit. Firstly, 
political parties need to seriously tackle the dysfunctional 
nature of local governments, to question their internal 
functioning, stop irrelevant cadre deployment and promote 
good governance. This implies, amongst other things, that 
councillors, mayors and municipal managers, just like 
provincial leaders and members of executive councils, 
should be appointed according to their proven ability to 
deliver, and not according to their position or their connec-
tions. Today, these leaders are more accountable to their 
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political parties than to their constituencies - a situation 
that must be reversed. Secondly, administrative and legal 
shortcomings must be overcome so that unlawful practices 
can be effectively punished, including the implementa-
tion of effective protection for whistle-blowers. Powers 
and means of the public protector should be extended to 
promote good governance in state affairs. Anti-corruption 
laws should be enforced. These are only a few examples 
of what needs to be done. Proposals to effectively remedy 
the present shortcomings exist; the issue at stake more 
concerns the implementation of these solutions. Only 
once these issues have been addressed can there be a 
real chance to properly deal with inequality. The National 
Planning Commission has released its Vision 2030 report 
for the country: it is an ambitious plan that is generally 
regarded as achievable, provided that the state becomes 
“capable, developmental, professional and responsive”. 
Here lies the challenge. n
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L
ike the popular Tex-Mex cuisine found across the United States, 
Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP) has been an effort to fuse two very 
different cultures. In place of culinary traditions, BOP has attempted 
to blend the core capabilities and resources of big business with the 
heart of global development institutions – a visionary fusion of profits 
with poverty alleviation (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002; Prahalad 
and Hart, 2002). 
But the theory that global corporations could simultaneously drive 
profits and alleviate poverty by selling products and services to the 
world’s four billion poorest consumers has proven less than palat-
able in practice. Over the more than dozen years since the concept was put forward, 
numerous business experiments to reach BOP consumers have failed to support the 
profit opportunity half of the hypothesis (Karamchandani, Kubzansky and Lalwani, 
2011; Karnani, 2007). 
Visibility into the challenge is further obscured by well-publicized corporate ventures 
deemed successes in the popular press by virtue of simply being operational and having 
expanded a pilot – actual profitability and return on investment remain far from 
certain. Two often referenced successes are the Hindustan Lever’s Shakti initiative, 
an effort to build a door-to-door, rural sales channel in remote villages of India for the 
company’s personal care and home care products by recruiting and training women 
micro-entrepreneurs from self-help groups; and ITC’s e-choupal, which provides rural 
Indian farmers with market and agricultural data via village-based internet kiosks. 
The disappointment hasn’t been confined to the business-side of the equation. The 
broader development community’s assessment of initial corporate ventures was less 
Erik Simanis, 
Center for Sustainable 
Global Enterprise, 
Cornell University, 
Ithaca, United States 
of America
“Bottom of the pyramid” strategies combine the profit motive with devel-
opment objectives. However, the idea that a multinational corporation 
might simultaneously drive profit and alleviate poverty has not become 
a reality; it requires a revised, more modest definition of promised out-
comes so they may better integrate with corporate interests. 
Bringing Bottom 
of the Pyramid into 
business focus
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than rosy. Seeing efforts that – to their eyes – were little more than attempts to sell 
products to the poor, the term “poverty wash” entered into the BOP lexicon (Karnani, 
2007). In response to this critique, academics (including the author) and development 
practitioners urged corporations pursuing BOP markets to also expand the incomes 
of the poor by sourcing from them and incorporating them into their value chains 
(Drayton and Budinich, 2010); to empower and build local capacity by co-creating 
new businesses and products in close partnership with low-income communities 
(Simanis et al., 2008a; Simanis, Hart and Duke, 2008b); and to conduct rigorous 
assessments on the poverty-alleviation impacts of their ventures (London, 2009). In 
short, corporations were being asked to do what non-profits do. 
It’s not surprising, then, that the locus of corporate interest in BOP has steadily 
shifted away from the profit-and-loss side of the business to the philanthropic and 
social responsibility departments. Danone’s partnership with Grameen Bank to bring 
wholesome yogurt to the poor in Bangladesh through a network of rural women entre-
preneurs is one such high-profile effort. Rather than a fusion of competitive returns 
on investment with development impact – the vision that spurred initial enthusiasm 
among corporations – many of today’s BOP ventures are corporate-funded develop-
ment projects justified on the basis of their reputational value to the company. While 
The work of Prahalad and Stuart (2002) revealed the existence of nearly 4 billion poor consumers whose 
needs were not being sufficiently taken into account by the market. The idea of  developing specific products 
for this segment of the population is the logical next step.
FIGURE 1 Estimating the size of the BOP market
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such corporate-social responsibility efforts do indeed bring tremendous value to the 
communities where they operate and should continue to be encouraged and expanded, 
they are a shadow of the initial vision. 
The goal of this chapter is to help revive corporate interest in the BOP as a profit 
opportunity by bringing a business-focus back to the field. To do so, I summarize what 
I believe are key misconceptions concerning the roots of business success/failure 
in low-income markets, and the poverty alleviation potential of corporations more 
broadly. The issues reach from the field-level all the way up to the boardroom. I 
hasten to add that not only have I contributed to some of these misconceptions, but 
I have also guided and closely advised a number of failed corporate BOP business 
ventures that drew from this blueprint. This article is therefore based on hands-on 
experience and personal learning and reflects a fundamental re-thinking of some of 
my earlier positions. 
Misconception 1: Build it right and they will come
First, it’s common to hear and read today that the true challenge of BOP markets 
is, first-and-foremost, one of understanding poor consumers’ needs and translating 
those needs into high-quality products. Companies, so the argument goes, simply 
don’t understand how these consumers live, what they value and what their aspira-
tions are. Should a product fail to attract sufficient consumer demand to be profit-
able – as so often is the case – the company is faulted for not having truly heard the 
voice of the customer.
In fact, this was the theory at the very start of the BOP movement in the late 1990s 
– that companies, by working closely together with BOP consumers to “co-create” an 
offering, would crack the code. This view was also appealing from a development 
perspective, as it was consistent with the core tenets of what is called “participatory 
development” – a development approach popularized in the 1980s which calls for 
the close and active participation of the poor in the design and implementation of all 
solutions. Such deep participation empowers the poor, builds capabilities and ensures 
that solutions are appropriate for the local context (Chambers, 1983, 1997). 
So what happened? Companies got on the ground, did in-depth research (in all of 
the projects I’ve led and advised in Africa and India, the teams and I did homestays in 
the slums and villages we aimed to serve), engaged the community in “co-creation” 
using various participatory techniques, launched products that seemed to address 
pressing needs, and then… failed. In many cases, there was no demand after all 
that co-creation and engagement – even for products that seemed so important to a 
healthy, normal life; such as clean water solutions, nutrient fortified food products, 
smoke-free stoves, etc. 
What became clear to me is that needs aren’t the same thing as a market (Simanis, 
2009; Simanis, 2010). A market is a lifestyle built around a product. When a market 
exists, consumers have embedded a product and its value proposition into the fabric 
of their lives – buying and using it is second nature. In that case, market researchers 
and product designers can get really good consumer data, and it makes sense to work 
A PLANET FOR L IFE220
closely with consumers to improve a product’s functionality. 
But for most products launched in the BOP, there is no market – instead, a market 
has to be created. With market creation, traditional consumer research and data are 
fuzzy signals at best, as consumers have no reference point for understanding the value 
of the new functionality, nor the various changes to their existing routines, budgets 
and lifestyles that product adoption will entail. So it’s possible to collect lots of data 
and get extensive consumer feedback – but when push comes to shove and consumers 
are asked to hand over money for the product they endorsed in the abstract, they balk. 
Successful market creation requires a very different approach to product positioning 
and go-to-market strategies more broadly. The primary objectives are to help kick-start 
an initial consumer “sensemaking” process – a trial-and-error based form of experi-
mentation – that invites consumers to figure out on their own terms how a product fits 
into their lives and the value it holds, and to then catalyse a bandwagon effect that, 
in sociological terms, normalizes the offering and makes it seem a necessary and vital 
part of any person’s life. Specific marketing techniques that I’ve used with success in the 
field include pricing for repeat usage (rather than one-time sampling) and including 
“props” or familiar items from the consumers’ context as part of the offering (as part 
of a rewards programme, for example). I’ve also tested and refined a “seed group” 
strategy that creates an initial group of committed users through workshops geared 
FIGURE 2 What is the BOP market made of?
According to the WRI (2007), well-adapted products could meet a variety of basic needs of the poor. The 
two largest markets are the improvement of food and household equipment.
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towards encouraging participants to model key behaviours associated with the offering 
and begin feeling part of a high-visibility brand community.  
Misconception 2: Target high volumes at low margins 
and price points 
A second misconception that dates back to the very first BOP articles is that profita-
bility is a matter of setting low margins and price points, and generating high volumes. 
The mathematics seemed intuitively correct: BOP consumers spend a scant dollar a 
day, but make up two-thirds of the world’s population. Mathematics aside, I believe 
this proposed revenue model was quickly and uncritically accepted because it helped 
assuage the potential reservations of managers and executives in terms of making 
money off the proverbial backs of the poor: getting by on razor-thin margins seemed 
the morally correct way of doing business at the BOP. 
However, basing a revenue model on intuition and emotional resonance has proven 
to be a recipe for failure. The low price/low margin/high volume strategy simply 
doesn’t work in the majority of BOP markets, as it inevitably requires an impractical 
penetration rate of the target market (Simanis, 2012). Two factors account for this: 
One, costs in BOP markets are much higher than in traditional markets. Compen-
sating for poor infrastructure (e.g., outage-prone power grids, pot-holed roads) and 
absent or inefficient social institutions (e.g., corrupt law enforcement agencies, poor 
school systems) with back-up diesel generators and in-house employee literacy training 
programmes drives up operational costs beyond the levels found in traditional markets. 
The poverty penalty to which low-income consumers are subjected, which results 
in their paying more than their middle-class counterparts for essentially the same 
goods and services (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002), exists also on the supply side 
of the equation.
And because of the market creation issue discussed above, acquiring and retaining 
customers demands a very high-touch sales and marketing strategy. Getting people 
to value new-to-the-world functionality and changing long-held routines and behav-
iours –even when it can save their lives – is extremely difficult. Think about the 
massive campaigns and the measures taken just to get people to wear seatbelts and 
bicycle helmets or to use condoms. All this drives up costs and pushes out break-even 
timelines, as corporations have to pay for awareness building and behaviour modifi-
cation through future profits (even if it forms partnerships with local NGOs, self-help 
groups and governments, as they too don’t work for free).
The second factor is that business units in low-income markets come pre-set with 
an “efficient scale” that is extremely small. In economics, “efficient scale” refers to 
the size of business facilities, equipment, and operations that generate the highest 
level of efficiency and, thereby, maximize profits. Consider the previously mentioned 
e-Choupal venture by ITC that provides poor farmers with agricultural information: 
each one of their internet kiosks serves farmers living within just a five kilometres 
range. The main culprit behind this phenomenon is poor transportation infrastruc-
ture. Dismal road quality across rural areas drives up costs rapidly when companies 
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try to access consumers living further away from their base of operations. On the flip 
side, consumers are constrained to doing most all of their shopping within their own 
villages (or very nearby) because of the disproportionately high cost of local trans-
portation. Consider that in rural Ghana the cost of a five-mile return trip using the 
public mini-bus is approximately $1.40. That’s more than 20% of the average daily 
spend of a four-person farming family. 
The upshot is that the business unit is forced to meet its sales volume target from 
the consumer base living in a narrow geographical range – one holding little more 
than a cluster of villages in rural areas, or several neighbourhoods in the case of 
larger slums. The only way to cover these disproportionately high operational costs 
and generate a return within a reasonable time frame without essentially converting 
an entire target market into repeat customers is by generating what accounting calls 
a high contribution per transaction (the sale price minus a product’s variable costs). 
To raise contribution levels, a company has to raise its gross margin (by decreasing 
variable costs) and/or raise its sale price. 
To generate very high contributions within a BOP context, companies inevitably 
have to restructure the entire business model: beginning with the value proposition, 
the pricing structure and down through the supply chain. Several generic strategies 
that I’ve outlined in prior published work that are effective in boosting contribu-
tion levels include offering a bundle comprised of bulk-format products; integrating 
an “enabling service” that engages customers in an activity linked to the bundle so 
that they self-teach themselves to maximize product functionality; and aggregating 
customers into peer groups (Simanis, 2012). 
Misconception 3: High profits are unethical 
A related misconception, or perhaps misunderstanding to be more accurate, concerns 
what constitutes an appropriate or reasonable profit level for corporations at the BOP. 
It’s a topic for which I too have received criticism based on my argument above that 
very high gross margins are necessary for profitability in low-income market contexts. 
While there are certainly ethical and moral dimensions to this debate, I believe that 
a significant portion of the confusion – particularly between the non-profit sectors and 
business – stems from something far less philosophical: definitional inconsistency. In 
other words, people are talking past one another, as they are using the word “profit” 
to mean very different things. 
The term in common business usage refers (mainly) to three very different things 
– gross profitability, operational profitability, and investment profitability. When I 
wrote that companies needed very high profit levels, I was referring to the first two. 
As explained above, high gross profitability (sales minus variable costs) is necessary 
because of the higher-than average operational costs in these markets. If you don’t 
start off with very high gross profitability, a business unit will find itself in the red 
when those operational costs are subtracted. 
What is often misunderstood by those outside the business sector is that a venture 
can generate seemingly high year-on-year operational profitability – more or less the 
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equivalent of net profits – but still have negative investment profitability. Investment 
profitability is a measure of a project’s overall return on investment and represents the 
payoff to the people (e.g., shareholders) who risked their money to make the project 
possible. It’s a situation that the pharmaceutical industry – which is characterized by 
enormous upfront research and development costs and years of clinical trials before 
sales can begin – periodically struggles to explain to the public. Take, for example, a 
business that generates $1,000,000 of operating profits every year. If $2,000,000 was 
invested to launch the business and it is up and running in two years, the business 
has strong investment profitability by almost any measure; but if $20,000,000 was 
invested and it took five years to start seeing those profits, those risking their money 
are faring very poorly when they take into consideration inflation and the guaranteed 
returns they could have received by simply putting their money into a savings account. 
Low-income market opportunities, much like the pharmaceutical industry, invari-
ably require very high operational profitability to generate a positive return on invest-
ment. The reasons are two-fold. The first is that many of these opportunities won’t 
see profits for many years, given the extensive market research, development of new 
products, and pilot tests that are necessary before sales start in earnest. 
The problem is quite literally compounded in emerging markets, as the discount 
rate used to assess the present value of future profits is very high – 30% or more in 
many corporations. To put that in perspective, the present value of $1,000,000 of net 
profits earned ten years from a project’s starting point is only $72,000 when a 30% 
discount rate is used. 
The second reason is that the upfront investment costs needing to be recouped are 
often quite high, as many BOP opportunities demand extended, multi-country project 
teams, draw on a wide range of corporate capabilities, and entail extensive invest-
ment in assets and new business infrastructure (particularly on the distribution side).
As this suggests, very high gross and operational profitability do not automatically 
lead to “unfair” levels of investment returns. By that same token, an “investment-
worthy opportunity” is also not inherently extortionist – it is simply one that covers 
within a given period of time those upfront expenditures, the income forgone or what 
economists call the opportunity cost (i.e., a guaranteed return on the money, usually 
equal to the interest rates paid by government-backed securities), and the risk that 
an investor assumes. As one might imagine, the opportunity costs in developing and 
emerging markets are higher (because inflation levels are generally much higher in 
emerging markets, thereby pushing up interest rates), and there is a lot more business 
risk because of the market creation issue. So it’s not a case of trying to make more 
money off the backs of the poor; rather, it is the challenging nature of the investment 
climate that sets a high bar for corporate BOP ventures.
That said, once some of these markets are established, the necessary level of invest-
ment profitability will probably start to decline, as business risk decreases and compe-
tition increases. It is a dynamic that financial analysts call a “reversion to the mean”. 
It’s already taking place in some markets in the micro-finance industry (Porteus, 
2006), thus forcing companies to maintain their investment profitability by reducing 
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their costs (as competition often doesn’t allow them to increase their prices – in fact, 
companies usually face pressure to decrease prices). That’s the so-called magic of 
markets and why they generally result in increasing consumer value over time.   
Misconception 4: Corporations should use a blended 
value approach to BOP 
The final misconception reaches the very heart of what makes a corporation a corpo-
ration. Increasingly, the rhetoric in the BOP space urges corporations to take a much 
broader approach to assessing the value of their investments – to base resource alloca-
tion decisions not simply on the expected returns to shareholders, but also on the 
value generated in poor communities. By this view, corporations should invest in 
expanding BOP ventures even if they fail to reach an internal hurdle rate of return, as 
the societal value of tackling poverty and providing for the unmet needs of the poor 
should essentially be viewed as offsetting that loss. 
This discussion has been confounded by the advent of the impact investing field, 
which invests in social entrepreneurs first and foremost to generate a social or environ-
mental impact and secondly to generate some financial return, and by the concept 
of the “social business” proposed by Nobel Prize winner and Grameen Bank Founder 
Mohammed Yunus. Yunus’ social business is a business established to solve a social 
problem that covers its operational costs but pays no dividends to investors; all profits 
are reinvested in the business (Yunus, 2007). 
The argument is absolutely understandable and certainly appealing. But it’s a plati-
tude, and fails to give due recognition to how institutions function, in particular how 
the need to appeal to key resource providers dictates behaviour. This view, known as 
resource dependence theory, essentially states that all organizations are dependent 
on outside resources; to maintain a flow of those resources and ensure the organiza-
tion’s survival, organizations have to perform first and foremost along dimensions 
important to the primary providers of those resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
So it’s not just publicly-traded corporations that are beholden to these outside forces, 
but so too social enterprises, non-profits, churches, teachers associations and town 
hall assemblies. As Bob Dylan penned in song, “it may be the Devil or it may be the 
Lord, but you’re gonna have to serve somebody.”
So organizations that operate under various “non-profit” legal designations – like 
social enterprises/entrepreneurs, impact investment funds, multilaterals, and founda-
tions to name a few – aren’t acting benevolently in using a blended value approach: 
they have an obligation to their resource providers to do so and to prioritize social impact 
over profits. Why? Because people give resources to these organizations so that they 
impact on external social and environmental issues – not for the sake of growing the 
organization for the sake of itself. Self-obsolescence is, in fact, a sign of a mission 
accomplished. 
That’s not the case for corporations – the overwhelming majority of company inves-
tors (e.g., shareholders) give funds specifically so that the company grows itself in 
order to repay the original investment with a dividend, much like banks are expected 
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to pay interest on customers’ savings deposits. So the changes in people’s lives that a 
company’s products and operations bring about are simply a means to the company’s 
growth and longevity.  
The point is that different institutions present different constraints and different 
boundaries to those working within them because of their differing obligations to 
resource providers. A corporation cannot do “BOP business” the same way as a social 
enterprise. For corporations to make BOP business part of their core operations, as 
Prahalad, Hart, Hammond and others initially envisioned, BOP resources will have 
to be allocated and the investments managed according to what capital markets and 
the shareholders that supply them with money set as the key benchmark of success: 
namely, rates of return better than or comparable to alternative investment opportuni-
ties. Corporations can, and hopefully increasingly do, bring progressive values to bear 
on how they achieve that target, but those values are not by themselves going to pay 
the bills, let the company continue growing, and attract additional investment capital. 
The situation may change and a blended value approach may in fact eventually 
become a shareholder demand – but that day is a long way away, as institutional 
contexts evolve very slowly. So if you want a seat at that table today and to get corpo-
rations directing their core capabilities and core resources to social and environ-
mental issues, the goal has to be re-framed in a way that it synchronizes with the 
norms, pressures and daily reality of the managers – not the other way around. As 
renowned 1970s community organizer Saul Alinksy argued in his seminal book, Rules 
for Radicals, if you aren’t communicating within the experience of your audience, you 
simply aren’t in the game (Alinsky, 1971). 
And that is exactly what has happened to the BOP field over the last decade. We (I 
include myself here) got too caught up with our own beautiful theories and abstract 
concepts (like mutual value creation, inclusive business) and lost sight of the pressure 
on managers to meet next quarter’s sales and earnings forecast. We theorized ourselves 
out of being relevant. As I noted in the introduction, the consequence is that companies 
are turning away from the space or only approaching it as a corporate social responsi-
bility project. And that’s a real loss, as companies can bring unique value to the poor.
But it’s a loss caused as much by the perverse pressures that drive corporate decisions, 
as it is by the field’s lack of creativity in re-framing these concepts and goals in a way 
that can speak to managers – from those sitting in the “C-Suite” (the top senior execu-
tives), right down to those in the field (Simanis and Milstein, 2012). We as a field 
need to start putting into practice our own recommendation about avoiding top-down 
or so-called “push solutions.” Instead we need to get on the proverbial shop floor and 
come up with solutions that work for the very managers whose annual performance 
reviews depend on successfully implementing them.  
Consider the total quality management (TQM) and just in time (JIT) management 
revolutions as case studies. I would wager that these management practices – ones 
today considered baseline skills for any respectable company – have had an order-of-
magnitude greater impact on reducing firm’s and industries’ environmental impacts 
than all “environmental management initiatives” combined. But TQM and JIT have 
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had such a profound environmental impact precisely because they were not under-
taken for that purpose. 
The goals, practices, language and metrics of TQM and JIT are focused on enabling 
a company to drive profitability and top-line growth – the environmental benefits were 
derivative of achieving the core institutional objective. It’s going to take the same kind 
of framing and approach if corporations are to make BOP and the creation of social 
value a part of their core operations. 
Conclusion
Audacity and bold visions are powerful and necessary tools for change. By freeing 
oneself from the limitations of current reality, they open minds, instil hope, catalyse 
motivation and spur action. The BOP concept has unquestionably had such an effect. 
But visions alone – no matter how often they are repeated or how boldly they are 
proclaimed – will not result in lasting institutional change. Sustained change requires 
bringing a vision back down to earth and re-embedding it into the day-to-day reali-
ties and practices that give institutions their shape and form. That process, however, 
FIGURE 3 Misconceptions of the BOP approach
The BOP approach, as it has been conducted, has raised hopes, achieved mobilization and led to 
disappointments. In the experience of the author, it is often the principles adopted by stakeholders for 
product definition, along with market research that have resulted in unsatisfactory outcomes. Other 
approaches are possible.
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is one of mutual adaptation and negotiation – not only will the organization change, 
but so too the vision. And that’s an unsettling process, as it requires letting go of the 
purity of one’s vision and frequently contenting oneself with half-wins and incre-
mental advancements.  
Today, the BOP concept is faced with such a decision: either we adapt the vision to 
meet the realities of the corporation, or we risk the concept fading entirely from corpo-
rate business agendas. To be clear, it’s not a question of going back to “business as usual” 
and giving up on the vision of a better world. Rather, bringing a business focus back 
to the BOP concept is an exciting next phase in an on-going process of change – one 
that will demand creativity and open up new waves of research and new opportuni-
ties for interaction and learning among academia, the development sector and global 
business. It is my hope that this article helps to shine a light on some of the potential 
new pathways that can make BOP a lasting part of corporate business agendas. ■
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C
hina’s economic reforms over the past three 
decades have dramatically changed the 
mechanisms for allocating goods and labour 
in both market and non-market spheres1. The 
role of the state and the work unit (danwei) as 
providers of social goods and services has been eroded, 
and responsibility for social reproduction and “care” – a 
domain principally of the state in the urban sector under 
the planned economy – has returned to the household. 
These processes have considerable – but largely under-
researched – implications for the work and status of 
women in both the home and the marketplace. 
This paper examines the social and economic trends 
that intensify the pressure on the care economy and 
on women in particular in playing their dual roles as 
caregivers and income-earners in post-reform China. What 
are the implications of the reform process for non-market 
activities, such as care for children and elders, activities 
which traditionally are the domain of women? How does 
caregiving responsibility affect women’s labour market 
outcomes? And what are the implications of work-family 
conflicts for the well-being of women and their families? 
The care economy under strain 
The overriding concern of the Chinese government in 
the post-reform period has been to find the most efficient 
way of restructuring the productive economy, assuming 
that social reproduction will adjust itself accordingly. As 
a result, social protection for women’s reproductive role 
1. This paper summarizes part of the discussion in Cook and 
Dong (2011).
Women’s paid work and unpaid care 
responsibilities in China
Sarah Cook and Xiao-yuan Dong, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, 
Switzerland
have been severely eroded; the support of the government 
and the employer for care provision has been substantially 
cut back; and the contribution of women’s unpaid care 
work has been completely ignored in the design of the 
emerging social security system. These policy changes 
have exacerbated the labour market penalty on women 
for their caregiving role, contributing to the deterioration 
of women’s position in the labour market (BERIK, DONG and 
SUMMERFIELD, 2007). Various institutional, economic and 
demographic changes affect childcare and elder care and 
intensify the pressure on women in trying to fulfill these 
roles in China’s transitional economy.  
With respect to institutional changes, nowhere have 
women with young children been more adversely affected 
than in the area of childcare provision. During the Maoist 
era, China established a public childcare system which 
provided care from the earliest months until primary school 
age (LIU, ZHANG, LI, 2008), although publicly subsidized 
childcare was more accessible to families in the urban 
sector than in the rural sector. The economic reform has 
brought about two major changes in China’s childcare 
policy. First, the post-reform policy discourse stressed 
the role of formal childcare for promoting early child-
hood education while downplaying its role for supporting 
working women (ZHU, WANG, 2005). Second, there has been 
a substantial cutback in the childcare support provided by 
the government and employers. According to the 2006 
Chinese enterprise social responsibility survey, enterprise-
run kindergartens existed in less than 20 percent of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and only 5.7 percent of the total 
surveyed enterprises (DU, DONG, 2010).  
Recognizing the changing patterns of childcare 
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provision, in its 2001 Guidelines for Kindergarten Educa-
tion the Chinese government formally endorsed a plural-
istic approach to childcare, with “state-run kindergartens 
as the backbone and exemplar” and “social forces (an 
ideologically convenient term for market forces) as the 
primary providers”. Between 1997 and 2006, the number 
of publicly funded kindergartens in China fell from 157,842 
to 55,069; in contrast, private kindergartens grew rapidly 
with their share rising from 13.5 percent to 57.8 percent. 
For China as a whole, the number of kindergartens 
decreased by 28.5 percent between 1997 and 2006 
(Ministry of Education, Educational Statistics Yearbook of 
China, various issues). The childcare reforms have raised 
concerns about the availability, affordability and quality of 
childcare programmes in China (CORTER et al., 2006; HE 
and JIANG, 2008; and LIU, ZHANG, LI, 2008).  
Similarly, elder care institutions have faced new 
challenges during the economic transition. Like many 
countries in the world, in China the provision of care for the 
elderly is primarily the responsibility of families. Consistent 
with the approach to childcare, the post-reform childcare 
policy discourse emphasizes family responsibility and the 
role of markets for care provision. The Elderly Rights and 
Security Law which was enacted in 1996 reiterates that care 
for frail elderly parents is a non-evadable responsibility of 
adult children, despite the growing reluctance of employers 
to accommodate the care-giving needs of their employees. 
China’s ongoing demographic transition to an increas-
ingly aged society further increases the care burden on 
families. According to official statistics, the proportion of 
the Chinese population aged 65 and above rose from 4.9 
percent in 1982 to 8.3 percent in 2008 (NATIONAL BUREAU 
OF STATISTICS, 2009, p. 90). Analysts project that China’s 
old-age dependency ratio will surpass that of industrialized 
countries in 2020 and become the highest of any popula-
tion in the world by the mid-twenty-first century (POSTON 
and DUAN, 2000). Due to the effect of the one-child policy 
on family demographics, growing numbers of married 
couples will have sole responsibility for four parents and 
one child, with the main burden of care again likely to fall 
on women (CHEN and STANDING, 2007).
The structural change of the Chinese economy from 
an agrarian to an industrial one has also created new 
tensions for the care economy. The rapid growth of indus-
trial production and high rates of urbanization separate the 
workplace from the home, increasing women’s needs for 
non-parental childcare services. However, without access 
to publicly subsidized childcare programmes, the vast 
majority of women in rural areas and migrant women in 
cities have to rely on informal care substitutes or fee-for-
service daycare programs to enable their participation in 
the labour market.  
Rural-to-urban migration also creates dislocation for 
migrant families. Due to institutional arrangements related 
to the residential registration system (hukou) and land 
use rights, as well as various other economic and cultural 
factors, migration remains temporary, resulting in a large 
left-behind population consisting of children, non-elderly 
married women, and the elderly (FAN, 2009). Almost 59 
million children under the age of 18 years – 28 per cent 
of rural children – are left behind, living with only one 
parent (mostly mothers), grandparents or other relatives 
(ALL CHINA WOMEN’S FEDERATION, 2008).  A growing number of 
rural elderly people live in “empty nests” in which elderly 
females take care of their spouses while having no one 
to take care of them after the spouse passes away (LIU, 
ZHANG LI, 2008).      
Economic growth, together with privatization and 
commercialization of care services and an aging popula-
tion, has led to a rapid expansion of markets for domestic 
and care services. Analysts estimate that about 15 to 20 
million Chinese workers earn a living by cleaning, cooking, 
and taking care of children, the elderly, and the sick for 
middle- and high-income families (HU, 2010). Laid-off 
urban female workers and female migrants account for 
the majority of paid domestic workers. In China, as in 
many other countries, the domestic service market is 
poorly regulated; paid domestic work is low status, low 
paid and not covered by the existing social security system; 
domestic workers also face societal discrimination (HU, 
2010; WANG, SI and CHEN, 2010). The development of 
domestic and care service markets has transferred the 
domestic and care burdens of middle- and upper-middle-
class women to women struggling at the margin of the 
labour market, thereby perpetuating socio-economic 
inequality.   
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The tensions between women’s dual roles as 
caregivers and income-earners 
The changes in the care economy associated with policy 
reforms and demographic transition have heightened the 
tensions between women’s dual roles as caregivers and 
income-earners. Recent empirical analyses shed light on 
the implications for the well-being of women and their 
families caused by the growing work-family conflicts that 
women have to face.
Access to childcare services profoundly shapes 
women’s labour force participation. Du and Dong (2010) 
examine the impact of childcare reform on women’s child-
care choices and labour force participation in urban China, 
using data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS) for the period 1991 to 2004. The authors point 
out that China’s pluralistic approach to childcare provi-
sion in conjunction with the legacy of employer-based 
welfare entitlements has created a two-tier system. In this 
system, subsidized high quality childcare services mainly 
reach already well-off parents - employees of non-profit 
public organizations and large SOEs which are still able 
to provide childcare services, while other parents have to 
rely on the fee-based services of private or commercial-
ized public kindergartens to meet their needs.  
These authors also find striking disparities in women’s 
labour force participation and access to formal childcare 
among different socio-economic groups. Women with less 
education or those that have lower levels of family income 
are more likely to withdraw from the labour market and 
are less likely to use centre-based childcare. For working 
women, those married to husbands with higher levels 
of educational attainment are more likely to enrol their 
children in centre-based childcare. These findings suggest 
that gender-blind, market-oriented childcare reforms are 
FIGURE 1 How men and women in China allocate their time
Chinese women, both urban and rural dwellers, undertake the majority of family support work, which mainly 
comprises childcare and household activities. They spend three times longer than their partners on these 
activities.
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reinforcing socio-economic inequalities, including gender 
inequality as well as inequality in the quality of childcare 
and early education.
Rural migrant families are among the most vulnerable 
socio-economic groups in post-reform urban China. Yuan 
(2010) explores how married migrant women cope with 
the tension between paid work and childcare using data 
from the 2007 Beijing Migrant Family Survey. The analysis 
shows that in response to the growing demand of migrant 
families, private childcare services have grown rapidly in 
the migrant communities in Beijing. In line with the fact 
that migrant workers are concentrated in low-paying jobs, 
the childcare accessible to migrant families is typically 
characterized by low fees and the provision of low quality 
services. Most of such childcare facilities are non-regis-
tered because they do not satisfy the regulations on safety, 
sanitation, teacher qualification, students-teacher ratios, 
and so on. The presence of low-fee childcare appears to 
be important for migrant women’s labour force participa-
tion. But, in the absence of affordable, quality childcare 
programmes, these women are forced to make harsh 
choices between earning income and the well-being of 
their children.
The tensions between work and child care provision are 
felt not just by migrant women in the cities but also by 
women in low-income rural villages, where services that 
can substitute for family provision are generally unavailable 
and the economic pressure to work is enormous. Wang 
and Dong (2010) find that grandmothers and older children 
are the only care substitutes available to women and the 
lack of access to affordable, decent childcare is a main 
obstacle to women’s participation in off-farm employment. 
These findings provide strong evidence that care for young 
children constitutes a barrier to women’s access to more 
lucrative off-farm employment and wage work. 
Concluding remarks 
The retreat of the Chinese state from the sphere of 
reproduction during economic transition has exacerbated 
the weight of domestic responsibilities which women 
have to balance alongside their labour force participation, 
limiting their occupational choices and time autonomy. 
Women from disadvantaged socio-economic groups 
have been the hardest hit. Privatization and commercial-
ization of childcare services not only restrict the choices 
of women from disadvantaged socio-economic groups in 
the labour market but also deny their children access to 
quality child care. Population aging, in conjunction with the 
FIGURE 2 High activity rates of Chinese women
Chinese women, whether rural or urban, have high activity rates (over 70%). The reduction of formal 
childcare opportunities creates tensions that are difficult for families to cope with.
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growing emphasis on Confucian values and family respon-
sibility in policy circles, has exacerbated the dilemma for 
middle-aged, married women who attempt to fulfil multiple 
responsibilities as income-earners as well as caregivers 
for family members at different stages of the life cycle. 
Social dislocation associated with labour migration has 
increased work burdens of the left-behind middle-aged, 
married women, school-age children and elderly people. 
The emergence of off-farm wage employment, and the 
lack of affordable, decent out-of-home child care substi-
tutes, force rural women with pre-school children into 
having to make difficult choices, intensifying the conflict 
between the employment of mothers and the well-being 
of their children. 
These choices may compromise the care and educa-
tion of children as well as the elderly. They also constrain 
women’s labour force participation and options, and 
thus ultimately their own incomes and well-being. It is 
increasingly clear that women have been disproportion-
ately pushed out of formal employment opportunities, are 
more likely to drop out of the labour market than men, and 
are concentrated in low paid, irregular forms of informal 
employment. While analysis on the labour demand side 
suggests explanations arising both from human capital 
and discrimination, the studies reported here point to the 
need for analysis of the supply side constraints – particu-
larly the need to balance care responsibilities – that under-
mine women’s capacity to undertake paid employment. 
The longer-term outcome is that these women have limited 
access to social protection or pensions, thus perpetuating 
the care responsibilities of the next generation. Ultimately, 
a gendered approach to both social and labour market 
policies, with investment in support for social reproduction 
services, will be needed to break this cycle.
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I
n his analysis, the sociologist Robert Castel, shows that today, although social 
security has continued to expand since the post-war era and still covers a 
large part of the French population, and despite the fact that the labour 
law and the welfare state remain strong even in the face of longstanding 
social criticism, the category that Castel calls the “disaffiliated of the wage 
society” continues to grow. This category applies to those people that the 
last twenty years of sociological literature has described as excluded (i.e. the 
long-term unemployed) and those that are experiencing a series of transient 
and precarious work situations (which has also been discussed for a long 
time but is now increasingly common) (Castel and Haroche, 2001).
Falling outside of the spectrum of occupations included within the wage society, 
which constitute the primary labour market (where people still benefit from collec-
tive agreements, trade union support, insurance, etc.), the disaffiliated make up a 
secondary market of unemployed people and permanent temporary workers whose 
services are only of intermittent interest to companies (Castel, 1995). This market 
is composed of “supernumerary”, “unnecessary” people, who no longer even have 
the opportunity to be “exploited” by a company and to be alienated by repetitive and 
monotonous work, since they are deprived of long-term employment and forced to 
accept positions that offer a “half-wage”, a “split salary status” or, in particular, a 
“low-paid wage”. These types of jobs, which are considered as “atypical” (short-term 
contract, temporary, part-time, insertion, odd jobs, holiday cover, trainee positions...) 
have become widespread1; and while the salaried status remains the dominant form 
1. 74% of new contracts in 2006 (Castel, 2007).
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of work organization, we are probably witnessing a rapid deterioration in the status of 
wage-earners towards a level that is “below” that of traditional employment (sched-
uled to last for an indefinite period) and no longer enjoying all the prerogatives of 
labour laws and social protection (Castel, 2007, p. 416-418).
For ten years, many authors have confirmed the analysis that identifies the return, 
among a large number of pervasively present inequalities (gender, race, etc.), of 
a fundamental inequality that is creating a hierarchy between two social classes 
(Chauvel, 2001, 2004, 2006). In the twenty-first century, this inequality is no longer 
that which existed between the bourgeoisie and the working class. It has in fact 
become an inequality that separates a large disaffiliated class, the members of which 
do not currently realize they are grouped within it, which consists of unemployed 
people and those that have become the holders of downgraded jobs, from the middle 
class2 (Castel, 1995, 2007, p. 415) which is disappearing from the bottom, since their 
social prerogatives are said to strain flexibility and competitiveness3. 
This new bi-polarity of social inequality is not only an inequality of “affiliation” in the 
traditional sense of the wage earning society. It also combines geographical inequality 
which, despite what we may like to believe, is not only present between North and 
South. Unemployment and precarious work are concentrated in certain segments of 
the population, in certain regions and in certain neighbourhoods. Throughout the 
world there are ghettos, either actual or quasi-ghettos, whose inhabitants do not 
have the slightest chance of being saved by a miraculous integration into the global 
economy. Instead, the logic of the capitalist flow continues to marginalize these “black 
holes”, as the sociologist Manuel Castells points out, because the locations of wealth 
generation are connected via telecommunications (Castells, 2000). The selective 
connections of capitalism circumvent these undesirable neighbourhoods or regions 
where the inhabitants cannot even expect a decent education (this is the situation 
in certain Parisian suburbs, U.S. cities with declining populations such as Detroit, 
the Chinese countryside, in Indian and South American slums, throughout almost 
the entirety of Africa…).
Nonetheless, within these “black holes”, which are home to the majority of disaffili-
ated people engaged in precarious work, life organizes itself. New associations and 
cooperatives are formed on a regular basis, the purpose of which is to allow members 
to re-establish social relationships and engage in the solidarity economy that is neces-
sary for their survival. The main hypothesis of this paper is that the strength at which 
this associative movement is currently developing not only enables a partial easing of 
the rate at which the wage society is eroding (what the public authorities expect from 
2. The middle classes are those that fall, said Castel, along a continuum of differentiated professional positions 
ranging from minimum wage workers to those in higher (senior) posts, but all have the same rights in terms of 
labour laws and its regulations, as well as in terms of the State and its social benefits.
3. Germany is a case in point. It addressed the current financial crisis through the multiplication of “small” 
poorly paid jobs, that are under-protected. This was made possible by a massive reform of the labour market 
that was voted for in 2004 (Hartz IV reform).
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it everywhere in the world), but that it also contains the seeds of another economic 
model, which is radically alternative, self-managing and non-capitalist. We will see 
that many members of the middle class are intuitively sensing the threats to the 
traditional wage society to which they are still integrated, and are engaging with the 
disaffiliated. Their efforts are not only based on charity: they live in the knowledge 
that at any time they may be downgraded to the less stable type of employment offered 
by the second deregulated labour market. A strong local solidarity economy could 
someday be important to these people, not just as mere volunteers or consumers of 
the goods and services that such a market offers.
The first part of this article focuses mainly on understanding the solidarity economy, 
with the help of quantitative data and examples of initiatives from Europe, the Anglo-
sphere and Asia. The second part deepens the analysis with regard to the observation 
that the solidarity economy is an alternative in which, in the words of Karl Polanyi 
(1985), the economy is re-embedded into politics and democracy. We note that the 
solidarity economy combines two fundamental dimensions: first, although the middle 
classes participate in the solidarity economy, it is largely initiated by and for this new 
disaffiliated class regardless of the country or continent; secondly its utopian outlook 
is that of the overthrow of capitalism (as distinct from the market) since its organi-
zational model draws much from associationist socialism and the libertarian princi-
ples of the nineteenth century that have been described elsewhere (Frere, 2009).
However, it is precisely the failure of the associationist socialism movement, which 
is caught between Marxism and liberalism, that has taught us that such a model must 
be politically focused and organized to be effective. Finally, the last part of the article 
is devoted to the question of whether the solidarity economy today has the strength 
to assert itself as what it means to be, namely, an alternative potential model, rather 
than what the market and the State wants it to be: a management and accounting 
tool for tackling unemployment and disaffiliation. 
An international economic revolution from below? 
As Jean-Louis Laville (2011) emphasized in his latest book, a revival of associationist 
socialism, assimilated to the solidarity economy, is underway on all continents. We 
can see this in the people’s economy of Latin America, in Africa’s informal economy 
and in the social economies in Asian and English-speaking countries (the notion of 
“social economy” is only now beginning to be distinguished from that of the “third 
sector” or “charities”). All of these different forms share common practices. Today, 
the commonly held view is that four elements comprise the alternative solidarity 
movement: social currency, solidarity-based finance, North-North or North-South 
fair trade, and local services. All these initiatives, which occur in different variations 
in the North and the South, have such a vast scope that for the last fifteen years a 
number of specialists, such as Ortiz and Munoz, have been sufficiently confident to 
talk of a “counter-hegemonic globalization” (Ortiz and Munoz, 1998).
The element of finance and solidarity-based savings includes a diverse range of 
structures, for example in France there are savings associations such as CIGALES 
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(Clubs d’Investisseurs pour une Gestion Alternative et 
Locale de l’Epargne Solidaire – investment clubs for 
alternative management and local solidarity savings) 
and credit unions such as Garrigue or the larger La Nef 
(Nouvelle économie solidaire – New fraternal economy), 
which invest in cooperative micro-initiatives that have 
been set up by and for collectives, precarious workers, 
unemployed people or people who no longer wish to 
hold the status of temporary workers or employees, 
positions that they found alienating. Most of the struc-
tures of so-called “North-North” solidarity finance 
have precise specifications that require, in order to 
qualify for funding, a structure to incorporate some 
solidarity dimensions relating to, for example, the social 
or cultural sector. Of course, the issue here, which is 
sometimes problematic, is to avoid reproducing micro-
capitalism on a small-scale (or “barefoot” capitalism as 
Serge Latouche (2003) would say, targeting in particular 
Muhammad Yunus’s micro-credit in Bangladesh), which 
only results in an application of the conventional market 
rules. Through this method of financing, various fair 
trade and “local” organic shops have been created, in 
France and elsewhere. The figures speak for themselves. 
While the first citizen club of CIGALES savers was estab-
lished barely 30 years ago, the French territory is today 
covered by 136 associations that currently support some 
350 companies and 1,800 potential (self-) employment 
positions. La Nef, which was formed just 24 years ago, 
now has 31,000 members – mostly drawn from, just like 
CIGALES, the middle classes that populate what Castel 
calls the primary labour market (engaged employees, 
militant civil servants, retired small-business people...). 
In 2010, La Nef invested 20 million euros in more than 
350 projects.
The rise of solidarity-based finance has also taken place internationally: in 2006, 
Jean-Michel Servet noted that from 1997 to 2004, the increase in the number of 
clients and projects supported by organizations of solidarity finance members of the 
International Network INAISE4 was 36%. In Japan, for example, the first commu-
nity bank (Bank Mirai) was set up in 1994. Citizens who placed their savings in this 
bank are able to choose the micro-projects in which they want to invest, provided 
these projects relate to environmental, social or cultural sectors, and the project 
4. International Association of Investors in the Social Economy.
FIGURE 1 The social economy in France
The Movement for Solidarity Economy (MES), which 
was founded in 2002 as a replacement for another 
more informal structure, now provides various 
French organizations with a common political 
platform, offering, beyond a simple representation, 
free participation in terms of various projects. 
Mapping of existing initiatives is one of the common 
actions undertaken. Both from the point of view of 
the political imaginary and from an organizational 
perspective, we can assume that the logic of the 
movement is federal and libertarian.
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implementers are also members of the credit union. Today, throughout Japan there 
are 12 such banks (known as NPO banks). The smallest are composed of around 20 
members and have capital amounting to several thousand dollars, while the largest 
have up to 500 members and their investments in 2010 amounted to 2 million dollars 
(Makino, 2011).
Social currencies constitute a second group. They have a long history that we will not 
reproduce here5, suffice to say that, while rare and isolated throughout the twentieth 
century, they underwent a major worldwide development from the 1980s, mainly 
in Europe, North America, South America and Japan. Jean-Louis Laville estimates 
that there are now some 2,500 such associations, which have a total of 1.5 million 
subscribers (Laville, 2011, p.148). Their main representatives in France are the 
local exchange services (Services d’échanges locaux – SEL). These groups of people 
practice the multilateral exchange of goods and services using a voucher system, 
that is to say, their own unit of account6, enabling the measurement of the value of 
internal transactions. Services are also exchanged, such as repair work, babysitting, 
language courses, etc. Some of the poorest associates are able to live off the fruits of 
this exchange. It should be noted that the French example (there are currently about 
300 SEL in France), as well as Italy’s time bank and Germany’s Tauschringe, are based 
on units of account that are not generally exchangeable into euros. The challenge is 
to avoid the commoditization of goods and services that would lead to their valori-
zation and devaloraization according to their traditional market price. The Local 
Exchange Trading Systems (LETS) is the Anglosphere’s version of this structure, which 
is present in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States. 
LETS enable the matching of their alternative currencies to the dollar, so as to give 
their poorest members the opportunity to convert their earnings, allowing them to 
obtain the non-accessible elements that are necessary to their daily lives in the LETS. 
Today, we cannot discuss social currencies without mentioning the Argentinian 
example. Here, in the mid-1990s, the first “barter clubs” were established in Buenos 
Aires. They were spectacularly successful and the idea was rapidly replicated by the 
disaffiliated and middle classes from the quasi “black holes” that were in effect most 
of the cities in Argentina. They boomed to such an extent that it quickly became 
necessary to create a global barter network (GBN) to ensure a certain amount of 
mutualisation. However, the network became so large that the exchanges between 
members of different clubs – who took the name nodo (“node” in the network) – 
became difficult because there was nothing to structure the equivalences between all 
currencies. The GBN therefore decided to create a single currency: the crédito. The 
phenomenon continued to grow until several problems appeared in the early 2000s: 
5. In France, the first experiment of this type was the People’s Bank created by libertarian anarchist Proudhon 
in 1848 (on this topic, see: Frere B., 2009, op. cit.). Reference is made to other European and American 
experiences in chapter 10 of the book Blanc J., 2000, Les monnaies parallèles. Unité et diversité du fait 
monétaire, Paris, L’Harmattan.
6. Le grain de SEL, le Pigalle, le Piaf, le caillou, etc.
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inflation due to the over-issuance of créditos, the relocation of several clubs which 
then (re-) created their own currencies, regionalization (and division) of the GBN, 
the creation of a social franchise... Despite the success of the bi-monthly mega férias 
(mega markets), which were supported by the Secretariat of Industry, Trade and 
Labour, as well as the municipality of Buenos Aires7, the system eventually imploded, 
after reaching a membership of more than 5 million people across Argentina. While 
there are only about twenty nodos left in Buenos Aires, with around 4,000 members 
and each operating with their own currencies, the fact remains that the Argentinian 
experience has shown that it is possible to set up a large scale economic system that 
not only incorporates the poorest, but also redraws the rules of economic exchange, 
since in this case, hoarding is unnecessary and a strict social equality exists between 
members: all goods and services have a value that is measured in time (the time taken 
to make the good or provide the service) and is not based on supply and demand. 
One hour of a CEO’s or university professor’s time is worth no more than that of an 
artisan or manual worker.
The Japanese example may be referred to in response to those who argue that any 
parallel economy, which is neither public nor capitalist, is systematically doomed to 
suffer the same decline as the Argentinian case. In Japan, the yichikris network brings 
together 270,000 associations that are autonomous and independent from the state 
(each consisting of 180 to 400 households). They offer all kinds of proximity goods 
and services to their members. As François Plassart wrote, “what yichikris show is 
that autonomous spaces of self-managed solidarity can exist in the in-between space 
that separates the family from the market economy, which separates the family and 
public services” (Plassart, 1997).
The third element comprises the North-North or North-South examples of fair trade, 
which in France is embodied by networks such as the Biocoop shops, and the AMAP8 
(for North-North exchanges), and Artisans du Monde and Andines (for North-South). 
While it only represents 0.02% of the current global trade, the figures concerning fair 
trade are steadily increasing – in 2007 the estimated total sales in France stood at 241 
million euros, which represented an increase of 157% since 2004. Worldshops, such 
as Artisans du Monde, could be counted on the fingers of one hand in the early 1970s, 
in the country where they originated: the Netherlands. Today, there are more than 
3,500 (involving over 60,000 volunteers and 4,000 employees) across 18 European 
countries. Naturally, this sector is not immune from tensions, such as those that are 
increasing between the worldshops movement and the so-called “certification” one, 
the main representative of the latter being Max Havelaar. The certification group 
considers that it is important to get their labelled products into supermarkets in order 
to reach a larger public. Conversely, the worldshops group criticizes the attitude of 
7. Following the model of “la Fabrica” on the property of the former textile factory La Bernalesa in Quilmes, 
where in 1997, 600 people exchange goods and services (electricians, hairdressers, accountants, artisans, 
cooks, teachers...). See in this regard the website of There Are Other Alternatives: www.taoaproject.org
8. Associations for the maintenance of small-holder agriculture.
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supermarkets for the “depersonalization” of the relationship between the consumer of 
the North and the producer of the South, whereas fair trade was originally intended 
to bring the two together (by organizing meetings, providing clear information in 
stores on production conditions and the identity of producers, etc.). Besides which, it 
has become evident that supermarkets have only been using fair trade as a showcase. 
Over the years they have not increased the shelf space devoted to such products or 
changed their draconian attitude towards their suppliers and staff9.
The most interesting aspect of fair trade is no longer only the charitable impulse 
that, for the last forty years, has led Northern civil society actors (mainly from the 
middle class) to associate themselves to Southern producers in order to overcome 
the inherent injustices of international markets that the latter suffer from. Now, for 
the last 10 years, we have seen examples emerge of North-North and South-South 
fair trade, representing new kinds of production and consumption cooperatives. In 
this respect, the French AMAPs are particularly interesting. Without providing a 
detailed historical account that goes back to the nineteenth century – which would, 
for example, include a reference to the Commerce véridique et social, the first true 
consumer cooperative initiated by Michel-Marie Derion in Lyon in 1835 (Bayon, 
2002) – it is estimated that the first AMAP-type contemporary cooperatives appeared 
in Japan in the 1970s. The first Teikei (which means “cooperative”) originated as a 
citizen reaction against intensive agriculture, which was then thriving, and enabled 
11 families from Tokyo to sign a contract with a number of local farmers that did not 
use chemical inputs (Zimmer, 2011). The concept was so successful to the point where 
today, one Japanese family in four participates in a Teikei. In the United States in the 
mid-1980s, the first CSA (Community Supported Agriculture) groups were organ-
ized in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. As was the case in Japan, the reasons 
behind this movement were both ideological and health-related. CSAs were also a 
great success in Canada, where more than 100 farms work with around 8,500 homes 
in Quebec alone. While in the United States, the last census reported almost 13,000 
CSAs (Charlebois, 2011; Flores, 2006).
The French AMAPs were developed later, the first one being established in 2001, 
but they operate in identical ways. They aim to provide their members with quality 
food produced close to their town or village, in exchange for involvement with the 
farmer regarding its distribution and/or production. The sharing of these tasks gives 
members access to organic products at a lower cost by the avoidance of a series of 
intermediaries. These initiatives represent an alternative to the industrial “organic” 
products sold by the supermarkets and, in particular, have the effect of relocating 
the commodity exchange, this is a point on which fair trade remains environmen-
tally problematic, since the products sold may travel around the world by plane 
before arriving on our plates. But it should be noted that, in both cases, for “fair” 
or “proximity” trade, it is again the middle classes, who commit through voluntary 
9. See in this regard the beautiful study conducted by Ferreras I. on supermarkets in 2007, Critique politique du 
travail, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po.
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work, which have enabled the economies of scale to function to allow the proper 
compensation of producers (often precarious workers) who want to focus on quality 
products. AMAP’s success is growing. As Fabrice Ripoll stated: “in late 2011, AMAP 
promoters announced that there was around 1,600 collectives, bringing together over 
66,000 families and nearly 270,000 consumers, for an annual turnover estimated at 
48 million euros” (Ripoll, 2013).
“Relocated fair” trade is also developing in the South. This is evidenced, for example, 
by the creation in Lima, in 2001, of the Latin American Network of Community trading 
(RELACC) which involves 12 countries. “Its aim is to promote the increase in national 
trade while reducing the intermediaries, so that the mostly indigenous producers 
receive a better price for their work. As for consumers, they have access to basic neces-
sities at a controlled price; in Peru, more than 3,000 popular restaurants are supplied 
in this way. The label Comercio Justo México is another example of the South-South 
dynamic, in terms of trade on the domestic market.” (Laville, 2011, p. 143)
Finally, the last element includes what experts have been referring to since the 1980s 
as “proximity services”, which are often developed in an associative or cooperative 
form. Four major areas are covered: services for daily life and health (elderly assis-
tance, etc.); services for the improvement of the quality of life (building maintenance, 
etc.); cultural services and recreation; and environmental services (maintenance of 
green spaces, recycling, etc.). The most common examples in France are the neigh-
bourhood boards or parental crèches that have thrived in most cities since the early 
1980s, which combine their resources together: public funds, the market and volun-
tary work. Structures exist to support the development of such services (for example, 
solidarity economy clusters). They bring together volunteers and professionals who 
are trying to support their promoters. All sometimes work with solidarity finance 
agencies (with the same kind of specifications) or with organic or fair trade networks. 
Like all other “solidarity” groups, there are many local variations of the concept 
of proximity services, such as in the heart of the popular economy in Latin America, 
and the social economy in North America. Since the 1980s, Community Development 
Corporations are increasing in the United States. These structures are aimed at the 
revitalization of neighbourhoods and rural areas through mobilization, of people who 
are disaffiliated or otherwise. New cooperatives are also on the increase, including 
work cooperatives where the workers hold the majority of shares and where the share 
distribution is relatively equal between them. They represent 1,200 small entities that 
employ some 15,000 people. In the UK, community approaches are expressed through 
the development of the Community Transport Association, nationally recognized as 
the representative body for groups that have come together to overcome the lack of 
transport. These include Community Enterprises, which are numerous in Scotland, 
some Community Foundations and Community Development Trusts. All these initia-
tives are taking place in rural and urban areas where conventional market activity is 
in decline, leaving in its place an economic black hole. Since the 1990s, this dynamic 
has originated from the population itself, with the objective of counteracting the 
marginalization of disadvantaged areas.
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With regard to environmental protection, the Groundwork Trust has helped with the 
take off of more than 3,000 projects, all of which have the common point of involving 
the participation of the inhabitants in their design and implementation, in partner-
ship with environmental organizations, local communities and businesses. In terms 
of childcare, Playgrounds are places that host young children on a part-time basis: 
they are managed by parents in reaction to the lack of supply, there were 18,000 of 
them in the early 2000s, which provided 19% of the spaces available for children 
under 5 years old, while their Swedish counterparts provide 15%. In Germany, at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, some 70,000 similar self-help structures have 
been identified, providing work for some 2.65 million people in the fields of health 
and social action (Laville, 2011, p. 130-131). While in France, the ACEPP (Associa-
tion des collectifs enfants-parents-professionnels – collective association of children, 
parents and professionals) which brings together parental crèches, works mainly for 
the establishment of its scheme in poor neighbourhoods where the self-management 
by parents of such structures can help to re-establish social links and enable substan-
tial financial savings. 
In the health sector, we can mention the 90 medical homes in Belgium that have 
been established to deliver free medical outreach in urban areas to the most vulner-
able. Brazil for its part has more than 100 similar cooperative medical services, 
involving nearly 15,000 associated doctors. These services come under the so-called 
“formal” economy, unlike the vast majority of the Brazilian proximity services which 
are still considered as informal economic activities, at the same level as crime or 
underpaid activities linked to the outsourcing strategies of large capitalist corpora-
tions. However, part of this “informal” sector, which is difficult to quantify, is only 
based on mutual aid10. Many proximity services in Brazil, and other Latin American 
countries, are organizations of unemployed people from various sectors including 
collective kitchens, vegetable gardens, self-construction pre-cooperatives, organiza-
tions devoted to housing problems, etc. Common ownership of the means of produc-
tion is the rule. It is estimated that at the end of the twentieth century, this popular 
economy represented 25% of employment in a city like Santiago. “In this country, as in 
others, one of the most illustrative examples is that of waste recycling. There are nearly 
300,000 people, or 1% of the population, who make a living from waste recovery, 
including 50,000 people in Bogota” (Laville, 2011, p. 120). Bogota’s recycling associ-
ation was created in response to the ostracism experienced by the city’s recyclers, 
who are victims of both the formal and informal intermediaries to whom they sell, 
often suffering stigmatization and social contempt. 
10. Without a doubt, many actors in the informal economy participate in both proximity services and certain 
illegal activities. It is important here to avoid naivety. It is thus not at all absurd to imagine that the same 
person could, in order to survive, be involved in drug trafficking while also investing in community solidarity 
activities, such as a cooperative restaurant for example.
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Characteristics of alternative solidarity: organization, 
empowerment and politicization
From the Japanese LETS, to the Brazilian proximity services cooperatives, through 
the British or American community enterprises, economists specializing in this sector 
agree that the characteristics of these initiatives are similar (Defourny et al, 2009): 
– their purpose is to serve members and the community, rather than profit;
– management autonomy (or self-management);
– democratic decision-making (1 person = 1 vote)
– collective ownership (cooperative or associative) of capital and means of produc-
tion;
– primacy of people and work over capital in the distribution of income (fair distri-
bution of the value-added between work and investment in the activity on the one 
hand, and between the workers themselves on the other);
- market activity (for proximity services, fair trade or solidarity finance) is specified 
by adding a final criterion: more than 50% of current resources should come from 
the sale of goods and services. 
FIGURE 2 The social economy in Brazil
In less than thirty years, solidarity initiatives have developed at a surprising rate in Brazil. If we believe their 
progression curves, their numbers will continue to grow strongly in the coming years. The main reasons 
given by the actors who engage in this alternative economic pathway are practical (incomes, alternatives to 
unemployment) as much as ideological (collective management).
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The uniqueness of the solidarity economy is therefore the people that comprise it: 
on the one hand, are the precarious and temporary workers, the tired trainees and 
the unemployed (the disaffiliated); while on the other are the middle class volun-
teers who live in the knowledge that they may one day join the ranks of the disaffili-
ated. This uniqueness is also its modus operandi. While, naturally all of these criteria 
are met to varying degrees depending on the situation, there is no doubt that they 
enable the very clear differentiation of the solidarity economy and that they attest 
to its potential desire to offer an alternative. The mere mention of criteria “1” and 
“4” (the rejection of the sole purpose of profit and private property) is enough to 
convince us that we are dealing with an economy that, ideally, does not dream of 
being “alongside” capitalism but rather to replace it. As for the notion of “market”, it 
is not de-legitimized so long as it is organized collectively through cooperative and 
collective actions.
In addition to its public and internal modus operandi, the rejection of the “insertion 
sector” is another dimension of the solidarity economy which demonstrates its aim to 
provide an alternative. The political supporters of this sector would like to confine the 
solidarity economy to addressing social issues and managing the disaffiliated classes, 
on the margins of a public sector and a capitalist private sector, which would deal 
with the things that matter: politics and economics. Whereas those involved in the 
social economy have known for years that, for some, it is absurd to try to “rehabilitate” 
the “excluded” into the “primary” employment market, which only exists precisely 
because it has a vast secondary market at its disposal, a sub-class of disaffiliated 
workers who are flexible and cheap (because they are often funded by the state on the 
basis of “insertion contracts” (Castel, 2007, p. 20) and who serve as extra workforce 
as and when needed. These actors all agree that the exclusion/inclusion connection 
must be terminated, as it is this connection which makes individuals carry the respon-
sibility for their own marginality, of their so-called difference, because they are not 
sufficiently “their own managers” or “leaders of their own lives” or “connected to 
opportunities” to find a full-time job with a permanent contract. Once these assump-
tions have been assimilated by the concept of exclusion, it becomes easy to say, as 
some authors have been doing for a long time, such as Pierre Rosanvallon, that there 
is no “precarious social class” and to pretend that the social issue can be addressed 
by imposing, hidden under the cover of the solidarity economy, “insertion” mecha-
nisms that are singular and particularized. If no “class” exists, but only “individuals”, 
then the answers should be “individualized” (Rosanvallon, 1995). And here lies the 
problem, in at least two respects.
First, it is not unreasonable to wonder, “insertion into what?” The middle classes 
know that they are far more likely to become precarious workers, rather than the 
reverse. As touched upon above, the middle classes are gradually disintegrating. 
The walls that separate them from precariousness and disaffiliation are crumbling, 
little by little, with the lengthening of working hours (the reduction of which has 
been shown to increase life expectancy), the lowering of wages and of the minimum 
wage threshold, a forced multi-job style of employment, a scarcity of permanent 
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contracts to be replaced by a range of increasingly sophisticated short-term contracts, 
a questioning of labour law11 (which slow downs productivity), etc. (Castel, 2007, 
p. 421). 
Second, the application of individual schemes to attempt to make the disaffiliated 
more connected, more mobile, more flexible, more adapted to the labour market and 
the global economy, is in a way to compel them to the labour of Sisyphus, bringing the 
excluded person back to the gates of the traditional wage society, to then be forever 
rejected. Ultimately, the utopia of insertion is to believe that it is possible to extract 
the disaffiliated from the black holes in the globalized information economy, and to 
use them to feed the secondary labour market, which the economy fundamentally 
needs as an adjustment mechanism.
Having gained experience of existing as an alternative, the solidarity economy 
refutes the logic of insertion into the conventional labour market, instead seeking 
to create its own. In the words of Castel, mentioned above, the solidarity economy 
would enrich a second labour market without trying to bridge it with the primary 
market, the market of the drifting middle classes.
A final element (after its public, its own modus operandi and empowerment towards 
the traditional labour market), which places the solidarity economy away from the 
capitalist economy, is its inherently political dimension. Often, these multifaceted 
associations are considered as a re-politicization of the economy, in the best and 
Polanyi sense of the term, as described above (the “re-embedding” of the economic 
into the social). These “solidarity” initiatives never refer to the “political” world (insti-
tutionalized) even though they reflect “a modest, ordinary citizenship.” It is something 
other than a simple and fragile survival strategy: the management of public space 
where we relate to others (Chanial, 1998). What becomes possible, it is said, is “a 
public commitment of dominated groups that would at least partially become autono-
mous from dominant representation structures” (parties or trade unions), “becoming 
free from the appearance and the compulsory channels of expression, the potential 
inclusion of politics within the actions in the field, the potentiality of a renewed 
exercise of democracy” (Ion, 1999).
Ultimately, as a utopian alternative to capitalism and as a vector of practical democ-
racy, the solidarity economy would carry a true project of political economy. At the 
head of this project is probably the Latin variation of the movement. Beyond the 
proximity services and LETS which, as we have seen, are developing in various forms 
in both the North and South, it should be noted that an additional political dimen-
sion characterizes mainly the solidarity economy in South America. Every year, in 
countries such as Argentina and Brazil, many companies are being taken over as 
cooperatives by their workers in an attempt to create democratic management (all 
workers participating in the general assembly: one man, one vote). However, all is 
11.  We can think for example, in France, of the contrats nouvelle embauche or the contrats première embauche, 
which are clear exceptions to the labour law and give employers the opportunity to dismiss workers as and when 
they want, without compensation.
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not rosy and the famous principle “we produce, we sell, we pay ourselves” is often 
very difficult to achieve. But the successes are more numerous in cases where tradi-
tional bosses, although they were highly skilled managers, were forced to give up: 
for example, the Impa metallurgical plant, the Bauen hotel, the Chilavert printing 
factory, the Fasinpat tile factory, the Catense cooperative and its 12,000 workers in 
the Brazilian northeast, and many more. 
In light of these experiences, one may wonder why the self-management vision 
struggles to develop in France at a time when both unions and political parties only 
offer as an alternative to the delocalization and closure of industrial sites, the idea of 
searching for “credible buyers” and “new foreign investors”. Even though of course, 
despite what we may pretend to believe, these new investors may well delocalize at 
the first opportunity. Indeed, everything transpires as if the traditional pillars of the 
political dialogue of our Western social democracies were so steeped in the image 
of the wage society (in its contemporary, most contorted, configuration)12 that they 
fail to consider that a different economy could go beyond the traditional triptych of 
investor shareholders, bosses (CEOs and managers) and salaried employees. One 
paradox of this observation is that it underlines the fact that the social structure of 
capitalism seems to be as necessary to those intending to fight it, as it is to those who 
benefit from it.
But is the solidarity economy the perfect solution to everything when the unions, 
for example, are left behind? The answer is no, far from it, because it is very likely 
that the unions have a political experience and lucidity towards political power, which 
they have had for a long time, whereas proponents of the solidarity economy currently 
have a kind of moral irenicism that is somewhat naïve and on which subject we will 
explore further below.
Indeed, while all of these associative or cooperative initiatives attest to an undeni-
able citizen momentum, thereby renewing an action trend derived from associationist 
socialism or nineteenth century libertarianism, which was to challenge the established 
economic and political domination, it remains that this citizen momentum raises an 
unsolved question regarding its own militant universe.
This unresolved issue is that of their political organization. It is probably rather 
idealistic to simply magnify the democratic strength of the solidarity economy and the 
“political essence” that it would carry. As written by Alain Caillé, these associations 
are “political”, certainly. But where is the large-scale organizational form that allows 
them to make their voices heard at European and national institutions in charge of 
12. Our political classes and unions have directly inherited this imaginary vision from the twentieth century: 
they fail to think about the work “outside” the domination relationship between employers and employees, that 
is inherent to the traditional forms of hiring in the private sector (staff, executives, manual workers...) or the 
public sector (civil servants). Things would be less serious if the salaried status, to which this vision refers, was 
not today translated as, on top of the domination relationship, something that is “below” the traditional salaried 
status, some sort of new existence of this status. Individuals of precarious status are ready to sell their labour, 
at any price that an employer may impose without any discussion (2007, p. 422 and 426). However, collective 
initiatives and property, self-management and democracy make the solidarity economy difficult to understand 
for those whose representation of economic activity fits into this imaginary vision.
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economic and social policies? Sooner or later, we will have to raise the question of 
power, that is to say, the question of a “meta-association between existing associations. 
There will have to be an emergence of associations, specialized in general problems 
in the issue of bindings and transversality” (Caille, 2003). Because, by carrying on 
pretending that the practiced citizenship is sufficient, we will not see the emergence 
of a common discourse that is likely to produce a collective scheme, such as unionism 
in a previous era, in which the various hopes could engage. Without an incarnation in 
a single place (where all could engage democratically, one after the other), power is 
almost squandered between diverse churches that sometimes oppose each other. This 
is proved by the multiplicity of international networks13, whose number is only equal 
to their weakness and impotence beyond their strict impact on local development.
The idea of  structuration is frightening. It evokes abandonment, verticality, the 
confiscation of speech and the compelled allegiance to a fixed ideological line. It is 
also at the crossroads of these elements that we understand the disinterest of most of 
the solidarity economy activists in engaging with the traditional political structures: 
which are very restrictive. One must give one’s voice to a representative, even though, 
since the 1980s, a growing number of activists feel a real distrust of the political 
delegations and the rhetoric of their leaders, which rarely lead to real social change. 
In new forms of commitment, such as the alternative and solidarity economy, the 
autonomy is much greater. One can engage and disengage easily from an associa-
tion: when we consider that the message (or products) no longer corresponds to our 
expectations, it is easy to withdraw and to engage elsewhere.
As Jacques Ion expertly shows, these forms of activism are better suited to a more 
individualized society: a lighter commitment, less time-consuming, a more person-
alized and less general protest (Ion et al, 2005). We chose from the menu, without 
feeling “forced” by a specific organization and the perception that it carries, as was 
the case in previous times when one became involved in trade unions or political 
parties with Maoist or Marxist ideologies. Ultimately, this form of commitment is the 
photographic negative of the engagement in contemporary capitalism for its execu-
tives: it is flexible. This is what makes both its strength and its fragility.
Certainly, by engaging into an AMAP or CSA, for example, members are being polit-
ical in a practical sense. They do not just verbally denounce productivist agriculture 
13. The suggested list below is by no means exhaustive but indicates the diversity of unions, networks and federa-
tions of the social and solidarity economy. In Europe only, there are already a large number of structures that 
do not have any specific links between them: ESENSEE (Eco Social Economy Network South and East Europe), 
REVES (European Network of Cities and Regions for the Social Economy), EESC (European Economic and Social 
Committee), FEBEA (European Federation of Ethical and Alternative Banks), Social Planet, RIPESS Europe (Inter-
continental Network for the Promotion of the Social Solidarity Economy), IRIS (European Inter-network of Ethical 
and Responsible Initiatives), Cooperatives Europe, CECOP (European Confederation of Workers” Cooperatives, 
Social Cooperatives and Social and Participative Enterprises), etc. This diversity also exists worldwide: RIPESS, 
FIESS (International Forum on the Social Economy), INAISE (International Association of Investors in the Social 
Economy), Alliance for a responsible and united world, ICA (International Cooperative Alliance), WFTO (World Fair 
Trade Organization), IFAT (International Fair Trade Organization), Point Pal (international network of proximity 
services), RIFES (International Network of Women and Solidarity Economy), IFHE (International Federation of 
Home Economics), the International Federation of cooperative and mutual insurance, etc.
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and the wide network of capitalist supermarkets (Carrefour, etc.). They also take 
practical action, reinventing a cooperative and mutualist local economy, the growing 
success of which may perhaps one day constitute a major concern to industrial 
producers and supermarket chains that hitherto had become accustomed to dictating 
the reality of consumption. Namely: a mass of products and customers in gigantic 
and impersonal spaces, away from the producers and any reflection on our ostenta-
tious consumption modes. Instead of a verbal political criticism, without substance, 
these cooperative and purchasing groups put practical criticism into action through 
emancipation, which is direct and sometimes even thoughtless.
Beyond political inaction, what are the modes of expression, the political interme-
diaries? Major social advances have never happened through moral good will (that, 
for example, of a Max Havelaar label coffee drinker) but through the overlap of well-
understood interests of social groups in a declared political struggle. But today, it is 
clear that if there is such a gap between political representatives and civil society, it 
is also because critical demonstrations by the latter, such as the solidarity economy, 
struggle to go from social diversity and moral pathos which partly characterize them 
(“I invest myself with and for the poor, through a community development corpora-
tion, fair trade, etc.”) to the formalization of a common struggle and a political logos.
Daring to face the question of the organization of power, while retaining its popular 
essence, is perhaps the challenge that lies ahead for the solidarity economy to become 
a real force of political proposal. A proposal that does not forget to think about democ-
racy, something that the radical left often do when aiming for a proletarian revolu-
tion that does not concern itself with the voice of the proletariat. 
Facing the ideology of the management of 
precariousness
Today, the solidarity economy, in all countries, is facing a crucial problem: because 
it lacks an identity and a political agenda, which are necessary vectors of a econom-
ical alternative, it can only assume the identity that some parties grant it, in the best 
case at the margin of their programmes or public policies. This “imposed” identity 
is that of the “resocialization” through re-insertion  with a few rare exceptions of 
self-management, such as those envisaged in Latin America. This would indeed be 
its vocation and its only raison d’être according to the left wing green and socialist 
parties, who might support it as such (conservative parties simply ignore it most of 
the time). Both in the North and South, the solidarity economy flirts constantly with 
public authority instrumentalization. Indeed, when it has the opportunity to “pay 
salaries” due to potential public subsidies, it is not uncommon that it uses the status 
that it decries: supported employment, short and part-time contracts. Everywhere, it is 
asked to “manage” the social issue in order to reformat the “excluded” according to the 
standards of the wage society that is today disguised with a new managerial ideology, 
which weighs heavily for both individuals and institutions, and is very well described 
by Vincent de Gaulejac. This ideology is based on a set of abstract principles that 
are overvalued but have powerful effects on the reality of the organization of work: 
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connectivity, flexibility, mobility, scalability, efficiency, performance, streamlining 
(de Gaulejac, 2005). All continuously assessed by expensive consultancy devices.
We believe this managerial ideology seems to be nothing less than the cosmetic 
tool used to try to disguise the metamorphosis of the wage society.
We will join de Gaulejac to conclude that, to a certain extent, the solidarity economy, 
the main achievements of which in the world are often born of the resourceful-
ness of the most disaffiliated themselves, is indeed a direct process of emancipation, 
especially driven by aforementioned organizational characteristics (self management, 
democracy, etc.) (de Gaulejac, 2005). This process is likely to arrest the manage-
rial ideology, and the border of the wage society that it also intends to redefine, by 
ensuring the refinement of tools that allow it to link at best the secondary and primary 
labour market: insertion, requalification, professionalism and competitiveness.
However, it is questionable whether by putting our noses to the grindstone, without 
pausing for thought, either pro or anti towards the initiatives of those who suffer 
the violence of a globalized and financialized economy (often women, foreigners, 
unemployed...), some of these initiatives are not likely to strengthen the identity of a 
marginal spare wheel for THE real economy, the authentic one, the big one – that of 
the market – instead just serving as a stick that breaks the spokes. To the extent that 
they do not even see that the atypical wage status that are specific to the precarious 
disaffiliated are often present in their own associations, due to a lack of political 
perspective.
Indeed, events sometimes unfold as if we agreed to leave the real political power to 
define the solidarity economy in the hands of institutions, and as if we settled for the 
aforementioned policy of local (modest and ordinary) which is more effective. The 
power of the labour movement which, since the nineteenth century, has enabled so 
much to be achieved in the social field, was precisely to have been fuelled by people 
who had no other choice but to unite to carry a collective voice, beyond the commit-
ment to the local. Today, recognizing common reasons to fight is no longer so easy in 
a wage society that is split between civil servants who are decreasing in number, and 
private sector employees who are still relatively protected but increasingly threatened 
in European countries, and a growing number of precarious people who are working 
part-time or short-term contracts and who are already ultra-flexibilized. And this 
lack of unity arising from the invisibility of common motivations even appears in the 
associative or cooperative commitment of the solidarity economy. Until now, whether 
it was investors in solidarity finance, fair trade coffee drinkers or work cooperatives 
set up by the poorest, the resourcefulness, the altruism or the pleasure of social links 
was prevalent among the reasons to commit... But the world has until now only been 
truly transformed when well-defined and collectivized interests have managed to 
violently enter into the established balance of power. n
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U
nequal access to natural resources, especially 
to land, is a major issue that lies at the heart 
of social movements throughout the world1. 
Population growth, development models and 
intensive agriculture are transforming many 
regions into battlegrounds where conflicts are waged over 
natural resource use, damaging the lives of the farmers 
who depend on such resources (SHIVA, 2004). In India, the 
Ekta Parishad movement was created during the 1990s 
to support and defend the landless in a country marked by 
significant land pressure and where 70% of the popula-
tion lives in rural areas. Dam construction, ore and cement 
mining, the creation of nature reserves and other wildlife 
parks, biofuel production… all play a role in intensifying 
the ever increasing pressure on land, forests and water. In 
the one-sided contests where businesses, landowners or 
the State take on indigenous peoples (Adivasis) or small 
farmers (mostly Dalits or untouchables), it is usually the 
latter group that end up the losers. “The pattern of land 
ownership is so unequal that 40% of the rural population 
are landless farm workers who labour under the control 
of local landowners and earn meagre daily wages” (CHIN-
NAPPAN, 2010). 
1.  There are many active social movements that focus on access 
to land, both in the South and the North, the most well known 
being the Landless Movement of Brazil (MST). Other examples 
include: the Via Campesina international movement (based 
in Indonesia) which is present in all regions of the globe; the 
association Terre de Liens in France; and Terres en vue in Belgium.
Ekta Parishad means Unity Forum. The movement2 
brings together thousands of Dalits and Adivasis from 
ten Indian states and unites thousands of local organi-
zations. “Led by P. V. Rajagopal (an activist in the mould 
of Ghandi…)” (SINGLETON, 2004), the movement evokes 
the Gandhian challenge: the reduction of inequalities 
through non-violent social action. Ekta Parishad’s activi-
ties primarily involve major demonstrations such as the 
Jan Satyagraha 2012 march, which is the most recent 
example. This protest, which was attended by 50,000 
landless people, proved to be the greatest non-violent 
march in history3, successfully enabling the voices of the 
excluded to be heard by government. In 2007, Janadesh, a 
similar march that gathered 25,000 people for one month, 
managed to help some landless people obtain land titles 
but mainly led to improvements in the rights of the poorest: 
in particular, a promise was obtained on the establishment 
of a National Commission for Agrarian Reform, along with 
amendments to the Land Acquisition Act and the Forest 
Rights Act. Two years later, Ekta Parishad activists began 
preparations for Jan Satyagraha 2012, a march that aimed 
2.  Ekta Parishad activists consider that they are part of a people’s 
movement, or a people’s organization, rather than a social 
movement. In doing so, they put the emphasis on the fact that 
their movement lies in the hands of the population, the poorest, 
those who are involved.
3. After only ten days of walking, the action was halted following 
the signing of an agreement between P. V. Rajagopal and the 
Prime Minister, the latter undertaking to initiate the early stages 
of land reform within six months.
Ekta Parishad, the landless people’s 
movement in India
Émeline de Bouver, Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
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to put pressure on the government to keep its promises, 
most of which had not been fulfilled.
The Ekta Parishad experience has shown that 
far-reaching demonstrations are only the tip of the iceberg. 
This article mainly discusses the submerged part: the 
analysis of the movement suggests that large mobiliza-
tions are only one step in the process of social change.
Ekta Parishad, a multifaceted social movement
An analysis of Ekta Parishad reveals that the movement 
is engaged in a strikingly diverse range of actions: self-
help groups, marches and sit-ins involving thousands 
of people, ashrams, political lobbying groups, land 
occupation, beekeeping training, youth camps... To the 
outside observer it is difficult to ascertain who is part 
of this movement and how it works4. This multiplicity 
of actions (often considered in mainstream analyses of 
social movements as spreading your resources too thinly5) 
and the different forms of the movement’s objectives 
are achievements in line with P.V. Rajagopal’s concept 
of activism and social change. For him, the transforma-
tion of society towards greater equality requires action on 
several levels. “Being an activist is not being a beggar”, 
he often cites. For him, demanding rights for the poorest 
is only legitimate and relevant if, in parallel, efforts are also 
focused on the responsibilities of the people themselves. 
The advocacy of Ekta Parishad is rooted in the work of 
the sustainable transformation of the daily lives of Dalits 
and Adivasis through the implementation of local initia-
tives ranging from job creation in road construction to 
the support of organic agriculture, among others. Ekta 
Parishad is based in thousands of villages where its activ-
ists initiate and support many projects that are part of the 
alternative and solidarity economy (see article by B. Frère). 
Focusing on the story of Lalita, a village coordinator who 
4. This multiplicity is also reflected in the various titles that 
are assigned to members of the movement. There are workers 
(those employed by Ekta Parishad), activists (including all other 
denominations), local leaders, national leaders (leaders are 
responsible for the coordination of the movement’s action in a 
village, a region or a state). 
5. For a critical view of the assimilation of multiplicity and 
dispersion, see Benasayag M. and Aubenas F. (2002). 
has worked with women and children in ten villages in 
southern India for a decade, gives us a good understanding 
of the invaluable work of Ekta Parishad, which is carried 
out locally by hundreds of activists. Lalita was employed 
to develop the work of Ekta Parishad in the region where 
she lived with her husband. Her first step, when she knew 
hardly anyone, was to create a village homework school 
that brought together children of all ages. She then repli-
cated her school in neighbouring villages. Through her 
interaction with the children, she began to meet many 
mothers and developed an interest in their lives and the 
difficulties they encountered. Realizing that their need 
for an income was very high, she decided to address 
the need for jobs before anything else. With the help of 
other Ekta Parishad activists, Lalita ran training courses 
in beekeeping and sewing, giving the families an oppor-
tunity to get involved in small businesses, which provide 
significant material support. Through her work, a strong 
bond of trust has been established between Lalita and 
many people of the village, allowing her to advance her 
projects in a step-by-step manner. Before long, a children’s 
council was established alongside the homework school, 
where the children are able to express their views on the 
strengths and weaknesses of their village. Elections are 
held in these councils to select leaders to discuss village 
problems (and solutions) in an inter-village council and 
then at an inter-district council. The sewing workshops do 
not only function as a support for job acquisition, they also 
serve as places where women can learn to express the 
difficulties they face in everyday life and to find solutions. 
Among these people, Lalita identifies and trains leaders: 
those with the potential to represent their village in public 
meetings and those who, like her, are suitable candidates 
for Ekta Parishad.
The movement has a think local philosophy, which 
primarily involves listening to people to understand their 
most pressing needs and working with them to find ways 
to respond to those needs, based on local capacities and 
resources. The multiplicity of initiatives is therefore the 
consequence of an extreme adaptability to local contexts. 
For the activists, think local also implies taking a step back 
from their objectives and focusing on learning non-violence, 
and coming to terms with realistic timescales for the 
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achievement of their goals. Unlike many movements that 
put the acceleration of change as a priority, the distance of 
Ekta Parishad activists vis-à-vis the results of their efforts 
allows them to appreciate the slow pace of transitions. 
Their first objective is to deal with whatever reality they 
are faced with, at the risk of appearing inconsistent. An 
outside observer must remember to view the work of Ekta 
Parishad in a diachronic context. For example, it is possible 
to regard Lalita’s seamstresses simply as poor women 
working for a pittance. To jump to this conclusion, however, 
means missing the most important element: these women 
have been inserted into a process that will enable them 
to develop much greater resilience. For Lalita, supporting 
these women to help them find a job to lift themselves 
and their families out of extreme poverty is a vital first 
step. To achieve this she must start by addressing the 
immediate needs of individuals, thereby gaining the trust 
of the people she supports and gradually guiding them 
towards collective issues. This approach is characteristic 
of the Ekta Parishad operation, which is based on two 
assumptions: first, that learning about non-violence is a 
lengthy process; and second that serving the commu-
nity requires energy, which will only become available 
once individual needs have been listened to. Activists live 
amongst the people (in their region of origin or elsewhere, 
depending on the history of their engagement and the 
needs of the movement) and they support these commu-
nities and show them how to lead a non-violent existence. 
However, before they can hope to earn the respect of the 
people, or to encourage others to follow their example, 
they must establish a relationship based on long-lasting 
trust between themselves and the local population. This 
requirement takes time.
Inequalities as structural violence
While Ekta Parishad is rooted in local activism, it does 
not operate solely at this level. The movement has a global 
vision and strategy. Its demands are focused on access 
to three key resources: water, land and forest (Jal, Jangle 
and Zameen). In relation to land, Ekta Parishad calls for a 
“structural change that consists in a complete land redis-
tribution to enable the marginalized and downtrodden to 
get out of poverty”6. Poverty, which is multidimensional 
(see illustration), affects a large proportion of the Indian 
population (the study illustrated here found that 55% of 
the Indian population lived below the poverty line). P.V. 
Rajagopal mobilizes people in opposition to a model of 
development that creates violence through inequality, and 
the perpetuation of these inequalities.
As one man alone cannot simultaneously be present 
in all of the places where Ekta Parishad is active, many 
local leaders and their teams work with P.V. Rajagopal in 
the field. People committed to the cause of non-violence 
surround him, but many also come to Ekta Parishad to 
seek fulfilment of diverse needs or desires (recognition, 
power, income, network, family...). The understanding of 
non-violence and the consistency of local initiatives there-
fore vary according to the skills and the examples set by 
the local leaders. To address this disparity, Ekta Parishad 
has organized hundreds of youth camps in recent years, to 
develop non-violent social action and support the empow-
erment of the landless7.
In India, the issue faced by Ekta Parishad is not so 
much the absence of laws favourable to the poorest, it is 
rather that they are only partially applied. The movement 
is concerned that many legal achievements have not been 
transformed into concrete changes due in particular to 
corruption and a lingering trace of feudalism within the 
various levels of government. Ekta Parishad activists 
regard their mission as corresponding to the definition of 
6. www.ektaparishad.com
7. These courses aim to develop the capacity of local people and 
enable them to better understand and defend their rights. A 
training manual has also been published: Carr-Harris, J. (2010)
. Measuring poverty in India remains a political 
challenge. Looking at income per capita and per 
day reveals that only 25% of the population is in a 
situation of extreme poverty (less than two dollars 
per day). If we accept a broader definition of poverty, 
taking into account access to essential services, we 
arrive at the much higher figure of 55%. Whatever 
the method, it is the rural populations who bear the 
greatest material deprivation.
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democracy given by the philosopher Alain: “continuous and 
effective regulation that the ruled apply to the rulers”8. At 
present, the movement is sounding the alarm because of 
a gradual change in the political discourse from the right to 
land for all moving towards the right to food for all. To Ekta 
Parishad, this subtle change of vocabulary is something 
that needs to be fought against: namely the devaluation 
of agriculture in favour of industrialization. For a family, to 
have land means being able to feed itself; but also to have 
a place to live, to be able take root in a community, to be 
autonomous... Conversely, placing the emphasis onto the 
right to food enables the dependency relationship of the 
poorest vis-à-vis landowners to persist, and will not lead 
to a long-term reduction in inequality. 
Conclusion
Ekta Parishad firmly believes that a more equitable 
sharing of natural resources can only be achieved by 
working in cooperation on several levels. In parallel, the 
movement has developed a type of local activism that is 
8.  “True democracy will not come by a few people seizing power, 
but by the power that everyone has to oppose the abuse of power” 
Gandhi, M. K. (1969). Tous les hommes sont frères, Paris, p. 239. 
rooted in the contrasting situations on the ground, and 
which aims for greater local resilience and a more tradi-
tional activism with claims of access to resources made at 
various levels of government. As a whole, Ekta Parishad is 
an ideal space for experimentation, using every opportunity 
available to support the transformation of the individual, 
to give them control over their own lives and to function 
as non-violent leaders in service to their communities. 
While not quite saints perhaps, Ekta Parishad's activists 
are doing their level best and learning every step of the 
way. n
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T
he chapters in this volume document the rise in inequality in many 
parts of the world, a trend that seems to represent a complex 
combination of technological forces, globalization, and domestic 
politics to a varying degree. Whatever the causes, the conse-
quences of high inequality can be severe, not only societies that 
are less fair, but also societies that are less healthy, politically 
stable and economically efficient. The goal of greater economic 
equality is therefore not just a moral one, but also a practical one. 
It is no accident that “social inclusion” is one of the main pillars 
of sustainable development, together with economic growth and 
environmental sustainability.   
Inequality is also not simply a fait accompli. Societies can take measures to make 
their economies more equal as well as more efficient. The social democracies of 
Scandinavia, for example, are marked by very low levels of inequality, combined 
with a high degree of social trust, quality of government, public health and overall 
economic well-being. The key, it would appear, is universal access to investment in 
human capital, meaning in essence that every child in a society, whether born in 
a rich or poor family, has the opportunity to develop his or her skills and physical 
well-being to the full potential. Societies that invest heavily in public health, 
children’s nutrition, quality day care and pre-school, and quality public education 
and job training, end up with greater social and economic equality, as well as lower 
unemployment and higher average economic prosperity.    
While the challenges of sustainable development are reasonably well under-
stood the world is not making sufficient progress in ending poverty and promoting 
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To meet the challenges of sustainable development, attendees at the 
2012 Rio+20 Conference – marking the twentieth anniversary of 
the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro – agreed to negotiate Sustainable 
Development Goals, aiming to strengthen existing accords and conven-
tions. These objectives would be few in number, simple to understand, 
universal in application and adaptable to each country beginning in 
2015. Global inequalities will be a crucial topic of discussion for this new 
development agenda. 
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economic development, maintaining social inclusion and ensuring environmental 
sustainability. To accelerate practical problem solving at local, national, regional 
and global levels, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has launched the Sustain-
able Development Solutions Network. The Network has recently prepared a draft 
framework for sustainable development, which synthesizes the challenges faced 
by countries around the world – rich and poor alike, including the challenges of 
economic and social inequality, and social inclusion.  
Below we reproduce an abridged version of this framework. The framework 
touches on all aspects of sustainable development, including poverty elimination, 
social inclusion, protection of the Earth’s ecosystems and the good governance of 
public and private institutions needed for success in sustainable development. The 
Solutions Network invites interested organizations to join the network and to help 
promote practical problem solving and innovative solutions for addressing the 
integrated challenges of sustainable development in all parts of the world.
 
Global sustainable development challenges
The scale of the global sustainable development challenge is difficult to exaggerate. 
The fight against poverty has made great progress, but more than 1 billion people 
continue to live in extreme poverty. Inequality and social exclusion are widening 
within many countries, rich and poor alike. With the world at 7 billion people and 
an annual GDP of US$70 trillion, human impacts on the environment have reached 
dangerous levels and are already exceeding some planetary boundaries. By 2050 
there may be anywhere from 8.1 billion to 10.6 billion people and a global GDP of 
more than US$250 trillion.
If this growth occurs on the business-as-usual trajectory, without drastically 
reducing the resource intensity as well as the pollution caused per dollar of economic 
output, the consequences will include catastrophic environmental threats. Current 
growth patterns are also not providing enough decent jobs, and are exacerbating 
inequalities within our societies. The bottom line is that we need a new global growth 
framework, one that is compatible with social and environmental objectives.    
Even at today’s global population and economic output, many key ecosystems are 
being threatened or destroyed. Climate change is not a distant threat but a stark 
reality in rich and poor countries alike. Global temperatures are rising; extreme 
weather events are becoming commonplace; the ocean is acidifying; fisheries are 
being fished to exhaustion; many fossil resources including oil and groundwater 
are being rapidly depleted; and the earth is in the midst of an unprecedented mass 
extinction of species. These problems will expand dangerously and rapidly unless 
the world changes course urgently.
Fortunately, rapid positive change has become eminently feasible thanks to rising 
incomes, unprecedented scientific and technological progress, a growing political 
awareness of the need for sustainable development pathways, and the recognition 
of the importance of strengthened global partnerships. The world has at its disposal 
REDUCING INEQUALITIES C H A P T E R  1 3
A PLANET FOR L IFE 257
the tools to end extreme poverty in all its forms, promote economic growth and 
advance environmental sustainability. Where improved tools are needed, particularly 
to decouple economic progress from the use of environmental resources, these can 
be developed through concerted action and practical problem solving by govern-
ments, business, civil society, science and academia. 
No country can tackle the sustainable development challenges alone. Integrated 
solutions must be developed at local, national, regional and global levels. Every 
country must rise to the challenge since the traditional distinctions between devel-
oped and developing countries or between donors and recipients no longer describe 
the complex world in which we live. Likewise, businesses and civil society must work 
towards achieving sustainable development. A compelling framework for sustain-
able development is needed to mobilize all stakeholders, explain the challenges, 
focus operational action at the right scale, and form a basis for a true international 
partnership.  
The Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN or the Solutions Network) 
has been commissioned by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon to engage scien-
tists, engineers, business and civil society leaders, and development practitioners 
for practical, evidence-based problem solving. 
The framework for sustainable development
We are moving from a development period defined by the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals1 (MDGs), which are to be attained by 2015, to one defined by goals that 
recognize the full economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable 
development. The Rio+20 Conference endorsed the concept of Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals for this purpose.  
The MDGs have successfully focused world attention on ending extreme poverty 
in all its forms and reducing gender inequality. They have accelerated progress 
towards these objectives and have become a normative framework for development. 
The discussion around a post-2015 framework must not detract attention away from 
achieving the MDGs by the end of 2015 or from the core priority of ending extreme 
poverty. Yet, today’s challenges of sustainable development are broader than the 
scope of the MDGs. They affect all countries, and all countries must contribute to 
solutions. In addition to national and local governments, businesses and civil society 
organizations must also be called upon to contribute to meeting the challenges of 
sustainable development.
The framework for sustainable development describes society’s commitment to 
four interconnected objectives: economic development (including the end of extreme 
poverty), social inclusion, environmental sustainability and good governance 
(including security). Each of these four dimensions of sustainable development 
contributes to the other three, and all four are therefore necessary for individual 
1. Many other internationally agreed goals exist that together cover much of sustainable development, but 
these goals have been far less successful than the MDGs in mobilizing public attention and stimulating action.  
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and societal well-being. Sustainable development is sometimes described by the first 
three dimensions: economic, social, and environmental. We add good governance 
and personal security as a fourth dimension to highlight several enabling conditions 
for sustainable development, including transparency, effective institutions, the rule 
of law, participation and personal security, accountability and adequate financing 
for public goods. These standards of good governance apply to the public sector, 
the private sector and civil society.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ENDING POVERTY A central task of sustainable develop-
ment is to complete the job of ending extreme poverty in all its forms and promoting 
economic development. A billion people or so remain in extreme poverty, lacking 
adequate incomes, food security, education, basic infrastructure, and access to 
healthcare as well as being amongst the most vulnerable to disaster risk. Within the 
coming generation, i.e. by 2030, it should be possible to ensure that all households 
have access to basic needs through adequate household income, decent nutrition, 
food security, and universal access to primary health services including the preven-
tion and treatment of certain non-communicable diseases. Likewise, they should 
have access to early childhood development, adequate education for professional 
life skills, and access to basic infrastructure services including, safe water and sanita-
tion, clean energy and broadband connectivity.
While most countries of the world have the domestic resource base to achieve 
sustainable development, some 50 or so low-income or otherwise fragile countries 
do not. They are too poor, too remote, too conflict-ridden, too bereft of natural 
resources, or too burdened by other challenges to meet the goals for sustainable 
development on their own. Often they experience insecurity and armed conflict. 
These countries, including many in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Central Asia and 
many landlocked and small-island economies, need special international support 
to break the vicious cycle of lack of economic development, environmental degra-
dation, insecurity and conflict.
Population growth remains very high in some parts of the world. To enable sustain-
able development, countries where population growth is still high because of high 
fertility should accelerate the reduction of fertility rates by expanding access to 
voluntary family planning and reproductive healthcare, investing in child survival, 
promoting an understanding of the benefits of small families, investing in girls’ 
education and adopting a holistic approach to the empowerment of women. Accel-
erating the reduction of fertility has the potential of ushering in a period where 
the age distribution of the population is beneficial for economic growth, as the 
number of potential workers rises in relation to that of children and older persons. 
Many middle-income countries have benefitted from those changes. For low-income 
countries to have similar experiences, action to promote the voluntary reduction of 
fertility should be expanded.  
Through broad-based and environmentally sustainable economic growth, all 
low-income countries can reach the per-capita income threshold of middle-income 
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countries by 2030. Today’s middle-income countries can end extreme poverty and 
become upper-middle-income or high-income countries, depending on their starting 
point. 
SOCIAL INCLUSION Labour markets around the world are undergoing unprecedented 
changes driven in large part by globalization and technical change. Workers with low 
educational attainments increasingly find themselves without marketable skills, left 
unemployed or with wages at poverty levels. Good jobs now require more schooling 
and more specialized training than before. Those with the skills, good education 
and social connections, often enjoy huge gains in income. As a result, inequalities 
of earnings in many countries, rich and poor, have soared in the past two decades, 
undermining the fairness, justice and even basic human rights in these societies. Of 
particular concern is the high youth unemployment in many countries, except in a 
few where targeted institutions of vocational training and apprenticeships seem to 
support the school-to-work transition.
Despite major progress, gender inequality persists in many societies and violence 
against women remains widespread. In addition, discrimination against ethnic 
minority groups, indigenous peoples and geographically isolated populations still 
exists in many contexts. Gender inequality and other forms of discrimination rob 
societies of the full productive potential of large shares of their populations. Realizing 
the economic and social rights of all members of society and reducing inequalities 
are therefore important elements of a framework for sustainable development.
Another challenge of social inclusion is to maintain or enhance the quality of social 
interactions, which sociologists call “social capital”. This term has many intercon-
nected meanings. It may signify the extent of trust in the society, a scarce resource 
that contributes to economic productivity and human well-being. Social capital may 
refer to cultural rights and practices that enable people to feel pride in their identi-
ties. It also refers to the honesty and accountability of governments and compa-
nies. Social capital also covers the ability of people to assert their points of view 
and pursue their interests in shared public decision-making processes, which are 
critical to poor people’s access to resources and opportunities and to the realization 
of their rights. Finally, social capital refers to the resiliency of civil-society organiza-
tions – such as charities, self-help groups and not-for-profit “social companies” that 
address social needs beyond the profit motive. In many countries research suggests 
a decline in social capital. Trust is falling, corruption (or the perception of it) is on 
the rise vis-à-vis both the government and corporate sector, and civil-society organi-
zations may be stymied. 
To ensure sustainable development economic gains must be socially inclusive, and 
the quality of social interactions – culture, trust, honesty, voluntarism and altruism – 
needs to be enhanced through the promotion of social ethics and the observance of 
human rights for all. Pathways towards addressing inequalities, overcoming discrimi-
nation, and improving other forms of social capital are complex and uncertain. Yet, 
there is strong evidence that policies and investments can play an important role 
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in lowering inequalities and promoting equal opportunities for all. These include 
improved education and on-the-job-training, particularly for the poor; smart policies 
to promote new industries; administrative reforms and measures to combat corrup-
tion; affirmative action for the poor and marginalized; and social safety nets to better 
manage the risk of sickness and the consequences of old age. 
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY Sustainable development cannot be attained 
without ensuring environmental sustainability and pursuing a green economy, 
meaning a decoupling of economic progress from human-induced environmental 
damage. In spite of growing public awareness, the dire environmental challenges 
have worsened considerably during the twenty years between the Rio Earth Summit 
in 1992 and Rio+20 in 2012: climate change, pollution and unsound chemicals 
management, unsustainable water use, unsustainable agriculture, unhealthy cities, 
massive biodiversity loss, emerging diseases, deforestation, desertification and the 
depletion and degradation of oceans. It is necessary and possible to reverse these 
trends, but countries lack long-term strategies to address these deep challenges, 
and there remains far too little environmental understanding and problem solving 
at local, national and global scales.
The poor often depend heavily on natural resources for their livelihoods and 
survival and are most vulnerable to environmental change, so extreme poverty can 
only be ended if environmental degradation is halted and reversed. This will require 
inter alia a drastic reduction in key dimensions of primary resource intensity of 
production and consumption in high-income and middle-income countries. 
Of particular urgency is the need to decarbonize the economy by 2050. The world 
economy is built on fossil fuels, which constitute over 80% of primary energy use 
globally. In order to safeguard the world from runaway climate change, we need to 
achieve a decarbonized energy and industrial system by 2050, meaning one that 
emits far less carbon dioxide, or that captures and sequesters the carbon dioxide 
that is emitted. Yet even with advances in renewable energy technology, fossil fuels 
remain cheaper on a market basis than most low-carbon energy sources, and carbon 
emissions have consequently continued to rise steeply. The crux of the problem is 
that the market prices of fossil fuels do not reflect their true social and environ-
mental costs, including the costs of climate change and pollution. A “social price 
on carbon” must be added to the market cost to reflect the true costs of fossil fuels, 
and thereby induce a shift to low-carbon energy.  
Even under the most optimistic scenarios, some severe climate change has by now 
become unavoidable. For example, in the coming decades the frequency and severity 
of extreme weather events will increase, putting pressure on agriculture, cities and 
infrastructure; some coastal areas will likely be flooded and some fragile regions 
may become uninhabitable; many more coral reefs will bleach and biodiversity loss 
will accelerate. As a result, strategies to achieve economic, social, environmental, 
governance and personal security objectives must be “climate resilient” and promote 
adaption to climate change.
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Another central challenge is sustainable agriculture and food security. Food 
production is often environmentally destructive, causing groundwater depletion, 
topsoil loss, greenhouse gas emissions, pollution from fertilizers and pesticides, 
loss of habitat, and declining biodiversity. While, on average, there is enough food 
today to feed all 7 billion people on Earth, under-nutrition among billions coexists 
with over-nutrition (excess caloric intake) of another billion or so. Too much food is 
wasted. Regions experiencing widespread malnutrition and growing food scarcity 
today will tend to expand and remain vulnerable to food insecurity over the foresee-
able future, especially because of climate change, depletion of fresh water supplies, 
and land erosion. The rising world population and per capita food demands will 
exacerbate these problems. These challenges must be addressed by pursuing an 
environmentally sustainable intensification of agriculture – particularly among 
smallholder farmers, investments in the resilience to climate change, drastically 
reduced losses in the food production chain, and promoting the rapid, voluntary 
reduction of fertility.  
Cities and urban development constitute another priority challenge. Cities are 
often growing at unmanageable rates; are unhealthy for their residents; comprise 
large and growing slum areas; rely on outmoded transportation and energy technol-
ogies; are threatened by severe environmental disasters; and fail to generate the 
number of jobs needed to employ their often young populations. Since urban infra-
structure is very long-lived, investment decisions made today risk locking cities into 
unsustainable resource use and unhealthy environments for a long time. Yet, cities 
also offer tremendous potential for positive change and are often at the forefront 
of innovation in technologies and policies. Cities are increasingly the fulcrum of 
economic development and poverty eradication, social inclusion, environmental 
sustainability and good governance. 
Policymakers are generally not familiar enough with the scale of environmental 
challenges, are too focused on short-term objectives and are excessively influenced 
by vested interests that resist the transition to sustainability. Often environmental 
policies are compromised by the belief that one should go for economic growth 
now, and then clean up later. But the experiences of many countries show that the 
cost of “cleaning up later” can be prohibitive.  Even more critically, the fact that the 
world is meeting or exceeding many planetary boundaries makes it impossible to 
sustain growth-first policies. Alternative development pathways are available, but 
governments in many parts of the world doubt their feasibility, overestimate costs 
and lack trust in each other’s real intentions to address sustainability.  
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND PERSONAL SECURITY Good governance is required of all 
sectors of society: governments, businesses and civil-society organizations. National 
and local governments need to build effective institutions and pursue sustainable 
development with transparency, accountability, clear metrics and openness to the 
participation of all key stakeholders. They should uphold and promote the rule of 
law as well as basic economic and social rights. Governments must design financing 
A PLANET FOR L IFE262
strategies, help mobilize the necessary resources and provide the public goods 
needed for sustainable development. Public policy decisions must be made on the 
basis of scientific evidence.
The most important public good is peace and security, including personal security. 
Development cannot thrive without safety from personal and psychological violence. 
When conflict is flaring development becomes impossible and hard-fought gains are 
quickly reversed, as evidenced by the fact that no conflict countries are achieving 
the MDGs. Ending conflict often requires international support in the form of media-
tion, peacekeeping and assistance to address the underlying economic and social 
needs that drive conflict. Personal security, ending conflict and peace building are 
therefore essential components of good governance for sustainable development.
The private sector is the principal engine for economic growth and job creation. It 
will develop and deliver many of the new technologies, organizational models and 
management systems that are needed for sustainable development. Good corporate 
governance therefore calls for all companies, especially the major multinational 
companies, to adopt transparent goals for sustainable development, and to hold 
themselves accountable for those goals vis-à-vis their investors, customers, suppliers 
and society at large. We should acknowledge that companies are often more powerful 
than governments in determining the fate of sustainable development and that they 
have unrivalled technologies, organizational skills and means. Yet their incentives 
are often not aligned with the public objectives of sustainable development. There 
can hence be no sustainable development without good corporate governance and 
accountability. In particular companies should work responsibly and constructively 
with governments to address market failures, help mobilize the needed resources 
and ensure that private incentives become more fully aligned with public objec-
tives. They must be accountable for the environmental and social consequences of 
their actions, along the lines of the “polluter pays” principle. All of this may require 
fundamental changes to some business models.
There also can be no sustainable development without civil society doing its part. 
This includes voluntary organizations that hold both government and business to 
account in terms of performance and honesty, organize and mobilize communi-
ties, deliver services, keep neighbourhoods pleasant and safe, and promote cultural 
activities. It includes philanthropies that support science, research, education and 
help for the poor. It includes civil society organizations that defend the environment 
against pollution and other externalities arising from the economy. And it includes 
“social enterprises,” often with distinct legal status, that work on a business model 
yet do not pursue profit as their sole or main motive. 
A central challenge for governments at all levels, the private sector and civil society 
is to fulfil the promise of new technologies for sustainable development. Substantial 
progress on any of the four dimensions of sustainable development will require the 
large-scale adoption of advanced technologies already available. Many more sustain-
able technologies will need to be developed. Universities and research institutions 
therefore play an important role in sustainable development. They are engines of 
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basic scientific and technological research.  They train future generations of leaders 
who will have to resolve many of the sustainable development challenges left by 
previous generations. They conduct much of the operational research that is needed 
to better understand the challenges, devise solutions, monitor and evaluate progress. 
And they can be an important partner in diagnosing local challenges and devising 
pathways towards sustainability.
SYNERGIES AND TRADE-OFFS – INTEGRATING ACROSS THE FOUR DIMENSIONS OF SUSTAIN-
ABLE DEVELOPMENT Strategies for sustainable development must be integrated and 
address the interconnections across the four dimensions. For example, a food security 
strategy must address the special needs of the extreme poor in rural and urban areas 
and address gender disparities so that women and young girls have equal access to 
food. Just as importantly, it must ensure sustainable use of water resources, preserve 
soil nutrients, protect biodiversity hotspots, and promote resilience as well as adapta-
tion to climate change. Likewise, such a strategy needs to develop effective institu-
tions, ensure adequate financing in the context of limited resources, and much more. 
The interdependencies across the four dimensions of sustainable development 
vary from country to country, from city to city, and from region to region. Therefore, 
public and private actors at local, national, and regional levels need to diagnose 
the interdependencies across sectors, identify strategies for exploiting synergies or 
“win-wins”, and determine how to manage trade-offs across policy areas. 
Setting goals for sustainable development for 2030
Addressing the challenges of sustainable development requires a shared focus on 
ending extreme poverty in all its forms and a fundamental transformation in the way 
our economies are organized. The necessary focus and collaboration across actors 
and countries can only be achieved through shared global objectives. For this reason 
the world needs effective and widely shared goals for sustainable development to 
follow-up on where the MDGs will leave off in 2015. Of course setting global goals 
will have little impact unless followed up by concerted action, but it is difficult to 
imagine a pathway towards global sustainability without an ambitious set of shared 
goals for sustainable development.  
Well-crafted post-2015 goals will guide public understanding of complex long-
term challenges, inspire public and private action, and promote accountability. 
Children will learn the goals at school as a shorthand definition of sustainable devel-
opment. The goals will also promote integrated thinking and put to rest the futile 
debates that pit one dimension of sustainable development against another. They 
will mobilize governments and the international system to strengthen measurement 
and monitoring for sustainable development. 
If our sustainable development framework is a good description of the challenges 
the world faces, then a new set of post-2015 goals till the year 2030 should apply to 
all countries – rich and poor – for the four dimensions of sustainable development. 
This does not mean that every goal must be a “stretch goal” for every country. Rich 
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countries, for instance, are likely to have met most goals relating to economic devel-
opment, but many still lag behind on goals relating to social inclusion, environmental 
sustainability and governance. Countries that cannot meet the goals on their own 
should receive international support to do so. 
The General Assembly of the United Nations will adopt the post-2015 goals 
following an intergovernmental process of negotiation. While that process is just 
starting, there is a reasonable chance that the post-2015 goals might comprise the 
components below: Ending extreme poverty and promoting sustainable growth; 
Promoting healthy lives and sustainable fertility; Promoting quality education, job 
skills and decent work; Promoting gender equality, personal security and well-being; 
Averting dangerous climate change and industrial pollution; Ensuring food security 
and sustainable food supplies; Protecting biodiversity and ecosystem services; 
Building smart, healthy and resilient cities; Fulfilling the promise of technologies 
for sustainable development; Ensuring good governance and accountability. 
These goals may seem utopian. They are not. Indeed the world has considerable 
wind in its sails to achieve them. Extreme poverty in developing countries was halved 
between 1990 and 2010, from 43% to around 22%. Child mortality rates have come 
down, from 97/1,000 to 63/1,000. Enrolment in primary education has risen from 
82% to 90% of the number of children of primary-school age. Access to safe water 
has increased from 76% to 89% of the population. And the technological revolution 
is spreading everywhere, with mobile phone subscriptions worldwide exceeding 6 
billion, including 250 million in sub-Saharan Africa. By 2017, more than 80% of the 
world will have access to wireless broadband internet. The impetus of technology, 
management and global awareness all make it possible to be ambitious regarding 
sustainable development.
One of the lessons of the MDGs is the need for better data systems to track progress 
towards the international goals, and to support management efforts aimed at 
achieving the goals.  Therefore, the new set of goals for sustainable development 
must be bolstered by a massive improvement in local, national, and global data 
collection and processing, using new tools (GIS, satellite, social networking, etc.) as 
well as existing tools. We will need real-time, complex, place-based and sub-national 
data to support the sustainable development efforts. 
Applying the framework: Integrated pathways to 
sustainable development
A framework for sustainable development must be applied at global, regional, 
national and local scales. Each region, each country, each city, and each rural locality 
will need to make its own situation analysis, asking questions such as: How can we 
end extreme poverty in all its forms? How can we reduce youth unemployment? 
How can we reduce disparities across gender and socio-economic groups? What are 
the locally and regionally available renewable energy resources? What are the local 
vulnerabilities of food production and food security? How do prevailing fertility rates 
and population trends affect prospects for sustainable development? And so forth.
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Feasible pathways are of course highly complex, subject to great technological 
uncertainty, and likely to require substantial financial resources. They often require 
changes in behaviour and involve complex interactions across objectives, across time 
and across actors. The sections below identify a few questions that will need to be 
addressed in applying the framework. This list is not complete and is designed as a 
starting point to trigger discussion and elicit practical problem solving.
(I) THE IMPORTANCE OF DECOUPLING Pathways to sustainable development need 
to “decouple” economic growth from the rising use of primary resources, thereby 
reducing the resource-intensity of production. At a time when high-income econo-
mies are looking to maintain living standards and re-start growth, and middle and 
low-income economies want to achieve economic convergence, decoupling is a 
fundamental condition of sustainable development. 
Decoupling requires a holistic approach to the transformation of the entire 
economy in regard to the use of energy and to the use of resources and materials. 
Important areas of decoupling include:
− Energy efficiency measures and low-carbon energy systems (renewables, nuclear, 
carbon capture and storage) can decouple rising energy use from carbon dioxide 
emissions;
− Precision farming, improved crop varieties, efficient water management and 
no-till farm practices can decouple rising food yields from unsustainable utilization 
of water, chemicals, fertilizers and land;
− Green buildings, smart grids, and improved transportation systems can decouple 
urbanization from rising urban energy use and ensure effective land use; 
Market signals are not currently adequate to achieve decoupling, since the market 
does not compel polluters2 to bear the full cost of pollution and does not establish 
prices for ecosystem services. This is particularly the case when pollution is global 
or at long distances from impacted areas, since political systems then have great 
difficulty in internalizing externalities, either through laws, economic incentives or 
social norms. For this reason, successful decoupling will require corrections to faulty 
market signals, increased political cooperation regionally and globally, strategies 
to promote research and development on sustainable technologies, and increased 
public awareness and understanding of the key challenges.
Investments in sustainable infrastructure will cost money and put a burden on 
low-income countries. At the core of sustainable development, therefore, must be 
a financing strategy that is deemed to be fair and practical. There will need to be at 
least three components of such a strategy. First, polluters should pay to clean up 
after themselves and compensate those bearing the burden of the pollution. Second, 
ecosystem services need to be priced. Third, rich countries should help poor countries 
to cover the incremental costs of investment.  
2. The term ‘polluter’ includes inter alia low-efficiency producers and wasteful consumers that squander resources 
with detrimental spillover to society at large.
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Finally, decoupling requires clear strategies for managing non-sustainable 
“stranded assets” such as fossil fuel deposits that should not be exploited or coal-
fired power plants that become uneconomical once the price for carbon emissions 
rises. Such strategies need to address deep political, legal and financial issues, which 
would otherwise delay or hinder the decoupling of economic growth from resource 
use and pollution. 
(II) THE NEED TO CHANGE BEHAVIOUR AND ARTICULATE THE BUSINESS CASE FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Putting the world rapidly onto a long-term path towards 
sustainable development requires very large numbers of individuals to change behav-
iour and make different choices with regards to business management, ethics, politics, 
healthy lifestyles and personal consumption, resource use, fertility, education and 
so forth. In some instances public policies create the incentives that guide behav-
iour (through corrective pricing for example). Often the behaviour is conditioned by 
factors outside the direct control of public policies and economic incentives. When 
government leaders are accountable to their people, changing people’s understanding 
and even behaviours becomes a necessary prerequisite for changing policies. 
Operationalizing the framework for sustainable development therefore requires 
clear diagnoses of the needed changes in professional and personal behaviour as 
well as explicit strategies for bringing about such changes. Such strategies can draw 
on successful examples from public health, education, politics and other fields. 
Changing the behaviour of private corporations requires inter alia a clear articula-
tion of the business case for sustainable development. In some instances companies 
BOX 1 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND RESOURCE CHALLENGES.
Using the World Bank’s definitions of income groups, 
the world is divided between low-income, middle-
income and high-income categories as follows:
Population 
2011 (billion)
Mean Income 
2011 ($US PPP)
Total Income 
($US PPP trillions)
Low-Income 0.8 1,383 1.1
Lower Middle-
Income 
2.5 3,833 9.7
Upper Middle-
Income
2.5 10,705 26.6
High-Income 1.1 38,572 43.8
World 7.0 11,574 81.3
As this table shows, raising the low-income countries to 
at least lower-middle-income status would not by itself 
lead to a large increase in global income. If today’s low-
income countries, with average incomes per capita of 
$1,383, were to become lower-middle-income countries 
at $3,833 per capita, the increment of income would 
be $2 trillion, or just 2.5% of today’s world income. If 
today’s lower-middle-income countries were to become 
upper-middle income countries, the increment to world 
income would be 21% of the world income. If today’s 
upper-middle-income countries were to achieve high-
income status, the increment would be 85% of today’s 
world income.
Since resource use remains directly related to 
income, the main conclusion is that raising average 
incomes in the poorest countries is not by itself a 
major resource challenge or burden on the planet. 
The much greater resource challenge is accommo-
dating the rise of today’s middle-income countries 
to high-income conditions. The latter can only be 
accomplished sustainably if the world succeeds in 
decoupling economic growth, primary resource use 
and environmental degradation.
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are beholden to “old ways of doing things” and fail to explore new business oppor-
tunities that increase profitability by reducing material use, lowering pollution, and 
increasing acceptance by their customers. The Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network will work with private sector networks to help articulate the business case 
for sustainable development with a particular focus on overcoming the perceived 
first-mover disadvantage.
(III) QUANTIFYING THE CHALLENGES OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Sustainable devel-
opment requires quantification. At what pace should de-carbonization occur? How 
much water use for agriculture is feasible in a particular location? How should ferti-
lizer use be moderated to protect crops and waterways at the same time? What are 
the implications of the growth of cities? What do different demographic pathways 
imply for countries’ sustainable development prospects? Which are the most effective 
techniques for reducing and managing disaster risks? These questions, and many 
others like them, require a quantitative assessment that combines Earth systems with 
human systems, and does so at many scales, from local to global. As one example, 
we illustrate the resource challenges emanating from economic growth (box 1).
Conclusion
The post-2015 development framework will be devised and adopted by UN member 
states over the coming two years. In comparison to the MDGs it seems necessary to 
broaden the agenda and give greater prominence to issues of inequality and social 
inclusion, the special needs of fragile states, natural resource use and planetary 
boundaries, etc. The world has also become more interconnected and is pushing 
hard against many planetary boundaries, so the post-2015 framework will need to 
apply to all countries – rich and poor alike. 
Adopting a bold and broad post-2015 framework will not guarantee that countries 
successfully address the four dimensions of sustainable development. Yet, it seems 
difficult to imagine how meaningful progress can be made in eradicating poverty, 
promoting economic development, enhancing social inclusion, and promoting 
environmental sustainability without a shared international framework. For this 
reason the successful adoption of a bold, operational set of goals is so important. 
The Sustainable Development Solutions Network will help mobilize universities, 
research institutes, business and civil society organizations through an open process 
to accelerate practical problem solving for sustainable development. In particular 
the network will identify and promote solution initiatives that can have a trans-
formational impact on sustainable development. In this way we hope to make a 
contribution towards moving the world onto a sustainable development pathway. n 
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T
he decision by governments at the Rio+20 
conference in June to articulate and adopt a 
comprehensive set of Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) was then – and is still – hailed 
as one of the most positive outcomes of the 
conference. With very few genuinely new commitments 
emerging from Rio, the sustainable development commu-
nity has pinned its hopes on the adoption of binding and 
shared goals covering the period from 2015 forward and 
addressing the range of sustainability challenges facing 
humanity. The process for making this aspiration a reality, 
including the creation of an Open Working Group (OWG) 
with heavy input from civil society and the private sector, 
has begun at the UN General Assembly in New York.
As we all know, however, the UN in New York has 
become a highly vexed forum in which to seek inter-
national consensus. What chance do the SDGs have of 
seeing the light of day, and how can they go beyond the 
simply aspirational and actually serve as a framework for 
global development efforts?  And what chance does the 
SDG process have of crossing the mosquito-ridden marsh 
without sinking irrevocably into the mud?
The most recent proximate experience is that of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Adopted at the 
Millennium Summit in 2000, the general consensus is that 
they have proved useful in focusing development effort 
and available funding on a handful of achievable targets 
and that, by the time their period of implementation has 
elapsed, at least some of them will have been met while 
others will have progressed considerably. Indeed, setting 
the initiation date of the SDGs in 2015 is intended not 
only to give space for consensus-building around the new 
goals, but to provide no excuse whatsoever for distracting 
attention from the completion of MDG obligations.
By 2015, the UN also aims to adopt a new develop-
ment agenda, drawing not only on all the intergovern-
mental undertakings over the two decades since the Earth 
Summit in 1992 but also very much on the outcomes 
of the Rio+20 conference. Further, it has established a 
High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons to advise it on this 
agenda. The interplay between the development agenda, 
the Panel and the OWG for the SDGs is clearly important, 
and the years until 2015 will allow the optimal synergy 
between the different processes to be achieved – or for 
one to dominate the others.
But, as so often happens in the intergovernmental world, 
we have entrusted the realization of our lofty intentions to 
one of the world’s most politically-captured institutions, 
one with a long track record of sending initiative after initi-
ative into the quicksand. Will the momentum from Rio carry 
the SDGs across the swamp to dry land on the other side? 
And how can we organize, run and support the process to 
maximize our chances for real success?
It is instructive to look at the experience of the MDGs 
to see what lessons can be learned for the SDG process. 
On the plus side, despite a slow start, the MDGs achieved 
a snowball effect throughout the development community 
and well beyond into civil society and the private sector. 
Here were – finally – eight go als and an accompanying 
set of targets that were politically, financially and logisti-
cally achievable; in fact the greatest criticism was that 
they lacked ambition, that in 15 years we should be able 
to accomplish even more. Indeed, suggesting that we could 
arrive at 2015 with over a billion still poor and hungry was 
Goal-setting in an era of multilateral 
mistrust
Mark Halle, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland
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not easy for many to accept, especially knowing that the 
resources exist to feed everyone on the planet. Similarly, 
halving the proportion of people without access to safe 
drinking water and decent sanitation is a modest goal, 
especially given that it could leave more people without 
safe water in 2015 than there were in 2000.
Nevertheless the MDGs, built as they are on existing 
programmes, served to concentrate and structure inter-
national effort and offered a clear and for the most part 
numerically monitorable pathway to progress and final 
achievement. The wide acceptance and high profile 
that the MDGs eventually achieved certainly led to new 
resources being mobilized and exerted moral pressure on 
countries to demonstrate what they were doing to favour 
their successful achievement. As a result, the MDGs rose 
to the top of the development agenda and stayed there 
for much of the decade since their adoption. That in itself 
explains more than any other factor why the MDGs have 
been regarded as a success, and why the SDGs are 
expected to meet the same high standard.
The choice to focus on the successes of the MDGs 
cannot be allowed to mask the much bleaker reality: in 
most cases the goals will not be met – the majority will not 
even be approached. Public discourse around the goals 
focuses on the poverty alleviation targets – regarded as 
the greatest MDG success story. But even if, as seems 
possible, these targets are met, it will largely be thanks 
to the rapid emergence of a middle class in China and 
India. If we subtract these two factors from the equation, 
the arrow not only fails to hit the bull’s eye, it falls well 
short of the target itself. And it would be a stretch to claim 
that the relative success of China and India is the result of 
actions taken in response to the MDGs.
Some of the MDGs should have been doable with 
readily available technology and with existing levels of 
institutional organization and funding – e.g. the targets on 
drinking water and sanitation, HIV/AIDS or improving the 
lives of slum dwellers. Others were included because their 
absence would have made the package seem imbalanced, 
even if not many observers felt they were achievable in the 
time period. Ending gender discrimination throughout the 
planet or ensuring that all girls receive primary education, 
while worthy and urgent, was not likely to be achieved, 
even with the most earnest of efforts.
Further, MDG success should not simply be judged on 
the differential between 2000 and 2015, but on the differ-
ential between 2015 and the likely 2015 scenario if the 
MDGs had not been adopted. After all, development was 
proceeding before 2000 and it would have continued even 
if the MDGs had not been set. It should be possible to 
project the trends in evidence in 1999 forward to 2015 
and determine whether or not the MDGs have caused a 
major increase in development achievement.
So what will happen in 2015? In all likelihood, we will 
celebrate the MDGs as a major triumph for develop-
ment and urge governments not to let up in their efforts 
to achieve the goals finally and fully. Those goals that 
were not met will no doubt find their place in one form 
or another in the newly-minted SDGs; those that were 
met will be tightened and similarly included. And a new 
horizon, probably 2030, will be fixed, elegantly kicking the 
can down the road well beyond the political mandates of 
any who might be blamed for failure.
How, then, can we build on the successes of the MDGs, 
and how can we avoid repeating their failures?
One criticism of the MDGs is that they were cooked up in 
the UN Secretary General’s office and sprung on Heads of 
State at the Millennium Summit with inadequate consulta-
tion. Whether or not it is justified, this criticism has stuck; 
the halls of Rio echoed with warnings not to make the 
same mistake with the SDGs. This is one of the reasons 
why a comprehensive set of draft goals was not tabled in 
Rio, and why a three-year period has been booked for their 
elaboration. The SDG process not only allows for the OWG 
and for eventual approval by the General Assembly but 
also for input from the Secretary-General’s new high-level 
panel and a still-to-be-defined process for collecting ideas 
from civil society and the private sector. Ideas abound, as 
do visions for how the process should be organized. The 
Secretariat will gather, sift and organize these proposals 
but, in the end, they will feed into a political process that 
will not necessarily assess them on their merits alone. 
Recent examples of the broad trawl for ideas, including 
the commendable process set up by the Brazilians for 
Rio, while inclusive and welcoming of a wide range of 
approaches, have had little effect on negotiated outcomes.
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Second, the SDGs must avoid the accountability failures 
of the MDG process. At the intergovernmental level it is 
easy to make promises, in large part because there is no 
price to be paid for not fulfilling them. It is all very well to 
promise to “Reduce Biodiversity Loss, achieving, by 2010, 
a significant reduction in the rate of loss” (MDG target 
7B). The real questions are: who will take what actions 
to reduce this loss, by when, with what means, and with 
what consequences if the actions are not taken? In the 
absence of clear answers to these questions, nobody can 
be held to account except the elusive “global commu-
nity” that is, in any event, exempt from punishment. So 
what happens in such cases? We sit back and hope that 
somebody, somewhere, will take steps to stem the global 
haemorrhage of biodiversity because they were inspired 
by the loftiness and global acceptability of the goal. To pin 
our hopes on this approach is to suffer from life-threat-
ening naivety.
In fact, what was expected was that the goal would 
lead governments to beef up existing programmes on 
biodiversity conservation in FAO, UNEP and others, to 
launch new initiatives (such as REDD and REDD+) and 
place biodiversity loss higher up the political agenda. Did 
that happen?  Yes, all of it happened, but in proportions 
entirely inadequate to the challenge. Who, then, was sent 
to the corner sporting a tall cone-shaped hat? Nobody, of 
course. Even when binding, most international undertak-
ings are in reality voluntary, and the will is not there, or 
at least not powerful enough, to set in motion the game-
changing decisions without which we will inexorably fall 
short of our goals.
The SDG process must take this lesson solidly on board. 
Without a clear and robust accountability framework, the 
goals will not be achieved, even if there is a strong inten-
tion at the outset to succeed. Each goal adopted should 
specify who will take what action, against what timetable. 
The funding needed to reach the targets must be identified 
and committed, and there must be a genuine link between 
failure and sanction – or between success and reward.
This is important. We are too inclined to think that 
accountability means punishment, but accountability can 
also be positive. How much more successful would we be 
if full implementation of agreed actions led to economic or 
political reward? Is it inconceivable that African countries 
might be rewarded with trade preferences for reaching 
their targets? Or that they receive an increased quota of 
scholarships to universities in the OECD countries? Or 
funding for the next stage of effort?
FIGURE 1 First MDG reached: water FIGURE 2 Sanitation, an almost forgotten MDG?
Access to water has significantly improved 
worldwide over the last decade, and is approaching 
universal provision. It can be said that in 2010, five 
years before the deadline, the goal of having halved 
the number of people without access to water 
compared to the 1990 level was achieved. Sub-
Saharan Africa however remains below the overall 
growth rate, with only 61% of the population having 
access to water in 2010.
Conversely, five years before the deadline, access 
to sanitation is one of the goals where least has 
been achieved. 2.5 billion people have no access to 
any form of sanitation. Coverage should reach 67% 
of the world population in 2015 instead of the 75% 
expected. In sub-Saharan Africa, but also in many 
Asian countries, investment in this area is virtually 
non-existent.
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Finally, and equally important, the MDGs are falling short 
of our aspirations in part because we have counted on 
governments to take the bulk of the action. If the SDGs 
are to draw on the ingenuity and sense of innovation 
evident in the broader sustainable development commu-
nity, they must be structured so that each component 
of that community has a role in achieving the goals. Of 
particular importance is the private sector which, more so 
even than governments and civil society, has the finan-
cial, institutional, logistical and human capacity to take 
the lead in turning the goals into achievements. It is idle 
to suppose that the private sector will be inspired by 
the kind of insipid soup that is dished out these days by 
intergovernmental process. It follows that the process 
around the OWG must be constructed with a good deal 
of imagination, so that the energy and spirit of enter-
prise that abound in civil society and the private sector 
are harnessed to build a bridge across the fetid swamp 
into which too many good international intentions tend 
to subside.
In the end, it may be better to set a limited number of 
SDGs, and to adopt only those to which we are prepared 
to commit and to whose achievements we are prepared to 
hold ourselves accountable and for which we have signifi-
cant buy-in from both the corporate sector and the wider 
organizations of civil society. n

